THe RIghts of Irregular Combatants
Defense Intelligence Journal, vol. 2, no. 1, (spr 2011): 35-49
What sort of rights are due terrorism suspects? What sort of rights are due terrorism suspects?
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The American Experience in Irregular War: From Practice to Policy, and Back Again
The American Experience in Irregular War: From Practice to Policy, and Back Again
Thesis Summary
Thesis Summary
Jason S. Alexander
America has a long and robust experience with irregular warfare. It is no stranger to insurgency or counterinsurgency. In fact, America was born of insurgency and has remained engaged in such irregular endeavors for centuries. It may even be argued that America is as much shaped by irregular conflict, such as the Indian Wars or Vietnam, as it is by conventional wars, including such wars as World War I, World War II and Korea.
However, America has had mixed results with irregular war. Before the modern age of irregular warfare, corresponding with Mao’s arrival as an insurgency leader and thinker, America maintained a strong record of success in irregular war, utilizing overwhelming military force to defeat adversaries. Such pre-Maoist successes include the Indian Wars, the Philippines, and event the eventual defeat of Civil War era Confederate guerrillas and revolutionaries. However, once modern insurgency emerged, with the Maoist theories of harnessing the adversary’s strength and turning perceived strengths into weaknesses (i.e., the Maoist approach to irregular war advocates merging military, populist, and political approaches), America has struggled in irregular conflict. Once Mao demonstrated that a weaker side can emerge victorious through this new and more comprehensive approach to conflict, America lost in Vietnam and then sought to avoid overt counterinsurgency warfare in general. However, global events pulled the U.S. back into global irregular war following September 11th, and the U.S. entered Iraq and Afghanistan in large scale only to be quickly confronted by growing populist based insurgencies mirroring Maoist-styled conflict. America slowly responded after years of floundering in both countries, rewriting and re-evaluating the entire American approach to counterinsurgency and stabilization. However, the conclusion of both Iraq and Afghanistan are still in doubt despite these major shifts in thinking. Further, the outcome for both countries still remains unknown despite tremendous amounts of resources that have poured into the countries as part of the new approach to irregular war. This thesis seeks to explain why the modern American approach to irregular conflict has proven unsuccessful since Vietnam and continuing today.
The rethinking of irregular warfare has developed new approaches to irregular war. One such approach is that the U.S. needs to better understand how to perform counterinsurgency at the grassroots practitioner level rather than driven by theory and doctrine aimed at merely reshaping strategic level thought. In addition, the new approach argues for an agreed upon and uniformly practiced methodology across the U.S. agencies working in irregular conflict environments. America’s historical record of irregular warfare reflects methodology that has been ad hoc at best and performed in stilted fashion due to competing strategies dependent upon constantly changing leadership. But new methodology has emerged, which consolidates “best practices” throughout history, and advocates a deeper and more refined understanding of the local population, placing population grievances as paramount to achieving success. This nascent methodology argues that the practitioner must focus on the local levels, have a comprehensive approach to uncover “sources of instability” (i.e., primary grievances driving violence), and that all U.S. government agencies and affiliated organizations in the conflict must coordinate and integrate for the sake of enhanced continuity and synchronization. Otherwise, those organizations and agencies tasked with performing counterinsurgency and stabilization risk working at cross-purposes, perpetuating, and even driving conflict with misapplied funding and programming. Further, the emerging methodology has consequences not only applicable to irregular conflict, but transcends beyond existing conflict, potentially assisting in humanitarian intervention, pre- and post-conflict environments. In short, the new methodology argues that it is in everyone’s interest to understand and mitigate conflict before local conflicts become war, and once peace is restored to maintain that peace.
The introduction of the thesis evaluates how and why insurgencies have become so prominent in the world today. The introduction begins by discussing the frequently nuanced intricacies that define irregular war, such as turning the adversary’s strengths into weaknesses and the critical concept of “human terrain.” Both concepts advocate that in irregular conflict “winning” the population is significantly more important than capturing physical terrain. Secondly, the introduction discusses why insurgency is so important to the American “way of war.” The chapter illustrates that not only has irregular war given birth to the American nation (i.e., American Revolutionary War), but it has always been a far more prominent form of war for America than conventional conflict. This is particularly the case in the modern age with the growing abundance of small, fragile, and fractured nation-states. Therefore, from a strategic as well as American historical and cultural perspective, irregular conflict is arguably more important than any other form of conflict in the modern world.
