Husserl

Husserl, the absolute flow, and temporal experience

by Christoph Hoerl

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, forthcoming

The notion of the absolute time-constituting flow plays a central role in Edmund Husserl’s analysis of our... more The notion of the absolute time-constituting flow plays a central role in Edmund Husserl’s analysis of our consciousness of time. I offer a novel reading of Husserl’s remarks on the absolute flow, on which Husserl can be seen to be grappling with two key intuitions that are still at the centre of current debates about temporal experience. One of them is encapsulated by what is sometimes referred to as an intentionalist (as opposed to an extensionalist) approach to temporal experience. The other centres on the thought that temporal experience itself necessarily unfolds over time. I show how some of Husserl’s more enigmatic-sounding remarks about the absolute flow become intelligible if they are read as attempts to accommodate both these intuitions at the same time. However, I also question whether Husserl ultimately provides good reasons for preferring his intentionalist approach to a rival extensionalist one.

The Lutheran Eucharist and the Postmodern Ethos

by Lance Green

Wrote this rather quickly, but I'm interested in exploring the topic further.

There is a common idiom amongst Christians that God "meets us where we're at." Postmodern philosophy, though... more There is a common idiom amongst Christians that God "meets us where we're at." Postmodern philosophy, though it cannot be reduced to mere nihilism, has created an ethos of disbelief. But Christianity has a response; the contention of this paper is that the Lutheran doctrine of the Eucharist offers hope to the anomic conditions created by certain postmodern philosophies. Though specifically dealing with phenomenology and subjectivity, my intent is to engage with the atheistic worldviews spawned by these philosophies, not to partake in polemics. God is made real, meeting people where they are at, offering Himself to be experienced through bread and wine, encountering us in our disbelief.

Verteilungen des Apriori in der Phänomenologie Husserls

by Wouter Goris

The present contribution presents a series of distributions of the apriori in different phases of Husserl’s... more The present contribution presents a series of distributions of the apriori in different phases of Husserl’s phenomenology: eidetic vs. categorial apriori in the Idea of Phaenomenology, formal vs. contingent apriori in the Formal and Transcendental Logic, and the distinction of the universal objective apriori and the universal apriori of the life-world in the Crisis of the European Sciences. The introduction of genetic phaenomenology, it is argued, gradually turns the formal apriori’s initially proclaimed independence of the material apriori to its opposite. In the Formal and Transcendental Logic, the foundational role of the contingent-material apriori with regard to the formal apriori is still qualified by the contingence of this material apriori relative to pure subjectivity. The Crisis, finally, unconditionally articulates the universal apriori of the life-world as the foundation of the universal objective apriori.

From Inference to Empathy: Objectivity and Alterity in Husserl's Fifth Meditation

by Michael J. Braund

"Draft Only"

