Hume

"Critica dell'assunzione" e "Costruzione metodica". Prospettive sull'empirismo trascendentale di Deleuze

by Fabio Treppiedi

Saggio critico sulle eredità humeane e kantiane di Deleuze , in "Giornale di metafisica", 1/2011

"Naturaleza y función del gobierno en Hume"

by Ana Marta González

Revista de Filosofía, vol. 33, nº. 1, pp. 161-196, 2008. ISSN 0214-4921

Justicia como virtud artificial en David Hume. Elementos para una teoría psico-social de la acción

by Ana Marta González

Pensamiento, pp. 97-127, 2008. ISSN 0031-4749

Alcance y límites del deber de obediencia en Hume

by Ana Marta González

Tópicos. Revista de Filosofía, nº. 37, pp. 77-116, 2009. ISSN 0188-6649

"Naturaleza y función del gobierno en Hume"

by Ana Marta González

Revista de Filosofía, vol. 33, nº. 1, pp. 161-196, 2008. ISSN 0214-4921

Justicia como virtud artificial en David Hume. Elementos para una teoría psico-social de la acción

by Ana Marta González

Pensamiento, pp. 97-127, 2008. ISSN 0031-4749

Alcance y límites del deber de obediencia en Hume

by Ana Marta González

Tópicos. Revista de Filosofía, nº. 37, pp. 77-116, 2009. ISSN 0188-6649

"La oposición de pasiones y su superación en el trato social según Hume: Familia, castidad y cortesía

by Ana Marta González

Themata. Revista de Filosofía, nº 44, 2011, pp. 308-325, 2011. ISSN: 0212-8365.

Fairweather, R. (2011) ‘Hume’s Scepticism: A reader’s guide to Gulliver’s Travels?’, The British Journal of Undergraduate Philosophy, 3(1), pp. 15-22. ISSN 1748-9393 (Online).

by Rory Fairweather

On First Principles: Rhetoric, Induction, Concern

by Jordan Adshead

Hume's Last Lessons: The Civic Education of My Own Life

by Ryan Patrick Hanley

David Hume and the Politics of Humanity

by Ryan Patrick Hanley

Hume e as teorias morais vulgares

by Marco Antonio Azevedo

Princípios, Natal,18, 29, 2011: 321-338.

Quais são as teorias vulgares da moralidade criticadas por Hume na famosa passagem is-ought? Quais eram seus... more Quais são as teorias vulgares da moralidade criticadas por Hume na famosa passagem is-ought? Quais eram seus defensores? Neste ensaio, trato de algumas diferenças entre Hume e Hutcheson que podem iluminar algumas respostas. Hume, ao contrário de Hutcheson, combateu toda forma de separação da natureza humana em componentes naturais e divinos. O conceito de simpatia cumpre uma função essencial nesse aspecto. Há bons indícios de que o jovem Hume adotou no Tratado uma estratégia abertamente crítica a todas as teorias morais defendidas pelos pensadores, religiosos e moralistas de sua época. Isso inclui o voluntarismo contratualista, as éticas racionalistas, bem como as concepções religiosas influenciadas pelo dogmatismo evangélico escocês. Nisso Hume distanciou-se de Hutcheson, pois sua crítica também incluía as visões influenciadas pelas teorias do direito natural com referência na providência divina. A passagem is-ought sinaliza essa intenção. Todavia, todo esse ímpeto juvenil resultou numa série de maus resultados pessoais, o que o levou, na maturidade a mitigar sua agressividade filosófica e a adotar, em seus escritos, uma atitude mais equilibrada.

J OShea - 'Hume's Reflective Return to the Vulgar' BJHP 1996

by James O'Shea

Each of the standard outlooks in the philosophy of perception--phenomenalism, direct realism, indirect realism,... more Each of the standard outlooks in the philosophy of perception--phenomenalism, direct realism, indirect realism, scepticism--has thus been viewed as Hume's own considered position in the eyes of informed commentators. I will argue that Hume does not ascribe univocally to any one of the traditional stances in the philosophy of perception, nor does he leave us only a schizophrenic or 'mood' scepticism. Hume attempted to resolve the traditional philosophical problem (or perhaps more accurately, to set it aside on principled grounds) by transforming the issue from one of theoretical consistency to one of pragmatic coherence. Hume's moderate scepticism and his systematic naturalism entail a reflective 'return' to the vulgar (cp. T 223), a qualified normative endorsement of the directly realist beliefs of common life. The interpretive challenge is to understand the subtle nature of that endorsement, and to explain how it arises out of genuinely Humean doctrines.

Fictitious Duration and Informative Identity in Hume’s Treatise

by James O'Shea

A pre-publication Word version of O‟Shea, J (1997) „Fictitious Duration and Informative Identity in Hume‟s Treatise‟, in Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia, Vol. XX, No.2, October 1997, pp. 169-211.

(This was a special issue of Manuscrito on Hume‟s philosophy, with articles by Geoff Sayre-McCord, Mark Sainsbury, Don Garrett, David Owen, Rachel Cohon, and Corliss Swain, and others.)

Hume's famous account of our idea of the identity through time of persons and objects is based upon a principle of... more Hume's famous account of our idea of the identity through time of persons and objects is based upon a principle of individuation according to which the idea of numerical sameness properly applies only to unchanging objects. Hume derives this idea of identity from a „fiction of the imagination‟ concerning the possibility of time without change. I argue that the puzzle Hume raises concerning identity and change is an important one in the form that he raised it, and not misguided as some have suggested; however, I show that his recourse to the duration fiction in attempting to account for our ascriptions of identity lands him in a vicious circularity. In the course of these arguments I take a close look at the nature of Humean fictions. In the final section I then suggest that there are resources in the Treatise for a more successful Humean account of the idea or „fiction‟ of identity, based primarily on certain aspects of Hume‟s theory of abstract ideas.

