Causation, unification and the adequacy of singular explanations.
In: Theoria 24(3)(2009): 301-320.
Pluralism with respect to the structure of explanations of facts is not uncommon. Wesley Salmon, for instance,... more
Pluralism with respect to the structure of explanations of facts is not uncommon. Wesley Salmon, for instance, distinguished two types of explanation: causal explanations (which provide insight in the causes of the fact we want to explain) and unification explanations (which fit the explanandum into a unified world view). The pluralism which Salmon and others have defended is compatible with several positions about the exact relation between these two types of explanations. We distinguish four such positions, and argue in
favour of one of them. We also compare our results with the views of some authors who have recently written on this subject.
Mythos Wissenschaft(lichkeit)?
published in: Psycho-Logik. Jahrbuch für Psychotherapie, Philosophie und Kultur 6, 2011, 269-285.
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Download (.pdf) On a Bayesian Analysis of the Virtue of Unification
In three recent papers, Wayne Myrvold (1996, 2003) and Timothy McGrew (2003) have developed Bayesian accounts of the... more In three recent papers, Wayne Myrvold (1996, 2003) and Timothy McGrew (2003) have developed Bayesian accounts of the virtue of unification. In his account, McGrew demonstrates that, ceteris paribus, a hypothesis that unifies its evidence will have a higher posterior probability than a hypothesis that does not. Myrvold, on the other hand, offers a specific measure of unification that can be applied to individual hypotheses. He argues that one must account for this measure in order to calculate correctly the degree of confirmation that a hypothesis receives from its evidence. Using the probability calculus, I prove that the two accounts of unification require the same underlying inequality; thus, McGrew and Myrvold have accounted for unification in fundamentally identical probabilistic terms. I then evaluate five putative counterexamples to this account and show that these examples, far from disqualifying it, serve to clarify our notion of unification by disentangling it from a host of other concepts. (Philosophy of Science (2005) 72(4): 594-607).
Must the Scientific Realist Be a Rationalist?
Marc Alspector-Kelly claims that Bas van Fraassen's primary challenge to the scientific realist is for the realist to... more Marc Alspector-Kelly claims that Bas van Fraassen's primary challenge to the scientific realist is for the realist to find a way to justify the use of some mode of inference that takes him from the world of observables to knowledge of the world of unobservables without thereby abandoning empiricism. It is argued that any effort to justify such an "inferential wand" must appeal either to synthetic a priori or synthetic a posteriori knowledge. This disjunction turns into a dilemma for the empirically-minded realist as either disjunct leads to unwanted consequences. In this paper, I split the horns of this dilemma by arguing that the realist can justify one particular such mode of inference -- abduction -- without committing himself to rationalism. The realist may justify this mode of inference by appealing to the analytic a priori axioms of the probability calculus. I show that Peter Lipton's tripartite defense of abduction constitutes such a method of justification. (Synthese (2007) 154(2): 329-334).
PhD thesis: A Critique of the Arguments for Scientific Realism
by Phil Rees
Recently successfully defended
This thesis aims to show that the arguments offered in support of the most prevalent versions of scientific realism... more
This thesis aims to show that the arguments offered in support of the most prevalent versions of scientific realism are unconvincing and offer no reason why an anti-realist position should not rationally be held.
Several formulations of realism are examined and reduced to two. First, Convergent Ontological Scientific Realism (COSR) – the claim that most current successful theories are approximately true, and successive theories converge upon the truth. Second, Axiological Scientific Realism (ASR) – the claim that while many current theories may not even be approximately true, nevertheless, science aims for the truth.
Axiological claims of all kinds are questioned and shown to be unhelpful. It is then argued that ASR theorists face difficulties, and need to also affirm COSR. Consequently, refuting COSR refutes ASR, and that is what the remainder of the thesis attempts to do.
The concept of approximate truth is critiqued and shown to be incapable of doing the relatively precise job scientific realism requires of it.
The Pessimistic Induction argument is presented in a revised form, and an extensive selection of realist criticisms are examined and rebutted. The claim against realism remains intact – that the historical record refutes its proposed link between empirical success and approximate truth.
The classical Underdetermination argument against realism is criticised. However, the Unconceived Alternatives argument is shown to undermine scientific realism by an induction on the historical record.
The No Miracles Argument for scientific realism is examined in detail and shown to be question-begging, and unconvincing on many other counts.
A non-realist alternative explanation of the success of science is offered which explains more than the putative realist explanation would have done.
The conclusion is that the case for scientific realism has not been made, leaving the way open for non-realist ways of understanding the activities of the sciences.
