Free Will, Moral Responsibility

Moral Deference

by Laurence THOMAS

This essay was inspired by deeply personal experience, namely a woman who had been raped. The trust that she and her... more This essay was inspired by deeply personal experience, namely a woman who had been raped. The trust that she and her husband placed in me was a moral gift like none other. She spoke about her pain with the aim of helping me to understand -- and not with the goal of condemning me or occasioning feelngs of guilt. My listening to her conversations inspired the term "moral deference".

Free will in Mīmāṃsā

by elisa freschi

draft only, to be published in a volume edited by E. Bryant and M. Dasti

The basic Mīmāṃsā approach to the issue of agency and free will is compatibilist, namely, the psychological experience... more The basic Mīmāṃsā approach to the issue of agency and free will is compatibilist, namely, the psychological experience of one's freedom of action is asumed to be valid, since one experiences one's actions as free and since the karman- or apūrva-based causalities cannot be ascertained to eliminate all precincts of application of free will. In fact, human beings are lead to act, according to Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā authors, by their desires, and, according to Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā authors,  by Vedic injunctions which, in turn, identify them through their desires. Consequently, their precinct of free will seems exactly to lie in one's faculty to train their desires. Even from the point of view of Prābhākaras, who stress the role of Vedic commands, free will is presupposed by the claim that, although the Veda tells one what to do, it does not make one do it.

Agency does not accrue to an underlying \emph{ātman}, but rather seems to constitute one of the subject's essential characters. Accordingly, the agent subject is said not to be immutable and does instead change through time.

Whose Lyme is it Anyway? Subject Positions and the Construction of Responsibility for Managing the Health Risks from Lyme Disease

by David Uzzell

Paper to be published in Health and Place: Uzzell, D., Marcu, A., and Barnett, J (2012) Whose Lyme is it Anyway? Subject Positions and the Construction of Responsibility for Managing the Health Risks from Lyme Disease, Health and Place,

There has been a significant increase during the last decade in the UK of the incidence of the Lyme disease. It is... more There has been a significant increase during the last decade in the UK of the incidence of the Lyme disease. It is transmitted through tick bites, and can have serious health consequences if not treated early. This study examined how the responsibility for managing and communicating the health risks from Lyme disease to forest workers and recreational visitors was constructed and acted upon by 21 interviewees in key managerial positions within one of the largest UK forestry organisations. The in-depth, semi-structured interviews were analysed using discourse analysis within a Foucauldian framework. The results demonstrated that the construction of responsibility towards the workforce and visitors was embedded into broader representations of the forest as a working, recreational and natural environment, as well as into the binary conceptualisation of forest hazards as natural and human-made. These constructions prescribed respective subject positions which differentially informed assumptions of responsibility, and consequent actions, towards the workforce and the public.

La tercera antinomia de la razón pura su crítica y resolución en el Sistema de Hegel

by Hector Ferreiro

En: López, Diana María (comp.), Experiencia y límite. Kant Kolloquium (1804-2004), Ediciones de la Universidad Nacional del Litoral, Santa Fe, 2009, pp. 195-207.

A superação hegeliana do dualismo entre determinismo e liberdade

by Hector Ferreiro

Paper reat at the Symposium `Sujeito e liberdade na filosofia moderna alemã´, Universidade Federal do Ceará, Fortaleza, Brazil, August 26-28, 2011.

The Concept of Voluntariness

by Ben Colburn

The Journal of Political Philosophy 16 (2008): 101-111.

In her work on the distinction between freedom and voluntariness, Serena Olsaretti suggests the following definition... more In her work on the distinction between freedom and voluntariness, Serena Olsaretti suggests the following definition of voluntary action: an action is voluntary if it is not non-voluntary, and non-voluntary if it is performed because there are no acceptable alternatives, where ‘acceptable’ means conforming to some objective standard (which Olsaretti suggests might be well-being). Olsaretti suggests that ascriptions of responsibility are underwritten by judgments of voluntariness, rather than freedom. Also, Olsaretti notes that a concern for voluntary choice might be grounded in respect for autonomy. So, two important questions in political philosophy – when an agent is responsible for her actions and what we must do if we want agents to live autonomous lives – hang upon whether Olsaretti's account of voluntariness is correct once it has been developed in detail. This article is a contribution to that development. I show that well-informedness about our options is crucial to whether we act voluntarily or not, and I argue that we should restrict the scope of what we consider relevantly unacceptable to include only things which involve serious prudential harm. Inevitably there are some questions left unanswered, but what follows indicates what I take to be the strongest form of Olsaretti's theory, and one which can play the role described for it above.

