Functionalism

The Project Zlín. Everyday Life in a Materialized Utopia

by Lucie Galcanova

Vacková, Barbora, Lucie Galčanová. 2009. „The Project Zlín. Everyday Life in a Materialized Utopia“. Lidé města / Urban People 11(2):311–337.

This article is based on a contribution to the "Město - mýtus - identita" (City - Myth - Identity)... more This article is based on a contribution to the "Město - mýtus - identita" (City - Myth - Identity) conference. In it we attempt to consider Baťa and Zlín as a specific kind of myth which is still alive within our cultural milieu. In the text which follows we will deal with one chapter from the overall story of Zlín: with the forms of worker housing, the original assumptions around its construction and its life in everyday currency (based on in-depth interviews with the residents). With this analytical look at this unique phenomenon we wish to peer under one layer of the Zlín myth.

Yesterday’s Church of Tomorrow - St. John the Baptist, Ermine Estate

by Karolina Szynalska

Delivered at the symposium The History and Heritage of Post-war Council Estates, Bishop Grosseteste University College Lincoln, 30 June 2011

Consecrated in 1963, the parish church of St. John the Baptist is a major contribution to ecclesiastical architecture... more Consecrated in 1963, the parish church of St. John the Baptist is a major contribution to ecclesiastical architecture of the second half of the 20th century. This avant-garde building is the central feature of the Ermine Estate in the provincial city of Lincoln. Its importance lies in combining innovative minimalist architectural thinking with advanced liturgical planning. The structure was designed by an architect largely invisible in architectural history, Sam Scorer, and a structural engineer, Hajnal Konyi. It consists of an impressive hyperbolic paraboloid roof made in reinforced concrete. Its form was fashionable and functional (romantically rational). It gave an impression of contradicting laws of gravity. It summarizes the post-war excitement with engineering.
The paper contains a discussion about contradictions and discontinuities that occur in the story of this intriguing architectural precedent.

Consciousness from a first-person perspective

by Max Velmans

This is a clean PDF of my reply to 36 peer reviews of my target article in BBS, 1991 “Is human information processing conscious?” As it develops quite a few themes that are fundamental to consciousness studies, I have added an Abstract and references so that it can be read as a stand-alone paper. As this paper tries to address all the points raised by the commentaries it ranges widely, and to assist easier reading it has been subdivided into sections that separate experimental issues from the more theoretical and philosophical issues. The commentators included many of the experimentalists and theoreticians that were prominent in consciousness studies at the time, including scientists such as Bernie Baars, Francis Crick, Christoph Koch, John Gardiner, Jeffrey Gray, Marcel Kinsbourne, Ben Libet, Dan Lloyd, George Mandler, Bruce Mangan, Norman Dixon, Howard Shevrin, Keith Stanovich, Geoff Underwood and philosophers such as Ned Block, Fred Dretske, Valery Hardcastle, Georges Rey, Aaron Sloman and Robert van Gulick. Viewed historically, it is interesting to see how confused the literature was at the time concerning how phenomenal consciousness relates to information processing and particularly to attentional processing. Viewed 20 years later, I would still make a similar defence of my original target article although many of the themes introduced in these two papers have now been elaborated in my subsequent writings.

This paper replies to the first 36 commentaries on my target article on “Is human information processing conscious?”... more This paper replies to the first 36 commentaries on my target article on “Is human information processing conscious?” (Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1991, pp. 651-669). The target article focused largely on experimental studies of how consciousness relates to human information processing, tracing their relation from input through to output, while discussion of the implications of the findings both for cognitive psychology and philosophy of mind was relatively brief. The commentaries reversed this emphasis, and so, correspondingly, did the reply. The sequence of topics in the reply roughly follows that of the target article. The discussion begins with a reconsideration of the details of the empirical findings, whether they can be extrapolated to non-laboratory settings, and the extent to which one can rely on their use of subjective reports. This is followed by an in-depth discussion of what is meant by “conscious processing” and of how phenomenal consciousness relates to attentional processing. We then turn to broader philosophical and theoretical issues. I point out some of the reasons why I do not support epiphenomenalism, dualist-interactionism, or reductionism, and elaborate on how first- and third-person views of the mind can be regarded as complementary and mutually irreducible. I suggest how the relation of conscious experiences to their neural correlates can be understood in terms of a dual-aspect theory of information, and how this might be used to resolve some of the paradoxes surrounding the causal interactions of consciousness and brain. I also suggest that, viewed from a first-person perspective, consciousness gives purpose to existence, which allows a different way of viewing its role in evolution.

