Diritti e giustizia sociale nella giurisprudenza europea 2010
Published in A. Cantaro (a cura di) Giustizia e diritto nella scienza giuridica contemporanea, Giappicchelli, Torino 2011, pp. 236-47.
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Seen by:La democrazia e i Watchmen
Dalle pagine di Dworkin e Habermas si continua a sviluppare pervicacemente l’idea che la corte è il luogo in cui viene... more Dalle pagine di Dworkin e Habermas si continua a sviluppare pervicacemente l’idea che la corte è il luogo in cui viene garantito uno spazio di espressione ai diritti dell’individuo a fronte di una sfera politica sempre più ermetica alle istanze di questi e, dinanzi alla vulnerabilità dei parlamenti, oggi come in passato.
Gloria di Dio e legge terrena. Un approccio cattolico alla teologia politica
in Democrazia e diritto, 3/2008 “Teologia Politica”, pp. 147-188, numero chiuso in redazione il 1. Novembre 2009.
Nel sistema della filosofia del diritto di Hegel lo stato doveva essere autonomo dalla Chiesa, perché conteneva in sé... more
Nel sistema della filosofia del diritto di Hegel lo stato doveva essere autonomo dalla Chiesa, perché conteneva in sé la sua essenza, in quanto è la suprema realizzazione dello spirito oggettivo. Paradossalmente però la forma-stato poteva innestarsi solo in una coscienza religiosa diffusa e genericamente cristiana (ma non certo cattolica) che aveva il compito di educare le coscienze dei cittadini. Böckenförde riferisce questa considerazione alla contemporaneità: la forma dello stato attuale non si può più basare sulla religione, quindi il suo consenso è sempre sospeso, ed è per questo che spesso si riaffaccia l’idea della “religione civile”, prevalentemente come un retaggio di queste diffuse moderne cui si farà cenno. Di contro Habermas ritiene necessario un approfondimento sulle ragioni della separazione richiesta nelle costituzioni liberali tra Stato e Chiesa e sul ruolo che le tradizioni e le comunità religiose possono svolgere nella società civile. L’argomentazione di Habermas è compatibile con il liberalismo politico rawlsiano, e si fonda sul dato di fatto che la laicità è condizione necessaria ma non sufficiente per una equa garanzia della libertà religiosa.
In Italia tali tematiche sono state di recente riportate al centro dell’attenzione da pensatori come Cacciari Tronti e Agamben, per citare solo i più influenti. Delineare il rapporto che intercorre tra la manifestazione della gloria di Dio nell’uomo e la vita pubblica nelle sue due manifestazioni di politica e diritto è sempre un grande rischio e un azzardo, poiché significa fare i conti con la sempre manchevole risposta che gli uomini danno all’assolutamente gratuita opzione della kenosi, la sempre ingrata e imperfetta risposta alla scelta di offrire la propria grazia tramite il Cristo che si è incarnato e si è lasciato crocifiggere ed è risorto per unire a se tutti gli uomini nella visione celeste del Padre tramite il lumen gloriae.
L’interpretazione del katèchon come diritto naturale conobbe diverse traversie, fino a giungere alla nozione giacobina di un diritto naturale dei popoli di sovvertire i propri sovrani e persino di giustiziarli in nome del medesimo diritto. Fichte vede nella strada intrapresa dalla Rivoluzione Francese nel campo del diritto il fine stesso a cui tende tutta l’umanità fino alla definitiva scomparsa della forma-Stato in quanto non piú necessaria. Fichte e i teorici giacobini utilizzano toni messianici che riecheggiano le idee di Gioacchino da Fiore, il monaco medievale che teorizzava, dopo quella del Padre e del Figlio, un’età dello Spirito, nella quale si sarebbero realizzate tutte le istanze di liberazione dell’uomo . Questo lascia in ombra un fondamentale dilemma, ben enucleato da Koselleck: "Il problema storico da risolvere è se Luigi XVI sia stato assassinato, oppure giustiziato, o addirittura punito; non il 'fatto' che una ghigliottina di un certo peso gli abbia staccato la testa dal tronco" . Il lungo processo di secolarizzazione della sovranità e la sua trasformazione in calcolo maggioritario fu il rovesciamento del tradizionale rapporto tra lotta cruenta e politica: la politica quantificata secondo tecniche sempre più raffinatesi nei due secoli scorsi diventa la prosecuzione della lotta cruenta con altri mezzi. Quello che era l’arbitrio del sovrano diviene la sovranità del parlamento, seguendo l’esempio inglese in cui il problema centrale del costituzionalismo è come limitare questo potere ormai considerato normativo e naturale.
Harmonia semper reformanda: the twin ideals of Harmonisation and the Rule of Law
paper presented at the HART LEGAL WORKSHOP 2008 (24 to 26 June 2008) Institute of Advanced Legal Studies London, now in M. Andenas & C.B. Andersen (eds.) The Theory and Practice of Harmonisation, Edward Elgar Press 2010.
