Global Egalitarianism

Resources, Rights and Global Justice: A Response to Kolers

by Chris Armstrong

This is a response to Avery Kolers's paper 'Justice, Territory and Natural Resources.' Both that paper, and my response, are forthcoming in Political Studies.

Shared Understandings, Collective Autonomy and Global Equality

by Chris Armstrong

unpublished paper

The relationship between the claims of global distributive justice, national self-determination and cultural diversity... more The relationship between the claims of global distributive justice, national self-determination and cultural diversity has attracted much attention recently. Three of the most commonly-voiced objections to global distributive justice – and especially, on some accounts, the egalitarian variety – are first that it is incompatible with respecting the collective autonomy of national communities; second that it cannot be achieved without endangering cultural diversity, perhaps even crushing it in instituting the kind of global state that egalitarian justice might require; and third that articulating and / or implementing principles of equality at the global level simply cannot be done. On this last view, we have no metric at the global level by way of which to judge whether resources or opportunities, for example, are equally held, given that different communities differ in the way they conceive and value the goods they distribute amongst themselves. The American philosopher Michael Walzer is a prominent theorist of equality at the domestic level, but his apparent resistance to any form of global distributive justice is much-noted; indeed he has been understood to advance all three of the above claims on the way to rejecting any version of global distributive justice.

This paper argues for a more nuanced view. In his most recent work – and also, to a lesser extent, in the very work that has been claimed to give evidence for his objections – Walzer demonstrates a surprising degree of sympathy for the claims of global distributive justice, even of the egalitarian variety. But the precise nature of this commitment to global equality remains to be explicated. The paper therefore examines the contours of Walzer’s global egalitarianism, paying particular attention to the conclusions we might draw firstly for our understanding of the opposition between global equality and national self-determination (which is more complex than has sometimes been thought), and secondly for the relationship between global equality and shared understandings.

Global Egalitarianism

by Chris Armstrong

Published in Philosophy Compass, 2009

To whom is egalitarian justice owed? Our fellow citizens, or all of humankind? If the latter, what form might a global... more To whom is egalitarian justice owed? Our fellow citizens, or all of humankind? If the latter, what form might a global brand of egalitarianism take? This paper examines some recent debates about the justification, and content, of global egalitarian justice. It provides an account of some keenly argued controversies about the scope of egalitarian justice, between those who would restrict it to the level of the state and those who would extend it more widely. It also notes the cross-cutting distinction between relationists (whose views on scope are derived from a belief about which relations, practices or institutions give rise to the demands of equality) and non-relationists (who place no such importance on empirical facts about the relations between individuals). Beyond this, it sets out some of the different principles that might flow from a commitment to global egalitarianism. One of the key goals is to highlight the increasing diversity within debates on global justice, so that even those with a shared commitment to global equality may espouse different views about the justifications for equality, as well as the nature of, and proper sites for, egalitarian principles.

Coercion, Reciprocity and Equality beyond the State

by Chris Armstrong

Forthcoming in Journal of Social Philosophy, 2009

This paper examines arguments for restricting duties of specifically egalitarian distributive justice to the level of... more This paper examines arguments for restricting duties of specifically egalitarian distributive justice to the level of individual states. One argument suggests that citizens of a given state owe one another such duties on account of their subjection to, and authorship of, a system of coercive laws and institutions. An alternative argument suggests that citizens of a given state owe such duties by virtue of their reciprocal contribution to the provision of certain collective goods. It is shown here that neither argument is successful in limiting egalitarian duties to the intra-state, as opposed to supra-state level. Normatively speaking, neither of the two arguments under review provides a persuasive account of when and why egalitarian duties are owed. Empirically speaking, each of the two arguments is in any case susceptible to what is termed the continuum objection: both accounts, that is, lead to the conclusion that at least some egalitarian duties are owed beyond the bounds of individual states. The paper concludes by offering some reflections on the nature of egalitarian duties at the global level, and attempts to carve out conceptual space for a pluralist, but nevertheless global, form of egalitarianism.

Defending the Duty of Assistance?

by Chris Armstrong

Forthcoming in Social Theory and Practice, 2009

Whereas the drive to elaborate principles and practices of global distributive justice is continuing apace in the... more Whereas the drive to elaborate principles and practices of global distributive justice is continuing apace in the academy, Rawls’s last book The Law of Peoples rejected the very idea of global distributive justice, and recommended instead a ‘duty of assistance’ towards societies burdened by unfavourable conditions – a concession that was described by many critics as wholly inadequate to the task of addressing global economic injustice. Recently, though, some more friendly critics (including Samuel Freeman, David Reidy and Mathias Risse) have argued for a reappraisal. Perhaps the duty is a demanding one, which enjoys clear advantages over some accounts of global distributive justice. And relatedly, perhaps The Law of Peoples possesses greater resources for theorising issues of global economic justice than has sometimes been recognised.

This paper evaluates this attempt at rehabilitation. The character of the duty of assistance is set out, and the reasons why it is held to be superior to principles of global distributive justice are briefly canvassed. The supposed advantages enjoyed by the duty are examined, and it is shown that these are far less impressive than has been suggested by both Rawls and some recent defenders of his position. The paper also considers the ways in which the account developed in The Law of Peoples is able to contribute to the theorisation of global economic injustice. Although the account does provide more resources than has sometimes been recognised, it is argued that as the duty-based account is pushed further on this issue, it becomes still less plausible to claim that it possesses appreciable advantages over various positions on global distributive justice. More pointedly, its supposed advantages turn out to be in tension with each other. As such, if the provision of an adequate position on global economic justice is the goal, the reappraisal of The Law of Peoples may ultimately demand a transcendence of at least some of its key elements.

National Self-Determination, Global Equality and Moral Arbitrariness

by Chris Armstrong

forthcoming in Journal of Political Philosophy

Basic Needs, Equality and Global Justice

by Chris Armstrong

From Journal of Global Ethics, 2009

Shared Understandings, Collective Autonomy and Global Equality

by Chris Armstrong

From Ethics and Global Politics, 2011

The political theorist Michael Walzer has usually been taken as an opponent of global distributive justice, on the... more The political theorist Michael Walzer has usually been taken as an opponent of global distributive justice, on the basis that it is incompatible with collective autonomy, would endanger cultural diversity, or simply on the basis that principles of global distributive justice cannot be coherently envisaged, given cross-cultural disagreement about the nature and value of the social goods which might be distributed. However in his recent work, Walzer demonstrates a surprising degree of sympathy for the claims of global distributive justice, even of the egalitarian variety. But the precise contours of his current position on global equality are not yet clearly developed. The paper therefore attempts to reconstruct what that position might be, paying particular attention to the conclusions we could draw firstly for our understanding of the opposition between global equality and national self-determination (which is more complex than has sometimes been thought), and secondly for the relationship between global equality and shared understandings.

Global Equality of Opportunity as an Institutional Standard of Distributive Justice

by Daniel Butt