Just War Theory

Bioethics and Armed Conflict: Moral Dilemmas of Medicine and War, by Michael Gross

by Per Sandin

Book review.

The state, human rights and the ethics of war termination: what should a just peace look like? A critical appraisal

by Manuela Melandri

published in 'Journal of Global Ethics', vol. 7 (3) 2011

Just Policing: An Ellulian Critique

by Andy Alexis-Baker

Alexis-Baker, Andy. "Just Policing: An Ellulian Critique." The Ellul Forum 48 (Fall, 2011): 12–18.

In the past decade many pacifist-minded Christians have began to explore differences between policing and warfare with... more In the past decade many pacifist-minded Christians have began to explore differences between policing and warfare with the noble hope of limiting or even abolishing war as we know it. Jim Wallis claims that since 9/11 many Christians have re-read Jacques Ellul, “who explained his decision to support the resistance movement against Nazism by appealing to the ‘necessity of violence’ but wasn’t willing to call such recourse ‘Christian.’” Similarly, Christian pacifists might respond to terrorism, Wallis claimed, by advocating that the international community create a global police force to deal with violations of international law and human rights. Such a force, Wallis wrote, is “much more constrained, controlled, and circumscribed by the rule of law than is the violence of war, which knows few real boundaries.” Wallis’ suggestion that Ellul’s works may help to formulate a response to terrorism, and that such a response ought to be “policing” raises the question of what an Ellulian analysis of policing might look like.

In my paper, I will use Ellul—rather than summarize his views—to critique just policing. Those who advocate for just policing have not adequately tested whether police are less violent because of the rule of law, and they make ahistorical arguments that do not countenance the possibility that policing may in fact sustain or even worsen violence, not lessen it.

The Nature of Necessity in the Just War Theories of The West and Islam

by Eric Gallager

The second paper I wrote for my Peace Studies class with Professor Irene Oh in the fall semester of my junior year at GWU.

In this paper I argue that the argument of necessity serves similar purposes in the just war theories of both the West... more In this paper I argue that the argument of necessity serves similar purposes in the just war theories of both the West and Islam, and that what differs between how it is used in each is what exactly constitutes "necessity."

Reluctant Soldiers: The Moral Dilemma of an Unjust War

by Jeff Montrose

Think 26, Vol. 9 (Autumn 2010), The Royal Institute of Philosophy, 2010

If called upon would you fight in a war you thought
unjust? This article attempts to explain why the majority... more If called upon would you fight in a war you thought
unjust? This article attempts to explain why the majority of
military officers and soldiers when faced with this question
do fight despite moral misgivings they may have.

A Death to Celebrate?: The Just-War Tradition and the Killing of Bin Laden

by Ronald Osborn

Commonweal, Vol.138, No.11, June 3, 2011 (cover story)

Ivo of Chartres, the gregorian reform and the formation of the just war doctrine

by Dominique Bauer

Journal of the History of International Law 7 (2005)

12. "Moral Considerations in Rabbinic Literature Regarding the Warsaw Uprising".

by Isaac Hershkowitz

in: Amnon Shapira & Yigal Levin (eds.), War and Peace in Jewish Tradition: From the Biblical World to the Present (Abingdon, Oxford: Routledge, forthcoming).

Fairness and Liability in the Just War: Combatants, Non-Combatants, and Lawful Irregulars

by Christopher Finlay

Forthcoming in Political Studies. For a slightly earlier version of the essay, please follow the link.

Critics of non-uniformed ‘irregular’ warfare argue that it is unfair both to non-combatants and to enemy ‘regulars’. I... more Critics of non-uniformed ‘irregular’ warfare argue that it is unfair both to non-combatants and to enemy ‘regulars’. I contest that view by asking how the leaders of a people forced to fight a just war should distribute risks within their own population. Insofar as all are the victims of aggression or unjust occupation, I argue, no citizens on the just side are morally liable to attack. But to benefit from the restraining effects of the principle of discrimination, some members must be rendered legally liable. Political leaders must therefore find the most appropriate distribution of the risk of harm, first, by deciding which and how many citizens to select as ‘combatants’; and second, by specifying how far to distance combatants from civilians. I identify four normative considerations that must be taken into account: each possible arrangement must (1) fulfil basic requirements of fairness domestically; then, between equally fair arrangements, leaders ought to determine which offers the most auspicious balance between (2) the goal of survival during the war (of the society and as many of its members as possible) and (3) the goal of winning it and, hence, eliminating the injustices that caused the war; finally (4) the arrangement should not be unfair to enemy combatants. On this basis, I argue that in spite of the increased risks it poses to civilians, limited ‘irregular’ warfare might be deployed legitimately against occupiers where the use of uniforms would have rendered insurgents vulnerable to targeted assassination or arrest prior to actual combat.

"Jus Ad Bellum After 9/11: A State of the Art Report"

by Mark Rigstad

The International Political Theory Beacon, Volume 3, June 2007

“The Morality of Cluster Bombing.” Studies in Christian Ethics 22, no. 3 (August 2009): 357-381.

by Tobias Winright

Employs just war theory, especially jus in bello criteria of discrimination and proportionality, to critique the use... more Employs just war theory, especially jus in bello criteria of discrimination and proportionality, to critique the use of cluster munitions.

