Indian Philosophy

Free will in Mīmāṃsā

by elisa freschi

draft only, to be published in a volume edited by E. Bryant and M. Dasti

The basic Mīmāṃsā approach to the issue of agency and free will is compatibilist, namely, the psychological experience... more The basic Mīmāṃsā approach to the issue of agency and free will is compatibilist, namely, the psychological experience of one's freedom of action is asumed to be valid, since one experiences one's actions as free and since the karman- or apūrva-based causalities cannot be ascertained to eliminate all precincts of application of free will. In fact, human beings are lead to act, according to Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā authors, by their desires, and, according to Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā authors,  by Vedic injunctions which, in turn, identify them through their desires. Consequently, their precinct of free will seems exactly to lie in one's faculty to train their desires. Even from the point of view of Prābhākaras, who stress the role of Vedic commands, free will is presupposed by the claim that, although the Veda tells one what to do, it does not make one do it.

Agency does not accrue to an underlying \emph{ātman}, but rather seems to constitute one of the subject's essential characters. Accordingly, the agent subject is said not to be immutable and does instead change through time.

Tutto in questa vita: considerazioni sull’etica e la morale dei Cārvāka/Lokāyata [forthcoming]

by Krishna Del Toso

Śrī Harṣa contra Hegel: Monism, Skeptical Method, and the Limits of Reason

by Ayon Maharaj

Forthcoming in Philosophy East and West

This essay brings Śrī Harṣa’s Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya (c. 1170) into dialogue with Hegel’s Phänomenologie des Geistes... more This essay brings Śrī Harṣa’s Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya (c. 1170) into dialogue with Hegel’s Phänomenologie des Geistes (1807), identifying salient points of affinity and divergence in the monistic metaphysics and skeptical methodologies of two thinkers working in entirely different traditions and separated by over six hundred years. Remarkably, both Śrī Harṣa and Hegel attempt to defend a monistic standpoint exclusively by means of a sustained critique of non-monistic philosophical positions. I will argue, however, that Śrī Harṣa and Hegel diverge sharply in their specific views on the powers and limits of philosophy and on the precise nature of monistic reality. In stark contrast to Hegel, Śrī Harṣa claims that the non-dual reality of Brahman lies beyond reason and hence rejects the very possibility of a philosophical justification of monism. Moreover, while Hegel drives a wedge between thought and empirical praxis by assuming the radical “independence of reason,” Śrī Harṣa insists that how we think and reason depends on the nature of our mind, which is itself conditioned by how we live.

Language: From I-Dentity to My-Dentity

by Debaprasad Bandyopadhyay

Working Paper

What does it mean by the word “our”/”my-ness”/“my-dentity” or possedness(svatva) in the context of four Ls: Language,... more What does it mean by the word “our”/”my-ness”/“my-dentity” or possedness(svatva) in the context of four Ls: Language, Labour, Land and Love ? The author of this paper has dealt with only two Ls: Language and Labour taking his cues from Raghunatha Siromoni and Karl Marx. My-dentity as a category does not depend on the exchange value as ascribed by the market economy, therefore the author has paraphrased “fit for use” (viniyogayogyata) as “use value” and it eradicates the self-other differences in the context of my-ness. The author is not talking about I-dentity or I-ness, but on my-dentity or my-ness, i.e., what “I” possesses or what belongs to “me”—my ownership, endowment, possessed-ness or rather entitlement . Thus this paper is a psychoanalytic shift from the individual ego to the possession of ego as imagined and symbolized. This paper starts with some problematic questions: Do “I” possesses something or something is imposed upon my I-dentity or as my “own” following certain rules of socio-cultural or politico-economic legitimacy? As a homo sapiens, except my supposed genetic endowment, do I have something as my “own”? Do I have my ownership of four Ls in the context or locus of this planet or universe ? Then what is about the legal entitlement as proposed by Amartya Sen? Without questioning the stipulated value ascribed to a currency note, Sen puts “etc.” at the beginning of the exchange process .This is the paradox of his framework as it leads to fallacy of infinite regress.The author elaborates his arguments by following age old dialogic forms.He concludes his paper by following Derrida and by introducing the concepts of Anti-Grammar, n-glossia, Bhasa-samavaya.
Note: This paper is an elaborated English version of the Bangla paper "On My-ness and Economic Entitlement" paper ID: 2032594. Therefore, the abstract is same.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 21

