History of Logic

Logic for Dogs

by Andrew Aberdein

In What philosophy can tell you about your dog, Steven D. Hales, ed. (Chicago: Open Court, 2008), pp. 167-181.

In March 1615 His Majesty King James the VI of Scotland and I of England participated in a debate concerning the use... more In March 1615 His Majesty King James the VI of Scotland and I of England participated in a debate concerning the use of logic by dogs. The debate was one of several entertainments provided for the King during a visit to the University of Cambridge. At first glance, this event might seem wholly frivolous. Certainly the King’s enthusiasm for hunting played a part in the choice of topic. But King James was no idle, anti-intellectual prince. He had assembled a hothouse of Protestant theologians to produce the English Bible that still bears his name, and his own collected works were to appear the following year. Moreover, as we shall see, the arguments rehearsed before King James echo down the history of logic, from antiquity to the twenty-first century.

Dark Age (But Not Obscure) Logic a Brief Excursion

by António de Freitas

Misyurov D.A. Dialectical formulas based on the binary notation as the development formulas // Credo New. 2012. №2

by Dmitry Misyurov

The article suggests dialectical formulas based on the binary notation as the development formulas: formula with... more The article suggests dialectical formulas based on the binary notation as the development formulas: formula with dominant and the non-dominant elements; universal formula; formula with symbolic weight of elements; tautological formula. For example, it suggests an opportunity to use the dialectical formulas for modeling and artificial intelligence creation, etc.

La silogística asertórica de Aristóteles

by Carlos Martín Collantes

The History of Logic in China: An Introduction

by Jeremy Seligman

This is the preface and brief introduction to a special issue of the journal "Studies in Logic" on the topic... more This is the preface and brief introduction to a special issue of the journal "Studies in Logic" on the topic of History of Logic in China (逻辑学研究 , 编辑部邮箱 2011年 03期), which resulted from a workshop at the Institute for Asian Studies at Leiden University, held in Amsterdam in November 2010 (http://www.sciencehistory.asia/history-logic-china). It involved a number of scholars form the PRC, Hong Kong and Taiwan, meeting with scholars from Europe and elsewhere.

Contents:

A Reading of the Guōdiàn 郭店 Manuscript Yǔcóng 語叢 1 as a Masterpiece of Early Chinese Analytic Philosophy and Conceptual Analysis (Christoph Harbsmeier)

Models of Reasoning in Ancient China (Fenrong Liu, Jeremy Seligman, Johan van Benthem)

Basic Concepts of Mohist Logic (Thierry Lucas)

Aristotelean and Mohist Conceptions of Logic and Language (Karel L van der Leeuw)

Valid Reasoning in Ancient China from the Perspective of Modern Logic (Wujin Yang)

A New Interpretation of Reasoning Patterns in Mohist Logic (Jincheng Zhai)

Enumerating Types of Boolean Functions

by Alasdair Urquhart

Published in the Bulletin of Symbolic Logic Volume 15 (2009), pp. 273-299.

GF Stout and the Theory of Descriptions

by Alasdair Urquhart

The theory of types

by Alasdair Urquhart

Emil Post

by Alasdair Urquhart

Judgment, extension, logical form

by Luciano Codato

http://www.degruyter.com/view/supplement/9783110210347_Inhaltsverzeichnis_Vol5.pdf

In Kant’s logical texts the reference of the form of the judgment to an “unknown = x” is well known, but its... more In Kant’s logical texts the reference of the form of the judgment to an “unknown = x” is well known, but its understanding remains far from consensual. Due to the universality of all concepts, the subject as much as the predicate, in the form S is P, is regarded as predicate of the x, which, in turn, is regarded as the subject of the judgment. In the CPR, particularly in the text on the “logical use of the understanding”, this Kantian interpretation of the subject-predicate relation leads to the question about the relations that must hold between intuition and concept in the judgment. In contrast to intuition, if no concept, due to its universal character, refers immediately to an object, how should we understand the relations of subject and predicate to one another, as well as their relations to intuition, which corresponds to the very special individuality of that object in general = x? In the Kant-Literatur, the relations between intuition and concept in the judgment have been considered in diverse theoretical backgrounds, mainly in Fregean logic and in the logic of Port-Royal. Although so markedly different, these two solutions to the problem above seem to share a common thesis, in so far as they claim, though in different ways, a predicative character to those relations. If the analytic tradition recognizes in the relation between x and the concept S the marks of a propositional function Sx, in turn, the interpretation elaborated from the background of Port-Royal recognizes in this relation the minor premise x is S implicit in the judgment every S is P. This being the case, if it were possible to prove, on the contrary, that the relations between intuition and concept in the judgment could only be of a non-predicative character, then a third solution would be open to us, a solution that could enable us to track down the sense of the conceptions of judgment and logical form in the CPR. In applying this argumentative strategy, it is of the utmost importance to insist on the specificity of Kant’s notion of extension, in order to prove its irreducibility to the Port-Royal notion of extension as well as to the modern one.

Négy mahájána mester

by Ferenc Ruzsa

Four Mahayana masters. Review of the Book Buddhista logika.

