Introspection

Deep, Dark,...or Transparent? Knowing Our Desires

by Lauren Ashwell

Critique of an Argument for the Reality of Purpose

by Danny Frederick

Forthcoming, Prolegomena: Journal of Philosophy

Schueler has argued, against the eliminativist, that human purposive action cannot be an illusion because the concept... more Schueler has argued, against the eliminativist, that human purposive action cannot be an illusion because the concept of purpose is not theoretical. He argues that the concept is known directly to be instantiated, through self-awareness; and that to maintain that the concept is theoretical involves an infinite regress. I show that Schueler’s argument fails because all our concepts are theoretical in the sense that we may be mistaken in applying them to our experience. As a consequence, it is conceivable that direct introspection of an event as a purposive action may be mistaken. I indicate ways in which the eliminativist may be able to explain why our perception and introspection is afflicted with systematic error.

Language in self-observation

by Brady Wagoner

Wagoner, B. (2012). Language in self observation. In J. Clegg (ed.), Self Observation in the Human Sciences. Charlotte, N.C.: Transaction Publishers.

This chapter is divided into three parts: First, a brief history of the early laboratories using self-observation is... more This chapter is divided into three parts: First, a brief history of the early laboratories using self-observation is given, focusing on how various linguistic practices and social relationships among experimenter and observer shaped their results. Second, I outline an argument for studying mind as it becomes embodied in a public material medium and the influence of others and social institutions on the operation and observation of mind. Finally, I will use ideas developed here to critique and redevelop contemporary psychology’s most widely used and perhaps (willfully) least understood method of self-observation, rating scales. The act of rating will be shown to involve a dialogical process of linguistic sense making, and as such the idea that rating scales provide unitary access to some inherently quantifiable mental state will have to be abandoned. Instead, rating scales can be used as tools to explore the context sensitive dynamics of research participants’ meaning making.

Corpora and introspection as corroborating evidence: The case of preposition placement in English relative clauses

by Thomas Hoffmann

2006. Corpus Linguistics and Linguistic Theory 2,2: 165-195.

While McEnery and Wilson (1996: 16) argue for a combination of introspection and corpus data, many linguists still... more While McEnery and Wilson (1996: 16) argue for a combination of introspection and corpus data, many linguists still only draw on either of the two data sources. In this article I will show that treating the two types of data as corroborating evidence allows a far more detailed analysis of the categorical and variable constraints governing syntactic variation than the two types of data would have allowed individually. To illustrate this point, I will present the results of a case study on preposition placement in English relative clauses which combines a statistical corpus analysis and a magnitude estimation grammaticality judgement experiment.

Casting a Critical" I" Over Caffreyʼs Irish Ale: Soft Words, Strongly Spoken

by Anthony Patterson

Consciousness and Metarepresentation: A Computational Sketch

by Bert Timmermans

Cleeremans A, Timmermans B, & Pasquali A (2007). Consciousness and metarepresentation: A computational sketch. Neural Networks, 20, 1032-9.

When one is conscious of something, one is also conscious that one is conscious. Higher-Order Thought Theory... more When one is conscious of something, one is also conscious that one is conscious. Higher-Order Thought Theory [Rosenthal, D. (1997). A theory of consciousness. In N. Block, O. Flanagan, & G. Güzeldere (Eds.), The nature of consciousness: Philosophical debates. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press] takes it that it is in virtue of the fact that one is conscious of being conscious, that one is conscious. Here, we ask what the computational mechanisms may be that implement this intuition. Our starting point is Clark and Karmiloff-Smith’s [Clark, A., & Karmiloff-Smith, A. (1993). The cognizer’s innards: A psychological and philosophical perspective on the development of thought. Mind and Language, 8, 487–519] point that knowledge acquired by a connectionist network always remains “knowledge in the network rather than knowledge for the network”. That is, while connectionist networks may become exquisitely sensitive to regularities contained in their input–output environment, they never exhibit the ability to access and manipulate this knowledge as knowledge: The knowledge can only be expressed through performing the task upon which the network was trained; it remains forever embedded in the causal pathways that developed as a result of training. To address this issue, we present simulations in which two networks interact. The states of a first-order network trained to perform a simple categorization task become input to a second-order network trained either as an encoder or on another categorization task. Thus, the second-order network “observes” the states of the first-order network and has, in the first case, to reproduce these states on its output units, and in the second case, to use the states as cues in order to solve the secondary task. This implements a limited form of metarepresentation, to the extent that the second-order network’s internal representations become re-representations of the first-order network’s internal states. We conclude that this mechanism provides the beginnings of a computational mechanism to account for mental attitudes, that is, an understanding by a cognitive system of the manner in which its first-order knowledge is held (belief, hope, fear, etc.). Consciousness, in this light, thus involves knowledge of the geography of one own’s internal representations — a geography that is itself learned over time as a result of an agent’s attributing value to the various experiences it enjoys through interaction with itself, the world, and others.

