History of Ethics

'The 'Bandon Valley Massacre' as a historical problem' artcle

by john regan

Moral Expertise: A Millian Perspective

by Dale E. Miller

Although the utilitarian moral theorist John Stuart Mill (1806–73) does not refer explicitly to the concept of moral... more Although the utilitarian moral theorist John Stuart Mill (1806–73) does not refer explicitly to the concept of moral expertise, it nevertheless plays an important implicit role in his thought. In order to explain what this role is, I first consider in more general terms what utilitarians have to say about moral expertise. With this as a foundation, I then introduce some of the distinctive features of Mill’s utilitarianism and construct a Millian account of moral expertise.

Reparations for Emancipation: Mill's Vindication of the Rights of Slave Owners

by Dale E. Miller

Mill's Misleading Moral Mathematics.”

by Dale E. Miller

Internal Sanctions In Mill's Moral Psychology

by Dale E. Miller

India House Utilitarianism: A First Look

by Dale E. Miller

Brown on Mill's Moral Theory: A Critical Response

by Dale E. Miller

In this article, I argue that the reading of Mill that D.G. Brown presents in ‘Mill’s Moral Theory: Ongoing... more In this article, I argue that the reading of Mill that D.G. Brown presents in ‘Mill’s Moral Theory: Ongoing Revisionism’ is inconsistent with several key passages in Mill’s writings. I also show that a rule-utilitarian interpretation that is very close to the one developed by David Lyons is able to account for these passages without difficulty.

Key Words: Mill • utilitarianism • rule utilitarianism • David Lyons

On Millgram on Mill

by Dale E. Miller

In a recent article in Ethics, Elijah Millgram presents a novel reconstruction of J. S. Mill's ‘proof’ of the... more In a recent article in Ethics, Elijah Millgram presents a novel reconstruction of J. S. Mill's ‘proof’ of the principle of utility. Millgram's larger purpose is to critique instrumentalist approaches to practical reasoning. His reading of the proof makes Mill out to be an instrumentalist, and Millgram thinks that the ultimate failure of Mill's argument usefully illustrates an inconsistency inherent in instrumentalism. Yet Millgram's interpretation of the proof does not succeed. Mill is not an instrumentalist. Millgram may be right that instrumentalism is incoherent, but he has chosen the wrong figure to illustrate the point.

Mill, Rule Utilitarianism, and the Incoherence Objection

by Dale E. Miller

Dale E. Miller characterizes the incoherence objection in terms of an inconsistency between a rule utilitarian theory... more Dale E. Miller characterizes the incoherence objection in terms of an inconsistency between a rule utilitarian theory and the argument for it, and maintains that the argument for rule utilitarianism that is most plausibly attributed to Mill is inconsistent with his version of the theory. Miller describes an alternative argument for rule utilitarianism whose premises can all be located in Mill’s thought, but he maintains that although there is no inconsistency between this argument and the version of rule utilitarianism to which it lends support, this version of the theory is an “individual rule utilitarianism” quite unlike Mill’s.

John Stuart Mill's Moral, Social, and Political Philosophy

by Dale E. Miller

Forthcoming in the Oxford Handbook of British Philosophy in the Nineteenth Century, ed. William Mander. OUP, 2012.

Sympathy versus spontaneity: a tension in Mill's conception of human perfection

by Dale E. Miller

Mill's Theory of Sanctions

by Dale E. Miller

Why Ought I Be Rational?

by Joey Miller

- Term Paper for Professor Lydia Patton's "Kant's Ethical Thought" Seminar (Fall 2011)
- Southwest Graduate Student Conference in Philosophy, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ, Mar 2-3, 2012

