Intuition

ICCM Symposium on Cognitive Modeling of Processes Beyond Rational

by Bill Kennedy

One mode of human decision-making is considered intuitive,
i.e., unconscious situational pattern recognition.... more One mode of human decision-making is considered intuitive,
i.e., unconscious situational pattern recognition. Implicit
statistical learning, which involves the sampling of
invariances from the environment and is known to involve
procedural (i.e., non-declarative) memory, has been shown to
be a foundation of this mode of decision making. We present
an ACT-R model of implicit learning whose implementation
entailed a declarative memory-based learner of the
classification of example strings of an artificial grammar. The
model performed very well when compared to humans. The
fact that the simulation of implicit learning could not be
implemented in a straightforward way via a non-declarative
memory approach, but rather required a declarative memory based implementation, suggests that the conceptualization of
procedural memory in the ACT-R framework may need to be
expanded to include abstract representations of statistical
regularities. Our approach to the development and testing of
models in ACT-R can be used to predict the development of
intuitive decision-making in humans.

Modeling Intuitive Decision Making in ACT-R

by Bill Kennedy

One mode of human decision-making is considered intuitive,
i.e., unconscious situational pattern recognition.... more One mode of human decision-making is considered intuitive,
i.e., unconscious situational pattern recognition. Implicit
statistical learning, which involves the sampling of
invariances from the environment and is known to involve
procedural (i.e., non-declarative) memory, has been shown to
be a foundation of this mode of decision making. We present
an ACT-R model of implicit learning whose implementation
entailed a declarative memory-based learner of the
classification of example strings of an artificial grammar. The
model performed very well when compared to humans. The
fact that the simulation of implicit learning could not be
implemented in a straightforward way via a non-declarative
memory approach, but rather required a declarative memory based implementation, suggests that the conceptualization of
procedural memory in the ACT-R framework may need to be
expanded to include abstract representations of statistical
regularities. Our approach to the development and testing of
models in ACT-R can be used to predict the development of
intuitive decision-making in humans.

Philosophie des mathématiques

by Jacques Dubucs

Avec D. Bonnay, in A. Barberousse, D. Bonnay @ M. Cozic (eds.), Précis de Philosophie des Sciences, Paris, Vuibert, 2011

INTUITION IN MATHEMATICS?

by Carlo Penco

The Knowing Body: Nishida's Philosophy of Active Intuition (Kōiteki chokkan)

by Matteo Cestari

Published in "The Eastern Buddhist", Vol. XXXI, No. 2, 1998, pp. 179-208.

Inviting Intuitive Understandings in Teaching and Professional Practices: Is Intuition Relationally and Culturally Neutral?

by Gonzalo Bacigalupe

Forum Qualitative Sozialforschung / Forum: Qualitative Social Research, 3(4), Art. 51 (2002)

Review Essay:

Terry Atkinson & Guy Claxton (Eds.) (2000). The Intuitive Practitioner: On the Value of... more Review Essay:

Terry Atkinson & Guy Claxton (Eds.) (2000). The Intuitive Practitioner: On the Value of Not Always Knowing What One is Doing. Buckingham, UK: Open University Press, 278 + ix pages, ISBN 0335-20362-0 (paperback), £18.99
To analyze the construct of intuition, Terry ATKINSON and Guy CLAXTON draw from the research, teaching experiences, and theoretical expertise of faculty at the University of Bristol, UK. The fourteen chapters by the faculty at Bristol explore the often slippery notion of "intuition" and its impact in professional practice, which is generally (and there are exceptions) defined as a cognitive psychological strategy rather than a relational and cultural exchange. The last chapter is a critical summary by ERAUT who assesses the book as an outsider to Bristol. The book reads like a final report of discussions and research by the authors within a university context rather than a cohesive theoretical summary by a sole author. The result is inspiring as a review of overlapping ideas that inform the reader of the relevance of intuition in educational and professional settings within the context of educational reforms during the last decade in several countries. It will not be compelling reading for professionals attempting to learn a set of activities that would aid them in learning how to incorporate "intuitive practices" or for researchers searching for ways of clearly formalizing intuition as a well-defined theoretical construct that can be analyzed in various cultural contexts and/or institutional situations.

Juhus, intuitsioon ja loovus kui õppimise pärisosa (Chance, intuition and creativity as the essential part of learning)

by Evelin Tamm

Education is much more than the teacher-led rationally planned activities. In this critical article I write about... more Education is much more than the teacher-led rationally planned activities. In this critical article I write about chance, intuition and creativity as something that every teachers can embrace instead of pretending as if it is not there. How to change your educational practices according to the changes that happen in the society?

I am currently thinking of translating some of my articles to English. If you are interested about the topics of this article, let me know so I have more motivation.