Quidquid Movetur, Ab Alio Movetur: On the Insufficiency of Strawson's “Basic Argument” to Invalidate the Thomistic Recognition of Moral Responsibility

by Thomas Sundaram

Written for a class offered in Fall 2010 by Fr. Anselm Ramelow at the Dominican School of Philosophy and Theology, "Do We Have Free Will?"

Galen Strawson has offered, with his modification of the Basic Argument, an intriguing argument with a deceptively... more Galen Strawson has offered, with his modification of the Basic Argument, an intriguing argument with a deceptively simple appearance for the refutation of moral responsibility and ultimately free will. It seems to stand up to a great deal of criticism. Nevertheless, it seems also to presume a great deal with regard to the metaphysical origin of morality, particularly in the notion of the moral agent and in his notion of "desert." I investigate the terms and notion of causality used in his argument and attempt to demonstrate that it does not apply to an Aristotelian-Thomistic metaphysical and ethical frame.

Blameworthiness and Time

by Alex Sarch

Co-authored with Jules Coleman; forthcoming in Legal Theory.

Reactive emotion accounts hold that blameworthiness should be analyzed in terms of the familiar reactive emotions.... more Reactive emotion accounts hold that blameworthiness should be analyzed in terms of the familiar reactive emotions. However, despite the attractions of such views, we are not persuaded that blameworthiness is ultimately a matter of correctly felt reactive emotion. In this paper, we draw attention to a range of little-discussed considerations involving the moral significance of the passage of time that drive a wedge between blameworthiness and the reactive emotions: the appropriateness of the reactive emotions is sensitive to the passage of time in ways that attributions of blameworthiness are not. There are a number of ways in which reactive emotion accounts might attempt to accommodate the moral significance of time, however. We consider the most important of these, but ultimately find them wanting. Accordingly, we conclude that the prospects for the reactive emotion accounts are bleak. Our argument, if successful, has a range of implications for legal theory, most importantly in providing a novel moral basis for statutes of limitations and in shedding light on new avenues in the theory of criminal law generally.

Responsibility in International Relations: A Social Practice Model

by Kirsten Ainley

Under review

In this paper I seek to investigate the notion of responsibility in IR. The dominant discourses of responsibility in... more In this paper I seek to investigate the notion of responsibility in IR. The dominant discourses of responsibility in contemporary international politics are the liberal nationalist discourse of the nation-state as protector of its people (see, especially, Walzer 1992) and the liberal cosmopolitan discourse of human rights (see, as exemplars, Beitz 1999, Caney 2005, and Pogge 2002) with responsibility in both cases being under-theorised, unclear and therefore inconsistently applied and exercised. A new interest in responsibility from politicians in the West has arisen simultaneously with a concern that the human rights regime has not delivered all that it should because it lacks sufficiently authoritative notions of responsibility or obligation for upholding rights. But the concept of responsibility is under-researched in IR, leading to divergent ideas of what responsibility means, so little responsible action. In addition, theorizing responsibility in philosophy has become to a large extent caught in a dead-end debate about free will and determinism.
To start to understand responsibility, we need to differentiate between metaphysical conceptions of responsibility qua responsibility, and the particular practices of responsibility we see in the world. A solid conception of what responsibility is, how it works, and what functions it serves in societies, domestic or international, should enable enlightened and influential intervention into debates on specific responsibilities. In this paper I briefly set out the central problem of understanding responsibility in any meaningful way – the problem of agency; outline a top-line conception of responsibility – a social practice model – which I argue overcomes the problem of agency and thus describes any and all practices of responsibility better than alternative conceptions; and start to use the model to critique existing liberal practices of responsibility.

The Social Practice of Institutional Responsibility

by Kirsten Ainley

Forthcoming in Toni Erskine ed. Responding to "Delinquent" Institutions: Blaming, Punishing, and Rehabilitating Collective Moral Agents in International Relations, Palgrave Macmillan. NB this draft will be updated prior to publication.

The chapter examines how it is that institutions can be responsible actors, and how to respond to those institutions... more The chapter examines how it is that institutions can be responsible actors, and how to respond to those institutions which are responsible for harm. The argument in the chapter is split into four sections. In the first section I outline a conception of responsibility that takes into account the social nature of responsibility ascriptions and discuss how institutional responsibility fits into such a conception. The second section examines how, within the ‘social practice’ of responsibility, the duties that a delinquent institution is said to have breached come to attach to the institution in the first place. These duties can be assigned, incurred or assumed before action, or, in rare circumstances, assigned afterwards. The third section reflects upon whom or what it is that should be responded to if an institution fails to discharge its moral responsibilities. I propose that the correct body to aim the response towards is not the delinquent institution itself but the group of people who controlled the resources of the institution and made decisions in its name at the time of the morally suboptimal acts or omissions: the ‘executive group’. The final section of the chapter examines what kind of responses delinquent institutions might be appropriate, and makes the case for collaborative rather than punitive responses. The argument here is that we should concentrate on incentivising and assisting institutions to accept and discharge responsibility in the international system rather than on attempting to punish those who do not.