In this paper I argue that any attempt to ground ethical concepts in pure rationality (thereby necessarily excluding... more In this paper I argue that any attempt to ground ethical concepts in pure rationality (thereby necessarily excluding appeals to empirical facts) is inevitably inadequate because it cannot provide an appropriate answer to the “why be moral” question. While the ethical rationalists seem to have a simple and straightforward answer to this question, difficulties arise in any attempt to provide an answer while continuing to adhere to the rationalist approach. Essentially, for the rationalist, the question “why be moral?” reduces to the question “why be rational?”, and the rationalist has two ways of addressing this question. First, they can claim that the question is ridiculous and requires no explanation, or, secondly, they can see it as a legitimate question and attempt to provide an answer. I argue that both attempts fail for the rationalist, and any attempt to answer the “why be moral” question cannot be done within a rationalist framework. In section II I provide a brief explanation of the rationalist approach, using Immanuel Kant’s framework as the primary example, followed, in section III, by an explanation of the rationalist’s answer to the question “why be moral?”. Section IV draws out some of the difficulties in this seemingly straightforward answer by explaining the two approaches the rationalist can take and how both approaches are inadequate. Finally, in section V, I explain the significance of this conclusion as it suggests that any attempt to build an ethical theory is going to seem to require a grounding of ethical concepts in empirical facts.

Bishop Butler on Bullshit

by Aaron Garrett

Draft only.

Smith on Sympathy and Propriety

by Warren Herold

This is a draft of the fourth chapter of my dissertation. It's very much a work in progress. Comments welcome!

Snapshots from manuscripts of the Epistle on Character Traits/Ethics (al-Risala fi’l-akhlaq) from the Rasa'il Ikhwan al-Safa (The Epistles of the Pure Brethren), corresponing to the edition by Butrus al-Bustani (Beirut, Dar Sadir, 1957), vol. 1, p. 299, l. 11ff.

by Omar Ali-de-Unzaga (عمر علي دي أونثاغا)

These are snapshots from manuscripts of the Epistle on Character Traits (al-Risāla fī’l-akhlāq) from the Rasāʾil Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ (The Epistles of the Pure Brethren), corresponing to the edition by Buṭrus al-Bustānī (Beirut, Dār Ṣādir, 1957), vol. 1, p. 299, l. 11ff.

I am currently working on a critical edition and translation of this text

Embodiment and ethics: constructing medicine’s two bodies

by David Armstrong

Aristotle and Kant on Contemplation, Ethics and Politics

by Byron Kaldis

Archiv für  Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie, 85/4, pp 540-562.

Gestalterapia: ensaio de superação ética de sua violenta condição de psicoterapia do Eu

by Herlon Bezerra

BEZERRA, Herlon A. Gestalt Terapia: ensaio de superação ética de sua violenta condição de psicoterapia do Eu. Universidade Federal do Ceará. Departamento de Psicologia. Fortaleza: 2002. (Monografia de Conclusão de Curso).

As transformações culturais contemporâneas vêm promovendo movimentos discursivos cujo significado final parece ser o... more As transformações culturais contemporâneas vêm promovendo movimentos discursivos cujo significado final parece ser o de uma verdadeira reviravolta cultural pós-metafísica. Em tal condição cultural residem, parece certo, questionamentos críticos fundamentais quanto aos tradicionais modelos éticos prescritivos, fundados na estabelecida metafísica ocidental grega. Esse o sentido, por exemplo, de propostas como a da ética da alteridade radical, do filósofo judeu e franco-lituano, Emmanuel Lévinas. Partindo da potente radicalidade crítica levinasiana, Freire (2002) empreendeu um desafiante diálogo com as psicologias do contexto da modernidade tardia. O presente exercício encontra-se inspirado nesse trabalho e ensaia, a partir de uma desleitura inventiva da Gestalterapia, introduzir um parâmetro de leitura no qual possa dar-se a promoção de uma superação ética de leituras nas quais essa abordagem é significada como psicoterapia do Eu, de pretensões ortopédicas e, assim, manifestamente violenta. Este é, pois, um discurso esperançoso, que pretende apontar para as possibilidades contemporâneas de uma psicoterapia ética.

Analytic Ethics in the Central Period

by Mark Bevir

History of European Ideas
Volume 37, Issue 3, September 2011, Pages 249-256

Analytic ethics in the central period – extending from the beginning of the twentieth century to post-World War II... more Analytic ethics in the central period – extending from the beginning of the twentieth century to post-World War II linguistic analysis – is too often construed by historians and philosophers alike in monolithic terms as the emotivism of A. J. Ayer. In contrast, we argue that a multiplicity of ethical doctrines were developed by analytic philosophers at this time of which Ayer's emotivism was just one. Moreover, we maintain that this multiplicity of ethical doctrines was itself the result of a multiplicity of conceptions of analysis and that connecting these two sets of beliefs makes for the best understanding of analytic ethics.