An Updated Perspective of the Hunch in Judicial Decision Making

by Diana Constantinescu

Please do not cite without permission. Feedback most welcome!

Will be presented at the "New Frontiers of Legal Realism: American, Scandinavian, European, Global" international conference in Copenhagen, 29-30 May 2012 (http://jura.ku.dk/crs/english/calendar/new-frontiers-of-legal-realism/)

In this essay I wish to approach an issue which is consistently disregarded in current jurisprudential debates – the... more In this essay I wish to approach an issue which is consistently disregarded in current jurisprudential debates – the issue of the judicial hunch. I wish to argue that hunches and intuitions happen much more often than we think; they are present at all levels of the judiciary, in easy and hard cases, at all levels of expertise. In fact, my argument goes stronger than that: hunches are an essential component of the act of judging. I also wish to show that “legal reasoning”, if it has to be used properly, designates but part of the judicial decisionmaking process, and it has less importance than legal theorists usually give it.

In our judicial decisionmaking discussion I wish to introduce two new types of theories which are useful in understanding what judicial hunches are and what role they play in the act of judging. The first one is already widely accepted in psychology and has strong supporting evidence from neuroscience; I will call it the fast/slow thinking distinction. The second theory is based on recent neurological findings and represents the new psychological paradigm of intuition. It tries to answer questions and dilemmas which legal theorists will find familiar: Is intuition rational or emotional? Do feelings influence intuition? Is intuition a process or a result? What role does professional expertise have in intuition? Are intuitions “accurate”? And the list could go on. The applicability of these theories to judicial decisionmaking will become apparent once I flesh them out in the paper.


I thank Prof Stephen Guest (UCL), Prof Fred Schauer (Virginia), Prof Veronica Rodriguez-Blanco (Birmingham/EUI) and John Rumbold (Keel) for providing precious feedback which will lead to an improved version soon.

Teoriopoznawcze i kognitywistyczne wyzwania matematycznego platonizmu [Epistemological and Cognitivistic Challenges of Mathematical Platonism]

by Mateusz Hohol

co-authored with Wojciech P. Grygiel, published in: "Logos and Ethos" 2009, vol. 27, no. 2, pp. 25-42.

A New Hope for Philosophers’ Appeal to Intuition

by Damián Szmuc

Essays in Philosophy: Vol. 13: Iss. 1, Philosophical Methodology.

Some recent researches in experimental philosophy have posed a problem for philosophers’ appeal to intuition... more Some recent researches in experimental philosophy have posed a problem for philosophers’ appeal to intuition (hereinafter referred to as PAI); the aim of this paper is to offer an answer to this challenge. The thesis against PAI implies that, given some experimental results, intuition does not seem to be a reliable
epistemic source, and —more importantly— given the actual state of knowledge about its operation, we do not have sufficient resources to mitigate its errors and thus establish its reliability. That is why PAI is hopeless. Throughout this paper I will defend my own conception of PAI, which I have called the Deliberative
Conception, and consequently, I will defend intersubjective agreement as a means to mitigate PAI errors, offering empirical evidence from recent studies on the Argumentative Theory of Reason that favor the conception I defend here. Finally, I will reply to some objections that might arise against the Deliberative Conception, which will lead me to discuss some metaphilosophical issues that are significantly relevant for the
future of the dispute about the appeal to intuition.

The power of intuitive thinking: a devalued heuristic of strategic marketing

by Anthony Patterson

Historically, the value of intuition in strategic marketing has been devalued. Consequently, the aim of this paper is... more Historically, the value of intuition in strategic marketing has been devalued. Consequently, the aim of this paper is to investigate empirically and articulate the ways in which the heuristic of intuition can prove, and is proving, helpful to marketing managers involved in making strategic-level decisions. Drawing upon extensive interviews conducted with marketing managers, we explore the extent to which intuitive insights are privileged over systematic, rational, logical evaluations. Our data evidence how intuition-led decision making becomes a powerful tool in instances where there is a paucity of data, when options are manifold, when the future is uncertain and when the logic of strategic choice needs to be confirmed. Ultimately, the paper seeks to place a new and affirmative subjectivity within the realm of marketing strategy that respects and legitimises the power of intuitive insight.

Bealer and the Autonomy of Philosophy

by Alex Sarch

George Bealer has provided an elaborate defense of the practice of appealing to intuition in philosophy. In the... more George Bealer has provided an elaborate defense of the practice of appealing to intuition in philosophy. In the present paper, I argue that his defense fails. First, I argue that Bealer’s theory of determinate concept possession, even if true, would not establish the “autonomy” of philosophy. That is, even if he is correct about what determinate concept possession consists in, it would not follow that it is possible to answer the central questions of philosophy by critical reflection on our intuitions. Furthermore, I argue that Bealer’s account of determinate concept possession in fact faces serious problems. Accordingly, I conclude that Bealer does not succeed in vindicating the appeal to intuition in philosophy.