It seems evident that any philosophy which seeks to derive objectivity wholly from the resources of consciousness... more It seems evident that any philosophy which seeks to derive objectivity wholly from the resources of consciousness necessarily encounters grave difficulties in justifying the common-sense belief that the world is a public object for a plurality of subjects. This problem is not a new one. It is frequently raised as the objection that idealism leads to solipsism, making it impossible to justify the almost universal belief that others have minds like our own. At first blush, the Fifth Meditation might lead one to believe that it is yet another essay concerning the traditional problem of other minds. After all, in the first paragraph Husserl proclaims that the task of “uncover[ing] the sphere of transcendental being as monadological intersubjectivity” must be undertaken precisely because of the objection that phenomenology, as a kind of idealism, could “be branded ... transcendental solipsism.” (CM 89) By seeming to present his theory of alterity as an answer to such an objection, “Husserl gives the impression that he is setting out to demonstrate, deductively or inductively, the independent existence of other subjects.” (Carr 1987, p.46) I will show that the comparison is superficial, however, and for several reasons. As posed, the other minds problem takes it for granted that we are in possession of, at least, some understanding of what it means for other minds to exist; the problem simply consists in justifying the empirical belief that there are such entities in the world. However, Husserl’s problem is of a deeper, transcendental nature. It asks how we can defensibly be said to arrive at such a conception in the first place. The task of the whole meditation is to gain insight into the intentional structures of consciousness wherein the sense “other ego” is constituted by the transcendental subject. So, his initial concern is how another ego is even cogitable. This segues with a second reason that Husserl’s account differs from that of someone addressing the other minds problem. As Husserl explains, it is impossible to move by inference from one’s own ego to the rest of the world, because the ego is not a ‘tag end of the world.’ It is not part of the world’s causal nexus. Consequently, inferences according to the principle of causality are ruled out by definition. This marks a decisive transformation in scope and focus. The problem is no longer how to prove the empirical existence of “objective subjects, subjects existing in a world.” (CM 124) Again, he says his concern is with “the transcendental clarification of experiencing ‘someone alien’ -- in the sense in which the Other has not yet attained the sense ‘man.’” (CM 138) The reason for this is that the overriding concern of the Cartesian Meditations is with objectivity, or the sense of anything existing in a way that does not reduce to facts about my individual consciousness. In what follows, I will articulate the subtle connections linking the themes of alterity and objectivity in Husserl’s final meditation, with the intention of arriving at a charitable defense of his position against the assertion that it remains fatally solipsistic. I will demonstrate how these (and other) phenomenologically-oriented concepts allow Husserl to reconfigure the traditional problem as a problem for transcendental philosophy, rather than attempting to render it straightforwardly solvable by one “natural” method or another.

Systems in Context: On the Outcome of the Habermas/Luhmann-Debate

by Poul F. Kjaer

66-77, Ancilla Iuris, Sep., 2006.

Usually regarded as a 1970s phenomenon, this article demonstrates that the debate between Jürgen Habermas and Niklas... more Usually regarded as a 1970s phenomenon, this article demonstrates that the debate between Jürgen Habermas and Niklas Luhmann continued until Luhmann’s death in 1998, and that the development of the two theorists’ positions during the 1980s and 1990s was characterised by convergence rather than by divergence. In the realm of legal theory, the article suggests, convergence advanced to the extent that Habermas’ discourse theory may be characterised as a normative superstructure to Luhmann’s descriptive theory of society. It is further shown that the debate’s result was an almost complete absorption of Habermas’ theory by Luhmann’s systems theoretical complex – an outcome facilitated by Luhmann’s deliberate translation of central Habermasian concepts into systems theoretical concepts. The article argues that both the debate and Habermas’ conversion were made possible because not only Habermas’ but also Luhmann’s work can be considered a further development of the German idealist tradition. What Luhmann did not acknowledge was that this manoeuvre permitted the achievement of Habermas’ normative objectives; nor did he notice that it could eradicate a central flaw in the system theoretical construction, by allowing the context within which distinctions are drawn to be mapped – an issue of pivotal importance for grasping relationships between different social systems, and coordinating them, via the deployment of legal instruments.

The phenomenology of union decision-making: A new way to enquire into reality.

by Robert Shaw

Ashish Malik & Robert Shaw (2011) The  phenomenology of union decision-making: A new way to enquire into reality. Proceedings of the ANZAM conference, Wellington, New Zealand, Australia and New Zealand Academy of Management. 7 December 2011.

This paper inaugurates a discussion about the phenomenology of union decision-making. Phenomenology provides a new... more This paper inaugurates a discussion about the phenomenology of union decision-making. Phenomenology provides a new lens that may enable us to gain penetrating insights into how unions function in the fractious world of human resources management. The present paper is preliminary to any fieldwork that may be undertaken. Its main purposes are to identify theory that could be the foundation of further practical work, relate recent work in the phenomenology of management to union practices and to propose directions of enquiry. The relevant theory is that of Edmund Husserl who provides us with a practical method of enquiry into the real world of human resource practice. Husserl’s work has already been applied in relation to local government functioning and some of the findings there appear relevant to the present enquiry. In particular, the nature and role of plebiscites.