Chapter I discusses the topic of the American historical experience in irregular conflict. The chapter illustrates that the American war experience is defined as much or more by irregular conflict as it has by large conventional wars with which Americans closely identify. The chapter uses as case studies the most prominent irregular conflicts, such as the American Revolutionary War (a study which examines America as the revolutionary insurgents); the American Civil War (with special focus on the popularly-supported Confederate guerrillas); the Indian Wars; the Philippines campaign; the Small Wars years (i.e., the early 20th Century campaign throughout Latin America), and Vietnam. The current engagements such as Iraq and Afghanistan are discussed in detail throughout the following two chapters. The intent of this chapter is to provide the reader with an understanding that America has a long history with irregular war and has approached such conflict in a wide variety of ways, the lessons of which are promptly forgotten, or never documented, following the conflict.
Chapter II begins the examination of policy and practice of the American style and approach to irregular conflict. In the previous chapters the thesis argues that the American approach to such conflict was ad hoc at best and largely driven by key individuals rather than a stable policy and based on sound principles. In this chapter, the thesis narrative advocates moving beyond ad hoc approaches, which are counterproductive to irregular conflict and often drives the conflict rather than ameliorating the extant conflict factors. Due to American irregular war “ad-hocisms,” U.S. involvement often made a troubled situation worse and frequently reduced the chance for earlier conflict resolution during the conflict. In turn, with unmitigated conflict ongoing within the population, insurgencies were able to further de-legitimize U.S. supported governments and create new opportunities to win popular support for themselves and their cause. In order to deal with these challenges, the chapter examines the new and innovative methodology called the District Stability Framework (DSF), which seeks to understand the local population’s grievances, design population-focused programs, and measure the effect of these programs. The DSF methodology is keened focused on mitigation of local level grievances and conflict drivers, based on the theory that the reduction of local conflict drivers will ultimately undermine insurgent influence upon the population. Further, the chapter demonstrates that the DSF methodology is an effective approach to coordinate and synchronize interagency efforts in irregular conflict environments, ensuring efforts are aligned and working toward common objectives.
Chapter III moves beyond the nuts-and-bolts of the structure, approach, and constraints of the DSF methodology and examines the wider applications and implications of the methodology. This chapter views the topic of stabilizing fragile, failing and failed states from a much wider lens arguing that just as the U.S. requires a common interagency approach to states dealing with irregular conflict; it also requires a common approach to humanitarian assistance, pre-conflict, and post-conflict states. This chapter argues that the DSF can serve as the appropriate methodological platform on which to build the interagency approach. As such, the chapter argues that the appropriate approach to instability and fragility must be a focus on integrating civil and military capabilities, defining a common methodology to identify local sources of instability, devising and implementing activities to diminish them, and measuring their effectiveness in stabilizing the area. Fortunately, a new approach based on historical “best practices” now exists in the form of the DSF. If effectively applied, the DSF has the potential to mitigate current conflict and guide humanitarian assistance to greater effect, both of which have the potential to save lives in the future.
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It's become trite to state that the solution for U.S. involvement in Afghanistan is "political," and not... more It's become trite to state that the solution for U.S. involvement in Afghanistan is "political," and not solely "military," in nature. Both Presidents Bush and Obama made the case that the purpose of U.S. and coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan was to provide a security space allowing for national and local governance to take hold and grow. But while President Bush found five brigades to surge into Iraq and President Obama committed 30,000 additional forces to Afghanistan, neither President could find adequate numbers of —foreign and civil servants to accompany our men and women in uniform. U.S. non-military civilian numbers in both countries remain low. One senior official estimated that U.S. civilian personnel in Afghanistan total around 1,000 strong, just one percent of the military footprint in that country. Even now, most of these are found in the crowded embassy in the capital. If the U.S. is serious about winning the war in Afghanistan through a political solution, Congress should change current law and begin to draft civil servants with the right skill sets and training for national objectives abroad.
