Folk Psychology

Beyond Folk Psychology? Toward an Enriched Account of Social Understanding

by Mitchell Herschbach

Ph.D. Dissertation, Philosophy & Cognitive Science, UC San Diego, 2010

Why Studies of Autism Spectrum Disorders Have Failed to Resolve the Theory Theory Versus Simulation Theory Debate

by Meredith Wilkinson

Co-authored with Linden J Ball

Wilkinson, M. R., & Ball, L. J. (forthcoming) Why Studies of Autism Spectrum Disorders Have Failed to Resolve the Theory Theory Versus Simulation Theory Debate, Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 2012, DOI 10.1007/s13164-012-0097-0

Arbitrating between Theory-Theory and Simulation Theory: Evidence from a Think-aloud Study of Counterfactual Reasoning

by Meredith Wilkinson

Co-authored with Linden J. Ball and Rachel Cooper

Wilkinson, M. R., Ball, L. J., & Cooper, R. (2010).  Arbitrating between theory-theory and simulation theory:  Evidence from a think-aloud study of counterfactual reasoning. Chapter in S. Ohlsson & R. Catrambone (Eds.) Proceedings of the Thirty-Second Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. (pp. 1008-1013) Austin, Texas: Cognitive Science Society     

Rational choice, social identity and beliefs about oneself

by Fernando Aguiar

Co-authored with Andrés de Francisco; published in "Philosophy of the Social Sciences", 2009.

Keywords: beliefs; externalism; identity; internalism; rational choice theory;
rationality

Social identity poses one of the most important challenges to rational choice theory, but rational choice theorists do... more Social identity poses one of the most important challenges to rational choice theory, but rational choice theorists do not hold a common position regarding identity. On one hand, externalist rational choice ignores the concept of identity or reduces it to revealed preferences. On the other hand, internalist rational choice considers identity as a key concept in explaining social action because it permits expressive motivations to be included in the models. This article rejects externalist reductionism and proposes a redefinition of social identity as a net of beliefs about oneself, beliefs that are indexical, robust, and socially shaped.

Introduction to debates on embodied social cognition

by Shannon Spaulding

(penultimate draft) forthcoming in Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences

Embodied social cognition (ESC) aims to explicate how our embodiment shapes our knowledge of others, and in what this... more Embodied social cognition (ESC) aims to explicate how our embodiment shapes our knowledge of others, and in what this knowledge of others consists. Although there is much diversity amongst ESC accounts, common to all these accounts is the idea that our normal everyday interactions consist in non-mentalistic embodied engagements. In recent years, several theorists have developed and defended innovative and controversial accounts of ESC. These accounts challenge, and offer deflationary alternatives to, the standard cognitivist accounts of social cognition. As ESC accounts grow in number and prominence, the time has come for a dedicated, sustained debate on ESC and its most controversial and innovative elements. The goal of this special issue is to host such a debate with the aim of bringing clarity to the discussion of social cognition.

Mirror Neurons Are Not Evidence for the Simulation Theory

by Shannon Spaulding

Forthcoming in Synthese.

Recently, there has been a resurgence of interest in theories of mindreading. New discoveries in neuroscience have... more Recently, there has been a resurgence of interest in theories of mindreading. New discoveries in neuroscience have revitalized the languishing debate between the Theory Theory (TT) and the Simulation Theory (ST). The discovery of so-called mirror neurons has revived interest particularly in ST. Both ST proponents and theorists studying mirror neurons have argued that mirror neurons are strong evidence in favor of ST over TT. In this paper I argue against the prevailing view that mirror neurons are evidence for ST. My view is that on an appropriate construal of their function, mirror neurons do not operate like simulation theorists claim. In fact, mirror neurons are more appropriately understood as one element in an information-rich mindreading process. As such, mirror neurons fit in better with some sort of TT account of mindreading. I defend a positive account, the Model TT, which better explains the role of mirror neurons in social cognition.

Mirror Neurons and Social Cognition

by Shannon Spaulding

forthcoming in Mind & Language

Mirror neurons are widely regarded as an important key to social cognition. Despite such wide agreement, there is very... more Mirror neurons are widely regarded as an important key to social cognition. Despite such wide agreement, there is very little consensus on how or why they are important. The goal of this paper is to clearly explicate the exact role mirror neurons play in social cognition. I aim to answer two questions about the relationship between mirroring and social cognition: What kind of social understanding is involved with mirroring? How is mirroring related to that understanding? I argue that philosophical and empirical considerations lead us to accord a fairly minimal role for mirror neurons in social cognition.

