Islamic Political Thought

Beyond “Liberal” Female Piety or “Women Read the Qur’an Too” by Amy Levin

by Feminism and Religion

Originally published on the Feminism and Religion project

I’m a teacher’s assistant for an undergraduate course at New York University called, “What is Islam?” The other day in... more I’m a teacher’s assistant for an undergraduate course at New York University called, “What is Islam?” The other day in class, my professor asked the students whether or not the Qur’an is considered a “book”. Fraught with anxiety over inheriting such a problematic scholarly tradition of defining and delineating what “religion” is, I kept quiet. While my professor was aiming more for something sounding like, “a book is read, while the Qur’an is recited,” I kept thinking about the physicality and sacrality of the Qur’an (among other authoritative religious texts) and the way it is handled, revered, preserved, loved, an constantly under interpretation. It was about a week later when news broke out that U.S. soldiers in Afghanistan were guilty of burning several copies of the Qur’an on their military base, followed by an unfortunate slew of casualties including at least 30 Afghan deaths and five US soldiers.

Mazhab In Islamic Economics (Indonesian Language)

by Ali Muhayatsyah

Ada tiga sudut pandang/mazhab atau corak pemikiran dalam mengkaji ilmu Ekonomi Islam. Mazhab tersebut adalah Mazhab... more Ada tiga sudut pandang/mazhab atau corak pemikiran dalam mengkaji ilmu Ekonomi Islam. Mazhab tersebut adalah Mazhab Baqir as-Sadr, Mazhab Mainstream, Mazhab Alternatif Kritis.

Qāḍī-s and the political use of the maẓālim jurisdiction under the ʿAbbāsids

by Mathieu Tillier

Published in: Christian Lange et Maribel Fierro (éd.), Public Violence in Islamic Societies: Power, Discipline, and the Construction of the Public Sphere, 7th—18th Centuries CE, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 2009, p. 42-66.

Early and Medieval Jihad Doctrine and Its Relevance in Understandng Contemporary Islamic Fundamentalism

by Nadim Pabani

This paper attempts to uncover the relationship, if any, between the early and medieval doctrine of Jihad in... more This paper attempts to uncover the relationship, if any, between the early and medieval doctrine of Jihad in understanding the actions of contemporary Islamic fundamentalism.

We suggest that early writings on the doctrine of Jihad and warfare are of little relevance unless studied alongside and in conjunction with a study of the specific individuals and contexts involved.

Reasons to Ban? The Anti-Burqa Movement in Western Europe

by Prakash Shah

This MMG Working Paper 12-09 (Göttingen: Max Planck Institute for the Study of Religious and Ethnic Diversity) is Co-authored with Ralph Grillo, Emeritus Professor of Social Anthropology at the University of Sussex. Publications include: Pluralism and the Politics of Difference: State, Culture, and Ethnicity in Comparative Perspective, Clarendon Press (1998); editor of The Family in Question: Immigrant and Ethnic Minorities in Multicultural Europe, Amsterdam University Press (2008); co-editor of Legal Practice and Cultural Diversity, Ashgate (2009). Ralph Grillo is a member of the Advisory Group of the Department of Socio-Cultural Diversity of the Max Planck Institute for the Study of Religious and Ethnic Diversity at Göttingen.

During the 2000s, the dress of Muslim women in Muslim-minority countries in Europe and elsewhere became increasingly a... more During the 2000s, the dress of Muslim women in Muslim-minority countries in Europe and elsewhere became increasingly a matter for debate and, in several instances, the subject of legislation. In France, a ban on the wearing of the headscarf
in places of education (2004) was followed in 2010 by the law criminalizing the wearing of the face-veil (usually but inaccurately referred to as the ‘burqa’) in public space. Other countries have enacted similar legislation. Muslim women’s dress has historically been a controversial matter in Muslim-majority countries, too, most recently in North Africa following the Arab Spring, but the present paper concentrates on the movement against face-veiling in Western Europe, documenting what has been happening and analysing the arguments proposed to justify criminalizing this type of garment. In doing so, the paper explores the implications for our understanding of contemporary (ethnically and religiously) diverse societies and their governance.
Is anti-veiling legislation a protest against what is interpreted as an Islamic practice unacceptable in liberal democracies, a sign of a wider discomfort with non-European otherness, or an expression of an underlying racism articulated in cultural terms?
Whatever the reason, is criminalization an appropriate response? An Appendix notes some topics for further research.

