H.P. Grice

Embedded Implicatures Observed: A Comment on Geurts and Pouscoulous (2009) (Semantics and Pragmatics)

by Chad Dube

Blasphemies: a speech act perspective (2011)

by Neri Marsili

Lecture for the XII ‘Pathaphisical Symposium held Prague, September 2011

This study presents an innovative challenge for speech act theory: understanding blasphemy. The results shows that a... more This study presents an innovative challenge for speech act theory: understanding blasphemy. The results shows that a pragmatic approach can offer significant improvement to theological and moral comprehension of blasphemy.

Rubin, M., & Badea, C. (2007). Why do people perceive in-group homogeneity on in-group traits and out-group homogeneity on out-group traits? Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 33, 31-42.

by Mark Rubin

People tend to perceive ingroup homogeneity on ingroup stereotypical traits and outgroup homogeneity on outgroup... more People tend to perceive ingroup homogeneity on ingroup stereotypical traits and outgroup homogeneity on outgroup stereotypical traits (e.g., Kelly, 1989; Simon, 1992a; Simon & Pettigrew, 1990). If it is assumed that people use homogeneity ratings to indicate the extent to which groups possess traits, then this stereotype effect may be interpreted as an expression of perceived trait possession (i.e., ingroups possess ingroup stereotypical traits and outgroups possess outgroup stereotypical traits). If it is further assumed that research participants abide by the conversational norm of appropriate quantity (e.g., Bless, Strack, & Schwarz, 1993), then this stereotype effect should be significantly reduced following prior expressions of perceived trait possession. A literature review and two minimal group experiments (Ns = 75, 104) supported this prediction. This evidence is discussed in relation to the outgroup homogeneity effect and self-categorization theory.

Is Common Ground a Word or Just a Sound? Second Order Consensus and Argumentation Theory

by Italo Testa

(with P. Cantù), published in "Dissensus and the Search for Common Ground", ed. by Hans V. Hansen, Christopher W. Tindale, J. Anthony Blair, Ralph H. Johnson and David M. Godden, OSSA,Windsor, ON, 2007

This paper focuses on the role played by the concept of Common Ground by investigating various roles played by... more This paper focuses on the role played by the concept of Common Ground by investigating various roles played by consensus and dissensus in different argumentation theories. A dynamic conception of Common Ground as a second order consensus will be invoked.

Externalizing Communicative Intentions

by Charles Lassiter

revised version of "Embodying Communicative Intentions"

Implicating without Intending on the Gricean Account of Implicature

by Charles Lassiter

This is a revised version of the paper "Unintentional implicature, speaker meaning, and communal norms"

The aim of this paper is to support the position that what is implicated is not determined by speaker intention, a... more The aim of this paper is to support the position that what is implicated is not determined by speaker intention, a claim which runs counter to the widely accepted position that what is implicated is determined by speaker intention. This paper argues for the conclusion that communication of conversational implicatures can be unintended by presenting three examples in which Grice’s criteria for the completion of conversational implicature are satisfied but the speaker does not intend to implicate anything. The paper ends with the suggestion that rules governing implicatures are importantly normative and that linguistic communal norms account for their normativity.

Say what? On Grice on what is said.

by Luca Baptista

European Journal of Philosophy - Early view

In this paper I argue that there is a very important, though often neglected, dissimilarity between the two Gricean... more In this paper I argue that there is a very important, though often neglected, dissimilarity between the two Gricean conceptions of ‘what is said’: the one presented in his William James Lectures and the one sketched in the ‘Retrospective Epilogue’ to his book Studies in the Way of Words. The main problem lies with the idea of speakers' commitment to what they say and how this is to be related to the conventional, or standard, meaning of the sentences uttered in the act of saying. Since the later notion of ‘what is said’, or ‘dictiveness’, is claimed to be logically independent from ‘formality’ (roughly, conventional meaning), Grice seems to maintain that there are cases in which content that is not expressed by a sentence in a context may nevertheless count as what is said. I propose an account of what is said that brings together the two apparently irreconcilable approaches. The price to be paid for a Gricean, however, is to accept a duality of behaviour between (natural language counterparts of) logical constants and logical variables.

