Intelligence Studies

MI (R), G (R) and British covert operations, 1939–42

by Simon Anglim

Positivism, Postpositivism and Intelligence Analysis

by Mary Manjikian

Intelligence Ethics and Non-Coercive Interrogation

by Michael Skerker

Defense Intelligence Journal, 16-1 (2007): 61-76

Personality, self-estimated intelligence, and uses of music: A Spanish replication and extension using structural equation modeling

by Anna Muro

The LEVI Case: Document 1 and a note on LEVI and GILDINER, trans. from the Polish by L.W. Gluchowski

by Leszek Gluchowski

See also Document 2 on the LEVI Case.

The LEVI Case: Document 2 and a note on LEVI and GILDINER, trans. from the Polish by L.W. Gluchowski

by Leszek Gluchowski

See also Document 1 on the LEVI Case.

Intelligent Design? Transforming intelligence in Serbia and Georgia

by Hans Felber Charbonneau

MA Thesis, Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies, Carleton University, 2012

The 1990s saw the emergence of authoritarian governments and the outbreak of civil war in the Caucasus and the... more The 1990s saw the emergence of authoritarian governments and the outbreak of civil war in the Caucasus and the Balkans. After a decade of turbulence, the peoples of Georgia and Serbia overthrew corrupt regimes. In both countries, transforming the security and intelligence services that had been pillars of the previous regimes was a priority for the new governments.

This thesis will examine the reform of the security and intelligence services in Georgia and Serbia. It will test the hypothesis that the main challenges to successful reform are a lack of determination on the part of the political elite and institutional continuity with pre-revolutionary services.

The Efficacy of Ottoman counterintelligence in the 16th century

by Emrah Safa Gürkan

Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hung. Volume 65 (1), 1–38 (2012)

This article examines the Ottoman counter-intelligence mechanism and the extent to which it succeeded in preventing... more This article examines the Ottoman counter-intelligence mechanism and the extent to which it succeeded in preventing enemy intelligence. In the 16th century, the length and the scope of both Ottoman–Habsburg and the Ottoman Safavid Rivalry convinced the Ottomans to establish an intelligence network that gathered information in a large geography. Nevertheless, in the war of information between the Ottomans and their rivals, the success of Ottoman information-gathering was intertwined with the efficiency of Ottoman counter-intelligence. In order to gain an advantage in “politics of information”, the Ottoman secret diplomacy successfully refused its enemies a comfort which it sought for itself: access to information about the adversary.

A Knowledge Taxonomy for Army Intelligence Training: An Assessment of the Military Intelligence Basic Officer Leaders Course Using Lundvall’s Knowledge Taxonomy

by Texas State PA Applied Research Projects

Ruiz, Victor H., "A Knowledge Taxonomy for Army Intelligence Training: An Assessment of the Military Intelligence Basic Officer Leaders Course Using Lundvall’s Knowledge Taxonomy" (2010). Applied Research Projects, Texas State University-San Marcos. Paper 331.
http://ecommons.txstate.edu/arp/331

Purpose: The events of September 11, 2001 and the succeeding wars in Iraq and Afghanistan changed intelligence... more Purpose: The events of September 11, 2001 and the succeeding wars in Iraq and Afghanistan changed intelligence requirements from those of the Vietnam era and the cold war. As a result, intelligence training was modified to keep up with matters such as globalization and counterinsurgency operations. This dynamic operational environment thus necessitates constant evaluation of intelligence training practices. This research has two purposes. First, it explores the different types of knowledge involved in military intelligence training. Second, it uses Lundvall‘s Knowledge Taxonomy to assess the types of knowledge acquired through intelligence training at the Military Intelligence Basic Officer Leader‘s Course (MIBOLC). The four evaluated knowledge categories are know-what, know-how, know-who and know-why.

Method: In conjunction with Lundvall‘s knowledge taxonomy, this research uses four working hypotheses to explore the different types of knowledge that intelligence training provides to company-grade Army intelligence officers. While initially based on the taxonomy, the working hypotheses contain intelligence-related topics found in the literature supporting the postulated knowledge categories. Each working hypothesis contains sub-hypotheses that are used to supplement or reinforce their corresponding expectation. A case study methodology is used to assess the types of knowledge acquired at the MIBOLC. The data-collection techniques used in this research are document analysis, structured interviews, and direct observations.

