Gilbert Simondon

Nietzsche’s Pharaonic Thought: Hieroglyphic Transduction

by Nandita Biswas Mellamphy (UWO)

Forthcoming in Horst Hutter, ed., Becoming Loyal to the Earth: Ecology and Life-Affirmation in Nietzsche’s Vision -- Nietzsche’s Teaching as a Therapy for Political Culture (London: Continuum Books, 2012).

Heidegger et Deleuze, même combat ?

by Pierre-Alexandre Fradet

à paraître dans PhaenEx, vol. 8.1, mai 2013.

Concrete Software: Simondon’s mechanology and the techno-social

by Simon Mills

The article provides an introduction to Simondon’s theory of technological genesis and indicates the problematic nature of the cultural for Simondon’s account. This is made apparent by contemporary developments in techno-social networks. However, I will also argue that this insufficiency is not insurmountable given Simondon’s overall ontology. Instead, it is a result of his own bias regarding technological development at the time when he was writing.

In the latter part of the paper I will attempt to demonstrate how this insufficiency can be overcome and Simondon’s theory can be fruitfully applied to the theorization of contemporary social media and software (with a specialfocus on the Twitter API). Additionally, I hope this paper will go some way to indicating Simondon’s relevance to current ethical concerns regarding the relation of the technological to nature.

El artefacto, ¿estructura intencional o sistema autónomo? La ontología de la función artefactual a la luz del intencionalismo, el dualismo y la filosofía de Gilbert Simondon

by Andres Vaccari

Forthcoming in 2012, in CTS: Revista Iberoamericana de Ciencia, Tecnología y Sociedad. This is an uncorrected final draft.

ABSTRACT (English): The present paper carries out a comparative analysis of the notion of function in analytical... more ABSTRACT (English): The present paper carries out a comparative analysis of the notion of function in analytical philosophy (in particular, intentionalism and artifact dualism) and in the philosophy of Simondon. I examine the relation between agency, intentionality, and the use and production of artifacts in both approaches. An interesting feature of Simondon’s approach is that it does not draw any real distinction between function and structure, a distinction that is crucial in artifact dualism. Also, against intentionalism, Simondon elaborates a philosophy of technology that considers artifacts as dynamic entities that should be examined in terms of internal, formal causes, rather than as products of human intentions. Finally, I examine the systemic theory of function developed by Cummins on the analytical side, which also considers functions as internal features define in terms of the system they compose. This theory is considered rather compatible with Simondon’s, and some productive conclusions can be drawn from their comparison.

ABSTRACT (Spanish): El presente trabajo aborda un análisis comparativo entre la noción de función, tal como ha sido desarrollada en la filosofía analítica, y la noción de función en la filosofía de Simondon. Se examina la relación entre agencia, intencionalidad, y el uso y producción de artefactos en ambos enfoques. Una característica llamativa es que en la filosofía de Simondon no se establece la distinción entre función y estructura, la cual es central en el dualismo artefactual. Finalmente se examina la noción sistémica de la función desarrollada por Cummins en el lado analítico, la cual se considera complementaria o afín a la de Simondon.

Teleindividuation

by Rafał Ilnicki

Against the “Networked Information Economy”: Rethinking Decentralization, Community, and Free Software Development

by Ben Roberts

Published in Criticism 53.3, 2011, pp. 385-405
DOI: 10.1353/crt.2011.0023

To Have or Not to Be: Possession of Action as Organizational Mode of Being

by Nicolas Bencherki

Bencherki, N., & Cooren, F. (2011). To have or not to be: the possessive constitution of organization. Human Relations, 64(12), 1579-1607.

How does an organization act? Can it be considered an actor on its own or does it need organizational members who act... more How does an organization act? Can it be considered an actor on its own or does it need organizational members who act on its behalf? We would like to suggest our own take on the issue by suggesting a genuinely communicative approach to the issue of organizational action. Using the narratology of A. J. Greimas to make apparent in talk some of process philosophy’s tenets, we show how organization act by being attributed actions. The detailed study of meetings from a community organization serves as our empirical grounding. We suggest that through the imbrication of mandates and programs of action in a logic of appropriation/attribution, the organization can effectively act while always relying on others to do so. Far from “just talk”, we contend that in doing so, participants reconfigure their organization and make it do things. There is no need to resort to an essentialist ontology of organization to state that it acts “itself”. We therefore reconcile the two most common views of organizational action – that of an organization acting by itself and that of agents acting on its behalf.

