Internalism/Externalism

Slaying the Chimera: a Complementarity Approach to the Extended Mind Thesis

by Mirko Farina

Supervisors : Andy Clark, Julian Kiverstein, Tillman Vierkant
Examiners: Michael Wheeler and Mark Sprevak

Williams' Internalism Reconsidered

by Nicholas Smyth

Draft only! Comments welcome.

In this paper, I offer some clarificatory remarks on Bernard Williams' brand of reasons-internalism, which I believe... more In this paper, I offer some clarificatory remarks on Bernard Williams' brand of reasons-internalism, which I believe is often misunderstood in crucial ways.

Cartesian Epistemology and the Authority of Norms

by Mark C. R. Smith

Published in History of Philosophy Quarterly, Vol. 27, no. 2.

Internalism and Externalism In Semantics and Epistemology

by Sanford Goldberg

Anti-Individualism: Mind and Language, Knowledge and Justification

by Sanford Goldberg

A simple (and surprising) argument against justification internalism

by Sanford Goldberg

What is the subject-matter of the theory of epistemic justification?

by Sanford Goldberg

The content of perceptual experience

by michelle montague

The Possibility of Practical Reason

by J. David Velleman

Published in Ethics (1996)

On the debate between internalists and externalists about reasons for action On the debate between internalists and externalists about reasons for action

Moore's Paradox and the Accessibility of Justification

by Declan Smithies

Forthcoming in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research

This paper argues that justification is accessible in the sense that one has justification to believe a proposition if... more This paper argues that justification is accessible in the sense that one has justification to believe a proposition if and only if one has higher-order justification to believe that one has justification to believe that proposition. I argue that the accessibility of justification is required for explaining what is wrong with believing Moorean conjunctions of the form, ‘p and I do not have justification to believe that p.’

Mentalism and Epistemic Transparency

by Declan Smithies

Forthcoming in The Australasian Journal of Philosophy

Questions about the transparency of evidence are central to debates between factive and non-factive versions of... more Questions about the transparency of evidence are central to debates between factive and non-factive versions of mentalism about evidence. If all evidence is transparent, then factive mentalism is false, since no factive mental states are transparent. However, Timothy Williamson has argued that transparency is a myth and that no conditions are transparent except trivial ones. This paper responds by drawing a distinction between doxastic and epistemic notions of transparency. Williamson’s argument may show that no conditions are doxastically transparent, but it fails to show that no conditions are epistemically transparent. Moreover, this reinstates the argument from the transparency of evidence against factive mentalism.

Why Justification Matters

by Declan Smithies

Forthcoming in Epistemic Evaluation: Point and Purpose in Epistemology, edited by D. Henderson & J. Greco, Oxford University Press.

This chapter is guided by the hypothesis that the point and purpose of using the concept of justification in epistemic... more This chapter is guided by the hypothesis that the point and purpose of using the concept of justification in epistemic evaluation is tied to its role in the practice of critical reflection. In section one, I propose an analysis of justification as the epistemic property in virtue of which a belief has the potential to survive ideal critical reflection. In section two, I use this analysis in arguing for a form of access internalism on which one has justification to believe a proposition if and only if one has higher-order justification to believe that one has justification to believe that proposition. In section three, I distinguish between propositional and doxastic versions of access internalism and argue that the propositional version avoids familiar objections to the doxastic version. In section four, I argue that the propositional version of access internalism also explains and vindicates internalist intuitions about cases. In section five, I conclude with some reflections on the relationship between critical reflection, responsibility and personhood.

Recent Work on Motivational Internalism

by Gunnar Björnsson

With Fredrik Björklund, John Eriksson, Ragnar Francén Olinder and Caj Strandberg

Analysis 2012 72: 124-137; doi: 10.1093/analys/anr118

http://analysis.oxfordjournals.org/content/72/1/124.full.pdf+html

Reviews work on moral judgment motivational internalism from the last two decades. Reviews work on moral judgment motivational internalism from the last two decades.

Against referential semantics

by Magdalena Sztencel

Magdalena Sztencel. 2011. Against referential semantics. In P. Frath, V. Bourdier, E. Hilgert, K. Bréhaux & J. Dunphy-Blomfield (eds.), Res-per-nomen III : La référence, la conscience et le sujet énonciateur / Reference, Consciousness and the Speaking Subject. Editions et Presses Universitaires de Reims (2011). ( forthcoming)

Moral Fetishism Revisited

by Teemu Toppinen

2004, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104: 307-315.

In this paper the ‘moral fetishism’ argument originally presented by Michael Smith against moral judgment externalism... more In this paper the ‘moral fetishism’ argument originally presented by Michael Smith against moral judgment externalism is defended. I argue that only the internalist views on the relation of moral judgment and motivation can combine two attractive theses: first, that the morally admirable are motivated toact on the reasons they take to ground actions’ being right, and second, that their virtuousness need not be diminished by their acting on their thinking something right. Lastly, some possibilities are envisaged for internalists in light of a worry to the effect that the argument, if successful, undermines the internalist theories, too.

The myth of the false, justified belief

by Clayton Littlejohn

I defend the view that there are no false, justified beliefs. Most of this paper has been incorporated into... more I defend the view that there are no false, justified beliefs. Most of this paper has been incorporated into Justification and the Truth-Connection (Cambridge University Press).

Two-Dimensional Semantics (Stanford Encyclopedia Entry)

by Laura Schroeter

Stanford Encyclopedia Entry (penultiamte draft 2010)

From anti-causalism to causalism: an opinionated history of the reasons/causes debate

by Giuseppina D'Oro

I would welcome feedback on this paper. I cover some old ground in the beginning and would welcome feedback especially (but not only) on the section on internalism/externalism from p. 19 ff.

De las dudas de Montaigne a la certeza de Descartes: una hipótesis sobre la función del estoicismo en el origen del internalismo epistémico moderno

by Jesús Navarro-Reyes

Cuadernos sobre Vico 23/24 (2009): 247-270.

¿Fue realmente la necesidad de responder a los retos del escepticismo –y, en concreto, del escepticismo de Montaigne–... more ¿Fue realmente la necesidad de responder a los retos del escepticismo –y, en concreto, del escepticismo de Montaigne– lo que incitó a Descartes a formular el argumento del cogito? Este artículo defiende una respuesta negativa, pues no fue la herencia del escepticismo sino la del estoicismo clásico, también revitalizado en el Renacimiento, lo que fue determinante en el surgimiento del internalismo epistémico moderno.
PALABRAS CLAVE: Montaigne, Descartes, Epicteto, escepticismo, estocismo, internalismo epistémico moderno.

Was Descartes’ Cogito argument an answer to the challenges of Scepticism and, in in particular, to Montaigne’s version of it? This paper claims that the answer to this question should be negative, since it was not the influence of Scepticism, but the one of classic Stoicism –a trend that was also retrieved in the Renaissance– the one that had the main role in the rise of modern epistemic internalism.

KEYWORDS: Montaigne, Descartes, Epictetus, Scepticism, Stoicism, modern epistemic internalism.

Cognitive Systems and the Extended Mind - Reviewed by Mirko Farina

by Mirko Farina

forthcoming in : http://www.humanamente.eu/callforpapers-issue15.html