Findings: The results strongly support the existence of know-what and know-how knowledge training at the MIBOLC. Know-who and know-why knowledge training is also present but only in limited to adequate amounts. While the course provides a foundation for conducting intelligence analysis, two areas of instruction need improvement: fostering interpersonal relations and developing higher order thought processes. These findings are in line with Major General Flynn‘s 2010 assessment of intelligence operations in Afghanistan, where population-centric information gathering and adaptive thinking better support counterinsurgency operations (2010, 5,15). Improving the areas of know-who and know-why will support current operations by placing more emphasis on people and on how to think critically and adaptively. These findings apply to intelligence leaders at the United States Intelligence Center and to Brigade Combat Team commanders and intelligence officials. Improving know-who and know-why knowledge at the school-house and tactical levels will provide junior officers the ability to critically analyze the central intelligence aspect of counterinsurgencies, the people. Not improving know-who and know-why knowledge will limit an intelligence officer‘s abilities and therefore perpetuate a reluctance to view counterinsurgency operations in a holistic manner

Market Value of Culture: Quantifying the Risk of Antiquities Looting

by Erik Nemeth

View abstract at: View abstract at: http://culturalsecurity.net/cs/research.htm#marketvalueofculture

Art-Intelligence Programs: The Relevance of the Clandestine Art World to Foreign Intelligence

by Erik Nemeth

View abstract at: View abstract at: http://culturalsecurity.net/cs/research.htm#artintel

Reading Power in UK Cybersecurity

by Tim Stevens

Unpublished MRes thesis (2010)

John Maynard Keynes and the New Poland: Pro-German Sentiments at the Treasury

by Leszek Gluchowski

Annotated paper originally presented to the symposium ‘British Perspectives on Poland, 1915-45’ at the School of Slavonic and East European Studies (SSEES), University of London, on 14 October 1989.  See Pamiętnik literacki (London), vol. 15 (1990), p. 139, for a report of the conference.

The Kriegsmarine, Signals Intelligence and the Development of the B-Dienst Before the Second World War

by Marcus Faulkner

Intelligence and National Security 25/4 (2010) 521-46

This article explores the development of the Kriegsmarine's signals intelligence service, the B-Dienst, and its role... more This article explores the development of the Kriegsmarine's signals intelligence service, the B-Dienst, and its role in operational planning prior to 1939. It challenges the prevalent view that the Kriegsmarine had little interest in intelligence gathering and contends that the naval leadership understood the implications and possibilities of this new intelligence source. By employing hitherto unused source material the article demonstrates how the B-Dienst was systematically protected and nurtured by the naval staff. Consequently the Kriegsmarine entered the Second World War with a well-prepared signals intelligence machinery from which it reaped the rewards in the first half of the conflict.

Covert Operations, Strategic Asset

by Simon Anglim

Draft paper on covert activities. Rejected already by one journal as possibly 'too hot to handle.'

On the International Anti-Globalization Movement: An East European Perspective

by Leszek Gluchowski

Paper of a talk presented to the Hamilton (Ontario) Branch of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs two days after 9/11.

Applying Cultural Knowledge to Design Problems: Notes for the U.S. Military about Challenges and Opportunities

by Derek B. Miller

Presented at the "Culture Summit" for U.S. Training and Doctrine Command, 2009, and available on the website of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research

A provocative presentation that reviews cultural education in the U.S. military since the 1950s and suggests a new way... more A provocative presentation that reviews cultural education in the U.S. military since the 1950s and suggests a new way to mobilize cultural knowledge as a strategic asset in the design of local solutions. Led to an invitation in 2010 to address culture and maritime security in Kiel, Germany at the Maritime Security Conference.

Raport Korczyńskiego z 1961 roku (Centralne Archiwum Wojskowe 525/85, ‘Sprawozdanie z działalności Zarządu II Sztabu Generalnego według stanu na dzień 1 grudnia 1961 roku’, k. 456-85)

by Leszek Gluchowski

My preface and a copy of the original Polish-language 'Korczyński Report' of Dec. 1961. See also my English-language translation of the report on this website.

Domestic Intelligence

by Cameron Cowan

By Cameron Cowan for Norwich University MDY Program

This was my signature paper on Domestic Intelligence and my social media based intelligence system. This was my signature paper on Domestic Intelligence and my social media based intelligence system.

Oliver Kress - A new approach to cognitive development: ontogenesis and the process of initiation

by Oliver Kress

Evolution and Cognition (1993) 2:319 - 332. Springer Verlag

In the current models of cognitive development some phenomena cannot be categorized: self-actualizing people (Maslow),... more In the current models of cognitive development some phenomena cannot be categorized: self-actualizing people (Maslow), Buddhism and Taoism. Using Piaget´s genetic epistemology we can argue that the human cognitive system is not flexible enough to cope with the fundamental changes in structure of the need-satisfying actions (infant/adult) without adaption delays. In this article the process of cognitive new-adaptation with all related effects is described as the initiation process. Four thought-forms are introduced and derived from the hypothesis, with which it is possible to categorize the phenomena mentioned above. The initiation process is an independent side effect of onotgenesis and therefore requires a new definition for intelligence.