Jus in Bello

İlkçağlardan Günümüze Haklı Savaş Kavramı

by Uluslararası İlişkiler

Fulya A. Ereker, "İlkçağlardan Günümüze Haklı Savaş Kavramı", Uluslararası İlişkiler, Cilt 1, Sayı 3 (Güz ), 2004.

Savaş üzerine düşünmenin bir boyutu olarak ele alındığında “haklı savaş”, savaşa başvurmanın ne zaman haklı... more Savaş üzerine düşünmenin bir boyutu olarak ele alındığında “haklı savaş”, savaşa başvurmanın ne zaman haklı olabileceği ve haklı bir savaşta dahi zor kullanımını sınırlamayı amaçlayan düşünce ve pratikleri içeren bir kavram olarak tanımlanabilmektedir. Kavram, özellikle Batı kültüründe, yüzyıllar boyunca gelişme gösteren çok çeşitli kültürel kaynakların bir ürünüdür. Bu çalışmada haklı savaş kavramı, tarihsel süreçte gösterdiği gelişme boyutuyla ele alınarak, geleneğin bugün ulaştığı yapı ortaya konmaya çalışılmaktadır. Bu amaç doğrultusunda öncelikle, biraraya geldiklerinde hem haklı savaş kuramının kavramsal çerçevesini, hem de kuramın iki farklı boyutunu oluşturan “jus ad bellum” ve “jus in bello” ifadeleri açıklanmaya çalışılmaktadır. Tarihsel gelişme süreci, geleneğe yapılan düşünsel katkılar bağlamında, belirli dönemler altında ele alınmaktadır. Ayrım, kavramın batı kültür ve geleneğinin bir unsuru olması dolayısıyla, batının tarihsel gelişme süreci göz önüne alınarak yapılmıştır.

International Humanitarian Law and Permissible Violence, a Critique of David Kennedy

by Georgina Duffin

Fairness and Liability in the Just War: Combatants, Non-Combatants, and Lawful Irregulars

by Christopher Finlay

Forthcoming in Political Studies. For a slightly earlier version of the essay, please follow the link.

Critics of non-uniformed ‘irregular’ warfare argue that it is unfair both to non-combatants and to enemy ‘regulars’. I... more Critics of non-uniformed ‘irregular’ warfare argue that it is unfair both to non-combatants and to enemy ‘regulars’. I contest that view by asking how the leaders of a people forced to fight a just war should distribute risks within their own population. Insofar as all are the victims of aggression or unjust occupation, I argue, no citizens on the just side are morally liable to attack. But to benefit from the restraining effects of the principle of discrimination, some members must be rendered legally liable. Political leaders must therefore find the most appropriate distribution of the risk of harm, first, by deciding which and how many citizens to select as ‘combatants’; and second, by specifying how far to distance combatants from civilians. I identify four normative considerations that must be taken into account: each possible arrangement must (1) fulfil basic requirements of fairness domestically; then, between equally fair arrangements, leaders ought to determine which offers the most auspicious balance between (2) the goal of survival during the war (of the society and as many of its members as possible) and (3) the goal of winning it and, hence, eliminating the injustices that caused the war; finally (4) the arrangement should not be unfair to enemy combatants. On this basis, I argue that in spite of the increased risks it poses to civilians, limited ‘irregular’ warfare might be deployed legitimately against occupiers where the use of uniforms would have rendered insurgents vulnerable to targeted assassination or arrest prior to actual combat.

The Burden of Autonomy: Non-combatant Immunity and Humanitarian Intervention

by William Cornwell

Ethical Perspectives 12.3 (September 2005): 341-355

Michael Walzer argues that except in cases involving genocide or mass slaughter, humanitarian intervention is... more Michael Walzer argues that except in cases involving genocide or mass slaughter, humanitarian intervention is unjustified because "citizens get the government they deserve, or, at least, the government for which they are 'fit.'" Yet, if people are autonomous and deserve the government that rules over them, then it would seem that they are responsible for the government's actions, including their nations' wars of aggression. That line of thought undermines the doctrine of non-combatant immunity, which is perhaps the most important of Walzer's jus in bello principles. In this way, the concept of self-determination frustrates Walzer's attempts to keep jus ad bellum and jus in bello considerations separate.