「シモンドンにおける存在の問いとしての個体発生」

by Stehlin Laurent

VOL, n. 5, 2011, pp. 128-141

« L’ontogenèse comme question de l’être chez Simondon »

Cet article, qui se base essentiellement sur "L’individuation à la lumières des notions de forme et... more Cet article, qui se base essentiellement sur "L’individuation à la lumières des notions de forme et d’information", parcourt la philosophie de l’individuation de G. Simondon à travers les différents niveaux qu’elle définit, le physique, le vital et le psycho-social. Son objectif est de mettre à jour l’intuition proprement philosophique de Simondon qui les relie.
Si Simondon se refuse à simplement bâtir le supérieur sur l’inférieur et à voir une individuation unique fonctionner identiquement partout, on constate cependant une complexification des différents processus d’individuation. La méthode « analogique » de Simondon développe toujours plus les dimensions dégagées dans l’individuation du cristal qui lui sert de « paradigme ». Ainsi, nous nous intéressons en particulier aux « polarisations » temporelle et spatiale qui se déploient comme dimensionnalités de l’ontogenèse : l’individu est pris depuis son centre.
Cette complexification doit être lue par le biais d’une « problématique ». Selon Simondon, l’individuation vaut comme la résolution d’un problème. C’est avec le vivant que surgit une « question de la vie », qui devient elle-même problématique lorsque le vivant comme « sujet » devient un problème pour lui-même dans une nouvelle individuation : l’individuation psychique est une mise en question de la question elle-même. Mais celle-ci ne peut trouver de solution que dans une sorte de désindividuation qui conduit l’individu-sujet vers le « transindividuel ». De cette façon peut-il découvrir sa dimension « préindividuelle », complément de tout individu formé et fonctionnant comme source de potentialités de nouvelles individuations. Le préindividuel devient le lieu de rencontre avec autrui pour une individuation partagée, à la fois intérieure et extérieure. C’est seulement ainsi que l’individu peut résoudre sa problématique en déployant une temporalité complète, puisqu’il peut se déterminer également comme élément de réponse à sa question (dimension du futur, alors que le vivant se détermine surtout par rapport au présent). Les polarisations temporelle et spatiale sont alors véritablement significatives, sens.
Le problème de l’individuation est donc une reprise de la question de l’être au sens classique (changement/immobilité ; un/multiple, etc.), avec une inspiration mais aussi un écart important par rapport au Heidegger de Être et temps.

La filosofia relazionale di Simondon

by Didier Debaise

Debaise, D. (2008). "La filosofia relazionale di Simondon." Il Protagora 12: 363-369.

Qu'est-ce qu'une pensée relationnelle?

by Didier Debaise

Published in 'Multitudes', N° 18, 2004

Les conditions d'une pensée de la relation selon Simondon

by Didier Debaise

Published in P. Chabot (ed.), Simondon, Paris, Vrin, 2002

Ec(h)ology of the Désêtre

by Dan Mellamphy

Dan Mellamphy and Nandita Biswas Mellamphy in Reza Negaretani, ed., Collapse: Journal of Philosophical Research and Development VII: "Culinary Materialism" (Spring-Summer 2011), 412-435.