There Are No Folk Psychological Narratives

by Matthew Ratcliffe

Proof. Final version appeared in the Journal of Consciousness Studies (2009)

I argue that the task of describing our so-called ‘folk psychology’ requires difficult philosophical work.... more I argue that the task of describing our so-called ‘folk psychology’ requires difficult philosophical work. Consequently, any statement of the folk view is actually a debatable philosophical position, rather than an uncontroversial description of pre-philosophical commonsense. The problem with the current folk psychology debate, I suggest, is that the relevant philosophical work has not been done. Consequently, the orthodox account of folk psychology is an uninformative caricature of an understanding that is implicit in everyday discourse and social interaction, and also in literary narratives. I conclude by considering two recent departures from it, so-called ‘experimental philosophy’ and Daniel Hutto’s ‘narrative practice hypothesis’. Both, I claim, take steps in the right direction but retain unhelpful assumptions that they inherit from the orthodox view.

Folk Psychology'is Not Folk Psychology

by Matthew Ratcliffe

This paper disputes the claim that our understanding of others is enabled by a commonsense or ‘folk’ psychology, whose... more This paper disputes the claim that our understanding of others is enabled by a commonsense or ‘folk’ psychology, whose ‘core’ involves the attribution of intentional states in order to predict and explain behaviour. I argue that interpersonal understanding is seldom, if ever, a matter of two people assigning intentional states to each other but emerges out of a context of interaction between them. Self and other form a coupled system rather than two wholly separate entities equipped with an internalised capacity to assign mental states to the other. This applies even in those instances where one might seem to adopt a ‘detached’ perspective towards others. Thus ‘folk psychology’, as commonly construed, is not folk psychology.

Against the Deflationary Account of Self-Deception

by José Eduardo Porcher

Published in Humana.Mente, Feb. 2012, Vol. 20, pp. 67–84.

Self-deception poses serious difficulties for belief attribution because the behavior of the self-deceived is deeply... more Self-deception poses serious difficulties for belief attribution because the behavior of the self-deceived is deeply conflicted: some of it supports the attribution of a certain belief, while some of it supports the contrary attribution. Theorists have resorted either to attributing both beliefs to the self-deceived, or to postulating an unconscious belief coupled with another kind of cognitive attitude. On the other hand, deflationary accounts of self- deception have attempted a more parsimonious solution: attributing only one, false belief to the subject. My aim in this paper is to critically examine this strategy and, subsequently, to suggest that its failure gives support to the neglected view that the self-deceived are not accurately describable as believing either of the relevant propositions.

Religion's Folk Psychological Context

by Uku Tooming

In: Studies in Science and Theology, No. 13: European Society For the Study of Science and Theology Conference, University of Edinburgh, 07.04 - 10.04, 2010. (Toim.) Jackelén, Antje; Smedes, Taede; Fuller, Michael; Evers, Dirk., 2012, pp. 243-258

The paper deals with the application of the study of folk psychology to the cognitive science of religion. It has been... more The paper deals with the application of the study of folk psychology to the cognitive science of religion. It has been quite a common understanding in the aforementioned area that religious cognition (namely, the representation of supernatural or counterintutive agents) makes use of the same folk psychological inferences that are drawn in the case of dealing with human agents.
Relying on some recent authors in the study of folk psychology (Dan Hutto, Shaun Gallagher, Matthew Ratcliffe), I am going to argue that many important aspects of person-specific knowledge depend crucially on the embodiment of the other, social context (most notably, social roles and norms) and also second-person interactions. Because of that, there is a rather strong asymmetry between the representations of human and nonhuman agents. For the latter to be relevant for human cognition, these three aforementioned aspects have to be created or somehow simulated and this requires a great amount of construction from humans. This also means that the conception of the ’naturalness’ of religion is ambivalent, to say the least, because only in the case of humans can we have these aspects naturally.

Does Intentional Ascent "Require" Semantic Ascent? A Reply to Bermudez

by Michael J. Braund

That some non-linguistic creatures are capable of some varieties of thought has become progressively hard to deny.... more That some non-linguistic creatures are capable of some varieties of thought has become progressively hard to deny. Evidence extends from the manufacture and use of tools in the case of many animals, to the ways infants respond when shown atypical perceptual events. (2003a, p. 81) In Thinking Without Words (TWW for short), Jose Luis Bermudez’s project is to explain how this thinking is possible. Therein, he presents a highly economical statement of the nature of non-linguistic thought, by developing a conceptual framework for treating infants and nonhuman animals as “genuine thinkers.” (2006, p. 320) While the idea of non-linguistic thought has garnered a great deal of attention in cognitive ethology and the neurosciences, this is not true of analytic philosophy. There, the discussions about non-linguistic behavior have focused on how such thoughts might be physically realized. In contrast, Bermudez approaches the problem by considering what is required to explain behavior in psychological terms. How can we know what non-linguistic creatures think? What fixes the contents of their thoughts? Are they thinkers like us, or do humans grow up to become fundamentally different types of thinkers with unique cognitive abilities? TWW offers answers to these questions, setting out criteria for identifying when psychological explanations are required for non-linguistic creatures, as well as determining the limits of such explanations. In what follows, I will briefly outline (what I take to be) Bermudez’s position in TWW, paying special attention to the claim that metarepresentational thought refers only to linguistically informed, inferential thinking. I will then argue that while the case he builds for a positive theory of non-linguistic thought is rich and cogent, holding up to the battery of criticisms I consider, it is doubtful whether his case for the negative aspects of the theory gets as far as it should. After posing a few general problems for the argument that intentional ascent requires semantic ascent, I will show that its basic strategy rests upon a dubious understanding of the role played by representational vehicles in thinking about thoughts.