Keywords: my-dentity/my-ness, linguistic entitlement, svatva,“gift” or zakat, governmentality, nihsvatva, baikhari, madhyama, pasyanti, paravak, Bhasa-samavaya, n-glossia, reverse mimicry,anti-grammar =grammEr

Enacting Selves, Enacting Worlds: On the Buddhist Theory of Karma

by Matthew MacKenzie

Approach to Physical Reality: a note on Poincare Group and the philosophy of Nagarjuna

by Michele Caponigro

Īśvaragītābhāṣya of Vijñānabhikṣu, Sanskrit edition of chapter one

by Andrew Nicholson

This is a Sanskrit edition of chapter one of Vijñānabhikṣu's commentary on the Īśvara Gītā ("Song of Lord Śiva").

I give my permission for this edition to be shared, copied, or redistributed, as long as the source is properly cited. (Nicholson, Andrew James. Doctrine and Boundary Formation: The Philosophy of Vijñānabhikṣu in Indian Intellectual History. Chicago: Ph.D. Diss., University of Chicago, 2005).

ECP is Dead, Long Live ECP

by Debaprasad Bandyopadhyay

2012. "ECP Is Dead, Long Live ECP!" M. S. Thirumalai ed. LANGUAGE IN INDIA. 12:4. (pp. 79-86) http://www.languageinindia.com/april2012/debaprasadabhava.pdf

This paper, written in connection with Bandyopadhyay (1989, where a status of a 'free' bound morpheme in Bangla was... more This paper, written in connection with Bandyopadhyay (1989, where a status of a 'free' bound morpheme in Bangla was discussed), had introduced the Nyaya-Vaisesika (two branches of Indian Philosophy) concept of relational absence or abhava to strengthen the semantics of the ECP (though it was dated at that time) and deletion. Any moved element that leaves behind a trace in the locus may be considered as a case of posterior absence. The open question as posited by Chomsky, Lasnik (1991:21) that whether a moved element actually leaves behind a trace or not can be solved by an independent reason of posterior absence which, by assigning the absential qualifier to the empty locus, points out the once-upon-a-time cognition of existence of the counter-positive. An NP-trace is an instance of posterior-absence. The trace of moved element can be cognized in the locus from where the counter-positive is moved. Thus the 'trace of X' can be interpreted in the chain of (qulifier,qualificand or counterpositive, locand, locus) X, t or binder-bindee relation. This is called as L-relation or sub-super stratum/locus-counterpositive or bindee-binder relation or the antecedent-trace association. Assigning absential qualifier emphasized the fact emphasized that any case of chain like (John, t) is not to be interpreted as only a simple case of “copy and delete” but a case of a definite locus-counterpositive relation or L-relation. If the locus’s (where trace occurs) being the absence of counterpositive amounts to the locus’s being the object referred by the word ‘absence’, that is occasioned by a prior cognition of the counterpositive. In the case of posterior absence, the counter-positive is destroyed and the counter-positive is responsible for this type of abhava. PRO is a locus of the counterpositive or antecedent. It may be called posterior absence where lexical element is destroyed and thus contraction is possible, e.g. in case of wanna-contraction. PRO is always controlled by its counterpositive. Posterior absence is also found in the case of pro in Null subject languages or pro-drop languages like Italian, where pronominal is dropped or destroyed though the locus of that counterpostive is there. The property of counterpositive is reflected in the Agr or phi-features in those pro-drop languages. The absence cognized in the t is under the mode of limitorship of the moved element. Thus, there must be a locus for an absence, though the content of the counterpositive is moved. In a given sentence, whenever a phonological matrix is lacking, the category as a locus for that moved or destroyed counterpositive exists for absential cognition in a given sentence. If locus is there the delimiting properties of counterpositiveness is also there. Thus, in case of deletion, both the category and content is not hammered and erased, it is only the content that is absent from the category-ness of locushood. Thus, though deletion is a posterior absence, it has the delimiting property of being counterpositive-ness, e.g., in case of wh-deletion, the locus of wh lacks the wh (where there is no overt wh) as well as wh-ness or is marked by the posterior absence of wh and wh-ness in its locus. The underlying wh-phrase undergoes wh-movement to COMP leaving an absence or trace behind and then Wh-deletion or posterior absence of wh occurs. The category persists by means of inherence-relation. The application of universal Recoverability Condition is subject to the awareness of cognition of absence in the locus of the category. Thus the absential quantifier solves a crucial problem of whether a deletion erases category and content or only the contents of a category by positing the category as a locus of the counterpositive. However, there must be a distinction between a moved element and a deleted element. In case of moved element, the resident of t or R-expression is an instance of posterior absence.