Written for the special issue of Collapse edited by
Reza Negarestani on the theme of ‘Culinary Materialism’ *... more Written for the special issue of Collapse edited by
Reza Negarestani on the theme of ‘Culinary Materialism’ *
(Collapse: Journal of Philosophical Research and
Development, Volume VII, Spring-Summer 2011)
and attempting to transition between and thereby
transduce the ‘Culinary Materialism’ of that issue
with the ‘Geo-philosophy’ of the previous one
(most specifically Nicola Masciandaro's
‘Becoming Spice: Commentary as
Geo-philosophy’), the present essay
envisions human beings as being themselves
the Spice, Épice, and Épi[ce]phenomenon in and of
a monstrous yet mundane meal: the existent entrée of
the earthly ouroboros, serpent or dragon (etymonline.com/
index.php?term=worm). With reference to the works of
Frank Herbert (Dune books one to six), Michael Moor-
cock (Elric books one to six), and Reza Negarestani
(his 2008 Cyclonopedia), Nietzsche's “Wille zur Macht”
is interpreted as the veritable Will or Volonté d’estomac[ht],
the veritable “estomac[hia]” of an all-consuming eco-
logical eater qua Tiamaterialist Metabolism (Nega-
restanian “Tiamaterialism”). The sand-worms of
Herbert's ‘Arrakis’, the dragons of Moorcock's
‘Melniboné’ and vermicular vectors of Negarestani's
‘Middle East’ all describe a drakontos and drakontological
condition: the earth's ecosystem as a “force of violent
destruction” (Nietzsche, Wille zur Macht §23) which
gives rise to a “mathesis and politics of decay”
(Negarestani, Collapse VI, 381). Earth’s ecology,
in the end (and/or from the beginning), is utterly
non-egological and non-egocentric: it destroys
and devours individual egos and edifices --
like Elric’s soul-stealing sword Stormbringer,
it is in principle and process a psychophagy as opposed to
a psychology, a “force of violent destruction” that in-
gests the individual ‐‐ all individuals ‐‐ and al-
chemically digests it or digests them;
‘Culinary Materialism’ tout court.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[ note ] The description above
refers to the first draft of the essay,
which is the draft here supplied/attached.
The (re)edited version for Collapse VII
is the final rather than the first draft
(at least, thus far!) and is devoid of
Moorcock's Melniboné, amongst
other ingredients. For more on
the Collapse version, see the
Editors’ introduction at
http://www.urbanomic.com/Publications/Collapse-7/PDFs/C7_Mackay_Negarestani.pdf
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Brother Theodore’s contribution to ‘Culinary Materialism’
can be found at http://www.youtube.com/v/dC0DYqQiaWw?version=4
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Logoclast: Nihilophany in Beckett’s and Eliot’s Endgames

by Dan Mellamphy

Forthcoming in Aaron Cheak, ed., Alchemical Traditions (Victoria AU: Numen Books, 2012).

What is proposed in this paper is that the chess-games
in the works of T.S. Eliot and Samuel Beckett are among... more What is proposed in this paper is that the chess-games
in the works of T.S. Eliot and Samuel Beckett are among the
most well-defined and clear-cut arenas these authors have found
for foregrounding a particularly problematic protagonist. And it is
proposed that Beckett and Eliot, authors often considered
at odds with each other, endeavor in their works
to come to terms with a similar problematic protagonist.
This protagonist is not the Latin ‘personam’ but rather
that which the Latin ‘personam’, the Greek ‘prosopon’
or the façade of the individual ‘person’ obscures:
a pre-personal thus impersonal quantum of force
which [1] the philosopher/Beckett-scholar Gilles Deleuze
on the one hand called ‘the fractured ‘I’ of a dissolved cogito’
or ‘the system of a dissolved self’ and [2] the philosopher/Beckett-
scholar Alain Badiou on the other hand called the funda-
mental and formative field of functions: the general,
generic and generative ‘set-up that bears witness
to the question of being’.

