Gilbert Ryle

Tacit Knowledge and the Learning Paradox

by Neil Gascoigne

Draft only. To be given at Institute of Education on 9th May.

I can't get no (epistemic) satisfaction: Why the hard problem of consciousness entails a hard problem of explanation

by Brian Earp

Earp, B. D. (2012). I can’t get no (epistemic) satisfaction: Why the hard problem of consciousness entails a hard problem of explanation. Dialogues in Philosophy, Mental and Neuro Sciences, in press.

Daniel Dennett (1996) has disputed David Chalmers’ (1995) assertion that there is a “hard problem of consciousness”... more Daniel Dennett (1996) has disputed David Chalmers’ (1995) assertion that there is a “hard problem of consciousness” worth solving in the philosophy of mind. In this paper I defend Chalmers against Dennett on this point: I argue that there is a hard problem of consciousness, that it is distinct in kind from the so-called easy problems, and that it is vital for the sake of honest and productive research in the cognitive sciences to be clear about the difference. But I have my own rebuke for Chalmers on the point of explanation. Chalmers (1995, 1996) proposes to “solve” the hard problem of consciousness by positing qualia as fundamental features of the universe, alongside such ontological basics as mass and space-time. But this is an inadequate solution: to posit, I will urge, is not to explain. To bolster this view, I borrow from an account of explanation by which it must provide “epistemic satisfaction” to be considered successful (Rowlands, 2001; Campbell, 2009), and show that Chalmers’ proposal fails on this account. I conclude that research in the science of consciousness cannot move forward without greater conceptual clarity in the field.

În apărarea lui a-ști-cum - răspunsuri la obiecțiile lui Stanley și Williamson

by Adriana Zbanț

Knowledge-how, Linguistic Intellectualism, and Ryle's Return

by David Löwenstein

Final Draft. Published in: Tolksdorf, Stefan (ed.), Conceptions of Knowledge. Berlin & New York: Walter de Gruyter. pp. 269-304.

How should we understand knowledge-how – knowledge how to do something? And how is it related to knowledge-that –... more How should we understand knowledge-how – knowledge how to do something? And how is it related to knowledge-that – knowledge that something is the case?1 In this paper, I will discuss a very important and influential aspect of this question, namely the claim – dubbed ‘Intellectualism’ by Gilbert Ryle (1945, 1949) – that knowledge-how can be reduced to knowledge-that. Recently, Jason Stanley and Timothy Williamson (2001) have tried to establish Intellectualism with the aid of linguistic considerations. This project – Linguistic Intellectualism – will be criticized on three levels. First, I will reconstruct and object to Stanley & Williamson’s positive argument in favour of Intellectualism (section 2). Second, I will assess their view of the relationship between knowledge-how and practical ability and argue that their stance is not well-motivated (section 3). Third, I will discuss their criticism of Ryle’s objection against Intellectualism. After distinguishing between different versions of Ryle’s argument, I will show that its strongest version is both immune to the objection by Stanley & Williamson and a decisive argument against their own theory (section 4). Given that Intellectualism fails for these three reasons, I finally draw on a broader reading of Ryle in order to develop the beginnings of a positive account of knowledge-how and its relationship to knowledge-that (section 5).

"Is Know-How a Species of Know-That?"

by Dani Rabinowitz

Rough draft of a work in progress. Comments appreciated.

Jason Stanley and Timothy Williamson (2001) and Stanley (forthcoming) argue that knowledge-how is a species of... more Jason Stanley and Timothy Williamson (2001) and Stanley (forthcoming) argue that knowledge-how is a species of knowledge-that. Roughly, if an agent S knows how to φ then there is some relevant proposition that S knows. The target of their arguments is Gilbert Ryle who claimed that a distinction must be drawn between knowledge-that and knowledge-how, where, according to Ryle, the first is a relation between an agent and a true proposition whilst the latter is an ability. Whilst not defending Ryle’s position, I present a case in which I argue that know-how comes apart from know-that. Such a case indicates that knowledge-how is not a species of knowledge-that for one can luckily know how to φ thanks to a kind of luck that is standardly taken to destroy propositional knowledge. Knowing-how is therefore not a kind of knowing-that.

The ghosts in the Education Machine

by David R Cole

www.use.umu.se/english/research/educationinquiry/1-2010

The ghosts of this paper refer to the ways in which diverse practices and learning styles coincide in particular... more The ghosts of this paper refer to the ways in which diverse practices and learning styles coincide in particular frames.

This article will combine the philosophy of mind with an example of  educational poststructuralism to generate an informed approach to understand learning-practice. This combinational analysis rests on certain principles and focus points such as:

• Language plays a crucial role in the orchestration of practice.
• Learning cannot be separated from its contextual instantiations.
• The conjunction learning-practice is meaningless without a discussion about the language of practice and the learning context.

This approach called learning-practice will be furnished with an example taken from research into vocational education. The example will act as an experimental field to test the principles and focus points of learning-practice. The research field also acts to examine the coherence and cogency of the philosophy of education that we may draw from this perspective that strategically deploys ideas taken from Wittgenstein (1963), Deleuze & Guattari (1987) and Ryle (1949).     

La estructura disposicional de los sentimientos

by Omar V. Rosas

Published in "Ideas & Valores", 2011, 60(145): 5-31.

Este artículo analiza la estructura disposicional de los sentimientos. Con base en la teoría valorativa de las... more Este artículo analiza la estructura disposicional de los sentimientos. Con base en la teoría valorativa de las emociones, desarrollada por Frijda y sus colegas, se argumenta que los sentimientos pueden entenderse como parcialmente isomorfos a las emociones, cuyo rasgo fundamental radica en las disposiciones de un individuo a creer y actuar en congruencia con sus experiencias emocionales. Además, se exploran los criterios que permiten diferenciar los sentimientos, de otros tipos de disposición como los estados de ánimo y los rasgos de carácter. Finalmente se subraya la pertinencia de esta investigación para la filosofía política y moral.