Reflexive monism

by Max Velmans

This is a summary of some of the main features of reflexive monism published in the Journal of Consciousness Studies in 2008. Some further implications of reflexive monism considered as an integrative philosophical system are summarised in "Reflexive Monism: psychophysical relations among mind, matter, and consciousness" due to be published in the Journal of Consciousness Studies in October 2012

Reflexive monism is, in essence, an ancient view of how consciousness relates to the material world that has, in... more Reflexive monism is, in essence, an ancient view of how consciousness relates to the material world that has, in recent decades, been resurrected in modern form. In this paper I discuss how some of its basic features differ from both dualism and variants of physicalist and functionalist reductionism, focusing on those aspects of the theory that challenge deeply rooted presuppositions in current Western thought. I pay particular attention to the ontological status and seeming “out-thereness” of the phenomenal world and to how the “phenomenal world” relates to the “physical world”, the “world itself”, and processing in the brain. In order to place the theory within the context of current thought and debate, I address questions that have been raised about reflexive monism in recent commentaries and also evaluate competing accounts of the same issues offered by “transparency theory” and by “biological naturalism”. I argue that, of the competing views on offer, reflexive monism most closely follows the contours of ordinary experience, the findings of science, and common sense.

Jak udawać dualistę, wprowadzając epicykle do funkcjonalizmu

by Marcin Miłkowski

Miłkowski, Marcin. 2011. “Jak udawać dualistę, wprowadzając epicykle do funkcjonalizmu.” Przegląd Filozoficzny – Nowa Seria (1 (77)): 27-45.

Uwaga: PDF przed korektą autorską. Korekty:

s.29, wers 3 od góry: dodać przecinek po "skutki"
s.34, wers 4 od góry, usunąć wyrazy "nie są" po wyrazie "ani"
s. 35, przypis 10, wers 2 od dołu, usunąć wyrazy "na mierzeniu"
s. 40, wers 11-10 od dołu, zastąpić "zakładają zależności
przyczynowych" wyrazami "są one przyczynowe"

W artykule argumentuję na rzecz tezy, że stanowisko Chalmersa, określa- ne mianem naturalistycznego dualizmu, jest... more W artykule argumentuję na rzecz tezy, że stanowisko Chalmersa, określa- ne mianem naturalistycznego dualizmu, jest jedynie pewną wariacją na temat funkcjonalizmu, która jednak pozostaje czysto deklaratywna. Autor przypisuje jej inne zobowiązania ontologiczne, lecz wydają się one gołosłowne. Nawet śmiały i pozornie ekstrawagancki epifenomenalizm wydaje się pozorem, bo nie daje się go utrzymać jednocześnie z postulowanymi przez Chalmersa pra- wami psychofi zycznymi. Uzasadniony jest wadliwie, bo na podstawie błędnej koncepcji wyjaśniania, gdzie myli się warunek wystarczający z przyczyną. Co gorsza, nawet gdyby istniały niezależne argumenty na rzecz panpsychizmu czy teorii podwójnego aspektu (pozostają one w książce spekulacją, co autor pod- kreśla), to też nie miałyby znaczenia poznawczego, bo świadectwa na rzecz tych zjawisk nie są z natury rzeczy dostępne w intersubiektywny sposób. Twier- dzę, że zmiany w funkcjonalizmie, które wprowadził Chalmers, mają charakter epicykli – komplikacji wprowadzonych ad hoc, a jednocześnie jedynie zwięk- szających złożoność teorii, która niczym istotnym od funkcjonalizmu się nie różni. Stanowisko Chalmersa jest więc dualizmem jedynie z nazwy, a de facto – niespecjalnie nowatorską odmianą klasycznego funkcjonalizmu maszynowe- go w fi lozofi i umysłu.

Theory 101

by Erik De'Scathebury

So many *isms*, so little time...

A brief introduction to Functionalism as used in archaeological theory. A brief introduction to Functionalism as used in archaeological theory.