Seminario Popolare sul Pensiero dell'Estremo Oriente (4 Ed.). Perché guardare a Oriente?

by Pietro Piro

Programma delle giornate di studi: Perché guardare a Oriente? Termini Imerese 5-6 Maggio 2012.

Nella giornata di studi Perchè guardare a Oriente?  I ricercatori coinvolti,  a partire dalle proprie... more Nella giornata di studi Perchè guardare a Oriente?  I ricercatori coinvolti,  a partire dalle proprie competenze e dai propri interessi, cercheranno di chiarire, in modo semplice e “popolare” perché è necessario conoscere e approfondire un tema legato ad un aspetto del pensiero Orientale (musica, arte, filosofia, religione, cinema..etc). In questo modo, si cercherà di trovare ragioni vitali, e non esclusivamente accademiche o commerciali, per accostarsi all’Oriente. Il tentativo è quello di avvicinare quante più persone possibili ad una cultura che rimane, nonostante l’accelerazione dei ritmi globalizzanti, relegata in secondo piano e ristretta o al cerchio ristretto degli specialisti o esposta alla banalizzazione del pensiero unico. Si cercherà dunque, di offrire delle risposte che possano essere un vero punto d’inizio per chi, spesso carico di pregiudizi, si accosta per la prima volta ad un mondo così complesso e affascinante. La sfida non è semplice. Si cercherà di non esporre una teoria preconfezionata, quanto di cercare di aprirsi al dialogo interrogante e stabilire insieme ragioni superiori e condivise.

Gandhian Concept of Human Security

by Anurag Gangal

"Westernization and Women's Rights: Non-Western European Responses to Mill's 'Subjection of Women', 1869-1908"

by Eileen Hunt Botting

My co-author is Sean Kronewitter, an undergraduate student in political science at Notre Dame.

The article has been published online first by the journal Political Theory in May 2012; it will appear in print later in 2012.

The publication in 1869 of Mill's 'Subjection of Women' gave rise to philosophical and political responses beyond... more The publication in 1869 of Mill's 'Subjection of Women' gave rise to philosophical and political responses beyond Western Europe on the relationship between Westernization and women's rights in developing, colonial, and post-colonial countries. Through the first comparative study of the 'Subjection of Women' alongside the forewords to six of its earliest non-Western European editions, we explore how this book provoked local intellectuals in Russia, Chile, and India to engage its liberal utilitarian, imperial, Orientalist, and feminist ideas. By showing how Mill's Western European biases and instrumental reasoning establish problematic rhetorical models for women's rights arguments, we are able to explore the ethical dimensions of women's rights issues in the context of cultural and political imperialism. Most importantly, this reception history illustrates how cross-cultural and culturally sensitive dialogue on women’s rights can push us beyond Western bias and imperialism in advocating for the end of women's subjection around the globe.