Why shouldn't we be afraid of scepticism about intuitions?

by Péter Hartl

Second Draft,
Talk:
Salzburg Conference for Young Analytic Philosophy 2011
September 8-10, 2011
Department of Philosophy (Humanities) at the University of Salzburg

Do I have more free will than you do?

by Brian Earp

Earp, B. D. (2011). Do I have more free will than you do? An unexpected asymmetry in intuitions about personal freedom. New School Psychology Bulletin, Vol. 9, No. 21, 34-40.

The present research explores the relationship between moral evaluations and intuitions about the causes of human... more The present research explores the relationship between moral evaluations and intuitions about the causes of human behavior, in particular freedom of the will. Two studies test for a self-serving bias in intuitions about free will. Study 1 explores whether individuals may seek to exculpate themselves from wrongdoing by denying free will, while justifying blame of others by endorsing free will. Study 2 explores whether individuals may justify personal failures by denying free will, while taking credit for personal successes by endorsing free will. In neither study do the data show the predicted differences between conditions. However, an unexpected finding is reported. By pooling the data from both experiments and collapsing across conditions, it is shown that participants give greater endorsement of free will whenever actions are described from a first-person, instead of third-person, perspective—a tentative “I have more free will than you do” effect. Possible explanations for these findings are discussed, as are avenues for further research on this topic.

Intuition et finitude dans la lecture heideggérienne de Kant

by Maria Hotes

Référence complète :
Maria Hotes (2012). « Intuition et finitude dans la lecture heideggérienne de Kant », in Revue Phares, vol. 12, Hiver 2012, pp. 77-101.

La version finale est disponible sur le site de la revue : [http://www.ulaval.ca/phares/vol12-hiver12/texte05.html].

Understanding Intuition: The Case for Two Forms of Intuition

by Viktor Dörfler

Viktor Dörfler - Fran Ackermann
Management Learning, ()
2012

Since the recent rejuvenation of intuition research within the management literature, significant work has been done... more Since the recent rejuvenation of intuition research within the management literature, significant work has been done on conceptualizing intuition. Whilst remarkable progress has been achieved concerning many aspects of intuition, the role of intuition in creativity remains comparatively under-researched. Through an extensive review of intuition literature, including but also going beyond the management field, we believe that a reason for this could be that intuition in the management literature is generally conceptualized as judgement. In this paper we aim to extend our understanding of intuition in creativity by distinguishing between intuitive judgment and intuitive insight. Augmenting the literature and further strengthening the case this paper builds off two previous research projects. The first project focuses on presenting a comprehensive set of features of intuition based on the literature and the second builds a conceptual model of knowledge types. Further informing the research presented in this paper is Polanyi’s distinction of focal and subsidiary awareness. These four considerations lead us to propose that there are two distinct kinds of intuition – intuitive judgement and intuitive insight.

Piercing the Veil of Language: How to Achieve Intuitive Knowledge in Meditative Reading

by Bill Trusiewicz

Part I of a two-part article published in "Starlight," the Sophia Foundation of North America newsletter, vol. 8, No 2, Fall 2008

Piercing the Veil of Language: How to Achieve Intuitive Knowledge in Meditative Reading, Part I, is the first of two... more Piercing the Veil of Language: How to Achieve Intuitive Knowledge in Meditative Reading, Part I, is the first of two articles, in which a groundwork is laid upon which intuitive knowledge may be achieved.

Two prerequisites are discussed: a courage to face ambiguity, paradoxes and the like; and the ability to make a distinction between merely abstract ideas, what often masquerades as higher perception, and the "real thing."

Following this, eight suggestions are offered towards understanding what meditative reading involves.

A Priori Knowledge in Perspective: (I) Mathematics, Method and Pure Intuition

by Stephen Palmquist

The Review of Metaphysics 41:1 (September 1987), pp.3-22.

This article is mainly a critique of Philip Kitcher's book, The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge. Four weaknesses in... more This article is mainly a critique of Philip Kitcher's book, The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge. Four weaknesses in Kitcher's objection to Kant arise out of Kitcher's failure to recognize the perspectival nature of Kant's position. A proper understanding of Kant's theory of mathematics requires awareness of the perspectival nuances implicit in Kant's theory of pure intuition. (Apologies that the pdf of this article was prepared with every other page upside down. Take it as an opportunity to practice changing one's perspective!)

Trait emotional intelligence and preference for intuition and deliberation: Respective influence on academic performance

by Sylvain Laborde

When to Blink and When to Think: Preference for Intuitive Decisions Results in Faster and Better Tactical Choices

by Sylvain Laborde