Mnemosyne, Metaphor and Theory of Mind An Imaginative Visual Essay of Computionalism

by Marcio Alves da Rocha

Transtechnology Research • Reader 2011 Plymouth University

This essay will explore historic principles of a Computational Theory of Mind and metaphor as a cognitive process. The... more This essay will explore historic principles of a Computational Theory of Mind and metaphor as a cognitive process. The conceptual metaphor developed by Lakoff and Johnson states that “our ordinary conceptual system, in terms of how we both think and act, is fundamentally metaphorical in nature” (1980, p. 3) to define our representational system and understand the natural world. Computational Theory of Mind is a historical view in philosophy in which the human mind ought to be conceived as an information processing system, considering that thought is a form of computation. Externalist theory versions are explored in this essay also, highlighting the tension between central dilemmas and different notions on the subject. Informed by the way that Warburg proposed to represent part of the history of art through juxtaposed images, this essay seeks to open up the possibility to reflect on the history of Computational Theory of Mind, using metaphors and juxtaposed images and will result in visual insights in to the detriment of exclusively textual as evidenced by Warburg in his Mnemosyne Atlas.
One of Warburg’s contributions to the history of art through the Mnemosyne Atlas, a contribution which later became more explicit in a science of images, was based on diametrically opposed criteria rather than a pure formalism, and broke with the continuum of art history’s traditionally established chronological and hermetic hierarchy. Warburg positioned images to uncover the polarity of the form within incidental ephemera, such as postage stamps and printed materials, constructing imaginative metaphors and uncovering the interpretative energy within them, making metaphor underlying for the work that he proposed. Through his unfinished Mnemosyne Atlas, Warburg practised a polarised iconography through images meticulously juxtaposed, reconfiguring the production of human knowledge and understanding, and questioning the meaning of images, as evidenced by the emotive potential each project gathered in his unfinished Atlas (Grau, 2004).
This essay will deal with the following key topics: Computationalism, Functionalism, Behaviourism, Connectionism, Embodiment and Enactivism.
Although the function of the essay is to explore aspects of Computational Theory of Mind it will not be completely detached from the personal/authorial view of the author.

Culinary Innovation in Cognition Research and the Swallowing Ability of Functionalism

by Saray Ayala

very first draft. any feedback very welcome!!

Of the two existent interpretations of the embodied cognition
program (EC), a functionalist reading and a radical... more Of the two existent interpretations of the embodied cognition
program (EC), a functionalist reading and a radical reading,
only the latter recognizes that EC contains some innovative
proposals that challenge our traditional cognitivist
understanding of cognition. Here I explore the debate
between these two interpretations and conclude that (i) the
radical reading is the best way to understand EC, and (ii) the
functionalist reading, and the functionalist position in general,
lacks the decency required to take part in a scientific and
philosophical debate over the mind.

Real Algorithms: A Defense of Cognitivism

by John Bolender

Consciousness from a first-person perspective.

by Max Velmans

This paper is a clean PDF of my replies to the first 36 commentaries on my BBS target article "Is human information processing conscious?" In it, I tried to cover every point raised in the commentaries and the reply consequently provides a vignette of the complex theoretical debates in play at that time in both philosophy and science. Over 20 years later (at the time of this upload) it is partly of historical interest, and I have developed many of the ideas introduced in the paper in subsequent writings. However much of the paper is still relevant to current debates about the precise relationship of phenomenal consciousness to its associated cognitive functioning. For example in 1991 many commentators had internally inconsistent and, in my view, a confused reductive understanding of the relationship of phenomenal consciousness to focal-attentive processing. 20 years later the reduction of phenomenal consciousness to focal attention is less common, but alternative reductions (e.g. to "broadcasting" or to the working of a "global workspace") are still common, in spite of the fact that similar caveats about the irreducibility of first- to third-person perspective accounts of mental processing apply. Following BBS conventions, commentators are referred to in bold type on first mention in any given paragraph.

