Free Will and Moral Responsibility

Free will in Mīmāṃsā

by elisa freschi

draft only, to be published in a volume edited by E. Bryant and M. Dasti

The basic Mīmāṃsā approach to the issue of agency and free will is compatibilist, namely, the psychological experience... more The basic Mīmāṃsā approach to the issue of agency and free will is compatibilist, namely, the psychological experience of one's freedom of action is asumed to be valid, since one experiences one's actions as free and since the karman- or apūrva-based causalities cannot be ascertained to eliminate all precincts of application of free will. In fact, human beings are lead to act, according to Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā authors, by their desires, and, according to Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā authors,  by Vedic injunctions which, in turn, identify them through their desires. Consequently, their precinct of free will seems exactly to lie in one's faculty to train their desires. Even from the point of view of Prābhākaras, who stress the role of Vedic commands, free will is presupposed by the claim that, although the Veda tells one what to do, it does not make one do it.

Agency does not accrue to an underlying \emph{ātman}, but rather seems to constitute one of the subject's essential characters. Accordingly, the agent subject is said not to be immutable and does instead change through time.

Responsibility in International Relations: A Social Practice Model

by Kirsten Ainley

Under review

In this paper I seek to investigate the notion of responsibility in IR. The dominant discourses of responsibility in... more In this paper I seek to investigate the notion of responsibility in IR. The dominant discourses of responsibility in contemporary international politics are the liberal nationalist discourse of the nation-state as protector of its people (see, especially, Walzer 1992) and the liberal cosmopolitan discourse of human rights (see, as exemplars, Beitz 1999, Caney 2005, and Pogge 2002) with responsibility in both cases being under-theorised, unclear and therefore inconsistently applied and exercised. A new interest in responsibility from politicians in the West has arisen simultaneously with a concern that the human rights regime has not delivered all that it should because it lacks sufficiently authoritative notions of responsibility or obligation for upholding rights. But the concept of responsibility is under-researched in IR, leading to divergent ideas of what responsibility means, so little responsible action. In addition, theorizing responsibility in philosophy has become to a large extent caught in a dead-end debate about free will and determinism.
To start to understand responsibility, we need to differentiate between metaphysical conceptions of responsibility qua responsibility, and the particular practices of responsibility we see in the world. A solid conception of what responsibility is, how it works, and what functions it serves in societies, domestic or international, should enable enlightened and influential intervention into debates on specific responsibilities. In this paper I briefly set out the central problem of understanding responsibility in any meaningful way – the problem of agency; outline a top-line conception of responsibility – a social practice model – which I argue overcomes the problem of agency and thus describes any and all practices of responsibility better than alternative conceptions; and start to use the model to critique existing liberal practices of responsibility.

2009, « Habitus, Freedom and Reflexivity », in Theory and Psychology Volume 19, no. 6, pp. 728-755.

by Mathieu Hilgers

The question of freedom is recurrent in the theory of habitus. In this paper I propose that the notion of freedom is... more The question of freedom is recurrent in the theory of habitus. In this paper I propose that the notion of freedom is an essential and necessary component for the coherence of the analyses which mobilize habitus both in terms of their theoretical articulation and in terms of their grounding in empirical reality. This argument can seem surprising considering that the theory of habitus has often been accused of being deterministic. Yet I show that, from an epistemological point of view, habitus theory is not deterministic. Bourdieu’s treatment of this concept implies at least three principles that exclude determinism: (1) the production of an infinite number of behaviors from a limited number of principles, (2) permanent mutation, and (3) the intensive and extensive limits of sociological understanding. After identifying and describing these principles, I show the reason for their incompatibility with a deterministic perspective and consider their implications for the corresponding model of action. I illustrate this analysis by a discussion of Loïc Wacquant’s carnal sociology of the pugilistic universe which reveals why it is essential to understand and explain the relation between habitus and freedom.

Refuting a Frankfurtian Objection to Frankfurt-Type Counterexamples

by Ezio Di Nucci

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 2010, 13 (2): 207-213

In this paper I refute an apparently obvious objection to Frankfurttype counterexamples to the Principle of Alternate... more In this paper I refute an apparently obvious objection to Frankfurttype counterexamples to the Principle of Alternate Possibilities according to which if in the counterfactual scenario the agent does not act, then the agent could have avoided acting in the actual scenario. And because what happens in
the counterfactual scenario cannot count as the relevant agent’s actions given the sort of external control that agent is under, then we can ground responsibility on that agent having been able to avoid acting. I illustrate how this objection to Frankfurt’s famous counterexample is motivated by Frankfurt’s own ‘guidance’ view of agency. My argument consists in showing
that even if we concede that the agent does not act in the counterfactual scenario, that does not show that the agent could have avoided acting in the actual scenario. This depends on the crucial distinction between ‘not φ-ing’ and ‘avoiding φ-ing’.