Vermögende in Deutschland – Die Perspektive der Vermögenskulturforschung

by Tarek el Sehity

Co-authored with Anna Schor-Tschudnowskaja, published in "Vermögen in Deutschland", 143-202
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-531-92702-2_5

In diesem Beitrag wird die Gelegenheit wahrgenommen, den vermögenskulturellen Ansatz vorzustellen, indem wir die in... more In diesem Beitrag wird die Gelegenheit wahrgenommen, den vermögenskulturellen Ansatz vorzustellen, indem wir die in der Studie „Vermögen in Deutschland“ (ViD) gewonnenen Daten einer Analyse im Sinne der Vermögenskultur unterziehen. Ein zentraler Anspruch der Vermögenskulturforschung besteht in der differenzierten Betrachtung des Phänomens Reichtum. Druyen (2007, 2009) postuliert. dass es notwendig und sinnvoll ist, Reiche von Vermögenden qualitativ zu unterscheiden. Anliegen ist hierbei also nicht, einen weiteren Ansatz zur ökonomischen Bestimmung von quantitativen Reichtumsschwellen zu bieten (siehe hierzu Übersicht bei Lauterbach), sondern durch die Untersuchung des Selbst- und Weltbildes (Einstellungen, individuelle und kollektive Vorstellungen, Normen und Motivationen) zu erkennen, wie sich Personen dieser sehr distinkten Minderheit in ihrer gesellschaftlichen Stellung wahrnehmen und welche Bedeutung sie ihrem eigenen Handeln beimessen.

2009, « Habitus, Freedom and Reflexivity », in Theory and Psychology Volume 19, no. 6, pp. 728-755.

by Mathieu Hilgers

The question of freedom is recurrent in the theory of habitus. In this paper I propose that the notion of freedom is... more The question of freedom is recurrent in the theory of habitus. In this paper I propose that the notion of freedom is an essential and necessary component for the coherence of the analyses which mobilize habitus both in terms of their theoretical articulation and in terms of their grounding in empirical reality. This argument can seem surprising considering that the theory of habitus has often been accused of being deterministic. Yet I show that, from an epistemological point of view, habitus theory is not deterministic. Bourdieu’s treatment of this concept implies at least three principles that exclude determinism: (1) the production of an infinite number of behaviors from a limited number of principles, (2) permanent mutation, and (3) the intensive and extensive limits of sociological understanding. After identifying and describing these principles, I show the reason for their incompatibility with a deterministic perspective and consider their implications for the corresponding model of action. I illustrate this analysis by a discussion of Loïc Wacquant’s carnal sociology of the pugilistic universe which reveals why it is essential to understand and explain the relation between habitus and freedom.

Reconstructing Responsibility and Moral Agency in World Politics

by Joe Hoover

Draft version of article published in 'International Theory', Volume 4, Issue 2 (2012), 1-36.

Assigning responsibility is increasingly common in world politics, from the United Nation’s assertion that sovereignty... more Assigning responsibility is increasingly common in world politics, from the United Nation’s assertion that sovereignty entails a “responsibility to protect” to the International Criminal Court’s attempts to hold individuals responsible for international crimes. This development is welcome but problematic as the model of moral agency that our contemporary practices of responsibility are based on leads to a number of problematic consequences that impede efforts to make world politics more just. In particular, our contemporary practices of responsibility are excessively focused on the obligations of individual and collective actors, at the expense of enabling conditions, and on holding specific perpetrators accountable, neglecting the need for wider social transformations in response to mass violence and suffering. Alternative understandings of moral agency, which better serve international/global practices of responsibility, are possible and here I defend an understanding of moral agency based on the philosophy of John Dewey. The critical insights and practical possibilities of this alternative understanding of moral agency are explored with reference to international interventions in Sierra Leone and Uganda.