The sequence of topics in this BBS reply roughly follows that of the target article. The latter focused largely on... more The sequence of topics in this BBS reply roughly follows that of the target article. The latter focused largely on experimental studies of how consciousness relates to human information processing, tracing their relation from input through to output. The discussion of the implications of the findings both for cognitive psychology and philosophy of mind was relatively brief. The commentaries reverse this emphasis, and so, correspondingly, does the reply. Sections 1.1 to 1.9 begin with details of the empirical findings (Underwood, Inhoff, Mangan, Van Gulick, Shevrin, Dagenbach, Spiegel, Rey, Lloyd, Wagstaff, Block, Carlson, Mandler, Libet, and Keane). Sections 2 & 3 deal with general comments about the laboratory-based approach of the review (Kinsbourne, Reznick & Zelazo, Bowers, and Foulkes) and the status of subjective reports (Gregson, Economos, Gray, and Lloyd). Sections 4 to 6 discuss the nature of "conscious processing," beginning with differences between conscious and nonconscious processing in section 4 (Wilson, Bowers, Carlson, Block, and Inhoff), followed by a detailed treatment of the relation of consciousness to focal-attentive processing in sections 5.1 to 5.4 (Mandler, Baars, Carlson, Rey, Mangan, Klein, Van Gulick, and Block) and a further discussion of what is meant by a "conscious process" in section 6 (Van Gulick, Dretske). Sections 7 to 9, deal with broad philosophical and theoretical implications, starting (in 7.1 to 7.3) with the mistaken assumption (of Baars, Block, Lloyd, Mangan, Van Gulick, Kinsbourne, Corteen, Rey, and Hardcastle) that I support epiphenomenalism, and the problems of dualist-interactionism (MacKay, and Mangan) and reductionism (Sloman, Hardcastle, Rey, and Stanovich). Section 8 gives a fuller account of "first-person" vs "third-person" perspectives (Stanovich, Schaeken & d'Ywalle, Shevrin and Gardiner), and section 9, of "complementarity." 9.1 replaces the privileged status of "third-person" accounts with a more balanced view of the two perspectives (Lloyd) and 9.2 moves on to a proposed resolution of the paradoxes surrounding the causal interactions of consciousness and the brain (Libet). A "complementary" account is given of the relation of consciousness to its neural correlates in 9.3 (Economos, Koch & Crick, Van Gulick, and Navon) and, finally, of the role of consciousness in evolution in 9.4 (Mangan, Corteen, Klein, editorial, andSchaeken & d'Ywalle).

Systems in Context: On the Outcome of the Habermas/Luhmann-Debate

by Poul F. Kjaer

66-77, Ancilla Iuris, Sep., 2006.

Usually regarded as a 1970s phenomenon, this article demonstrates that the debate between Jürgen Habermas and Niklas... more Usually regarded as a 1970s phenomenon, this article demonstrates that the debate between Jürgen Habermas and Niklas Luhmann continued until Luhmann’s death in 1998, and that the development of the two theorists’ positions during the 1980s and 1990s was characterised by convergence rather than by divergence. In the realm of legal theory, the article suggests, convergence advanced to the extent that Habermas’ discourse theory may be characterised as a normative superstructure to Luhmann’s descriptive theory of society. It is further shown that the debate’s result was an almost complete absorption of Habermas’ theory by Luhmann’s systems theoretical complex – an outcome facilitated by Luhmann’s deliberate translation of central Habermasian concepts into systems theoretical concepts. The article argues that both the debate and Habermas’ conversion were made possible because not only Habermas’ but also Luhmann’s work can be considered a further development of the German idealist tradition. What Luhmann did not acknowledge was that this manoeuvre permitted the achievement of Habermas’ normative objectives; nor did he notice that it could eradicate a central flaw in the system theoretical construction, by allowing the context within which distinctions are drawn to be mapped – an issue of pivotal importance for grasping relationships between different social systems, and coordinating them, via the deployment of legal instruments.

A Dialogue on Comparative Functionalism

by Jan Smits

Co-authored with Jaakko Husa. Published in: Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law Vol. 18 (2011), pp. 554-558

The use of the functional method when comparing legal systems remains debated, even to such an extent that some... more The use of the functional method when comparing legal systems remains debated, even to such an extent that some authors have discarded functionalism as a fruitful method. The two authors of this paper ask what we can still expect from functionalism. While Jaakko Husa presents an argument in favor of rule-of-thumb functionalism, Jan Smits claims that functionalism has a bright future if it is reshaped. The authors present their arguments by way of a dialogue that was written for the ‘Legal debates’-section of the Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law.