A Unified Empirical Account of Responsibility Judgments

by Gunnar Björnsson

Co-authored with Karl Persson, forthcoming in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research

Skeptical worries about moral responsibility seem to be widely appreciated and deeply felt by laymen. To address these... more Skeptical worries about moral responsibility seem to be widely appreciated and deeply felt by laymen. To address these worries—if nothing else to show that they are mistaken— theories of moral responsibility need to relate to whatever concept of responsibility underlies the worries. Unfortunately, the nature of that concept has proved hard to pin down. Not only do philosophers have conflicting intuitions; numerous recent empirical studies have suggested that both prosaic responsibility judgments and incompatibilist intuitions among the folk are subject to a number of surprising factors, sometimes yielding apparently contradictory judgments. In this paper, we show how an independently motivated hypothesis about responsibility judgments provides a unified explanation of the more important results from these studies. According to this ‘Explanation Hypothesis’, to take an agent to be morally responsible for an event is, roughly, to take a relevant motivational structure of the agent to be part of a significant explanation of the event. We argue that because of how explanatory interests and perspectives affect what we take as significant explanations, this analysis accounts for the puzzling variety of empirical results. If this is correct, the Explanation Hypothesis also provides a new way of understanding debates about moral responsibility.

Catholicism, Contraception, and Conscience: Church Imposed Teaching, God’s Gift of Free Will, and Political Rhetoric

by Michele Stopera Freyhauf

originally published on the Feminism and Religion Project

Certainly one cannot turn on the news without seeing a story about the feud over the Catholic Church’s stance on... more Certainly one cannot turn on the news without seeing a story about the feud over the Catholic Church’s stance on forbidding the use of contraception and Obama’s Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) that mandates free contraception to women.  In preparing this article, I took the time to review many articles from liberal and conservative news outlets, law professors who are experts on constitutional law, and statements from the USCCB and Bishops.  Before asking questions, I want to outline the following points:

In the literature reviewed, only two women, Sr. Carol Keehan and Sr. Mary Ann Walsh, made a statement against this policy stating that the government is interfering with the working of the Church.  Most voices heard and shouting the loudest are members of the clergy.

Hospitals considered “Catholic” hire people of all faiths and various beliefs.  They also treat patients of all faiths.  They are not exclusively “Catholic.”

Catholic identified Colleges hire professors and staff that are not Catholic.
Moreover, their student body is not totally Catholic.

Catholic Charities, once again, hire non-Catholics.

Insurance plans currently in place often offer contraception prescriptions at a zero to low co-pay price.  These plans are in-force at many Catholic Institutions.

Under HIPAA, healthcare of employees are protected and the Employer, even the Catholic Church cannot violate the privacy of the patient, even if it is an employee.

Birth Control Pills are often prescribed for women with endometriosis or other “female” reproductive disorders and not birth control.

Women pregnant, carrying a dead baby, cannot have surgery due to risks are given medication to induce abortion are given.

With this background, I want to address the question causing the most controversy: 

Did I do It? Yeah, You Did! Wittgenstein & Libet on free will

by Carlos M. Muñoz-Suárez

Co-authored with: Rene J Campis

This is a standard draft, comments are welcome!!

Classic approaches to the problem of the relation between... more This is a standard draft, comments are welcome!!

Classic approaches to the problem of the relation between subjective choices & intentional motor acts assume that the latter are a direct effect of the former. According to Libet, intentional actions are direct effects of a brain event preceding them (called Readiness Potential). We propose a dual-domain analysis: (I) We claim from a naturalized standpoint that subjective choice is another neurocognitive event that intervenes in the making of intentional actions rather than being just an epiphenomenal event, since subjective choice is intrinsically related to the fixation of the focus of attention; (ii) We claim that the relevant concept of agent must be grasped starting from the relevant domain in which our conception of will make sense (in which we commonly use the concept). Wittgenstein's remarks in his early work seem to coincide with most of our general conclusions.

Do I have more free will than you do?

by Brian Earp

Earp, B. D. (2011). Do I have more free will than you do? An unexpected asymmetry in intuitions about personal freedom. New School Psychology Bulletin, Vol. 9, No. 21, 34-40.

The present research explores the relationship between moral evaluations and intuitions about the causes of human... more The present research explores the relationship between moral evaluations and intuitions about the causes of human behavior, in particular freedom of the will. Two studies test for a self-serving bias in intuitions about free will. Study 1 explores whether individuals may seek to exculpate themselves from wrongdoing by denying free will, while justifying blame of others by endorsing free will. Study 2 explores whether individuals may justify personal failures by denying free will, while taking credit for personal successes by endorsing free will. In neither study do the data show the predicted differences between conditions. However, an unexpected finding is reported. By pooling the data from both experiments and collapsing across conditions, it is shown that participants give greater endorsement of free will whenever actions are described from a first-person, instead of third-person, perspective—a tentative “I have more free will than you do” effect. Possible explanations for these findings are discussed, as are avenues for further research on this topic.