It was Badiou who suggested that ‘Beckett
is a disciple of Heraclitus’, and indeed
it is argued in this study that the principles at work
in Beckettian and Eliotic chess-games are at once
Heraclitean and Pythagorean. Beckett and Eliot
point us in the direction of these Pre-Platonic figures --
for instance via the Pythagorean formulations in Beckett’s
Murphy and the Heraclitean epigraphs of Eliot’s Four Quartets --
and exemplify in their respective works [i] the notion of personae
as Pythagorean ‘psephoi’ or Heraclitean ‘pesseia’ (the ‘calx’ or
‘counting‐stones’ which in a game of chess would be the
chess-game playing‐pieces), [ii] the impersonal or pre-
personal field of the Pythagorean ‘tetractys’ or Heraclitean
‘logos’ (the mathesis or ‘matrix’ which in a game of chess
would be the chess-board playing‐field), and [iii] the dynamics
‘at play’ or ‘in the play’ between the personal and the pre-personal,
between the ‘psephoi’ or ‘pesseia’ and the ‘logos’ or ‘tetractys’,
expressed as the thoroughgoing tension of that Heraclitean
‘palintonos’ or Pythagorean ‘hypotonos’ which
in a game of chess would be the movements
of the game as such: its back-and-forths,
turn after turn, round after round:
Heraclitean ‘agchibasien’).

The Heraclitean ‘logos’ and the Pythagorean ‘tetractys’
-- the ‘matrix’ of the chess-game and of the game of life:
‘aion pais esti paizon pesseuon’ -- are ‘surds’: they remain,
in the worded world, unheard (‘sourd’, in French, or ‘muet’:
mute), and are thus for the most part ‘unheeded’. To be
attuned to this mute matrix, Beckett’s ‘matrix of surds’,
is to fall out of tune with oneself and uncover in so [un]doing
the selfless or pre-individual dimension of existence
which Deleuze’s great precursor Gilbert Simondon
described as a ‘primitive magical unity’ and which
Deleuze himself, in one of his earliest essays,
likened to the mathesis universalis of the Pythagoreans.
The ‘fall’ here described, or ‘failure’ as Beckett put it, is akin to
the check-mate of chess: the ‘being crossed out’ of the
check-mated king at the crux of the chess-game
as such. To suddenly find oneself in check-mate,
and thereby to find oneself unselved, is to find oneself
not only in a negative, negated condition, but also
to find onseself -- unselved -- in a condition of
negative capability, able to perceive from this
[dis]position the impersonal condition at the heart of
Beckett’s and of Eliot’s respective works. Check-mate
(in Arabic the ‘shah mat‘: the murder, or ‘mat‘, of the king,
or ‘shah‘) allows, in the ‘thaumazéin‘ or ‘bewildering minute’
of its annihilation, an absurd perception: that of the
‘être assassiné’, as Beckett said, or of the martyr
‘Murder[ed] in the [Chess] Cathedral’, paraphrasing Eliot:
the witnessing, in other words, of an ultimately unnameable
existence at odds with existents. http://tiny.cc/krjac c/o ck/

Gilbert Simondon: The Essence of Technicity

by Dan Mellamphy

Ninian Mellamphy, Dan Mellamphy & Nandita Biswas Mellamphy (translators), Deleuze Studies 5.3 (11-11-11), 406-424; excerpt from Gilbert Simondon, On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects, trans. Ninian Mellamphy, Dan Mellamphy & Nandita Biswas Mellamphy, forthcoming from Semiotexte/MIT Press, 12-12-12 (?).

An excerpt from the forthcoming translation for Semiotext(e) of Gilbert Simondon’s Mode of Existence of Technical... more An excerpt from the forthcoming translation for Semiotext(e) of Gilbert Simondon’s Mode of Existence of Technical Objects by Ninian Mellamphy, Dan Mellamphy and Nandita Biswas Mellamphy (excerpt scheduled for publication in Deleuze Studies 5.3, 11-11-11). This copy is only a rough draft and is not for distribution (preview only). The excerpted passage is from Chapter One, ‘The Genesis of Technicity’, of Part Three, on ‘The Essence of Technicity’. This chapter is comprised of three sub-sections: 1, on ‘The Notion of Phase Applied to Becoming’; 2, on ‘The Phase‐Shift of Primitive Magical Unity’; and 3, on ‘The Divergence of Technical Thinking and of Religious Thinking’.

Le langage de l'individuation

by Didier Debaise

Published in 'Multitudes', N° 18, 2004, Paris

What is relational thinking?

by Didier Debaise

The translated version of an article on Simondon's philosophy published in Multitudes, 18, 2004.