A Hybrid within a Hybrid: Contextualizing REACH in the Process of European Integration and Constitutionalization

by Poul F. Kjaer

European Journal of Risk Regulation, Vol. 1, No. 4, pp. 383-396, 2010

REACH is a new European Community Regulation on chemicals and their safe use. This Regulation is a hybrid that... more REACH is a new European Community Regulation on chemicals and their safe use. This Regulation is a hybrid that combines hierarchy and heterarchy from a both a legal and an organisational perspective. Such hybridism is, however, not a feature that is particular to REACH. Rather the EU itself must be understood as a hybrid, thereby making REACH a hybrid operating within a hybrid. The hybrid structure of REACH reflects its societal function, which is to simultaneously separate and combine politics, science, economy, health and the environment within a single legal framework. The legitimacy of REACH reflects its hybrid structure in the sense that it is based on a combination of democratic, procedural and deliberative components.

Is human information processing conscious?

by Max Velmans

This is a clean PDF of my 1991 target article published in the Behavioral and Brain Sciences. At the time of publication, it was in many ways heretical. (One irate commentator wrote to the editor that if BBS were prepared to publish this they were clearly willing to publish anything!) But at the time of this upload, this is my most highly cited paper. At the time of publication, nearly all cognitive psychologist assumed that phenomenal consciousness was reducible to third-person viewable information processing. They merely argued about what form of information processing it might be. A similar functionalist view was widely adopted within philosophy of mind. This paper reviewed evidence that the many functions ascribed to consciousness could be carried out without it, and that when a given process is accompanied by consciousness the relevant conscious phenomenology follows the process to which it most obviously relates, all of which requires a more nuanced analysis of the different ways in which a process can be said to be "conscious".The paper also posed a fundamental challenge to the reductionist functionalism that was prevalent at the time, and introduced the idea that first- and third-person views of the operations of mind were complementary and mutually irreductible. This last suggestion could not be properly developed in this first target article (it was fully developed in later papers and in my book Understanding Consciousness)--and, having given a critique of the role of phenomenal consciousness in third-person viewable information processing, many commentators assumed that I was an epiphenomenalist in the style of Thomas Huxley.That, however, was never my view; in blocking functionalist reductionism my aim was restore consciousness to its true first-person significance rather than to diminish its importance. 20 years later, various aspects of the paper have become widely accepted, for example the unconscious/preconscious nature of much of human information processing and the idea that first- and third-person views of the mind can be treated as complementary and mutually irreducible.

Investigations of the function of consciousness in human information processing have focused mainly on two questions:... more Investigations of the function of consciousness in human information processing have focused mainly on two questions: (1) where does consciousness enter into the information processing sequence and (2) how does conscious processing differ from preconscious and unconscious processing. Input analysis is thought to be initially "preconscious," "pre-attentive," fast, involuntary, and automatic. This is followed by "conscious," "focal-attentive" analysis which is relatively slow, voluntary, and flexible. It is thought that simple, familiar stimuli can be identified preconsciously, but conscious processing is needed to identify complex, novel stimuli. Conscious processing has also been thought to be necessary for choice, learning and memory, and the organization of complex, novel responses, particularly those requiring planning, reflection, or creativity. The present target article reviews evidence that consciousness performs none of these functions. Consciousness nearly always results from focal-attentive processing (as a form of output) but does not itself enter into this or any other form of human information processing. This suggests that the term "conscious process" needs re-examination. Consciousness appears to be necessary in a variety of tasks because they require focal-attentive processing; if consciousness is absent, focal-attentive processing is absent. Viewed from a first-person perspective, however, conscious states are causally effective. First-person accounts are complementary to third-person accounts. Although they can be translated into third-person accounts, they cannot be reduced to them