Keywords:

John Stuart Mill, The Subjection of Women, Non-Western Political Thought, Women's Rights, Westernization

The Wolf’s Footprints: Indian Materialism in Perspective. A (Annotated) Conversation with Ramkrishna Bhattacharya [FINAL DRAFT]

by Krishna Del Toso

accepted for publication on "East and West" 2010 (forthcoming)

Review Of the Book: "Sounds Of Silence".

by Debaprasad Bandyopadhyay

http://www.scribd.com/debaprasad_bandyopad/d/83138351-Review-Of-the-Book-Sounds-Of-Silence

Despite the fact that Chomsky (1994) himself made Empty Category Principle as a redundant tool, the editors and... more Despite the fact that Chomsky (1994) himself made Empty Category Principle as a redundant tool, the editors and authors of this book dared to venture into the domain of such silenceme. However, it is matter of regret, they had cut a sorry figure due to the epistemological amalgamation of at least five models of Chomskian syntax that had led to the problem of incommensurability.

This is a crucial as well as puzzling question as it is still doubtful whether this type of tool would serve the semantactic purpose and could attain explanatory adequacy by clearing up one unresolved question: does empty category erase both category and content or not or there might be a possibility of disjunctive situation? Bendjaballah and Haiden’s answer was “a tentative yes” (pg.23) as the “theoretical framework has changed considerably”, but in case of post-syntactic component, their answer was negative and this was a paradoxical situation that entailed aporia. Many radical changes had occurred after the question of Reimsdijk et al (note the date: it was 1986) was put into the arena of formal-practitioners of Chomskian syntax.

This review, taking cue from such problematic zones, where, within formalism, decidability of emptiness had elicited ambivalent responses, would try to understand the enterprise that is still subscribing a phenomenon that was already abandoned or being considered as mere “descriptive taxonomy” by the initiator and some of his followers of this particular principle.

My Indian Music Site

by Teed Rockwell

According to Academia.edu, someone just did a search with the question "Are there two Teed Rockwells?". The answer is that there are at least two, but that they all live in the same skin. For those who want to meet the musical one, you can connect to this link to see and hear videos of my Indian music. (Both Hindustani and Bollywood). There are also links to my twenty years of columns as Music Critic for India Currents Magazine.

The Fertile Clash: The Rise of Philosophy in India

by Ferenc Ruzsa

A fundamental motive of philosophical thinking in India is suggested: the fruitful conflict of two culures. The... more A fundamental motive of philosophical thinking in India is suggested: the fruitful conflict of two culures. The remains of the Indus Civilization, agriculturists with their fertility-oriented dominantly magical world-view became dominated by the less numerous but warlike Vedic people whose polytheistic religion was devotional and very masculine. The origin of hindu pantheism and also of the concept of abstract neuter Brahman are shown here to be the result of combining elements and motives from both traditions.

Personhood and Moral Responsibility: An Alternative Approach from the Analects and the Bhagavad Gita

by Alexus McLeod

a fuller version of the account of personhood in the Analects and Gita I give in "Moral Personhood in the... more a fuller version of the account of personhood in the Analects and Gita I give in "Moral Personhood in the Analects and the Bhagavad Gita."

Though He Is One, He Bears All Those Diverse Names: A Comparative Analysis of Jayanta Bhatta's Argument for Toleration

by David Slakter

This paper analyzes Jayanta's argument for toleration in the Agamadambara (Much Ado About Religion) through a... more This paper analyzes Jayanta's argument for toleration in the Agamadambara (Much Ado About Religion) through a comparison with similar arguments given by John Locke and Pierre Bayle.

Il ‘velo di Maya’, un’invenzione dell’Occidente

by Alessandro Grossato

Jainism: Key Themes

by Jeffery Long

Moral Personhood and Roles in the Analects and the Bhagavad Gita

by Alexus McLeod