La société abbasside au miroir du tribunal. Égalité juridique et hiérarchie sociale

by Mathieu Tillier

Published in: Annales Islamologiques, 42 (2008), p. 157-186.

Les sources juridiques comme la littérature d’adab des IXe et Xe siècles insistaient sur la stricte égalité des... more Les sources juridiques comme la littérature d’adab des IXe et Xe siècles insistaient sur la stricte égalité des plaideurs devant le cadi, quelles que soient leurs places respectives au sein de la société. Cet article entend montrer comment, au-delà de cette règle théorique, le tribunal demeurait un puissant révélateur de l’appartenance sociale des individus. La doctrine limitait les droits de certaines catégories de la population et, de leur côté, diverses stratégies de distinction permettaient aux puissants d’asseoir leur supériorité ; par ailleurs, une mauvaise connaissance de la langue arabe ou une culture juridique insuffisante affaiblissaient la position des plaideurs issus des milieux populaires. Enfin, par son rôle dans la reconnaissance des filiations et des généalogies, le tribunal du cadi contribuait même à la fixation de groupes sociaux hiérarchisés.

In the 9th and 10th centuries, legal sources as well as adab literature stress the strict equality of the litigants before the qâdî, whatever their respective places in society. This article intends to show that despite this theoretical rule, the practice of the court still reflected individuals’ social backgrounds. The doctrine restricted the rights of some categories of the population and several strategies of discrimination enabled the powerful to establish their superiority; a weak knowledge of Arabic language or a poor legal culture could also weaken the position of litigants belonging to the popular classes. Finally, by recognizing filiations and genealogies, the qâdî’s court even contributed to the establishment of hierarchical social groups.

Un traité politique du IIe/VIIIe siècle : l’épître de ʿUbayd Allāh b. al-Ḥasan al-ʿAnbarī au calife al-Mahdī

by Mathieu Tillier

Published in: Annales Islamologiques, 40 (2006), p. 139-170.

Movimentos sociais em contextos islâmicos: abordagens antropológicas

by maria cardeira da silva

The Role of the Religion in the Caucasus Region and Societal Security

by Orkhan Gafarli

New threats have begun to put the security system into jeopardy after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. One... more New threats have begun to put the security system into jeopardy after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. One of the main threats is the fundamentalism that evokes the creation of radical and extremist religious groups. And the problem of our day is to ensure security of society from those religious threats.
This article analyzes the new social threats and challenges in the Caucasus region. In the first part of this paper the concept of Societal Security will be considered. The problems of traditional Islam and the reasons for the disappearance of traditional Islam in the Caucasus will be analyzed in the second part of the paper. Ultimately, the spread of non-traditional Islam in the Caucasus region, and whether it poses a threat to Societal will be examined.



Keywords: Societal Security, religious threats, radical Islam, Caucasus region, September 11, 2001, Security Sector, securitization, traditional and non - traditional islam. 

[2005] Kalashnikovs, Explosives & Hijab: A chronology of female involvement in the Iraqi insurgency

by Michael Loadenthal

American University, Independent Study under the supervision of Professor Abdul Bangura

A chronology of female involvement in the Iraqi insurgency A chronology of female involvement in the Iraqi insurgency

Theory of Islamic Politics and Objectives of Islamic Law.

by Muhsin Parari

first part of an article( Malayalam ) being published in Bodhanam.

an attempt to apply the theory of 'Objectives of Islamic law/ Shari'ah' to the theory of Islamist Politics. an attempt to apply the theory of 'Objectives of Islamic law/ Shari'ah' to the theory of Islamist Politics.