“The Liturgy as a Basis for Catholic Identity, Just War Theory, and the Presumption against War.” In Catholic Identity and the Laity, College Theology Society Annual Vol. 54, ed. Tim Muldoon. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2009, pp. 134-151.

by Tobias Winright

Drawing on the work of Virgil Michel OSB, I argue that the liturgy as a basis for Catholic thinking about just war... more Drawing on the work of Virgil Michel OSB, I argue that the liturgy as a basis for Catholic thinking about just war establishes a strong presumption against war (contrary to George Weigel's claims).

“Jus Post Bellum: Extending the Just War Theory” (with Dr. Mark Allman). In Faith in Public Life, College Theology Society Annual Vol. 53, ed. William J. Collinge. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2008, pp. 241-264.

by Tobias Winright

Argues that the just war tradition should encompass jus post bellum criteria and practices in addition to jus ad... more Argues that the just war tradition should encompass jus post bellum criteria and practices in addition to jus ad bellum and jus in bello.

A Typology of Terrorism

by Shawn Kaplan

Published in Review Journal of Political Philosophy, Vol. 6, No. 1, Fall 2008, 1-38.

In this paper, a two-fold strategy is carried out for gaining conceptual clarity in response to the question: What is... more In this paper, a two-fold strategy is carried out for gaining conceptual clarity in response to the question: What is terrorism? The first stage is to defend a broad working definition of terrorism that emphasizes the instrumental employment of terror or fear to obtain any number of possible ends. As proposed in this paper, Terrorism is an act or threat of violence to persons or property that elicits terror, fear, or anxiety regarding the security of human life or fundamental rights and that functions as an instrument to obtain further ends. This instrumentality relies upon either an explicit or implicit threat of separate acts of future violence. It is argued that such a functionalist approach to defining terrorism captures the core qualities that unite the broad family of both political and nonpolitical terrorist actions. At the same time, the proposed definition avoids the problems associated with other approaches that either focus upon the terrorist’s ‘unconventional’ tactics, or the ‘innocence’ of their targets, or their coercive intentions. The breadth of the proposed definition allows for the more nuanced typological analysis in the second stage. The typology is primarily an analysis of the modes of terrorism’s instrumentality. Thus, the broad phenomenon of terrorism is divided according to factors of targets, the degree of force employed, agency, and the geographic context of the action. It is only by drawing out the diverse types of terrorism that the projects of morally evaluating terrorism and formulating a just response to terrorism can take place in a concrete and meaningful way.

Unraveling Emergency Justifications and Excuses for Terrorism

by Shawn Kaplan

Publsihed in Journal of Social Philosophy, Vol. 42, No. 2, June 2011, 219-238.

One significant strategy for justifying or excusing indiscriminate terrorism is to invoke ‘emergency’ circumstances.... more One significant strategy for justifying or excusing indiscriminate terrorism is to invoke ‘emergency’ circumstances. This paper examines two such arguments from extremity whereby overriding the principle of non-combatant immunity is claimed to be either justified or excused. Both approaches recognize that the right of non-combatant immunity should not necessarily be held above the value of survival, whether construed as individual or communal survival; yet, neither provides a convincing argument as to when and why the survival of some innocents ought to counterbalance the harms or rights violations of indiscriminate terrorism. However, once one begins to unravel the existing arguments from extremity used to excuse or justify indiscriminate terrorism, one discovers a broader rationale for conceivably excusing or justifying such acts and which does not require an emergency per se.

Reform Intervention and Democratic Revolution

by Christopher Finlay

Published in the 'European Journal of International Relations', 2007.

Can interventions be used to assist oppressed peoples in overthrowing their governments? According to the influential... more Can interventions be used to assist oppressed peoples in overthrowing their governments? According to the influential non-interventionist arguments of J.S. Mill and Michael Walzer, reform interventions are incompatible with a principle of national self-determination. This article challenges Mill and Walzer, arguing that, in limited cases, interventions could in principle support revolutionary movements in such a way as to facilitate democratic transition. It does so by tracing a lack of conceptual clarity back to Mill's argument in `A Few Words on Non-Intervention'. In particular, it is argued that Mill's and consequently Walzer's account of domestic revolutionary conflicts fails to distinguish the salience of military from properly political forces. Mill's Considerations on Representative Government provides the starting point for a clearer set of distinctions through which to reconstruct the principle of non-intervention on a stronger footing.

Legitimacy and Non-State Political Violence

by Christopher Finlay

Journal of Political Philosophy, 18.3 (2010): 287-312.

http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-9760.2009.00345.x/abstract

Rosemary Durward and Lee Marsden (Eds). 2009. Religion, Conflict and Military Intervention. Aldershot: Ashgate, Pp. 198, Hb,# 55.00. ISBN-13: …

by Carys Moseley

Terrorism, Supreme Emergency, and Killing the Innocent

by Anne Schwenkenbecher

published in Perspectives - Review of International Affairs, 2009, Vol. 17, No. 1

Terrorist violence is often condemned for targeting innocents or non-combatants. There are two objections to this line... more Terrorist violence is often condemned for targeting innocents or non-combatants. There are two objections to this line of argument. First, one may doubt that terrorism is necessarily directed against innocents or non-combatants. However, I will focus on the second objection, according to which there may be exceptions from the prohibition against killing the innocent. In my article I will elaborate whether lethal terrorism against innocents can be justified in a supreme emergency. Starting from a critique of Michael Walzer’s account of supreme emergency, I will argue that the supreme emergency exemption justifies the resort to terrorism against innocents to avert moral disasters such as genocide and ethnic cleansing, provided that the criteria of last resort, proportionality and public declaration are satisfied.

McMahan - Killing in War

by Anne Schwenkenbecher

published in Australian Journal of Philosophy, 2011