The Scientific Practice of Assessing Progress
by Moti Mizrahi
Proceedings of the Third Biennial Conference of the Society for Philosophy of Science in Practice
In a recent debate about the nature of scientific progress, Alexander Bird and Darrell Rowbottom have argued for two... more In a recent debate about the nature of scientific progress, Alexander Bird and Darrell Rowbottom have argued for two competing accounts of progress. According to Bird, scientific progress consists in the accumulation of scientific knowledge. Rowbottom, on the other hand, thinks that truth alone is necessary for progress. Both appeal to intuitions in support of their views, and it seems that the debate has reached an impasse. In an attempt to avoid this stalemate, I propose that we abandon appeals to intuitions and turn to scientific practice instead. I propose to examine the institution of the Nobel Prize, where scientists award their peers for what they consider to be important contributions to science, in order to shed new light on the question of scientific progress. I discuss two case studies that illustrate what I call “the scientific practice of assessing progress.” This practice shows that scientists make evaluative judgments about scientific discoveries based on epistemic criteria. As far as scientists are concerned, progress is made when scientific discoveries contribute to the increase of scientific knowledge of the following sorts: empirical (factual), theoretical (inferential), practical, and methodological. I then propose that we should articulate an account of scientific progress that does justice to this scientific practice. I discuss one way of doing so, i.e., by abandoning the distinction between ‘knowing that’ and ‘knowing how’ and granting that know-how counts as scientific knowledge.
Why the Ultimate Argument for Scientific Realism Ultimately Fails
by Moti Mizrahi
Forthcoming in Studies in History and Philosophy of Science
In this paper, I argue that the ultimate argument for Scientific Realism, also known as the No-Miracles Argument... more In this paper, I argue that the ultimate argument for Scientific Realism, also known as the No-Miracles Argument (NMA), ultimately fails as an abductive defence of Epistemic Scientific Realism (ESR), where (ESR) is the thesis that successful theories of mature sciences are approximately true. The NMA is supposed to be an Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE) that purports to explain the success of science. However, the explanation offered as the best explanation for success, namely (ESR), fails to yield independently testable predictions that alternative explanations for success do not yield. If this is correct, then there seems to be no good reason to prefer (ESR) over alternative explanations for success.
The Role of Unification in Explanations of Facts
In: H. De Regt, S. Okasha and S. Hartmann (eds.). EPSA Philosophy of Science: Amsterdam 2009. Berlin: Springer, 2012.
In the literature on scientific explanation, there is a classical distinction between explanations of facts and... more In the literature on scientific explanation, there is a classical distinction between explanations of facts and explanations of laws. This paper is about explanations of facts. Our aim is to analyse the role of unification in explanations of this kind. We discuss five positions with respect to this role, argue for two of them and refute the three others.
Indispensability Arguments in Favour of Reductive Explanations
In: Journal for General Philosophy of Science 42(1)(2011): 33-46.
Instances of explanatory reduction are often advocated on metaphysical grounds; given that the only real things in the... more Instances of explanatory reduction are often advocated on metaphysical grounds; given that the only real things in the world are subatomic particles and their interaction, we have to try to explain everything in terms of the laws of physics. In this paper, we show that explanatory reduction cannot be defended on metaphysical grounds. Nevertheless, indispensability arguments for reductive explanations can be developed, taking into account actual scientific practice and the role of epistemic interests. Reductive explanations might be indispensable to address some epistemic interest answering a specific explanation-seeking question in the most accurate, adequate and efficient way. Just like explanatory pluralists often advocate the indispensability of higher levels of explanation pointing at the pragmatic value of the explanatory information obtained on these higher levels, we argue that explanatory reduction—traditionally understood as the contender of pluralism—can be defended in a similar way. The pragmatic value reductionist, lower level explanations might have in the biomedical sciences and the social sciences is illustrated by some case studies.
Quasi-Truth as Truth of a Ramsey Sentence
Draft
I show the quasi-truth of a sentence in a partial structure to be equivalent to the truth of a specific Ramsey sentence... more I show the quasi-truth of a sentence in a partial structure to be equivalent to the truth of a specific Ramsey sentence in a structure that corresponds naturally to the partial structure. Hence quasi-truth, the core notion of the partial structures approach, can be captured in the terms of the received view on scientific theories as developed by Carnap and Hempel. I further show that a mapping is a partial homomorphism/isomorphism between two partial structures if and only if it is a homomorphism/isomorphism between their corresponding structures. It is a corollary that the partial structures approach can be expressed in first or second order model theory.
Auxiliary Assumptions, Unification, and Intelligent Design: A Defense of Contrastive Testability
Draft
Boudry and Leuridan argue that in a number of cases—and specifically in the case of intelligent design—a theory can be... more Boudry and Leuridan argue that in a number of cases—and specifically in the case of intelligent design—a theory can be intuitively testable, but not contrastively testable according to Sober’s definition. I argue that their purported counterexamples rely on misunderstandings of the concept of contrastive testability and the version of intelligent design criticized by Sober. I also argue that the liberalization of contrastive testability suggested by Boudry and Leuridan is trivial.
Generalizing Empirical Adequacy II: Partial Structures
Draft
The companion piece to this article captures and generalizes empirical adequacy in terms of vagueness sets. In this... more The companion piece to this article captures and generalizes empirical adequacy in terms of vagueness sets. In this article, I show that previous attempts to capture and generalize empirical adequacy in terms of partial structures fail. Indeed, the motivations for the partial structures approach are better met by vagueness sets, which can be used to generalize the partial structure approach.