Introspective Minds: Using ALE meta-analyses to study commonalities in the neural correlates of emotional processing, social & unconstrained cognition

by Bert Timmermans

Schilbach L, Bzdok D, Timmermans B, Fox PT, Laird AR, Vogeley K, & Eickhoff SB. (2012). Introspective Minds: Using ALE meta-analyses to investigate commonalities in the neural correlates of emotional processing, social & unconstrained cognition. PLoS ONE 7(2): e30920.

Previous research suggests overlap between brain regions that show task-induced deactivations and those activated... more Previous research suggests overlap between brain regions that show task-induced deactivations and those activated during the performance of social-cognitive tasks. Here, we present results of quantitative meta-analyses of neuroimaging studies, which confirm a statistical convergence in the neural correlates of social and resting state cognition. Based on the idea that both social and unconstrained cognition might be characterized by introspective processes, which are also thought to be highly relevant for emotional experiences, a third meta-analysis was performed investigating studies on emotional processing. By using conjunction analyses across all three sets of studies, we can demonstrate significant overlap of task-related signal change in dorso-medial prefrontal and medial parietal cortex, brain regions that have, indeed, recently been linked to introspective abilities. Our findings, therefore, provide evidence for the existence of a core neural network, which shows task-related signal change during socio-emotional tasks and during resting states.

Art, ideology, and introspection

by Anthony Patterson

An fMRI study of the neural correlates of graded visual perception

by Thomas Zoëga Ramsøy

A Priori Infallibilism: Reply to Hoffmann

by Ted Parent

draft only

The present piece is a reply to G. Hoffmann on my (2007) infallibilist view of self-knowledge. Contra Hoffmann, it is... more The present piece is a reply to G. Hoffmann on my (2007) infallibilist view of self-knowledge. Contra Hoffmann, it is argued that the view is compatible with (i) strictly a priori justification, and (ii) the Quinean revisability of any belief, in light of new evidence.

Externalism and "Knowing What" One Thinks

by Ted Parent

draft only

Some worry that semantic externalism is incompatible with knowing via introspection what content your thoughts have.... more Some worry that semantic externalism is incompatible with knowing via introspection what content your thoughts have. In this paper, one primary argument is examined for this incompatibilist worry, the slow-switch argument. Following Goldberg, the argument is construed as problematizing an externalist’s skeptic immune knowledge of content (where this type of knowledge persists under various skeptical hypotheses). Goldberg attempts to reclaim such knowledge for the externalist by developing a strategy from Burge. Nevertheless, it is noted that such Burge-style accounts only address a subject’s ability to know that she is thinking that “water is wet.” They do not explicitly concern the subject’s ability to know what she is thinking, which is the distinctive type of knowing at issue in the slow-switch argument. Subsequently, however, the Burge-style view is recast so that the relevant “knowing what” has a chance against the argument. For one, it is emphasized that “knowing what” is intensional (one can know what a water thought is sans familiarity with H2O-thoughts). Second, the relevant “knowing what” is construed as ontologically non-committal (so that knowing what a water-thought is does not require knowing that water exists). Third, following Boër & Lycan, “knowing what” is understood as purpose relative, in that whether one “knows what” depends on whether one knows enough to achieve some contextually salient purpose/goal. And for at least some purposes, it seems an externalist can introspectively “know what” she thinks—even in a skeptical context.

A Simple Theory of Introspection

by Declan Smithies

Published in Introspection and Consciousness, edited by D. Smithies & D. Stoljar, Oxford University Press, 2012.

This chapter develops a simple theory of introspection on which a mental state is introspectively accessible just by... more This chapter develops a simple theory of introspection on which a mental state is introspectively accessible just by virtue of the fact that one is in that mental state. This theory raises two questions: first, a generalization question: which mental states are introspectively accessible; and second, an explanatory question: why are some mental states introspectively accessible, rather than others, or none at all? In response to the generalization question, I argue that a mental state is introspectively accessible if and only if it is phenomenally individuated. And in response to the explanatory question, I argue that a mental state is introspectively accessible if and only if it is among the determinants of justification. This provides the basis of an argument for a phenomenal conception of justification, according to which a mental state is among the determinants of justification if and only if it is phenomenally individuated.

A Simple Theory of Introspection

by Declan Smithies

Published in Introspection and Consciousness, edited by D. Smithies & D. Stoljar, Oxford University Press, 2012.

This chapter develops a simple theory of introspection on which a mental state is introspectively accessible just by... more This chapter develops a simple theory of introspection on which a mental state is introspectively accessible just by virtue of the fact that one is in that mental state. This theory raises two questions: first, a generalization question: which mental states are introspectively accessible; and second, an explanatory question: why are some mental states introspectively accessible, rather than others, or none at all? In response to the generalization question, I argue that a mental state is introspectively accessible if and only if it is phenomenally individuated. And in response to the explanatory question, I argue that a mental state is introspectively accessible if and only if it is among the determinants of justification. This provides the basis of an argument for a phenomenal conception of justification, according to which a mental state is among the determinants of justification if and only if it is phenomenally individuated.