Les “premiers” cadis de Fusṭāṭ et les dynamiques régionales de l’innovation judiciaire (750-833)

by Mathieu Tillier

Published in: Annales Islamologiques, 45 (2011), p. 214-242.

This article recounts the judicial innovations that developed in Egypt during the early Abbasid caliphate, through an... more This article recounts the judicial innovations that developed in Egypt during the early Abbasid caliphate, through an analysis of qāḍī-s who were the first to adopt a legal practice. The Egyptian legal milieu, which was critically committed to the Medinese school, had some influence in the middle of the 2nd/8th century as far as the Abbasid court, which developed partly its centrality by assimilating provincial models. In return, the attraction of several prominent jurists or qāḍī-s to Bagdad caused the adoption, in Fusṭāṭ, of new judicial practices inspired by Iraqi models. Centralisation of judgeship under al-Manṣūr and his successors, who send in Egypt a series of qāḍī-s trained in Iraq, increased even more the influence of Iraqi practices on the court of Fusṭāṭ. As a paradox, the reinforcement of central authority on the Egyptian judgeship set also in motion a dynamic of local innovations: the designation in Fusṭāṭ of non-Egyptian qāḍī-s caused a reorganisation of the court at the turn of the 3rd/9th century, in particular by the creation of new networks and the setting up of a body of professional witnesses, an institution which spread in other provinces of the caliphate.

Darfur: Ground Zero for Africa’s Crises of Identity

by Patrick James Christian

A psycho-Historiography of Darfur's Tribes in Conflict
Nova Southeastern University Graduate School of Humanities & Social Science, Department of Conflict Analysis & Resolution

Introduction 2
Darfur: A Broken Place 3
Identity Disintegration in Darfur 5
Applying identity conflict theory 6
The Arabs 8
Arab Identity Subordination of Islam 9
Arab Hierarchical Ownership of the Islamic Ummah 10
Islamic Universality and the Fractured Identity of Arab Muslims 10
Islamic Universality of Ethnic Inclusion versus African Diffusion 12
The Africans 12
The Language of Religion and of Slaves 17
Islam and Paganism: the Sacred and the profane in Contest in Darfur 18
Law & Social Order: Sharia versus African Communal Justice 20
Psychological and Emotional Trauma as Spoilers to Identity Definition 22
“Intervention” Resolving Identity Conflict & Managing Psychological Trauma 24
Securing the Population 24
Stabilizing the Population 25
Rebuilding the Psycho-Sociological Structures of Human Societies 26
Conclusion 27
References 29
Notes 36

Diplomatic and peacekeeping initiatives by the international community in emerging cultures in conflict have failed to... more Diplomatic and peacekeeping initiatives by the international community in emerging cultures in conflict have failed to stem the violence and resolve the underlying conditions. Based primarily on political analysis, such initiatives do not address the underlying causes of the civil war at the individual, family, and tribal levels. This paper examines the psychological and sociological motivations for the violence within and between the Arab and African tribes of Darfur, to include motivation exploration of ethnic defections, failing cultural identity markers, and the effects of cognitive dissonance of the personal and social identities of the Darfur tribes. Research suggests that the identities of the African and Arab tribes are deeply contested over ethnicity, tribalism, religion, race and the generational memory that historical narratives provide. This fundamental identity conflict is overlaid by decades of violent physical, psychological and emotional assault upon the population. The result is a fundamental change of the psycho-sociology of tribal life and threatens disintegration and disestablishment of large group identity. The resulting societal and leadership breakdown of and within the tribes creates conditions of warlord-ism commonly found in ungoverned states such as Somalia. The paper concludes that the international community will ultimately fail unless measures are taken to create conditions for survival of the tribes physically, psychologically and sociologically.

El Islam y la Sexualidad de la Mujer

by Oswaldo Cali

El trabajo plantea un panorama general de las mujeres árabes en cuanto a la titularidad y disfrute efectivo de sus... more El trabajo plantea un panorama general de las mujeres árabes en cuanto a la titularidad y disfrute efectivo de sus derechos humanos fundamentales. En un primer capítulo estudia los derechos de las mujeres de acuerdo al Corán, y en un segundo capítulo señala algunos desafíos en países árabes.