Many scholars following M. Horwitz see the rule of law as some find of tool being used in an instrumental way, or in a... more
Many scholars following M. Horwitz see the rule of law as some find of tool being used in an instrumental way, or in a mere functional one. The rule of law is therefore in strong need of definition, or better is still without Bestimmung: this German word means determination and destination together, and the concept “Rule of Law” is in great need more than any other legal concept a clear definition and destination. Consequently, the law cannot serve as an effective barrier to the government’s abuse of power because power structures in society, and not the law itself, determine the outcome of legal issues and problems. Problems are not only related to the work of the executive branch, but also to the real owner of many executive powers today, like supranational agencies, NGOs, the always growing law firms, transnational corporations and the UN. Framing nations into supranational entities has the balance in macro-regions that are growing inside national states, and stronger communities and municipalities that are getting more and more power following the sacred principle of subsidiarity. This last one in European lexicon is closely bound up with the principles of proportionality and necessity, which require that any action by the Union should not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the Treaty .
As long as the determination of the law is made by the community then there is no necessary connection between law and morality, but there is still (using the modal categories of Kant) a place for its possibility. Another question that is necessary to approach is the ontology of the separate body of the judiciary: is this part of the community or not, I think it should not be but it is, and in this respect they were also part of the "officials" in the infamous regimes that are analyzed in the works of Matthew Kramer and Nigel Simmonds.
The background of a different analysis could be the concept of secularization developed recently by Taylor . The "subtraction story" (the idea that the secularization is just the shifting of the world away from faith) for Taylor is a gross oversimplification. Secularism, and the religious responses to it, has a complex, convoluted history with many twists and turns. The impetus for both views, Taylor argues is predominantly ethical -- developing views on what is important for human life -- rather than merely epistemological.
Taylor's approach is greatly influenced by Hegel. He offers a type of dialectic in which one type of religious belief leads to a resulting series of secularist or religious responses which result in other further variants and responses. In spite of his own religious commitments, he celebrates the diversity of options people have today towards both secularism and religion. The peculiarities of Hegelian analysis are the connection between Taylor and philosophers like Habermas or Böckenförde, in their different efforts to deal with the emergence of the moral universalism as a new form of ruling in the realm of philosophy.
Norberto Bobbio's Legal Theory and Kelsen's Heritage
paper presented at the Department of Philosophy, The University of Manchester, December 1995
'Sympathetic Exchange,' Adam Smith and Punishment
by Eric Miller
Ratio Juris, Vol. 9, No. 182, 1996
Adam Smith says relatively little about justice and punishment in the Theory of Moral Sentiments. What he does say... more Adam Smith says relatively little about justice and punishment in the Theory of Moral Sentiments. What he does say reveals that Smith viewed morality as dynamic, almost economic exchange. Exposing the transactional nature of his theory of morality not only the operation of sympathy and moral judgment, but allows us to see a much closer link between the Theory of Moral Sentiments and the Wealth of Nations. Much remains to be said about this, as about his theory of justice. However, I do believe that to view Smith's moral theory from an "economic" perspective as a system of "sympathetic exchange" enables a more fruitful and cohesive account to be given of all aspects of his work, moral, economic and jurisprudential.
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Seen by:Judicial Preference
by Eric Miller
Houston Law Review, Vol. 44, 2008
In this paper I claim that, where the judge possesses strong discretion, she has both a legal power and the legal... more
In this paper I claim that, where the judge possesses strong discretion, she has both a legal power and the legal right to decide whichever way she wishes. Neither law nor morality provides a decisive ground for decision and all that is left is her taste or inclination.
Perhaps because it looks like a naked exercise of power, the judge's predilections are not a terribly popular basis for judicial decision. Preference is often characterized as non-rational: as having no basis in reason because not based upon some unique reason requiring a particular decision. Reason-based decision, by contrast, is represented as demonstrating that some decisive reason overrides competing ones to settle the outcome of a legal dispute, independent of the judge's will. Absent such a reason, judicial decision consists an arbitrary exercise of the power authoritatively to resolve cases.
I claim that the judge's personal preference or predilection operates as a legitimate basis for judicial decision in cases presenting strong discretion. Strong discretion exists wherever legal rules conflict, and there is no decisive reason determining the outcome. In such circumstances, each of the conflicting rules is undefeated and there is no incorrect thing to do. The judge has both a legal power and a legal right to decide whichever way she wishes.
I contrast my strong discretion thesis with the claim that the judge has only "weak" discretion to resolve the case because extra-legal reasons bind the judge. In particular, I demonstrate that Ronald Dworkin and Joseph Raz, who are often thought to entertain diametrically opposed theories of law, both endorse weak discretion in adjudication and do so for similar, though mistaken, reasons.
Whatever the merits of the weak discretion thesis generally, I argue that strong discretion and preference-based decision is an inevitable and useful feature of complex legal systems. It encourages judges to experiment with different outcomes in circumstances in which they have only a limited ability to foresee the consequences, and no way to determine which among the possible consequences is best.