La posibilidad de una "fenomenología de la historia"

by François Jaran

Investigaciones Fenomenológicas, vol. monográfico 3: Fenomenología y política, 2011, pp. 237-248.

Resumen: El estudio aborda el problema del acercamiento fenomenológico a la historia, a partir de algunos trabajos de... more Resumen: El estudio aborda el problema del acercamiento fenomenológico a la historia, a partir de algunos trabajos de Husserl, Heidegger y Rudolf Boehm.

Abstract: This study deals with the problem of the phenomenological approach to history, taking as a starting point some texts from Husserl, Heidegger and Rudolf Boehm.

‘Cavaillès, Husserl and the Historicity of Science, Angelaki (Vol 8. No.3 2004), 59-72.

by David Webb

Is it Essential to Self-Consciousness that I situate Myself in an Intersubjectively Shared Space and Time

by Fauve Lybaert

Proceedings of the Southeast Philosophy Congress, Vol. 3, 2010.

When I am aware of my diachronic existence, do I then necessarily refer to myself as being an objective particular... more When I am aware of my diachronic existence, do I then necessarily refer to myself as being an objective particular that is in principle traceable by others in an intersubjectively shared space and time? This is the question that I here wish to pose.
I probe it through an evaluation of Edmund Husserl’s claim that there could be a consciousness that individuates and unifies itself even if there were no nature or idea of nature. I contest this claim by raising questions that bring out how the constitution of our self-consciousness depends on our capacity to situate ourselves in an objective space and time.

Wandering Across the face of Europe

by Gregory Cameron

Husserl on Signs

by Mark Sentesy

in Proceedings of the Kent State University May 4th Philosophy Graduate Student Conference 5 (2006).

Husserl’s controversial distinction between meaning and indication in the Logical Investigations has been attacked by... more Husserl’s controversial distinction between meaning and indication in the Logical Investigations has been attacked by Derrida and others. In this paper I investigate the nature of this distinction, its meaning, and its implications for the philosophy of language and phenomenology. Husserl takes signs, in the sense of a Kantian transcendental clue, as evidence for the structure of the subjective acts that constitute them. Thus, Husserl’s investigation into the ambiguity in the ‘sign’ leads us to the mind, for only the mind can distinguish between the indicative and meaning-functions of signs. Thus I use the resources in Husserl’s account to articulate the structure of indication, sketching how we have access to the structure of subjectivity by examining indication in interpersonal communication.

Jacob Klein's Revision of Husserl's Crisis: A Contribution to the Transcendental History of Reification

by Ian Angus

“Jacob Klein’s Revision of Husserl’s Crisis: A Contribution to the Transcendental History of Reification” Philosophy Today, Vol. 49, No. 5, 2005.

Subjects Without a World? An Husserlian Analysis of Solitary Confinement

by Lisa Guenther

Psychiatrist Stuart Grassian has proposed the term “SHU syndrome” to name the cluster of cognitive, perceptual and... more Psychiatrist Stuart Grassian has proposed the term “SHU syndrome” to name the cluster of cognitive, perceptual and affective symptoms that commonly arise for inmates held in the Special Housing Units (SHU) of supermax prisons. In this paper, I analyze the harm of solitary confinement from a phenomenological perspective by drawing on Husserl’s account of the essential relation between consciousness, the experience of an alter ego and the sense of a real, Objective world. While Husserl’s prioritization of transcendental subjectivity over transcendental intersubjectivity underestimates the degree to which first-person consciousness is constitutively intertwined with the embodied consciousness of others, Husserl’s phenomenology nevertheless provides a fruitful starting-point for a philosophical engagement with the psychiatric research on solitary confinement.