Describing and modeling hypnagogic imagery using a systematic self-observation procedure (1995)

by Tore Nielsen

The published literature suggests that systematic self- observation may be a suitable method for clarifying the nature... more The published literature suggests that systematic self- observation may be a suitable method for clarifying the nature and correlates of hypnagogic imagery and thus a useful adjunct to psychophysiological and cognitive studies of sleep onset. The potential applicability of one recently proposed self-observation procedure (Nielsen, 1992) to such studies is demonstrated in the present work. The procedure permits numerous hypnagogic images to be collected during spontaneous drowsy periods occurring during the day. The observer sits in an upright, head-unsupported position, fixes an observational intent, and pays attention to internal events; images are observed, transcribed and then assessed for their likely memory sources. The procedure has been pilot-tested by the author in four exploratory studies comprising over 250 hypnagogic images. Neuromuscular events accompanying these images (e.g., head nods, leg jerks) and EEG correlates of the images are described. Certain distinctions among imagery types are suggested, e.g., fleeting vs. fully-formed, images with self movement vs. images with non-self movement. Silberer's conclusions regarding the 'autosymbolic' function of hypnagogic images are supported and extended by the results. Four types of memory element (immediate, short-, medium-, and long-term) appear to have contributed causally to the formation of these hypnagogic images and are illustrated. To demonstrate how the self- observational method may be used to model the formation of hypnagogic imagery from such memory sources, a single sample image and its multiple memory sources are described and analyzed in detail.

What are the memory sources of dreaming? (2005)

by Tore Nielsen

Inner Sense, Self-Affection, and Temporal Consciousness in Kant\'s Critique of Pure Reason

by Markos Valaris

What Certainty Teaches

by Tomas Bogardus

forthcoming in Philosophical Psychology

Lots of people insist that I'm a body, a brain, or some other object with parts. But I argue that such a view forces... more Lots of people insist that I'm a body, a brain, or some other object with parts. But I argue that such a view forces open the possibility that every one of my introspective beliefs is defeasible. Since that's not an open possibility, it follows that I'm simple, i.e. partless.

Devereux's Paradox: Disciplined Subjectivity as the Royal Road to Objectivity

by Kevin Groark

Paper presented at the 2011 Biennial Meeting of the Society for Psychological Anthropoology

In Devereux’s classic anthropological text “From Anxiety to Method,” the existence and role of unconscious dynamics is... more In Devereux’s classic anthropological text “From Anxiety to Method,” the existence and role of unconscious dynamics is postulated as a fundamental variable that must be accounted for in order to understand the observational and interactional field of the human sciences. In other words, the "subjective response" is part and parcel of the observational field, and is thus a piece of “data” to be understood. Despite his commitment to what we might refer to as a proto-intersubjective field theory, Devereux’s tendency to emphasize the “distorting” impact of subjectivity retains elements of a positivist approach in which the subjective element—no matter how valuable—is a “factor” to be corrected for in the pursuit of a more objective and “scientific” accounting. In this paper, I bring Devereux’s epistemological and methodological approach into dialogue with parallel developments in psychoanalytic hermeneutics, namely Heinrich Racker's seminal 1957 work on transference-countertransference dynamics. While Devereux tends to take what we might call the “negative path” in his work, drawing our attention to the myriad countertransference interferences that arise in the course of the ethnographer’s data collection and interpretive work, Racker highlights the positive uses of countertransference, setting out to clarify the processes underpinning the interpretive attitude—the work involved in the “intention to understand.” Through this discussion, I balance Devereux’s tendency to emphasize the “distortions” brought about by countertransference reactions—namely anxiety and its derivatives—with a focus on the ways in which positively inflected “subjective factors” might allow for increased insight and empathically-mediated understanding of the interpersonal field in which self and other emerge and become knowable. I close with an exploration of the implications of a transference-based interpretive model for anthropological hermeneutics.

Choice Blindness for Reasoning and Process Introspection

by Robert Teszka

Masters Thesis

Discrimination and Self-Knowledge

by Patrick Greenough

forthcoming in D. Smithies and D. Stoljar (eds) Introspection and Consciousness, Oxford: OUP, 2012.

In this paper I show that a variety of Cartesian Conceptions of the mental are unworkable. In particular, I offer a... more In this paper I show that a variety of Cartesian Conceptions of the mental are unworkable. In particular, I offer a much weaker conception of limited discrimination than the one advanced by Williamson (2000) and show that this weaker conception, together with some plausible background assumptions, is not only able to undermine the claim that our core mental states are luminous (roughly: if one is in such a state then one is in a position to know that one is) but also the claim that introspection is infallible with respect to our core mental states (where a belief that C obtains is infallible just in case if one believes that C obtains then C obtains). The upshot is a broader and much more powerful case against the Cartesian conception of the mental than has been advanced hitherto.