Complicity and Dissent in the Islamic‐Political Discourse of Saudi Arabia

by Steve Welsh

Final Paper for Richard Bulliet's "History of the Modern Middle East"

An analysis of the nature of authority in Saudi Arabia based on
Mamoun Fandy's "Religion, Social Structure,... more An analysis of the nature of authority in Saudi Arabia based on
Mamoun Fandy's "Religion, Social Structure, and Political Dissent in Saudi Arabia" Gwenn Okruhlik's "Networks of Dissent: Islamism and Reform in Saudi Arabia" and Juan Cole's "Engaging the Muslim World"

Resignations deepen rift among Turkish Islamists and country’s soccer crisis

by James M. Dorsey

By James M. Dorsey

The Turkish Football Federation’s (TFF) three top managers have resigned in a move that... more By James M. Dorsey

The Turkish Football Federation’s (TFF) three top managers have resigned in a move that appears to have deepened the rift between Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Turkey’s powerful Islamic Gulen movement as well as the massive match-fixing crisis in Turkish soccer.

TFF chairman Mehmet Ali Ayindar and his vice chairmen Goksel Gumusdag and Lutfi Arıbogan gave no reason for their resignation days after the federation’s general assembly defeated a proposed rule change that would have prevented soccer teams found guilty of match-fixing from being relegated.

Mr. Gumusdag, an in-law of Mr. Erdogan and head of a club with two players implicated in the scandal, was among scores of soccer officials detained last year in the match-fixing scandal, but he was released after several  hours of questioning.

The rejection of the rule change constituted a defeat for Mr. Erdogan, who last month drove against President Abdullah Gul’s will a controversial bill through parliament that reduced penalties for match-fixing from a maximum 12 to three years and prepared the ground for the rejected TFF rule change.

Mr. Gul is believed to be close to Fethullah Gulen, a self-exiled, Pennsylvania-based cleric, whose movement, Turkey’s foremost Islamic alliance, operates schools, businesses, media, including major Turkish media, and NGOs across the globe, and is widely seen as having significant sway over Turkey’s police force. The Gulen movement has been instrumental in the rise of Turkey’s appeal across the Middle East, North Africa and in sub-Saharan Africa with its network often paving the way for Turkish diplomacy and business.

Mr. Erdogan increasingly, however, has come to see Mr. Gulen not only as an asset but also a liability. The cleric’s inroads into the judiciary and the police has meant that critics of his movement have more often than not found themselves behind bars on charges of involvement in the murky and controversial Ergenekon affair, involving Turkey’s Kemalist, ultra-nationalist deep state. The affair has led to massive military arrests and made Turkey one of the world’s foremost jailers of journalists. The arrests have sparked international criticism and portrayed Mr. Erdogan as increasingly arrogant and authoritarian.

Mr. Gulen left Turkey in 1998 ostensibly for health reasons but more likely to avoid standing trial for a recording in which he allegedly advocated an Islamic regime. “Our friends who have positions in legislative and administrative bodies should learn its details and be vigilant all the time so that they can transform it and be more fruitful on behalf of Islam ... However, they should wait until the conditions become more favourable ... they should not come out too early,” Mr. Gulen was reported to have said.

Mr. Gulen asserts that the quote was taken out of context. He was acquitted in 2006 after having been tried in absentia on charges of trying to overthrow the secular state. Mr. Gulen has opted to remain in rural Pennsylvania although he is free to return to Turkey.

Mr. Gul and his supporters view the investigation of the match-fixing scandal as part of a greater clean-up in Turkey. They argue that the match-fixing scandal involves huge sums of money and is closely linked to organized crime.

A majority of TFF members rejected the proposed rule change that would have replaced relegation with a minimum penalty of a 12-point deduction on the grounds that such a move could only be made once legal proceedings in Turkey’s worst match-fixing scandal had been completed. Jailed Fenerbahce president Aziz Yildirim and his storied club, who have been targeted by Gulen media, were among those opposed to the rule change despite the fact that the club is threatened with relegation under the current TFF rules.