Declerck, G. (2010). Phénoménologie et psychologie du tangible. Éléments pour une théorie de la valeur cognitive et pratique de la résistance. PhD Thesis.

by Gunnar Declerck

Complete reference :
Declerck, G. (2010). Phénoménologie et psychologie du tangible. Éléments pour une théorie de la valeur cognitive et pratique de la résistance. PhD Thesis, , Université de Technologie de Compiègne.
Sous la direction de Charles Lenay et François-David Sebbah. Soutenue devant un jury composé de Bruno Bachimont (examinateur), Yann Coello (président), Pierre De Loor (examinateur), Natalie Depraz (rapporteur), Jean-Michel Salanskis (rapporteur). Thèse soutenue le 29 mars 2010.

Phénoménologie et psychologie du tangible
Éléments pour une théorie de la valeur cognitive et pratique de la... more Phénoménologie et psychologie du tangible
Éléments pour une théorie de la valeur cognitive et pratique de la résistance

L’homme, s’il se rêve parfois pur esprit libéré des entraves de la matérialité, existe comme un corps dans un monde lui-même essentiellement construit comme un système spatialisé de corps, où la résistance, l’impénétrabilité, l’inertie, la pesanteur et la force, constituent non pas l’exception ou l’accident mais la règle.
Les réflexions présentées dans ce travail visent à élucider sur un plan phénoménologique le rapport que l’homme entretient avec la tangibilité de son environnement, et la fonction que ce rapport remplit dans la construction des différents secteurs de l’existence, au premier chef la perception : l’ouverture à un monde ambiant prégnant d’une organisation et d’un sens. Il s’agit d’une part de prendre en vue et de conceptualiser la manière dont cette tangibilité (l’épreuve que l’individu peut faire de la résistance de son environnement dans le cadre d’un rapport corporel direct à celle-ci, mais plus largement la compréhension que celui-ci possède de la possibilité de ce rapport) participe à la mise en place de la rationalité par laquelle l’homme se rend intelligible son monde ; et d’autre part, d’identifier les structures de la « subjectivité » (les structures de la cognition, pour parler la langue de la psychologie) qui rendent possibles la manière spécifique dont l’homme construit son expérience et sa compréhension de la résistance tangible – que cette résistance soit perçue dans le cadre d’un rapport d’affrontement corporel effectif, ou qu’elle soit visée de manière « indirecte » à titre de « simple » possibilité.
Nous montrerons ici, sur l’appui d’analyses phénoménologiques aussi bien que d’éléments issus de la psychologie empirique (psychologie expérimentale aussi bien que neuropsychologie), que le rapport que l’homme entretient avec la résistance est tributaire d’une ouverture au possible, et que l’organisation du monde ambiant sous la forme d’un espace où se disposent des structures matérielles, soit des structures capables d’opposer de la résistance au corps, relève d’une rationalité consistant à se rendre intelligibles les phénomènes en les interprétant en référence aux capacités d’action aussi bien que de passion dont le corps nous investit, le pouvoir qu’il nous procure et les contraintes auquel il nous soumet.
Aussi la chose matérielle – la chose tangible, le corps –, si elle fait fonction d’archétype de la « présence » et de l’« être » (qu’y a-t-il en effet de plus « réel » qu’un corps ?), tire en vérité sa teneur phénoménale de ce qu’elle cristallise pour celui qui la perçoit un faisceau de possibilités, qui rendent par conséquent la présence hic et nunc du « monde tangible » essentiellement débitrice d’une inactualité.

Mots-clés : tangibilité, résistance, poids, matière, haptique, toucher, effort, espace, mouvement, possibilité, perception, cognition, interfaces, phénoménologie, philosophie, psychologie, neurosciences, épistémologie, constructivisme, objectivisme.