A Nágárdzsuna, Vaszubandhu, Sankaraszvámin (?) és Kamalasíla egy-egy szövegét bemutató tanulmánykötet részletes... more A Nágárdzsuna, Vaszubandhu, Sankaraszvámin (?) és Kamalasíla egy-egy szövegét bemutató tanulmánykötet részletes elemzése.

LA LÓGICA ESTOICA Y MEGÁRICA

by Carlos Martín Collantes

Russell and the Universalist Conception of Logic

by Ian Proops

Published in Noûs, 2007, 41: 1, 1–32

The paper examines the widespread idea that Russell subscribes to a "Universalist Conception of Logic".... more The paper examines the widespread idea that Russell subscribes to a "Universalist Conception of Logic". Various glosses on this somewhat under-explained slogan are considered, and their fit with Russell's texts and logical practice examined. The results are, by an large, unfavorable to the Universalist interpretation.

Russell's reasons for logicism

by Ian Proops

Draft only. Published in Journal of the History of Philosophy (2006), 44 (2):267-292.

What is at stake for Russell in espousing logicism? I argue that Russell's aims are chiefly epistemological and... more What is at stake for Russell in espousing logicism? I argue that Russell's aims are chiefly epistemological and mathematical in nature. Russell develops logicism in order to give an account of the character of mathematics and of mathematical knowledge that is compatible with what he takes to be the uncontroversial status of this science as true, certain and exact. I argue for this view against the view of Peter Hylton, according to which Russell uses logicism to defend the unconditional truth of mathematics against various Idealist positions that treat mathematics as true only partially or only relative to a particular point of view.

The Tractatus on Inference and Entailment

by Ian Proops

Draft only. Published in Erich Reck, ed., *From Frege to Wittgenstein: Essays on Early Analytic Philosophy* (O.U.P.), 283–307

In the Tractatus Wittgenstein criticizes Frege and Russell's view that laws of inference (Schlussgesetze)... more In the Tractatus Wittgenstein criticizes Frege and Russell's view that laws of inference (Schlussgesetze) "justify" logical inferences. What lies behind this criticism, I argue, is an attack on Frege and Russell's conceptions of logical entailment. In passing, I examine Russell's dispute with Bradley on the question whether all relations are "internal"

Buddhist Philosophy of Logic

by Koji Tanaka

Forthcoming in Blackwell Companion to Buddhist Philosophy, Steven Emmanuel (ed.), Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell.

This is my attempt to understand what Buddhist logicians are talking about. I think this is the very first study of... more This is my attempt to understand what Buddhist logicians are talking about. I think this is the very first study of this kind.

26. ‘ “Megaric” Logic’

by Susanne Bobzien

in K. Algra / J. Barnes/ J.Mansfeld / M.Schofield (eds), The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy, Cambridge: CUP 1999, 83-92.

Summary presentation of the logic of Philo the Dialectician (aka Philo of Megara) and Diodorus Cronus, including some... more Summary presentation of the logic of Philo the Dialectician (aka Philo of Megara) and Diodorus Cronus, including some general remarks on propositional logical elements in their logic, a presentation of their theories of the conditional and a presentation of their modal theories, including a brief suggestion for a solution of the Master Argument.

The Later Mohists and Logic

by Dan Robins

History and Philosophy of Logic 31.3 (2010), 247--285.

This article is a study of the Later Mohists' ‘Lesser Selection (Xiaoqu 小取)’, which, more than any other early Chinese... more This article is a study of the Later Mohists' ‘Lesser Selection (Xiaoqu 小取)’, which, more than any other early Chinese text, seems to engage in the study of logic. I focus on a procedure that the Mohists called mou 侔. Arguments by móu are grounded in linguistic parallelism, implying perhaps that the Mohists were on the way to a formal analysis of argumentation. However, their main aim was to head off arguments by móu that targeted their own doctrines, and if their argument succeeds then it entails that linguistic parallelism can never ground a cogent argument. In a way, this committed them to the view that formal logic cannot work, but the fact that they did not pursue this line of investigation was by no means inevitable. One consequence of this study is that the Later Mohists conducted their logical work by studying the behaviour of terms and verb phrases, and did not identify the sentence as a significant linguistic unit. This tends to confirm Chad Hansen's generalisation that early Chinese philosophers did not posit sentences or other sentence-like entities such as propositions, beliefs, or laws. Focusing on subsentential expressions did not stop the Mohists from addressing genuinely logical issues, but it may help explain the fact that they never developed a conception of logical structure. This study includes the complete Chinese text of the ‘Lesser Selection’ and a translation in English.

Freedom and Mathematical Science: The problem of freedom in the introduction of ideal entities in mathematics

by Ioannis Vandoulakis

I. Strangas, A. Hanos (Eds) Proceedings of the Greek Association of Research in History and Philosophy of Law. Circle: Concepts of Freedom and Law. Vol. 3, 189-227, Athens-Thessalonica: Sakkulas Publishers, Paris-Torino-Budapest: L’Harmattan, 2006 [in Greek with extended summary in French]

Plato’s Third Man Paradox: its Logic and History

by Ioannis Vandoulakis

Archives Internationale d’histoire des Sciences, Vol. 59 No 162 (2009), 3-52