Toward a Cultural Phenomenology of Intersubjectivity: The Extended Relational Field of the Tzotzil Maya of Highland Chiapas, Mexico

by Kevin Groark

In Press: Language & Communication (Special Issue: “Intersubjectivity: Cultural Limits, Extensions and Construals”; E. Danziger and A. Rumsey, eds.)

*Note: This is an uncorrected page proof. When citing, please refer to the final published version.

Among the Tzotzil Maya of San Juan Chamula (Chiapas Highlands, Mexico), dream experience, symptom formation, and... more Among the Tzotzil Maya of San Juan Chamula (Chiapas Highlands, Mexico), dream experience, symptom formation, and certain forms of emotionally heightened self-consciousness are drawn upon to gain knowledge of the social surround. Through an exploration of these ostensibly non-intersubjective domains (and their epistemological and ontological entailments), I begin to trace the contours and dynamics of the “extended relational field” of the highland Maya, emphasizing a distinctly multimodal approach to intersubjectivity which includes interpersonal relations, intersomatic processes, and soul-based “counterpart relations.” By attending to social experience across diverse phenomenal levels, contemporary Tzotzil Maya are able to cultivate a more fully dimensional understanding of the dispositional surround—particularly in terms of those aspects of feeling and intention that are systematically stripped from most face to face interactions. Through this discussion, I hope to broaden the frame through which we view cross-cultural inflections of intersubjectivity, emphasizing the importance of tracing the differential manifestations of relational processes across diverse—and often unexpected—experiential registers, only some of which involve “minds coming to knowing other minds.

Modified Occam's Razor

by Ben Phillips

The Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 2012, Vol 90, No. 2: 371-82.

According to the principle Grice calls ‘Modified Occam’s Razor’ (MOR), ‘Senses are not to be multiplied beyond... more According to the principle Grice calls ‘Modified Occam’s Razor’ (MOR), ‘Senses are not to be multiplied beyond necessity’. More carefully, MOR says that if there are distinct ways in which an expression is regularly used then, all other things being equal, we should favour the view that the expression is unambiguous and that certain uses of it can be explained in pragmatic terms. In this paper I argue that MOR cannot have the central role that is typically assigned to it by those who deploy it. More specifically, I argue that potential justifications of the epistemic import of parsimony in semantic theorizing are problematic, and that even if MOR could be justified, it has a redundant role to play in adjudicating the debate between the ambiguity-theorist and the proponent of the pragmatic approach.

Inference: Procedures and implications for ELT

by Costas Gabrielatos

Gabrielatos, C.
2002
In R.P. Millrood (Ed.) Research Methodology: Discourse in teaching a foreign Language (pp. 30-52). Tambov, Russia: Tambov University Press.

Inferencing is essential for effective communication for two reasons. Firstly, the conventional meaning of lexis is... more Inferencing is essential for effective communication for two reasons. Firstly, the conventional meaning of lexis is not always a clear indicator of the intended message of speakers/ writers (e.g. Grice 1975). Secondly, "discourse rarely provides us with a fully explicit description of a situation" (Eysenck 1990:224); there fore, we usually have to fill in the missing information (see also Clark & Clark 1977:96-98). It seems wise then for foreign language teachers and materials writers to take account of the clues and procedures involved in language interpretation. But how is inferencing achieved? That is, how do we understand more than (or even something different from) what the actual words seem to denote? Whatknowledge and clues do we use? What processes take place in our minds? As far as ELT is concerned, what are the implications for decision-making, materials writing and classroom practice? In other words, what is it that teachers and materials writers need to know about inferencing, and how can they translate this knowledge into teaching materials and procedures?