Epistemic Freedom

by J. David Velleman

Originally published in the Pacific Philosophical Quarterly (1989). Reprinted in The Possibility of Practical Reason, online in the SPO Monograph Series

We are not metaphysically free to do just anything that is within our power, but we are epistemically free to believe... more We are not metaphysically free to do just anything that is within our power, but we are epistemically free to believe that we will do just anything that is within our power.

35. Afterword to THE PHILOSOPHY OF ARISTOTLE, Signet/Penguin.

by Susanne Bobzien

New afterword to THE PHILOSOPHY OF ARISTOTLE, ed. Bambrough, Signet/Penguin, new edition, January 4th, 2011, 291-510. (Final Draft)

ABSTRACT: This is a little piece directed at the newcomer to Aristotle, making some general remarks about reading... more ABSTRACT: This is a little piece directed at the newcomer to Aristotle, making some general remarks about reading Aristotle at the beginning and end, with sandwiched in between, a brief and much simplified discussion of some common misunderstandings of Aristotle's philosophy, concerning spontaneity, causal indeterminism, freedom-to-do-otherwise, free choice, agent causation, logical determinism, teleological determinism, artistic creativity and freedom (eleutheria).

45. Review of Michael Frede, A Free Will: Origins of the Notion in Ancient Thought, Berkeley 2011

by Susanne Bobzien

Forthcoming in Journal of the History of Philosophy 50.2, 2012.
Please quote from published version only.

Libertarianism, Action, and Self-Determination (1995)

by Galen Strawson

Moral Responsibility and Mental Illness: A Case Study

by Matthew Broome

Broome, Bortolotti and Mameli 2010 - published in Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics

Various authors have argued that progress in the neurocognitive and neuropsychiatric sciences might threaten the... more Various authors have argued that progress in the neurocognitive and neuropsychiatric sciences might threaten the commonsense understanding of how the mind generates behavior, and, as a consequence, it might also threaten the commonsense ways of attributing moral responsibility, if not the very notion of moral responsibility. In the case of actions that result in undesirable outcomes (e.g., someone being harmed), the commonsense conception—which is reflected in sophisticated ways in the legal conception—tells us that there are circumstances in which the agent is entirely and fully responsible for the bad outcome (and deserves to be punished accordingly) and circumstances in which the agent is not at all responsible for the bad outcome (and thereby the agent does not deserve to be punished).

5. Choice and Moral Responsibility in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics iii 1-5

by Susanne Bobzien

Draft. Do not quote without author's permission.
Paper forthcoming in R. Polansky (ed.) The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, Cambridge: CUP 2012.

This paper serves two purposes: (i) it can be used by students as an introduction to chapters 1-5 of book iii of the... more This paper serves two purposes: (i) it can be used by students as an introduction to chapters 1-5 of book iii of the NE; (ii) it suggests an answer to the unresolved question what overall objective this section of the NE has. The paper focuses primarily on Aristotle’s theory of what makes us responsible for our actions and character. After some preliminary observations about praise, blame and responsibility (Section 2), it sets out in detail how all the key notions of NE iii 1-5 are interrelated (Sections 3-9). The setting-out of these interconnections makes it then possible to provide a comprehensive interpretation of the purpose of the passage. Its primary purpose is to explain how agents are responsible for their actions not just insofar as they are actions of this kind or that, but also insofar as they are noble or base: agents are responsible for their actions qua noble or base, because, typically via choice, their character dispositions are a causal factor of those actions (Section 10). The paper illustrates the different ways in which agents can be causes of their actions by means of Aristotle’s four basic types of agents (Section 11). A secondary purpose of NE iii 1-5 is to explain how agents can be held responsible for consequences of their actions (Section 12), in particular for their character dispositions insofar as these are noble or base, i.e. virtues or vices (Section 13). These two goals are not the only ones Aristotle pursues in the passage. But they are the ones Aristotle himself indicates in its first sentence and summarizes in its last paragraph; and the ones that give the passage a systematic unity. The paper also briefly consider the issues of freedom-to-do-otherwise, free choice and free-will in the contexts in which they occur (i.e. in the final paragraphs of Sections 6, 7, 12, 13).