Bha Mi'Sa'Chnoc: Creativity In Scottish Gaelic Tradition

by Michael Newton

Milleks on sotsiaalse tunnetuse uurimisvaldkonnas tarvis filosoofiat? (Why does social cognition research need philosophy?)

by Vivian Bohl

The aim of the paper is to explain what is and what should be the contribution of philosophy to the social... more
The aim of the paper is to explain what is and what should be the contribution of philosophy to the social cognition research. I refute three popular claims against the necessity of philosophy in scientific research and bring out several ways of how philosophers contribute and should continue to contribute to social cognition research. I clarify the role of thought experiments in studying social cognition and argue that although classical philosophical thought experiments are unsuitable for solving scientific problems in this area, the methods of experimental philosophy should be more widely used for studying folk psychology. I claim that whereas philosophers tend to analyse the research of social cognition in order to make normative claims, there is likewise a need for more elaborate descriptive analysis. I also analyse the possible role of phenomenology in social cognitive research and explain how does the contribution of phenomenology differ from the contribution of nonphenomenological philosophy and what is the potential of phenomenology in social cognition research.

Käesoleva artikli eesmärgiks on selgitada, milline on ja peaks olema filosoofia panus sotsiaalse tunnetuse uurimisvaldkonnas. Vastustades kolme populaarset väidet, mille kohaselt filosoofiat ei ole teaduse tegemiseks tarvis, selgitan, kuidas filosoofid panustavad ning peaksid jätkuvalt panustama sotsiaalse tunnetuse uurimisse. Eraldi käsitlen mõtteliste eksperimentide rolli sotsiaalse tunnetuse uurimisel ning väidan, et kuigi klassikalised filosoofilised mõttelised eksperimendid ei sobi sotsiaalse tunnetuse valdkonna teaduslike probleemide lahendamiseks, tuleks rahvapsühholoogia uurimisel ulatuslikumalt rakendada eksperimentaalfilosoofilisi meetodeid. Väidan, et filosoofid analüüsivad sotsiaalse tunnetuse valdkonnas tehtud uurimistööd enamasti normatiivsetel eesmärkidel, kuid tarvis oleks ka sotsiaalse tunnetuse uurimistöö põhjalikumat deskriptiivset analüüsimist. Käsitlen ka fenomenoloogia võimalikku rolli sotsiaalse tunnetuse valdkonnas, selgitades, mille poolest fenomenoloogia panus erineb mittefenomenoloogilise filosoofia panusest ning milline on fenomenoloogia potentsiaal sotsiaalse tunnetuse uurimisel.

Self-deception, delusion and the boundaries of folk psychology

by Lisa Bortolotti

Published in HumanaMente in 2012. Co-authored with M Mameli.

To what extent do self-deception and delusion overlap? In this paper we argue that both self-deception and delusions... more To what extent do self-deception and delusion overlap? In this paper we argue that both self-deception and delusions can be understood in folk-psychological terms. ‘Motivated’ delusions, just like self-deception, can be described as beliefs driven by personal interests. If self-deception can be understood folk-psychologically because of its motivational component, so can motivated delusions. Non-motivated delusions also fit (to a large extent) the folk-psychological notion of belief, since they can be described as hypotheses one endorses when attempting to make sense of unusual and powerful experiences. We suggest that there is continuity between the epistemic irrationality manifested in self-deception and in delusion.

The Empirical Naivete of the Current Philosophical Conception of Folk Psychology

by Barbara Von Eckardt

Folk Psychology and Scientific Psychology

by Barbara Von Eckardt

Towards a Folk Psychology of Security: Insights From Evolutionary Psychology

by Michael Bang Petersen

Can unintended side effects be intentional? Resolving a controversy over intentionality and morality (2010)

by Bertram Malle

Guglielmo, S., & Malle, B. F. (2010a). Can unintended side--effects be intentional? Resolving a controversy over intentionality and morality. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 36, 1635-1647.

Editorial: Social Cognition: Mindreading and Alternatives

by Mitchell Herschbach

Co-authored with Daniel D. Hutto & Victoria Southgate. Introduction to "Social Cognition: Mindreading and Alternatives", a special issue of the Review of Philosophy and Psychology.