“Fenerbahçe voted against this for reasons of pride. The club thinks it's innocent and that it will prevail in the court case…. It has no problem being demoted a division and said so from the day that (European soccer body) UEFA announced they won't be in the Champions League. ‘You've already found us guilty with this decision, then why are you waiting to demote us?’ they said,” according to an email from Turkish blogger TurkeyEmergency, a Turkish journalist who wishes to remain anonymous because of the arrest of journalists critical of Mr. Gulen.

Messrs Erdogan and Gulen’s soccer proxy battle erupted as Mr. Yildirim and 92 other soccer club officials, coaches and players are scheduled to go on trial on February 14 on match-fixing related charges that involve eight teams, including Europa League members Besiktas and Trabzonspor. The scandal is believed to have affected 19 matches, including last season’s Fenerbahce 4-3 victory over Sivasspor which saw the club clinch the league championship on the final day. The Champions League has since barred Fenerbahce from participating in its competition because of the match-fixing scandal.

The TFF said that executive board member Hüsnü Güreli would be acting chairman until the federation elects a new head on February 27.

Mr. Aydinlar said in a statement that he had resigned because he could not “stand the atmosphere where there is no trust, where many people and institutions act without ethics. The point we are at is in deep contrast with my views in life and ethics, so I’ve decided to leave in order to raise attention to the situation.”

TurkeyEmergency quoted Mr. Yildirim as saying in a letter that he had no issue with Mr. Erdogan and that “no one can get in between Erdogan and myself,” an apparent reference to Mr. Gulen. Turkey’s Fanatik quoted Mr. Yildirim on Wednesday as saying in an interview three times that “Fenerbahçe is Atatürk's team and it will stay that way.” Mr. Yildirim was seemingly accusing Mr. Gulen, widely seen as an opponent of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the visionary who carved modern Turkey out of the ruins of the Ottoman empire, of wanting to remove him to gain control of Fenerbahce.

The soccer battle between Messrs Erdogan and Gulen is the latest of a string of incidents souring  the once close relationship between the two men. Mr. Gulen has taken Mr. Erdogan to task for his tough stance towards Israel in the wake of the 2010 Mavi Maramara affair. Mr. Erdogan effectively froze relations with Israel after Israeli forces stormed the Mavi Marmara, a Turkish aid ship that was attempting to run the Israeli blockade of the Gaza Strip, killing nine Turkish nationals.

The cleric has also criticized the prime minister for being too soft on Turkey’s staunchly secular armed forces despite the fact that Mr. Erdogan succeeded in bringing the military under civilian control and that hundreds of officers, including scores of serving generals, have on his watch been jailed for alleged coup-plotting. Mr. Gulen is believed to want Mr. Gul to succeed Mr. Erdogan in 2015 when Mr. Erdogan’s term as prime minister is up and he is expected to seek the presidency.

James M. Dorsey is a senior fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore and the author of the blog, The Turbulent World of Middle East Soccer.

Islamists vow to one-up ultras with clean-up of Egyptian sports

by James M. Dorsey

By James M. Dorsey

Flush with victory in Egypt's first-post revolt election, Islamists are vowing to... more By James M. Dorsey

Flush with victory in Egypt's first-post revolt election, Islamists are vowing to initiate change that militant soccer fans and youth groups have failed to achieve in a year of bloody street battles with security forces.
In doing so, the Muslim Brotherhood is seeking to distinguish itself from more militant Islamists, including more radical Salafis who propagating emulating life in the 7th century at the time of the profit and fundamentalist Egyptian and Saudi clerics as well as the Al Qaeda-affiliated Al Shabab militia in Somalia or factions of the Taliban in Afghanistan who denounce soccer as a game of the infidels and as a distraction from the obligation to worship Allah.

The dichotomy of the Islamists striving to achieve the militant soccer fans' sports-related goals while the two sides face off on the streets of Cairo is vividly on display this week as Egypt celebrates the first anniversary of the protests that last year ousted President Hosni Mubarak from 30 years in office.