Rebuilding the Force: Unconventional Advisory Forces in Counterinsurgency
Small Wars Journal, Small Wars Foundation 2010
The United States Military strategy is in the midst of the largest disarray since the ending of the cold war with... more The United States Military strategy is in the midst of the largest disarray since the ending of the cold war with global communism in the early 1990s. US Ground forces are now split between two competing and divergent missions: Counterinsurgency Warfare and the projection of High Intensity Combat (HIC) capabilities to its potential adversaries. Even as Army and Marine brigade commanders prepare for their missions in Iraq and Afghanistan, they try to retain one set of HIC skills while learning an entirely new skill-set necessary for the unconventional nature of countering insurgent warfare. Most senior conventional brigade commanders do not believe that they can do both successfully, and their use in one (COIN), renders them less than capable in the other (HIC). Finally, the sheer financial costs of breaking and rebuilding conventional force units for their (mis)use in COIN advisory missions will certainly result in decreased COIN mission performance as well as decreased levels of deterrence of the remaining political states hostile to US interests and objectives. Given the reality that our military and diplomatic forces will be tasked with operating in both the unconventional and conventional theaters of conflict for decades to come, a rebalancing of forces against these mission sets is now a stark requirement that we must accomplish sooner rather than later.
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Seen by:Meeting the Irregular Warfare Challenge: Developing an Interdisciplinary Approach to Asymmetrical Warfare
One of the most profound political-social developments affecting warfare and political violence is the nexus between... more One of the most profound political-social developments affecting warfare and political violence is the nexus between state legitimacy and the type of warfare facing the United States today. The recently released Quadrennial Defense Review now recognizes that Irregular Warfare of the type we are now dealing with is based upon a challenge to the legitimacy of governance and the cultural identities it protects and propagates. Increasingly, the Department of Defense is calling upon the SOF community to step up in this war against cultural extremists that use organized violence to contest the legitimacy of governing institutions. To meet the growing expectations of Army SOF, we must rebalance our doctrinal foundations with emerging knowledge gained from interdisciplinary studies of the social sciences. The Irregular Warfare challenge mounted by our adversaries dictates an evolution in the understanding of conflict origination and our responses to it.
Winning Damaged Hearts and Minds: An Irregular Warfare Concept
By Brigadier General David L. Grange, Scott Swanson, and Lieutenant Colonel Patrick Christian
In ungoverned and under-governed environments, the local populace is usually the center of gravity. Other centers of... more
In ungoverned and under-governed environments, the local populace is usually the center of gravity. Other centers of gravity within the population may include the will of the people that takes form as support for the governing authority or other political, economic and ideological forces. To win their hearts and minds and wean them off our adversaries’ control requires effective communication using the local “information systems.” Effective communications at the local level earns trust, which, in turn, establishes loyalty to our cause, commitment, and eventually buy-in to the regime we support. It also requires a focus on the local economic ecosystem that delves down to the community level, improves basic prosperity, honors local culture, and reinforces what’s important to the people. It requires a focus on the local political system that respects local codes, social networks, and empowers local leaders that eventually will connect to the state, region, and national political system.
Our goal must be to establish capabilities that support the creation of enduring, safe, and secure environments with local participation and responsibility. We want to develop Community Internal Defense (CID) participation with local, state, and foreign governmental and civilian agencies with, and for, the people with the purpose of protecting its citizens. This community provides a safe and secure environment, economic and social well-being, effective governance, human rights, and rule of law with a capacity to counter lawlessness. This is similar to the end-state of America’s historic “Wild West” communities.