Funktionalismus Paritätsprinzip und die These des erweiterten Geistes

by Fabian Hundertmark

My Bachelor thesis

Im folgenden Text werde ich mich mit dem Verhältnis von Funktionalismus und Paritätsprinzip befassen und die Frage... more Im folgenden Text werde ich mich mit dem Verhältnis von Funktionalismus und Paritätsprinzip befassen und die Frage klären, ob die Kombination beider Thesen dazu führt, dass es in unserer Welt externe geistige Zustände tatsächlich gibt.
Zu diesem Zweck stelle ich zunächst den Funktionalismus und das Paritätsprinzip dar und kläre die Frage, ob die eine Theorie aus der anderen folgt. Da dies nicht der Fall ist, ergibt sich aus der Kombination beider Thesen der erweiterte Funktionalismus. Dieser ist wesentlicher Bestandteil einer Argumentation für die These des erweiterten Geistes. Ich werde jedoch zeigen, dass eine solche nicht möglich ist, da auf keine funktionalistische Theorie zurückgegriffen werden kann. Zum Schluss werde ich beweisen, dass ein auf dem erweiterten Funktionalismus basierendes Ar- gument gegen ein in der Debatte viel
besprochenes Beispiel nicht gültig ist, da es auf einer unplausiblen Annahme beruht.

Superfunctionalizing the Mind

by Saray Ayala

An extended critical note of Andy Clark's Supersizing the Mind (2008) An extended critical note of Andy Clark's Supersizing the Mind (2008)

From Functionalism to Cultural Studies: Manifest Ruptures and Latent Continuities

by C. Patrick Burrowes

published in Communication Theory

Functionalism practically disappeared as an explicit tradition in communications due to the radical theoretical... more Functionalism practically disappeared as an explicit tradition in communications due to the radical theoretical realignments of the 1980s. Three criticisms proved decisive to this undoing; political conservatism; problems of logic, mainly tautology and an inappropriate appeal to teleological explanations; and a tendency to impose psychological and sociological analyses on specifically cultural materials. Formulated in reference to systemic Parsonian functionalism, which dominated the broader social sciences, these criticisms are relatively easy to reconcile within the contextual, actionist Mertonian tradition, which took root in the communications context, but only through a constructive dialogue with the cultural studies and cultural indicators approaches, both of which have spent the last decade investigating a traditionally functionalist concern - the hypothesis of cultural systems integration. If functionalism offers to this cross-fertilization a focus on the normative orders of society, the cultural indicators approach provides a rigorous methodology and cultural studies cautions a greater sensitivity to social hierarchies.

Lake. R. J. (2011). A Critique of Functionalist Values within Recent British Tennis Policy. International Sports Studies 32 (2), 47-59.

by Robert J. Lake

From the 1960s, British sport came to be regarded as serving particular societal functions, particularly along lines... more From the 1960s, British sport came to be regarded as serving particular societal functions, particularly along lines of social integration and national prestige. This is not unsurprising given the imbedded nature of Functionalist sociological thinking at this time, but while the inadequacies of this theoretical model were brought to light in critical sociological analyses during the 1960s and 70s, it has continued to pervade sports governance and political discourse until the present day. The sport of tennis in Britain is examined, with remit to analyse Lawn Tennis Association (LTA) discourse from 1990 until 2006. Results suggest an overwhelming ‘functionalist’ rhetoric, particularly with regard to how the concepts of inclusion/exclusion, talent development and tennis club culture are understood. A critique of LTA discourse drawn from documentary analysis of published materials and interviews with several key LTA personnel reveals a ‘contemporary bias’ and ‘consensus bias’ in conceptions of society, social class and social change, and how various tennis-related organisations should operate. LTA sports government discourse is critiqued with a view to adopting the arguably more adequate ‘Figurational’ sociological perspective, which recognises the dynamic and processual nature of society, seeks to illuminate long-term social processes and is underpinned by historical analyses.

Consciousness Researcher's Block: What's a Nice Robot Like Commander Data Doing in Ned's Naturalist-Phenomenal Realist Nightmare?

by Bret Cohen

Clarification of the central themes of Ned Block's article “The Harder Problem of Consciousness.” In particular,... more Clarification of the central themes of Ned Block's article “The Harder Problem of Consciousness.” In particular, explains why Block thinks that the question of whether a certain kind of robot is phenomenally conscious is relevant to the question of what phenomenal consciousness essentially is, that is, with what, if anything, it can be identified in terms of natural properties investigated by the natural sciences and difficulties with collecting empirical evidence to determine which hypothesis is correct.

Filosofische kritiek op de computer als model voor de verhouding tussen lichaam en geest

by Titus Rivas

Based on an article published in Terugkeer, 15, Winter 2004, Nr. 4, pp. 22-25, entitled "Filosofische kritiek op het computermodel voor de geest".