Uluslararası Hukukta Eleştirel Yaklaşımlar
Hürkan Çelebi, Ali Murat Özdemir, "Uluslararası Hukukta Eleştirel Yaklaşımlar", Uluslararası İlişkiler, Cilt 7, Sayı 25 (Bahar), 2010
Bu makale uluslararası hukukta mevcut eleştirel yaklaşımlar içerisinde önemli yer tutan iki yaklaşımı eleştirel olarak... more Bu makale uluslararası hukukta mevcut eleştirel yaklaşımlar içerisinde önemli yer tutan iki yaklaşımı eleştirel olarak incelemektedir: iyileştirici yaklaşım ve meta-biçim teorisi bağlamında ekonomi politik yaklaşım. Son dönemde uluslararası hukuk teorisi “Yeni Dalga” olarak bilinen eleştirel perspektifl erin yükselişine şahit olmuştur. “Yeni Dalga” yazarları Eleştirel Hukuk Çalışmaları olarak bilinen daha geniş bir akımın parçasını oluşturmaktadırlar. Ekonomi politik yaklaşım Evgeny Pashukanis’in hukuku meta dolaşımına bağlayan ve uluslararası hukuku meta biçim teorisinin geliştirilmesinde kullanan öncü hukuk çalışmalarına dayanmaktadır.
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Seen by:Jurisprudence for Foxes
by Leslie Green
forthcoming in the International Journal of Constitutional Law
This paper contests Brian Simpson's claim that HLA Hart's book, The Concept of Law, is that of a 'hedgehog', that is,... more This paper contests Brian Simpson's claim that HLA Hart's book, The Concept of Law, is that of a 'hedgehog', that is, a monistic thinker. It is not. Hart's work is pluralist both in its explanatory concepts and in its evaluative background. Some conjectures are offered as to why Simpson so misunderstood Hart, and as to why analytic legal philosophy is misunderstood, or distrusted, more generally.
Vagueness and Power-Delegation in Law: A Reply to Sorensen
Forthcoming in M. Freeman & F. Smith (Eds.), Current Legal Issues: Law and Language (Oxford University Press)
Roy Sorensen has argued that vagueness in the law cannot be justified by appeal to the value of power-delegation, and... more Roy Sorensen has argued that vagueness in the law cannot be justified by appeal to the value of power-delegation, and thereby threatens to take away one of the main reasons for thinking that vagueness can be valuable to law. Delegation of power to officials is justified, he thinks, only if these officials are in a better position to discover whether a particular x is F, a condition not satisfied in cases of vagueness. I argue that Sorensen’s argument is unsound: delegation of power can be valuable even if the delegates are not in a better position to answer that question.
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Seen by:Korematsu v United States; a basic judgement analysis in light of Hart's legal positivism, Finnis' natural law, and Critical Race Theory
by Jim Saxton
Legal and Social Theory Essay - 2011 - Sheffield Hallam University
This case study is on the subject of Korematsu v United States and will analyse the dissenting judgements, especially... more This case study is on the subject of Korematsu v United States and will analyse the dissenting judgements, especially the favoured opinion of Justice Black (and Justice Frankfurter), against those who opposed (Justice Roberts, Justice Murphy and Justice Jackson) and critique them in light of three schools of jurisprudence; Hart’s approach on legal positivism, Finnis and Natural Law and Critical Race Theory.
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Seen by: and 1 moreWomen Jurors on Trial: Popular Depictions of the American Woman Juror in Twentieth- Century Newspaper Coverage
by Journal of Research on Women and Gender
Meredith Clark-Wiltz, Franklin College
Jeremy Bentham’s Theory Today
Special issue on Bentham
THE TOCQUEVILLE REVIEW
LA REVUE TOCQUEVILLE
VOL. XXXII No. 1 –– 2011
LA REVUE TOCQUEVILLE
VOL. XXXII No. 1 –– 2011
CONTENTS
5 In Memoriam: Daniel BELL (1919-2011) by Nathan GLAZER
Jeremy Bentham’s Theory Today
11 Anne BRUNON-ERNST –– Introduction
21 Emmanuelle de CHAMPS –– Constitution and the code: Jeremy Bentham on the
limits of constitutional branch of jurisprudence
43 Stephen G. ENGELMANN & Jennifer PITTS –– Bentham’’s ““Place and Time””
67 Annie L. COT –– Entre expertise et utopie : Jeremy Bentham et la question des colonies
89 Malik BOZZO-REY –– La transparence chez Jeremy Bentham : de l’’invisibilité d’’un concept à sa publicité
113 Jean-Pierre CLÉRO –– Bentham, Stuart Mill et la santé publique
143 Tim MULGAN –– The future of utilitarianism
Tocquevilliana
169 ChristianBÉGIN––Tocqueville etla fracture religieuse

