Download (.pdf) Twins: a cloning experience
with Tim Spector
Drawing upon qualitative interviews with monozygotic (identical) twins sharing 100% of their genes, and with dizygotic... more Drawing upon qualitative interviews with monozygotic (identical) twins sharing 100% of their genes, and with dizygotic (fraternal) twins and singletons as control groups, this paper explores what it means to be genetically identical. (The twins interviewed were from the TwinsUK register in London.) In the context of the ongoing debate on human reproductive cloning, it examines questions such as: To what extent do identical twins perceive their emotional and physical bond to be a result of their genetic makeup? What would they think if they had been deliberately created genetically identical? How would they feel about being genetically identical to a person who was born a few years earlier or later? First, our respondents ascribed no great significance to the role of genes in their understanding of what it means to be identical twins. Second, the opinion that human reproductive cloning would "interfere with nature", or "contradict God's will", was expressed by our respondents exclusively on the abstract level. The more our respondents were able to relate a particular invented cloning scenario to their own life-worlds, the lower the prevalence of the argument. Third, for all three groups of respondents, the scenario of having been born in one of the other groups was perceived as strange. Fourth, the aspect that our respondents disliked about cloning scenarios was the potential motives of the cloners. Without equating monozygotic twins directly with "clones", these results from "naturally" genetically identical individuals add a new dimension to what a future cloning situation could entail: The cloned person might possibly (a) perceive a close physical and emotional connection to the progenitor as a blessing; (b) suffer from preconceptions of people who regard physical likeness as a sign of incomplete individuality; and (c) perceive the idea of not having been born a clone of a particular person as unpleasant.
Attitudes of social science students in Israel and Austria towards the Belated Twins scenarioan exploratory study
with Yael Hashiloni-Dolev, Asa Kasher, and Josef Prainsack
This article discusses results of a questionnaire survey of 156 university students in Israel and Austria examining... more This article discusses results of a questionnaire survey of 156 university students in Israel and Austria examining reactions towards the Belated Twins scenario, which entails the artificial twinning of embryos of which one is immediately carried to term while the other one is born later. The scenario resembles a case of human reproductive cloning in terms of result (the creation of genetically identical individuals in a time-delayed manner) but it involves gamete fusion like “natural” reproduction. By means of qualitative text analysis we discuss the core themes mobilized both in support and opposition to the scenario. While Israeli and Austrian respondents held similar general attitudes (about half were in favour of legalizing Belated Twins, while about a third opposed it), they drew partly on different arguments to arrive at their conclusions. In both groups, uncertainty stemming from “novel” elements in the scenario was regularly interpreted as negatively exacerbating existing issues.
Le trasformazioni della natura umana: Jürgen Habermas su eugenetica positiva e clonazione
Published in "Kykéion : semestrale di idee in discussione", N. 11 (October 2004)
Jürgen Habermas has strongly criticized some applications of biotechnology to human reproduction. In this paper I try... more Jürgen Habermas has strongly criticized some applications of biotechnology to human reproduction. In this paper I try to frame Habermas’ criticism to positive eugenics (i.e., the genetic enhancement of non-pathological traits and dispositions) and to reproductive cloning. According to Habermas, if these interventions on human life were scientifically possible, they would be threats to our sense of identity and responsibility and to mutual moral relationships. The only way to preserve the moral life is to consider inviolable the biological foundations of our existence. Finally, I shall try to highlight the weakness of habermasian arguments.
Begetting, Cloning and Being Human: Two National Commission Reports Against Human Cloning From Italy and the USA
Published in "HEC Forum", volume 18 (2006), number 2, 156-171
Human cloning for reproductive purposes is now raising many moral and legal issues. In this paper I try to compare two... more Human cloning for reproductive purposes is now raising many moral and legal issues. In this paper I try to compare two reports on human cloning, one by the U.S. President's Council on Bioethics and one by the Italian National Committee for Bioethics. The philosophical arguments against human cloning set forth by these two reports are analyzed and criticized by evaluating the effects of human cloning on autonomy and human identity, on the meaning of reproduction, and on family relationships. Finally, I’ll sketch some general considerations on human cloning and the ethical and philosophical implications of the shifting boundaries between chance and choice.