Generalizing Empirical Adequacy I: Multiplicity and Approximation
Draft
Based on a formalization of constructive empiricism’s core concept of empirical adequacy, I show that some previous... more Based on a formalization of constructive empiricism’s core concept of empirical adequacy, I show that some previous discussions rest on misunderstandings of empirical adequacy. Using one of the inspirations for constructive empiricism, I generalize the concept of a theory to avoid implausible presumptions about the relations of theoretical concepts and observations, and generalize empirical adequacy to allow for lack of knowledge, approximations, and successive gain of knowledge and precision. As a test case, I provide an application of the concepts to a simple interference phenomenon.
On Likelihoodism and Intelligent Design
Presented at the APA Eastern Division Meeting, Washington, DC, December 30, 2011
Two common and plausible claims in the philosophy of science are that (i) a theory that makes no predictions is not... more Two common and plausible claims in the philosophy of science are that (i) a theory that makes no predictions is not testable and (ii) one cannot confirm a theory by criticizing a competing one absent further assumptions about their relation. Elliott Sober has developed these claims within likelihoodism, which defines the testability and confirmation of a theory only in contrast to another, and has argued that the claims hold for intelligent design (ID) when contrasted with evolutionary theory (ET). I show that Sober’s arguments rely on a contentious hidden premise, and that within likelihoodism, both claims are false for ID and ET under his assumptions and one very weak further assumption about ID and ET. I then show that, given Sober’s assumptions, the claims are true for a non-contrastive criterion of testability close to the Bayesian one and the relevance criterion of confirmation.
Artificial Language Philosophy of Science
Published in the /European Journal for Philosophy of Science/.
Artificial language philosophy (also called ‘ideal language philosophy’) is the position that philosophical problems... more Artificial language philosophy (also called ‘ideal language philosophy’) is the position that philosophical problems are best solved or dissolved through a reform of language. Its underlying methodology—the development of languages for specific purposes—leads to a conventionalist view of language in general and of concepts in particular. I argue that many philosophical practices can be reinterpreted as applications of artificial language philosophy. In addition, many factually occurring interrelations between the sciences and philosophy of science are justified and clarified by the assumption of an artificial language methodology.
On a Contrastive Criterion of Testability II: The Material Inadequacy of Contrastive Testability
Draft
Elliott Sober has suggested his contrastive criterion of testability as an improvement over previous criteria of... more Elliott Sober has suggested his contrastive criterion of testability as an improvement over previous criteria of empirical significance like falsifiability and the standard Bayesian criterion of empirical significance. I argue that the criterion fails to meet four of the conditions of adequacy for a criterion of empirical significance that follow from Sober’s position or are presumed in his arguments. I suggest to define empirical significance as empirical non-equivalence to a tautology, because this definition does meet the conditions of adequacy. Specifically, it is equivalent to the standard Bayesian criterion of empirical significance whenever all probabilities are defined and contains falsifiability as a special case. This latter feature is important because those conditions of adequacy that apply to criteria of deductive empirical significance single out falsifiability.
On a Contrastive Criterion of Testability I: Defining Contrastive Testability
Draft
Elliott Sober has suggested his contrastive criterion of testability as an improvement over previous criteria of... more Elliott Sober has suggested his contrastive criterion of testability as an improvement over previous criteria of empirical significance like falsifiability or a suggestion within Bayesianism. I argue that Sober’s criterion entails that if one group of people is justified in believing a claim, every group is, and that it tacitly relies on an inconsistent interpretation of probabilistic inequalities. Furthermore, the criterion’s restrictions on the use of auxiliary assumptions are in part redundant and in part unjustified. Most importantly, they are so weak that almost all theories can be contrastively tested. On the basis of these results, I suggest a modification of Sober’s criterion that avoids these problems without abandoning Sober’s core idea.
Criteria of Empirical Significance: a Success Story
An earlier version of this article received the Sir Karl Popper Essay Prize 2009 of the British Society for the Philosophy of Science.
The sheer multitude of criteria of empirical significance has been taken as evidence that the pre-analytic notion... more The sheer multitude of criteria of empirical significance has been taken as evidence that the pre-analytic notion being explicated is too vague to be useful. I show instead that a significant number of these criteria—by Ayer, Popper, Przełęcki, Suppes, and David Lewis, among others—not only form a coherent whole, but also connect directly to the theory of definition, the notion of empirical content as explicated by Ramsey sentences, and the theory of measurement; two criteria by Carnap and Sober are trivial, but can be saved and connected to the other criteria by slight modifications. A corollary is that the ordinary language defense of Lewis, the conceptual arguments by Ayer and Popper, the theoretical considerations by Przełęcki, and the practical considerations by Suppes all apply to the same criterion or closely related criteria. Furthermore, the equivalence of some criteria allows for their individual justifications to be taken cumulatively and, together with the entailment relations between nonequivalent criteria, suggest criteria for general auxiliary assumptions, comparative criteria, and more liberal conceptions of observation.