Free Will

Free will in Mīmāṃsā

by elisa freschi

draft only, to be published in a volume edited by E. Bryant and M. Dasti

The basic Mīmāṃsā approach to the issue of agency and free will is compatibilist, namely, the psychological experience... more The basic Mīmāṃsā approach to the issue of agency and free will is compatibilist, namely, the psychological experience of one's freedom of action is asumed to be valid, since one experiences one's actions as free and since the karman- or apūrva-based causalities cannot be ascertained to eliminate all precincts of application of free will. In fact, human beings are lead to act, according to Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā authors, by their desires, and, according to Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā authors,  by Vedic injunctions which, in turn, identify them through their desires. Consequently, their precinct of free will seems exactly to lie in one's faculty to train their desires. Even from the point of view of Prābhākaras, who stress the role of Vedic commands, free will is presupposed by the claim that, although the Veda tells one what to do, it does not make one do it.

Agency does not accrue to an underlying \emph{ātman}, but rather seems to constitute one of the subject's essential characters. Accordingly, the agent subject is said not to be immutable and does instead change through time.

A superação hegeliana do dualismo entre determinismo e liberdade

by Hector Ferreiro

Paper reat at the Symposium `Sujeito e liberdade na filosofia moderna alemã´, Universidade Federal do Ceará, Fortaleza, Brazil, August 26-28, 2011.

Freud, Sartre, Laing: power and authenticity

by stanley wilkin

The flaws in Freud's understanding of the mind. An article.

A matter of authenticity. A matter of authenticity.

Distributed language: implications for volition

by Stephen J. Cowley

The attached paper is a draft for a Russian volume that explored new perspectives on language. It was translated and appeared in Russian as:
С. Дж. Коули. Понятие распределенности языка и его значение для волеизъявления // А.В.Кравченко (ред.). Наука о языке в изменяющейся парадигме знания (Studia linguistica cognitiva 2). Иркутск: БГУЭП, 2009. С. 192-227.

It can be cited as:
Cowley, S. J. (2009). Distributed language: implications for volition. (In Russian). In A, Kravchenko (ed.) New Perspectives on Language and Cognition, pp. 192-227, Irkutsk: Baikal University Press.

Most post-Cartesian views trace human agency to the organism and are thus obliged to either leave aside questions of... more Most post-Cartesian views trace human agency to the organism and are thus obliged to either leave aside questions of volition or, worse, seek explanations in the individual brain. By contrast, when language is recognised as distributed, human cognition is seen to arise as we adapt to life in a collective world. Since language is embodied AND non-local, learning emerges under dual or multiple control –babies learn to talk by participating in “distributed cognitive systems.” In relation to human volition, this opens a gap between tracing actions and feelings to a single brain and privileging the person ‘level’. Although behaviour emerges as people deal with circumstances together, language gives some control over what is not said or done. By focusing on the possible (and what we imagine), we can use the real duration associated with verbal and other thoughts. In short, it is because language is embodied and conventional that we can modulate action/perception: this enables individual organisms to act as living subjects who exert a degree of control over what they – and others – say and do.

Whose Freedom? – Spinoza’s Compatibilism

by Martin Lenz

Draft; comments welcome.

Spinoza’s notion of freedom confronts us with a paradoxical idea: on the one hand,freedom requires us to act with... more Spinoza’s notion of freedom confronts us with a paradoxical idea: on the one hand,freedom requires us to act with rational insight into the causally determined order of thenatural world. On the other hand, grasping this order seems to leave us with the insight that there is nothing that could be justly termed a human person. On my reading, the key to resolving this tension is to be sought within Spinoza’s theory of the striving for selfpreservation
(conatus). This theory suggests that we ought to re-describe our personal histories in terms of a gradual appropriation of the natural order and take supposedly external causes as our own reasons for action. The present article tries to set out this
solution and its difficulties against the background of the contemporary debate on freedom.

Quidquid Movetur, Ab Alio Movetur: On the Insufficiency of Strawson's “Basic Argument” to Invalidate the Thomistic Recognition of Moral Responsibility

by Thomas Sundaram

Written for a class offered in Fall 2010 by Fr. Anselm Ramelow at the Dominican School of Philosophy and Theology, "Do We Have Free Will?"