Egypt's military that last year temporarily took power from Mubarak with a pledge to lead the country to democracy is seeking to undercut with anniversary celebrations this week that include concerts and soccer matches the youth and soccer fan groups that were at the core of last year's revolt and are now demanding the armed forces' immediate return to the barracks. The military effort is backed by the Brotherhood.

The militants have been campaigning in recent days in an unsuccessful bid to convince a public tired of political turmoil and frustrated that their revolt has produced few material benefits of the evil of the soldiers who responded increasingly brutally to their protests against the military and Mubarak era sports officials over the past year.

Youth activists and soccer fans in the Cairo suburb of Heliopolis erected projector screens to show residents looking down from their balconies with little sense of engagement videos of what they see as the military's abuse of power "Why are you silent? Have you won your rights already?" the revolutionaries shouted at them in frustration.

Adding insult to injury, the Brotherhood is vowing to succeed where the militants have failed. Repeatedly the soccer fans demanded unsuccessfully with few exceptions the resignations of the Mubarak appointed boards of the Egyptian Football Association (EFA) and major soccer clubs. Some supporters of sports reform take heart in the recent replacement of the Mubarak-era heads of the national sports and national youth councils.

The Brotherhood, which last year briefly toyed with the idea of launching soccer teams of its own, has vowed to clean out the sports sector of Mubarak associated by removing the heads of associations starting with EFA president Sami Zaher as well as club board members linked to the ancien regime. Under pressure from fans and clubs, Mr. Zaher pledged last year to end his term early but has since given no indication that he intends to live up to his promise,

In their effort to distance themselves from the rejection of sports, and particularly soccer, by some Salafis and jihadists, Brotherhood members emphasize sport's health benefits. Some also stress the need for sports to stay in line with Islam.

"We support sports in general and encourage them. Sports flourished in the age of Islam, so why shouldn’t they under the Islamists? We are looking to encourage more sporting activities nationwide. ... Islam doesn’t have any problem with soccer and other sports," Al Akhbar el-Youm newspaper quoted Brotherhood spokesman Mahmoud Ghozlan as saying.

Mr. Ghozlan's statement is a far cry from a condemnation of soccer by Egyptian Salafi Sheikh Abu Ishaaq Al Huweni, an attempt by Saudi Salafi clerics to rewrite the rules of the game to allegedly Islamify it, and the outright banning of soccer by Al Shabab jihadists in Somalia.

“All fun is bootless except the playing of a man with his wife, his son and his horse… Thus, if someone sits in front of the television to watch football or something like that, he will be committing bootless fun… We have to be a serious nation, not a playing nation. Stop playing,” Sheikh Al Huweni said in a religious ruling published in 2009 on YouTube. Egypt's Salafist Al Noor party, which emerged as the country's second largest after the Brotherhood, has yet to distance itself from Sheikh Al Huweini.   

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TOE-tGmAI18

Al Noor has also yet to take issues with views such as those expressed in 2005 in a controversial ruling by militant clerics in Saudi Arabia, the world’s most puritanical Muslim nation where soccer was banned until 1951. The ruling denounced the game as an infidel invention and redrafted its internationally recognized International Football Association Board (IFAB) rules to differentiate it from that of the heretics. It banned words like foul, goal, and penalty and like shorts and T-shirts and ordered players to spit on anyone who scored a goal. 

James M. Dorsey is a senior fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore and the author of the blog, The Turbulent World of Middle East Soccer.

Politischer Islam: Zwischen politischer Kultur und Terrorismus

by Pascal Gemperli

French women groups protest FIFA decision to endorse hijab

by James M. Dorsey

By James M. Dorsey

Three French women’s organizations have expressed concern and disappointment with world... more By James M. Dorsey

Three French women’s organizations have expressed concern and disappointment with world soccer body FIFA’s endorsement of a proposal to lift the ban on women players wearing a hijab, an Islamic hair dress, on the pitch.

“To accept a special dress code for women athletes not only introduces discrimination among athletes but is contrary to the rules governing sport movement, setting a same dress code for all athletes without regard to origin or belief,” the three organizations said in an open letter to FIFA president Sepp Blatter.