The two faces of revenge: moral responsibility and the culture of honor

by Tamler Sommers

Priming Effects and Free Will

by Ezio Di Nucci

International Journal of Philosophical Studies (forthcoming)

I argue that the empirical literature on priming effects does not warrant nor suggest the conclusion, drawn by... more I argue that the empirical literature on priming effects does not warrant nor suggest the conclusion, drawn by prominent psychologists such as J. A. Bargh, that we have no free will or less free will than we might think. I focus on a particular experiment by Bargh - the ‘elderly’ stereotype case in which subjects that have been primed with words that remind them of the stereotype of the elderly walk on average slower out of the experiment’s room than control subjects – and I show that we cannot say that subjects cannot help walking slower or that they are not free in doing so. I then illustrate how these cases can be reconciled and normalized within a Davidsonian theory of action to show that, in walking slower, subjects are acting intentionally. My argument applies across various experiments, including those of goal priming. In the final section I argue that the only cases in which priming effects are efficacious are so called Buridan cases.

Beyond Determinism and Indignity: A Reinterpretation of Operant Conditioning

by Teed Rockwell

B. F. Skinner was an active and articulate philosopher for many years.  His acknowledged greatness as... more

B. F. Skinner was an active and articulate philosopher for many years.  His acknowledged greatness as a pioneer in developing behaviorist laboratory techniques has fostered the assumption that his philosophy and his psychology are a package deal i.e. that his philosophy must be accepted in order for a behavior modification technology to be successful, and that the data discovered in behaviorist laboratories are strong evidence for his philosophy. In this paper, I will show that his data actually contradict his philosophy. Behaviorist research does not provide proof of a deterministic universe. On the contrary, It provides the strongest inductive evidence we have for the existence of free will. Skinner’s own writings on scientific method are cited as support for the existence of freedom, not only in humans, but in rats and pigeons as well. The reasons that Skinner misinterpreted his own data base are also cited. These include the inability to tell a fact from a presupposition, and a definition of free will derived from Hume which renders that concept  magical and incoherent. A new definition of freedom is given which is comprehensible in behaviorist terms, and which fits our commonsense experience of ourselves more accurately than does the straw ghost that Skinner labels “Autonomous Man”. With this new definition of freedom, it no longer becomes necessary to go beyond freedom and dignity for society to reap the benefits of behavior modification technology.

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Free Will, Moral Responsibility, and Alternative Possibilities: An Empirical Investigation

by Justin Clardy

Published in 'Polymath' Vol. 1 No. 2 (2011)

Abstract
Moral responsibility (MR) and free will (FW) have been the topic of a considerable amount of research... more Abstract
Moral responsibility (MR) and free will (FW) have been the topic of a considerable amount of research in philosophy. Specifically, philosophers have argued whether or not the responsibility of an agent’s actions are contingent upon the agent’s having the ability to do otherwise than she actually does. This, alas, brings to the vanguard an important question. Namely, can we still be responsible for our actions if hard determinism is true? In this paper, I explore what many libertarians take to be the implications for MR given the truth of hard determinism, arguing ultimately, that a libertarian conception of FW is required for MR. That is to say that MR requires alternative possibilities. In doing so, I will consider what many take to be the most formidable opponent—Frankfurt-style counter examples (FSCs) to the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP).
It should be noted that my account is significantly different from most contemporary accounts for MR and libertarian FW in that I have sampled a group of people in order to see where their intuitions fall pertaining to alternative possibilities and FSCs. I will, then, appeal to that empirical data to build, bolster, and defend my argument, which leads us to the development of a modified principle of alternative possibilities (mPAP).

Sobre La Moral Y El Derecho

by Nicolas Zavadivker

Responsibility In Negligence: Why the Duty of Care is Not a Duty'To Try'

by Ori Herstein

The Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence, Vol. 23, No. 2, pp. 403-428 (2010)

Even though it offers a compelling account of the responsibility-component in the negligence standard - arguably the... more Even though it offers a compelling account of the responsibility-component in the negligence standard - arguably the Holy Grail of negligence theory - Professor John Gardner is mistaken in conceptualizing the duty of care in negligence as a duty to try to avert harm. My goal here is to explain why and to point to an alternative account of the responsibility component in negligence.

The flaws in conceiving of the duty of care as a duty to try are: failing to comport with the legal doctrine of negligence and failing as a revisionary account for the law; overly burdening autonomy and restricting the liberty of thought; adversely affecting the prevention of negligent harm - the essence of the negligence standard - and, raising severe probative difficulties. Moreover, the duty of care also does not give rise to what I call a de facto duty to try.

The duty of care is better construed to require only certain conduct and not trying. Returning to the primary appeal and motivation for exploring the validity of equating the duty of care with a duty to try - searching for the responsibility-component in the negligence standard - I argue that the responsibility-component in negligence does not take the form of an obligation to try but rather has a conditional form, manifested in the conditions of applicability of the negligence standard. In other words, the negligence standard comprises a conduct-based as opposed to a combined action-/intent-based duty (such as a duty to try) as its duty of care, a duty that only applies to actors who possess the capacity to intentionally or knowingly comply with it, or, put differently, possess the capacity to try.


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