Galen Strawson has offered, with his modification of the Basic Argument, an intriguing argument with a deceptively... more Galen Strawson has offered, with his modification of the Basic Argument, an intriguing argument with a deceptively simple appearance for the refutation of moral responsibility and ultimately free will. It seems to stand up to a great deal of criticism. Nevertheless, it seems also to presume a great deal with regard to the metaphysical origin of morality, particularly in the notion of the moral agent and in his notion of "desert." I investigate the terms and notion of causality used in his argument and attempt to demonstrate that it does not apply to an Aristotelian-Thomistic metaphysical and ethical frame.

The Actor‟ s Brain: Exploring the Cognitive Neuroscience of Free Will

by Roberto Di Letizia

The Illusion of Conscious Will

by Roberto Di Letizia

Prospective Codes Fulfilled: A Potential Neural Mechanism of Will

by Christine Looser

Free Will and Determinism: Are They Even Relevant to Each Other?

by Hasan Cagatay

Many philosophers tend to defend the view that there is a significant relation between the problem of determinism /... more Many philosophers tend to defend the view that there is a significant relation between the problem of determinism / indeterminism and the problem of free will. The belief that there exists such a significant relation is supported by our intuitions; however, in this thesis, I defend just the opposite view: free will has no significant dependence on the deterministic or indeterministic character of causal relations. In the same way, I propose that the question, whether or not determinism is true, cannot be answered based on observations about the problem of free will.
I believe that the genuine question whose answer would illuminate the darkness surrounding free will is whether or not will supervenes on anything other than itself. Therefore, in order to decide whether or not we are free, the question we should ask is “Does will supervene upon something other than itself?” Moreover, I defend the position that no matter whether the world is deterministic or indeterministic, if physicalism is true, i.e. if properties of free will supervene upon physical properties, then we cannot enjoy genuine freedom.
The position of the thesis has some important ethical implications: If we cannot be genuinely free, we cannot be genuinely responsible for our actions either. This implies that retributive and admirative desires towards other persons are rationally untenable. I defend the view that only practical attitudes like reinforcement and punishment or isolation and inclusion are rationally tenable.

2009, « Habitus, Freedom and Reflexivity », in Theory and Psychology Volume 19, no. 6, pp. 728-755.

by Mathieu Hilgers

The question of freedom is recurrent in the theory of habitus. In this paper I propose that the notion of freedom is... more The question of freedom is recurrent in the theory of habitus. In this paper I propose that the notion of freedom is an essential and necessary component for the coherence of the analyses which mobilize habitus both in terms of their theoretical articulation and in terms of their grounding in empirical reality. This argument can seem surprising considering that the theory of habitus has often been accused of being deterministic. Yet I show that, from an epistemological point of view, habitus theory is not deterministic. Bourdieu’s treatment of this concept implies at least three principles that exclude determinism: (1) the production of an infinite number of behaviors from a limited number of principles, (2) permanent mutation, and (3) the intensive and extensive limits of sociological understanding. After identifying and describing these principles, I show the reason for their incompatibility with a deterministic perspective and consider their implications for the corresponding model of action. I illustrate this analysis by a discussion of Loïc Wacquant’s carnal sociology of the pugilistic universe which reveals why it is essential to understand and explain the relation between habitus and freedom.

Refuting a Frankfurtian Objection to Frankfurt-Type Counterexamples

by Ezio Di Nucci

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 2010, 13 (2): 207-213

In this paper I refute an apparently obvious objection to Frankfurttype counterexamples to the Principle of Alternate... more In this paper I refute an apparently obvious objection to Frankfurttype counterexamples to the Principle of Alternate Possibilities according to which if in the counterfactual scenario the agent does not act, then the agent could have avoided acting in the actual scenario. And because what happens in
the counterfactual scenario cannot count as the relevant agent’s actions given the sort of external control that agent is under, then we can ground responsibility on that agent having been able to avoid acting. I illustrate how this objection to Frankfurt’s famous counterexample is motivated by Frankfurt’s own ‘guidance’ view of agency. My argument consists in showing
that even if we concede that the agent does not act in the counterfactual scenario, that does not show that the agent could have avoided acting in the actual scenario. This depends on the crucial distinction between ‘not φ-ing’ and ‘avoiding φ-ing’.

Some thoughts on essence placeholders, interactionism, and heritability

by Ilan Dar-Nimrod

Dar-Nimrod, I., & Heine, S. J. (2011). Some thoughts on essence placeholders, interactionism, and heritability: Reply to Haslam (2011) and Turkheimer (2011). Psychological Bulletin, 137(5), 829-833.