Anne Sugier, president of the League of International Women’s Rights (LDIF) founded by Simone de Beauvoire, said in an email that she had sent the letter together with the heads of FEMIX’SPORTS and the French Coordination for the European Women’s Lobby, following publication on December 19 of the FIFA executive committee decision in The Turbulent World of Middle East Soccer.

FIFA endorsed at its December 16-17 executive committee meeting in Tokyo  the proposal to lift a controversial ban on women wearing a hijab in a move that brings closer a resolution to demands by religious female Islamic soccer players that they be allowed to wear a headdress in line with their interpretation of their faith.

FIFA said it would submit the proposal put forward by Asian Football Confederation (AFC) vice president Prince Ali Bin Al Hussein, a half-brother of Jordanian King Abdullah, to the International Football Association Board (IFAB), which governs the rules of association soccer.

IFAB is expected to discuss the proposal that calls for the sanctioning of a safe, velcro-opening headscarf for players and officials at its next scheduled meeting on March 3. England alongside FIFA, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland form the secretive IFAB.

The FIFA endorsement follows an earlier approval of the AFC proposal that resulted from a workshop convened in October in Amman by Prince Ali that was attended by prominent soccer executives, women players and coaches, including head of FIFA’s medical committee Michel D’Hooghe, AFC vice president Moya Dodd, members of FIFA’s women committee and representatives of the soccer bodies of Jordan, Bahrain, Iran and England.

The dispute over observant Muslim women player's headdress led in June to the disqualification of the Iranian women’s national team after they appeared on the pitch in the Jordanian capital Amman for a 2012 London Olympics qualifier against Jordan wearing the hijab. Three Jordanian players who wear the hijab were also barred.

The three women’s organizations said FIFA’s acquiesce in the AFC’s assertion that the hijab, a headdress that complies with Islamic law that obliges women to cover their hair, ears and neck, as a “cultural rather than a religious symbol” and therefore did not violate IFAB rules was unacceptable.

The letter suggests that FIFA and AFC efforts to reach a compromise between world soccer rules and Islamic law followed by conservative female Muslim players was, likely to meet resistance from non-Muslim women’s and feminist groups. It is a battle between value systems in which conservative female Muslim players demand a right and non-Muslim women activists seek to impose what they see as a universal value.

Ironically, the two opposing groups may find common ground when it comes to Iran, which welcomed world soccer’s efforts to seek a compromise, but is likely to remain in the firing line because of its imposition of the hijab on its players rather than allowing it to be an individual voluntary decision. Iran is further likely to run afoul of world soccer because of its insistence that visiting foreign women soccer teams dress in accordance with the Islamic republic’s interpretation of Islamic law.

The three women’s organizations charged that the FIFA decision constituted an effort to kowtow to the most conservative Islamic states, presumably a reference to Iran and Saudi Arabia, which effectively bans women’s sports.

“To pretend that hijab is a cultural and not a religious symbol is not only preposterous, but untrue… You neither can put aside the fact that the conflict that has opposed FIFA to the Iranian regime is linked to Tehran’s will to impose its own religious law to women’s sport,” the organizations said in their letter.

They charged that Iran rather than seeing the hijab as a cultural symbol was seeking  “to impose a political religious outfit for women, that covers entirely their body… Sport must stay clear of political and religious interfering. Its aim also is to eliminate all forms of discrimination. FIFA ruling is about to abandon this noble aim and FIFA will be accountable for that,” the organizations said.

James M. Dorsey is a senior fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore and the author of the blog, The Turbulent World of Middle East Soccer.

The Nature of Necessity in the Just War Theories of The West and Islam

by Eric Gallager

The second paper I wrote for my Peace Studies class with Professor Irene Oh in the fall semester of my junior year at GWU.

In this paper I argue that the argument of necessity serves similar purposes in the just war theories of both the West... more In this paper I argue that the argument of necessity serves similar purposes in the just war theories of both the West and Islam, and that what differs between how it is used in each is what exactly constitutes "necessity."