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Phenomenology and psychology of the tangible world
Elements for a theory of the cognitive and practical value of resistance 

Man, even though he may sometimes dream of being a pure spirit free from all material constraints, actually exists as a body in a world which is itself essentially constructed as a spatialized system of bodies; and in this constructed world features such as resistance, impenetrability, inertia, weight and forces are not accidents or exceptions but the rule.
The reflexions presented in this work aim at elucidating on a phenomenological level the relation that man entertains with the tangible aspects of his environment, and the function that this relation plays in the construction of the different sectors of his existence. The first of the sectors is perception: the opening on an ambient world that is pregnant with organisation and meaning. On the one hand, we shall take into account and conceptualize the way in which the tangibility of the world (the testing experience that the individual can have of resistance of his environment in the frame of a direct bodily relation with that environment, but more generally the understanding that the individual possesses of the very possibility of such a relation) participates in setting up the rationality by which man renders his world intelligible. On the other hand, we shall identify the structures of “subjectivity” (to speak the language of psychology, the structures of cognition) which make possible the specific way in which man constructs his experience and understanding of tangible resistance – whether this resistance is perceived in the context of an actual bodily engagement, or whether it is envisaged “indirectly” in the guise of a “simple” possibility.
We shall show here, on the basis of phenomenological analyses as well as elements coming from empirical psychology (experimental psychology as well as neuropsychology), that the relation that man has with the resistance of his ambient world depends on an opening towards the possible; and that the organisation of the ambient world in the form of a space which can contain material structures, or structures capable of opposing a resistance to the body, depends on a rationality which consists of making phenomena intelligible by interpreting them with reference to those capacities for action and for passion which the body confers on us, to the power that the body provides us with and the constraints to which it submits us.
Thus, even though the realm of material things – tangible objects, bodies – functions as an archetype of “presence” and of “being” (indeed, what is more “real” than a body?), in the last resort it gains its phenomenal character from the fact that it crystallizes for the person who perceives it a stream of virtual possibilities; hence, the here-and-now presence of the “tangible world” is in an essential way indebted to the realm of that which is not actually realized.

Key words: tangibility, resistance, weight, matter, haptic, touch, effort, space, movement, possibility, perception, cognition, interfaces, phenomenology, philosophy, psychology, neuroscience, epistemology, constructivism, objectivism.

The Question of Naturalizing Phenomenology (new version)

by James Mensch

Temps de l'affect, défection de l'objet - Réflexions sur le temps chez Husserl et Levinas

by Vincent Duhamel

A Brief Account of Husserl's Doctrine of Time Consciousness with Accompanying Translations

by James Mensch

Bergsonian Intuition, Husserlian Variation, Peirceian Abduction: Toward a Relation Between Method, Sense and Nature

by David Morris

The Southern Journal of Philosophy (2005), 43 (2). pp. 267-298.

Husserlian variation, Bergsonian intuition and Peirceian abduction are contrasted as methodological responses to the... more Husserlian variation, Bergsonian intuition and Peirceian abduction are contrasted as methodological responses to the traditional philosophical problem of deriving knowledge of universals from singulars. Each method implies a correspondingly different view of the generation of the variations from which knowledge is derived. To make sense of the latter differences, and to distinguish the different sorts of variation sought by philosophers and scientists, a distinction between extensive, intensive, and abductive-intensive variation is introduced. The link between philosophical method and the generation of variation is used to illuminate different philosophical conceptions of nature and nature’s relation to meaning and sense.

Can "I" Prevent You from Entering my Mind?

by Marc Champagne

Published in Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences.

Shaun Gallagher has actively looked into the possibility that psychopathologies involving “thought insertion” might... more Shaun Gallagher has actively looked into the possibility that psychopathologies involving “thought insertion” might supply a counterexample to the Cartesian principle according to which one can always recognize one’s own thoughts as one’s own. Animated by a general distrust of a priori demonstrations, Gallagher is convinced that pitting clinical cases against philosophical arguments is a worthwhile endeavor. There is no doubt that, if true, a falsification of the immunity to error through misidentification would entail drastic revisions in how we conceive the boundary between self and other. However, I argue that (1) the idea of unearthing an exception to the Cartesian thesis is, on further reflection, not a realistic prospect and that (2) this casts doubt on the attempt to conjoin first-person phenomenology and third-person cognitive science in the service of philosophical debates.