On Losing and Getting A Head: Warfare, Exchange and Alliance in a Changing Sumba 1888-1988
The taking of bloody heads in vengeance raids on neighboring peoples defined the
parameters of leadership and... more
The taking of bloody heads in vengeance raids on neighboring peoples defined the
parameters of leadership and political relations on the Eastern Indonesian island
of Sumba a century ago. After pacification in the 1920s, exchange values of fierceness,
military skill, and violent conquest were transformed into modern ones of
rivalrous diplomacy, feasting, and alliance. Yoseph Malo, a prominent figure in
these transformations, decided to negotiate with his former enemies for the return
of his father's head. Details of this negotiation bring into question the relations
between systems of headhunting and alliance, the status of exchange as a transformative
activity, and the analytical definition of persons and objects, gifts and
commodities. The biography of an important figure in Sumbanese history is linked
to the "biography" of a severed head, as well as the "life histories" of persons and
objects on which he bestowed ritual names. Through a reevaluation of the role of
exchange in determining value, a new perspective is suggested on how persons
and things change their identities as they move through time. [history, exchange
theory, headhunting, alliance, Eastern Indonesia]
The asymmetric war discourse and its moral economies: a critique
by Yves Winter
published in International Theory 3 (3) 2011: 488-514
Contemporary military conflicts are frequently referred to as ‘new’, ‘irregular’, or ‘asymmetric’, labels that are... more
Contemporary military conflicts are frequently referred to as ‘new’, ‘irregular’, or ‘asymmetric’, labels that are meant to distinguish contemporary conflict formations from previous ones. Yet the language of asymmetry is not just a conveniently vague gloss for a variety of conflicts; it also introduces a normative schema that moralizes and depoliticizes the difference between states and non-state actors. The description of contemporary conflicts as asymmetric allows states to be portrayed as victims of non-state actors, as vulnerable to strategic constellations they ostensibly cannot win. ‘Asymmetry’ is today's idiom to distinguish between civilized and uncivilized warfare, an idiom that converts ostensibly technological or strategic differences between state and non-state actors into moral and civilizational hierarchies. Furthermore, the claim that these types of conflicts are new is used to justify attempts to revisit and rewrite the international laws of armed conflicts. While such attempts are unlikely to succeed in the formal arena, informally, a transformation of the international normative order is already underway. At the heart of this transformation is how states interpret a key cornerstone of international humanitarian law: the principle of discrimination between combatants and civilians.
Fairness and Liability in the Just War: Combatants, Non-Combatants, and Lawful Irregulars
Forthcoming in Political Studies. For a slightly earlier version of the essay, please follow the link.
Critics of non-uniformed ‘irregular’ warfare argue that it is unfair both to non-combatants and to enemy ‘regulars’. I... more Critics of non-uniformed ‘irregular’ warfare argue that it is unfair both to non-combatants and to enemy ‘regulars’. I contest that view by asking how the leaders of a people forced to fight a just war should distribute risks within their own population. Insofar as all are the victims of aggression or unjust occupation, I argue, no citizens on the just side are morally liable to attack. But to benefit from the restraining effects of the principle of discrimination, some members must be rendered legally liable. Political leaders must therefore find the most appropriate distribution of the risk of harm, first, by deciding which and how many citizens to select as ‘combatants’; and second, by specifying how far to distance combatants from civilians. I identify four normative considerations that must be taken into account: each possible arrangement must (1) fulfil basic requirements of fairness domestically; then, between equally fair arrangements, leaders ought to determine which offers the most auspicious balance between (2) the goal of survival during the war (of the society and as many of its members as possible) and (3) the goal of winning it and, hence, eliminating the injustices that caused the war; finally (4) the arrangement should not be unfair to enemy combatants. On this basis, I argue that in spite of the increased risks it poses to civilians, limited ‘irregular’ warfare might be deployed legitimately against occupiers where the use of uniforms would have rendered insurgents vulnerable to targeted assassination or arrest prior to actual combat.
Guerrillas in the Midst: US Planning, Advisory, and Training Team helps Colombian Army build skills
US Army Special John F Kennedy Special Warfare Center & School, Special Warfare Journal, Summer 2007
Extract:
Tuesday, Aug. 22, 2006 Municipality o Villagarzon, Department o Putumayo, southern
Colombia — Villagers report rantically to the commander o the
“Domingo Rico” inantry battalion, based outside Villagarzon, that
armed insurgents rom the 32nd Front o the Armed Revolutionary
Forces o Colombia, or FARC, are kidnapping everyone passing along
the main road leading south rom Villagazon to Puerto Asis. The
guerrillas are taking the travelers hostage and confscating their cars and
possessions, and the police, outmanned and outgunned, have requested
military assistance …
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US Army John F Kennedy Special Warfare Center & School, Special Warfare Journal, March 2006
As the world and regional security environments call increasingly for action
under coalition and... more
As the world and regional security environments call increasingly for action
under coalition and intergovernmental auspices, an emerging advisory role is
forming for the Army special-operations community. In these roles, perhaps
more than in any others, ARSOF Soldiers will be called on to put all of their
skills to the test. In these advisory roles, Soldiers will operate in isolation, with
few or no support personnel. They will have to work side by side with coalition
soldiers who do not speak their language and have no experience with their
technology. Often times, they will be called on not only to keep the peace, but
to broker it.
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