Flesh

Camus' Theory of the Flesh

by Jean-Philippe Deranty

Full edited version appears in Sophia, 50(4), 2011, pp. 513-525. Full edited version appears in Sophia, 50(4), 2011, pp. 513-525.

Deleuze y Merleau-Ponty. La carne del Mundo

by Gonzalo Montenegro

"Deleuze y Merleau-Ponty. La carne del Mundo", published in 'Polisemia' (ISSN 1900-4648), No. 9, volumen 1. Bogotá: Corporación Universitaria Minuto de Dios, pp. 45-55.

Resumen: A pesar de la distancia que parecen evidenciar la filosofía de Merleau-Ponty y de Deleuze, es posible... more Resumen: A pesar de la distancia que parecen evidenciar la filosofía de Merleau-Ponty y de Deleuze, es posible descubrir complicidades no sólo analógicas respecto de la crítica que dirigen a Husserl. En el terreno estético, por ejemplo, podemos constatar que las últimas reflexiones de Merleau-Ponty, presentes fundamentalmente en Lo visible y lo invisible, representan un parangón constante para el desarrollo de obras como la que Deleuze consagra al pintor Francis Bacon. La investigación que sigue se aboca, pues, a definir los lugares y motivos principales en los que de la mano de la lectura que efectúan de Husserl, se reconocen entre Merleau-Ponty y Deleuze puntos de contacto que desafían la indiferencia aparente desde la que se comprenden sus respectivas filosofías.

Palabras clave: Deleuze, Merleau-Ponty, percepción, carne, intensidad, tiempo magma.

Abstract: Despite the distance between the philosophies of Merleau-Ponty and of Deleuze, it is possible to discover not only analogue complicity with regard to the criticism addressed to Husserl. In the aesthetic, for example, we note that the last thoughts of Merleau-Ponty, present mainly in The visible and the invisible, are a constant reference for the works that Deleuze dedicates to the painter Francis Bacon. In the present research we expect to define the passages on account of the reading of Husserl, and to show the point of contact between Merleau-Ponty and Deleuze. So, we hope to change the image of apparent indifference with regard to understanding their philosophies.

Keywords: Deleuze, Merleau-Ponty, perception, flesh, intensity, time magma.

The end of the old flesh: beastly bodily becomings as contemporary parable

by JD Taylor

Presented at "The End of..." Conference, University of Kent, 22 January 2012.

In 1981 Gilles Deleuze read in Francis Bacon's paintings a 'zone of the indiscernible' between man and animal. Bacon's... more In 1981 Gilles Deleuze read in Francis Bacon's paintings a 'zone of the indiscernible' between man and animal. Bacon's figures spasm through their wounded architectures, screams erupting as destabilised bodies attempt to escape their figurations. This paper develops this zone of the indiscernible to explore how human flesh has become a medium for representations of the end. In David Cronenberg's Videodrome [1983], a dark psychological conspiracy places the flesh under suspicion of suggestible media-corruption, as Max Renn transcends to abstracted data by orgiastically abandoning the old flesh.

Against the knowing futurism of Videodrome, this paper compares Charles Burns' Black Hole comic-book series [1995-2005], which uses the grotesque contagious corruption of teenage flesh as a dark analogy for growing up and loss of innocence in the haunted spaces of late 20th century  Americana. Overtly Freudian, the rich contrasts of Burns' work introduces the becoming-monstrous and the eruption of contagion which racks modern American anxieties about the ending of the human, most familiar in recent zombie narratives. Taking a parallel track, in both accounts beastly becomings are played out on the flesh to mark internal turmoil whilst offering two directions for a contemporary bestiary of our culture. Whilst Burns offers a pessimistic Quietism and submission to the mysterious disease, Cronenberg's narrative alternatively calls to end the old flesh and embrace the possibilities of cybertechnology. Baudrillardian pessimism is spliced with 'biopunk' subcultures alongside Eugene Thacker's theoretical forays into life as the 'unthinkable' (2010, 2011) to finally ascertain why anxieties over life, technology and the end continue to play on a corrupted flesh. Does power embody itself through a zombified life, or will the skin continue to subvert and revolt against human (and posthuman) machinations?

Flesh and Nature: Understanding Merleau-Ponty's Relational Ontology

by Bryan Bannon

Research in Phenomenology 41 (2011) 327–357

In this paper I attempt to develop several ways Merleau-Ponty’s ontology might contribute to an environmental ethic... more In this paper I attempt to develop several ways Merleau-Ponty’s ontology might contribute to an environmental ethic through a redefinition of his concept of flesh in terms of a general theory of affectivity. Currently accepted interpretations of the concept such as those in Abram, Toadvine, Barbaras, and Dastur rely upon conceiving flesh as a perceptual experience. I contest this interpretation and argue that a more productive conception of flesh emerges when understood in terms of Heidegger’s philosophy. The paper concludes with a consideration of the normative significance of flesh by examining the role of “wildness” within a place-based ethic.

The Return of the New Flesh: Body Memory in David Cronenberg and Merleau-Ponty

by Dylan Trigg

Published in Film-Philosophy, Volume 15: Issue 1, 2011. PP.82-99.

From the “psychoplasmic” offspring in The Brood (1979) to the tattooed encodings in Eastern Promises (2007), David... more From the “psychoplasmic” offspring in The Brood (1979) to the tattooed encodings in Eastern Promises (2007), David Cronenberg presents a compelling vision of embodiment, which challenges traditional accounts of personal identity and obliges us to ask how human beings persist through different times, places, and bodily states while retaining their sameness. Traditionally, the response to this question has emphasised the importance of cognitive memory in securing the continuity of consciousness. But what has been underplayed in this debate is the question of how the body can both reinforce and disrupt the grounds for our personal identity. Accordingly, by turning the notoriously “body conscious” work of Cronenberg, especially his seminal The Fly (1986), I intend to pursue the relation between identity and embodiment in the following way.
First, by augmenting John Locke’s account of personal identity with a specific appeal to the body, I will explore how Cronenberg’s treatment of embodiment as a site of independent experience challenges the idea we have that cognitive memory is the guarantor of personal identity. Cronenberg’s treatment of the “New Flesh” posits an account of the body that undermines the Cartesian and Lockean account of personal identity as being centred on the mind. In its place, I will argue that Cronenberg shows us how the body establishes a personality independently of the mind.
Second, through focusing explicitly on body memory, I will explore how we, as embodied subjects, relate to our bodies in a Cronenbergian world. Approaching this relation between memory and embodiment via the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty, I will argue that memory is at the heart of Cronenberg’s vision of body horror. I will conclude by suggesting that far from generating unity, Cronenberg’s vision of embodiment and identity is diseased (often literally) by a memory that cannot be assimilated by cognition. The result of this failure to assimilate body memory, is that memory itself occupies the role of the monster within.