Refuting a Frankfurtian Objection to Frankfurt-Type Counterexamples

by Ezio Di Nucci

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 2010, 13 (2): 207-213

In this paper I refute an apparently obvious objection to Frankfurttype counterexamples to the Principle of Alternate... more In this paper I refute an apparently obvious objection to Frankfurttype counterexamples to the Principle of Alternate Possibilities according to which if in the counterfactual scenario the agent does not act, then the agent could have avoided acting in the actual scenario. And because what happens in
the counterfactual scenario cannot count as the relevant agent’s actions given the sort of external control that agent is under, then we can ground responsibility on that agent having been able to avoid acting. I illustrate how this objection to Frankfurt’s famous counterexample is motivated by Frankfurt’s own ‘guidance’ view of agency. My argument consists in showing
that even if we concede that the agent does not act in the counterfactual scenario, that does not show that the agent could have avoided acting in the actual scenario. This depends on the crucial distinction between ‘not φ-ing’ and ‘avoiding φ-ing’.

Why do we resist hard incompatibilism?

by Michael Corrado

One of the most difficult challenges for the “hard incompatibilist” is to deal with the overwhelming objections to the... more One of the most difficult challenges for the “hard incompatibilist” is to deal with the overwhelming objections to the therapeutic/incapacitative approach to crime control that seems to follow naturally from his theory.  See, for example, Pereboom’s Living without Free Will, Chapter 6.  Responding to this challenge requires the hard determinist (1) to find a way to distinguish between those who have traditionally been found responsible for their crimes and those who have been found not to be responsible; and (2) to justify the infliction of intentionally harsh treatment on at least some of those who fall into the first category.  I attempt to develop a theory that satisfies both those requirements.

Virtual moral agency, virtual moral responsibility: on the moral significance of the appearance, perception, and performance of artificial agents

by Mark Coeckelbergh

Imagining worlds: Responsible engineering under conditions of epistemic opacity

by Mark Coeckelbergh

Moral Responsibility, Technology, and Experiences of the Tragic: From Kierkegaard to Offshore Engineering

by Mark Coeckelbergh

Consciousness, Implicit Attitudes and Moral Responsibility

by Neil Levy

Matt King and Peter Carruthers have recently argued that consciousness of our attitudes cannot play a role in... more Matt King and Peter Carruthers have recently argued that consciousness of our attitudes cannot play a role in distinguishing actions for which we are responsible from those for which we are not, because there are no conscious attitudes. This claim, in turn, is defended on the basis of Carruthers’ argument that access to the content of our attitudes is interpretive rather than introspective. In the first, briefer, part of this paper, I argue that however we come to be aware of the content of our attitudes, whether we are aware of this content makes a morally significant difference. In the second, longer, part of the paper I consider the implications of Carruthers’ view for moral responsibility for actions caused by implicit attitudes. We appear regularly to be aware of the content of our implicit attitudes; moreover, if Carruthers is right, we discover this content by much the same route as we discover the content of our explicit attitudes. There seems, therefore, to be a case for treating implicit and explicit attitudes alike, so far as moral responsibility is concerned. I argue that awareness of the content of our implicit attitudes is not sufficient for moral responsibility for actions caused by them. Implicit attitudes impact on behavior in ways that differ systematically from the way explicit attitudes impact on behavior. I argue that attitudes that are reportable (as propositional attitudes) have broader and more integrated structures than attitudes that cannot be reported, and that this entails that the former have a role in integrating behavior lacked by the latter. Because moral agency and responsibility requires a high degree of unity on behalf of the agent, this difference makes a morally significant difference.

A Unified Empirical Account of Responsibility Judgments

by Gunnar Björnsson

Co-authored with Karl Persson, forthcoming in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research

Skeptical worries about moral responsibility seem to be widely appreciated and deeply felt by laymen. To address these... more Skeptical worries about moral responsibility seem to be widely appreciated and deeply felt by laymen. To address these worries—if nothing else to show that they are mistaken— theories of moral responsibility need to relate to whatever concept of responsibility underlies the worries. Unfortunately, the nature of that concept has proved hard to pin down. Not only do philosophers have conflicting intuitions; numerous recent empirical studies have suggested that both prosaic responsibility judgments and incompatibilist intuitions among the folk are subject to a number of surprising factors, sometimes yielding apparently contradictory judgments. In this paper, we show how an independently motivated hypothesis about responsibility judgments provides a unified explanation of the more important results from these studies. According to this ‘Explanation Hypothesis’, to take an agent to be morally responsible for an event is, roughly, to take a relevant motivational structure of the agent to be part of a significant explanation of the event. We argue that because of how explanatory interests and perspectives affect what we take as significant explanations, this analysis accounts for the puzzling variety of empirical results. If this is correct, the Explanation Hypothesis also provides a new way of understanding debates about moral responsibility.