A Unified Empirical Account of Responsibility Judgments

by Gunnar Björnsson

Co-authored with Karl Persson, forthcoming in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research

Skeptical worries about moral responsibility seem to be widely appreciated and deeply felt by laymen. To address these... more Skeptical worries about moral responsibility seem to be widely appreciated and deeply felt by laymen. To address these worries—if nothing else to show that they are mistaken— theories of moral responsibility need to relate to whatever concept of responsibility underlies the worries. Unfortunately, the nature of that concept has proved hard to pin down. Not only do philosophers have conflicting intuitions; numerous recent empirical studies have suggested that both prosaic responsibility judgments and incompatibilist intuitions among the folk are subject to a number of surprising factors, sometimes yielding apparently contradictory judgments. In this paper, we show how an independently motivated hypothesis about responsibility judgments provides a unified explanation of the more important results from these studies. According to this ‘Explanation Hypothesis’, to take an agent to be morally responsible for an event is, roughly, to take a relevant motivational structure of the agent to be part of a significant explanation of the event. We argue that because of how explanatory interests and perspectives affect what we take as significant explanations, this analysis accounts for the puzzling variety of empirical results. If this is correct, the Explanation Hypothesis also provides a new way of understanding debates about moral responsibility.

L'intervento di Gherush92 sulla "Commedia": una mancata occasione di diplomazia culturale

by Marina Decó

In 10 days on MonteCovello News, 4-2012, too

The paper considers Gherush92's statements about Dante's Comedy as a phaenomenon of cultural pyrrhonism, which deletes... more The paper considers Gherush92's statements about Dante's Comedy as a phaenomenon of cultural pyrrhonism, which deletes Dante's exegesis and hermeneutics, not worthing free will.

Choosing to be Human: Albert the Great on Self Awareness and Celestial Influence

by Scott Hendrix

Published in Culture and Cosmos, 12.2 (2008): 23-41.

Albert the Great (c.1200-1280) was so interested in astrology and the influence of the heavens upon terrestrial... more Albert the Great (c.1200-1280) was so interested in astrology and the influence of the heavens upon terrestrial affairs that he discussed this important component of natural philosophy in almost everything he wrote, from his early De bono to his late and unfinished Summa theologiae. A poorly understood component of the reason why he was so fascinated with this subject is his understanding of human versus animalistic action. According to Albert it is only when people act in accord with a willed choice informed by an understanding of why the action is undertaken that an activity may properly be considered human and therefore good, making it very important to understand external affecting factors. In Albert’s philosophy, the most powerful external influence affecting a person is that derived from the heavens—therefore understanding these forces is important if one wishes to act as a fully actualized human. Analysis of this component of Albert’s philosophical system is essential if we are to understand the vast importance that he gave astrology, which in turn is the key to many elements of his broader philosophy.

The Dilemma of Deliberation: On the Faculty and Mode of Willing in Aristotle and Maximus the Confessor

by Jon Greig

Provided as a writing sample for applications to philosophy graduate programs.

Aristotle’s definition of the will as rational appetite appears to have been a normative definition in anthropological... more Aristotle’s definition of the will as rational appetite appears to have been a normative definition in anthropological thought for much of the ancient philosophical world well into Late Antiquity thought. The Monothelite controversy in early Christianity, however, presented a conflict on this understanding of the will that had to be settled by a re-examination of the nature of the rational appetite and the activity of willing itself. St Maximus the Confessor, a sixth century Byzantine Church Father, provided crucial philosophic insight into the rational appetite and the process of willing that helped to provide the orthodox Christian answer to the question of how a divine person, Christ, could possess a human and divine will while simultaneously lacking any opposition within himself. While Maximus relies on Aristotle for his philosophy of will, Maximus’s concept of the natural and “gnomic,” or deliberative, modes of willing provides something new to the insights Aristotle articulated. Besides asking how these two modes of willing work, one crucial question is: are these two modes of willing essentially different from the faculty and act of willing in Aristotle’s thought? And if not different, how Aristotle’s and Maximus’s conceptions are connected? This paper shows that Maximus the Confessor’s distinction of the natural and “gnomic” modes of willing provides a better understanding of the process of willing in man, and it also shows that Maximus’s conception finds its seminal root in the thought of Aristotle on the rational appetite and the process of willing.

Kant's Practical Metaphysics of Freedom

by Maxwell Murphey

From Free Will to Hegel and Kant on Teleology and Life

by James Kreines

DRAFT

Neurons v Free Will

by Anthony Gottlieb

Essay on the alleged challenges to the notion of free will posed by neuroscience. Published in Intelligent life, March/April 2012.