Externalism

Concepts: Where Fodor Went Wrong

by Alex Levine

Book Review of Groundless Knowledge: A Humean Solution to the Problem of Skepticism

by Peter Fosl

In The Review of Metaphysics 53.1 no. 209 (September 1999): 144-45.

Review of Henrik Bohlin's book. Groundless Knowledge: A Humean Solution to the Problem of Scepticism by Henrik Bohlin... more Review of Henrik Bohlin's book. Groundless Knowledge: A Humean Solution to the Problem of Scepticism by Henrik Bohlin (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell International, 1997)

The Extended Mind: A Dynamical Systems Perspective

by Andy Forceno

Clark and Chalmers (2002) advance two hypotheses that both cognition and the mind extend into the environment. Both... more Clark and Chalmers (2002) advance two hypotheses that both cognition and the mind extend into the environment. Both hypotheses are grounded in active externalism about mental content and the Parity Principle. Active externalism proposes that the external features of the environment in the present directly influence our mental contents and behavior. The Parity Principle states that a process or state in the environment is cognitive if it is functionally equivalent to a comparable intracranial cognitive process. This paper reviews two of the strongest replies to the hypotheses, namely that arguments for them commit the coupling-constitution fallacy and that the hypothesis of extended cognition is incompatible with any satisfactory criteria that distinguishes between cognitive and non-cognitive processes. This paper argues that a dynamical systems approach avoids both objections and offers a conceptual and methodological framework for an extended cognitive science. Lastly, an account of collective intentionality will be considered to show how groups of individuals can be the bearers of mental states.

Origens da interioridade: autoconhecimento e externalismo; Origins of interiority: self-knowledge and externalism

by claudia passos ferreira

Collingwood, Psychologism and Internalism

by Giuseppina D'Oro

This is the penultimate version of a paper which appeared in European Journal of Philosophy 12, 163-177, 2004.

The paper defends Collingwood’s account of rational explanation against two objections. The first is that he... more The paper defends Collingwood’s account of rational explanation against two objections. The first is that he psychologises the concept of practical reason. The second is that he fails to distinguish mere rationalisations from rationalisations that have causal power. I argue that Collingwood endorses a form of non-psychologising internalism which rests on the view that the appropriate explanans for actions are neither empirical facts (as externalists claim), nor psychological facts (as some internalists claim), but propositional facts. I then defend this form of internalism against a range of Davidsonian objections which attempt to weaken the distinction between reasons and causes.

The Future of Scientific Psychiatry

by Lisa Bortolotti

with M Broome, in Broome and Bortolotti (eds.), Psychiatry as Cognitive Neuroscience: Philosophical Perspectives, Oxford University Press 2009.

We offer two other examples of the way in which neurosciences, at the current stage of development, cannot do all the... more We offer two other examples of the way in which neurosciences, at the current stage of development, cannot do all the explanatory work in psychiatry. The first example centres on the employment of normative notions in the characterization of the manifestation of psychopathologies as deviant. The second example highlights the importance of environmental factors in the onset of psychosis. In the end, we explore some potential for future research in these areas.

Supersizing the Mind: Embodiment, Action and Cognitive Extension. Reviewed by Mirko Farina. School of Philosophy, Psychology and Language Sciences, University of Edinburgh

by Mirko Farina