by Stephen J. Cowley
This appeared as:
Cowley, S. J. (2002). Why brains matter: an integrational perspective on “The Symbolic Species”. Language Sciences, 24: 73-95.
Deacon's co-evolutionary theory provides a new basis for how we think about language and brains. Instead of ascribing... more
Deacon's co-evolutionary theory provides a new basis for how we think about language and brains. Instead of ascribing language to either nature or nurture, it is intrinsic to both: biological principles ensure that the brain can only function by attuning to itsbody's worlds. For humans, this means both that our brains are biosocial organs permeated by history and that human bodies can tightly constrain the nature of our languages.
While endorsing the thought that language is insinuated into brains, I also identify what I take to be the theory's Achilles heel. Deacon pictures the brain as able to process words qua 'symbolic' tokens. Unlike morphosyntactic patterns, these belong to a private domain where referential interpretation detaches from experience. Opposing this split between symbolic (and nonverbal aspects of language,I claim that it is not only unnecessary but also implausible and damaging to co-evolutionary theory.
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