Abortion, Metaphysics and Morality: A Review of Francis Beckwith's Defending Life: A Moral and Legal Case Against Abortion Choice
by Nathan Nobis
In Defending Life: A Moral and Legal Case Against Abortion Choice (2007) and an earlier article in this journal,... more In Defending Life: A Moral and Legal Case Against Abortion Choice (2007) and an earlier article in this journal, “Defending Abortion Philosophically”(2006), Francis Beckwith argues that fetuses are, from conception, prima facie wrong to kill. His arguments are based on what he calls a “metaphysics of the human person” known as “The Substance View.” I argue that Beckwith’s metaphysics does not support his abortion ethic: Moral, not metaphysical, claims that are part of this Substance View are the foundation of the argument, and Beckwith inadequately defends these moral claims. Thus, Beckwith’s arguments do not provide strong support for what he calls the “pro-life” view of abortion.
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‘Recalcitrant Copies and Vulnerable Bodies: Literary Engagements with Human Cloning.’
by Sara Wasson
Annual conference of the British Society for Literature and Science. Birmingham, 29-31 March 2007.
‘Love in the Time of Cloning: Science Fictions of Transgressive Kinship.’
by Sara Wasson
Published in the journal 'Extrapolation' 45.2 (Summer 2004): 130-144. ISSN: 0014-5483.
This paper was conceived in reaction to the social furor that met the cloning of Dolly the sheep. It examines... more This paper was conceived in reaction to the social furor that met the cloning of Dolly the sheep. It examines contemporary science fiction that speculates on the ways cloning might alter notions of intimacy and familial relationship. Putting these stories (by James Tiptree Jr., Joe Haldeman, John Varley, Ursula Le Guin, Richard Cowper and others) in dialogue with queer theory and psychoanalytic theory, I identify ways that the concept of cloning intriguingly complicates even conventional kinship and attachment.
Reproductive cloning in humans and therapeutic cloning in primates: is the ethical debate catching up with the recent scientific advances?
co-authored with Silvia Camporesi and published in the Journal of Medical Ethics in 2008
After years of failure, in November 2007 primate embryonic stem cells were derived by somatic cellular nuclear... more After years of failure, in November 2007 primate embryonic stem cells were derived by somatic cellular nuclear transfer, also known as therapeutic cloning. The first embryo transfer for human reproductive cloning purposes was also attempted in 2006, albeit with negative results. These two events force us to think carefully about the possibility of human cloning which is now much closer to becoming a reality. In this paper we tackle this issue from two sides, first summarising what scientists have achieved so far, then discussing some of the ethical arguments in favour and against human cloning which are debated in the context of policy making and public consultation. Therapeutic cloning as a means to improve and save lives has uncontroversial moral value. As to human reproductive cloning, we consider and assess some common objections and failing to see them as conclusive. We do recognise, though, that there will be problems at the level of policy and regulation that might either impair the implementation of human reproductive cloning or make its accessibility restricted in a way that could become difficult to justify on moral grounds. We suggest using the time still available before human reproductive cloning is attempted successfully to create policies and institutions that can offer clear directives on its legitimate applications on the basis of solid arguments, coherent moral principles, and extensive public consultation.
Reproductive cloning in humans and therapeutic cloning in primates: is the ethical debate catching up with the recent scientific advances?
Co-authored with Lisa Bortolotti, published in 'Journal of Medical Ethics', 2008
After years of failure, in November 2007 primate embryonic stem cells were derived by somatic cellular nuclear... more After years of failure, in November 2007 primate embryonic stem cells were derived by somatic cellular nuclear transfer, also known as therapeutic cloning. The first embryo transfer for human reproductive cloning purposes was also attempted in 2006, albeit with negative results. These two events force us to think carefully about the possibility of human cloning which is now much closer to becoming a reality. In this paper we tackle this issue from two sides, first summarising what scientists have achieved so far, then discussing some of the ethical arguments in favour and against human cloning which are debated in the context of policy making and public consultation. Therapeutic cloning as a means to improve and save lives has uncontroversial moral value. As to human reproductive cloning, we consider and assess some common objections and failing to see them as conclusive. We do recognise, though, that there will be problems at the level of policy and regulation that might either impair the implementation of human reproductive cloning or make its accessibility restricted in a way that could become difficult to justify on moral grounds. We suggest using the time still available before human reproductive cloning is attempted successfully to create policies and institutions that can offer clear directives on its legitimate applications on the basis of solid arguments, coherent moral principles, and extensive public consultation.