Sentimentalism (International Encyclopedia of Ethics)

by Antti Kauppinen

The final, approved version. (Special thanks to associate editor Sarah Stroud for many useful questions and suggestions, which significantly improved the paper.)

Sentimentalism comes in many varieties: explanatory sentimentalism, judgment sentimentalism, metaphysical... more Sentimentalism comes in many varieties: explanatory sentimentalism, judgment sentimentalism, metaphysical sentimentalism, and epistemic sentimentalism. This encyclopedia entry gives a brief overview of the positions and main arguments pro and con.

Hume on historical knowledge and the problem of scepticism about testimony

by Péter Hartl

Draft

Recently Hume's account of testimonial knowledge has been reconsidered and defended against its critics. These... more Recently Hume's account of testimonial knowledge has been reconsidered and defended against its critics. These interpretations challenge the reductionist account and place Hume's statements into a broader context. My discussion focuses on Hume's critique of miraculous testimony. Of Miracles is one of the most widely disputed of his texts. What I would like to examine, though, is whether Hume was in fact sceptical about testimonial knowledge, and whether we can interprete his theory in a Cartesian framework. I will investigate Coady's interpretation and his general objection against Hume's theory of testimony. I will also examine Hume's views on historical knowledge: since it is well known that he wrote thick volumes about the history of England, he could not have been completely sceptical about historical knowledge. I will also present Anscombe's classical interpretation of Hume's views on historical knowledge, and summarize Traiger's criticism. I will argue that Traiger's interpretation has some valuable points, even though he fails to show that Anscombe's interpretation is not valid. Nevertheless, Hume himself has not made a clear distinction between the “psychology” and “epistemology” of testimony, while he was aware of the importance of testimony as well as the essential social aspects of belief-forming.

Collapsing Time and Exploding Gender: Kristeva, Kant and Laruelle

by Benjamin Norris

I have removed the link for this paper because it has since been dramatically re-worked and will be featured in the upcoming edition of Speculations. I will post the full version of the new paper (now titled "Re-asking the Question of the Gendered Subject after Non-philosophy") once Speculations III has been released.

Is a science of (non-)gender identity constitution possible? What would be the object of this science? And, most... more Is a science of (non-)gender identity constitution possible? What would be the object of this science? And, most importantly, what new spaces of (non-)philosophical investigation can be opened in light of such an analysis?
Using Julia Kristeva's "Women's Time" as a point of entry, I develop a picture of a non-decisional science of gender constitution based on a reinterpretation of Francois Laruelle's The Concept of Non-photography in order to answer the above questions. I argue that all theories of identity constitution from David Hume to Judith Butler exemplify the production of an antinomic impasse between the transcendent and the immanent created by the principle of sufficient philosophy. In order to move past the empirico-transcendental deadlock created by philosophical discourse we must move toward a non-decisional investigation of the fractal nature of temporal experience that renders the idea of irreconcilable and antagonistic binaries inoperative.
The shift in focus from either empirical or transcendent gender constitution to the fractal experience of irreducible temporality can lead us outside of the traditional binary philosophical deadlock and point toward a "third way" (in the sense Kristeva gives this idea in "Women's Time") of temporal experience that is always- already upon us. By collapsing the temporality of gender onto a flat, yet infinitely complex surface we can explode the possibilities of gender expression and solidify a unitary core from which gendered resistance can proceed.

'Hume on himself' 2001

by Galen Strawson

superseded by
The Evident Connexion: Hume on Personal Identity (Oxford University Press, 2011)

first published in Essays in Practical Philosophy: From Action to values, ed. D. Egonsson, J. Josefsson, B. Petersson & T. Rønnow-Rasmussen (Aldershot: Ashgate Press), pp 69-94

paper given at 1999 Hume conference in Cork, Ireland; early version of an argument that Hume is not a bundle theorist... more paper given at 1999 Hume conference in Cork, Ireland; early version of an argument that Hume is not a bundle theorist + a theory about what his problem is in the Appendix to the Treatise, when his 'hopes vanish'.

Kant's Response to Hume on Geometry

by Zachary Baran

I argue that, although Kant could not have explicitly known it, he correctly predicts and forms a response to a... more I argue that, although Kant could not have explicitly known it, he correctly predicts and forms a response to a relatively understudied view in Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature, viz. that (i) certain geometric concepts are fictional and (ii) we haven’t any knowledge of the truth of (applied) geometric judgments about particulars. My aim is not so much to evaluate Kant’s response on independent grounds, as it is to motivate interpretations of Hume and Kant respectively through the lens of the other. In particular, I sketch a reading of Hume’s theory of space and time at T1.2.1-3 from which I claim it follows that Hume’s brand of mathematical fictionalism and skepticism can seem particularly compelling. Kant’s latent response is primarily formulated in the section of the first Critique entitled “The Discipline of Pure Reason in its Dogmatic Use,” where he makes the case that mathematical concepts are (uniquely) free of empirical conditions, and that this releases pure mathematics from any epistemological burden to explain its truth as a function of our actual (as opposed to possible) experience of the world of particular, concrete (and often geometrically imperfect) objects. However, I argue that Kant cannot save applied mathematics from Humean skepticism the way he can save pure mathematics from Humean fictionalism.