by henry laycock
DRAFT CONFERENCE VERSION - ALMOST IDENTICAL WITH PUBLISHED VERSION
In that semantic tradition of which Frege and Russell are among the most distinguished members, the project of... more
In that semantic tradition of which Frege and Russell are among the most distinguished members, the project of formalizing natural-language sentences is not simply a matter of developing smooth and effective techniques for the representation of reasoning. Over and above the representation of valid inference as valid, and invalid inference as invalid, there is a further objective. Logic in this tradition is what Frege himself famously calls a concept-script, the import of the notion being chiefly that in natural languages, as Frege emphasizes, ‘the connection of words corresponds only partially to the structure of concepts’, thereby compelling the logician to ‘conduct an ongoing struggle against language and grammar, insofar as they fail to give clear expression to the logical’. In the more recent past, a kindred overall approach is forcefully expounded in the work of Quine, who writes, albeit with a positivistic slant, that
the simplification and clarification of logical theory to which a canonical logical notation contributes is not only algorithmic, it is also conceptual ... each elimination of obscure constructions or notions that we manage to achieve, by paraphrase into more lucid elements, is a clarification of the conceptual scheme of science.
The approach is one with which I find myself in general sympathy; indeed the contrast between clear and less-than-clear ‘expressions of the logical’ is vital to the thesis of this work. Though it has not always received the understanding and respect which it deserves, the ideal of a logically transparent language represents, in my estimation, no merely interesting episode in the history of ideas. It embodies, rather, a permanently valid insight, an enduringly valuable ideal for any analytical conception of philosophy.
Download (.pdf)