Music and the Extended Self
My Chapter from the Book Situated Aesthetics:Art beyond the Skin. Edited by Riccardo Manzotti. available at imprint-academic.com
Leonard Bernstein argues that our musical experience must be constructed out of individual notes, the way Chomsky sees... more Leonard Bernstein argues that our musical experience must be constructed out of individual notes, the way Chomsky sees sentences constructed out of individual words. I argue that our experience of music, and experience in general is equally well accounted for by seeing it as starting with an experience of an undifferentiated whole, without even awareness of a distinction between self and environment. New experiences are not acquired by stuffing sense data into the brain, but rather by dividing a primordially unified experience into smaller interacting parts. This view dissolves many traditional problems in philosophy of mind, and also more accurately reflects what we have learned about connectionist neuroscience.
Extended cognition and intrinsic properties
Published in Philosophical Psychology, 23: 6, 741
— 757
The Hypothesis of Extended Cognition (HEC) have been criticized as committing what is called the coupling/constitution... more The Hypothesis of Extended Cognition (HEC) have been criticized as committing what is called the coupling/constitution fallacy, but it is the critic’s use of this concept which is fallacious. It is true that there is no reason to deny that the line between the self and the world should be drawn at the skull and/or the skin. But the data used to support HEC reveal that there was never a good enough reason to draw the line there in the first place. The burden of proof has fallen on the Mind/Brain identity theory, now that our intuitions/prejudices no longer support it. One of those “intuitions” is the Aristotelian assumption that the world can be neatly divided into objects that possess intrinsic causal powers, and the causal relations that connect those objects. In modern science, however, the concept of intrinsic causal powers is only a temporary stopgap that makes it possible to begin research in a particular area. It therefore seems best to assume that the line between mind and world is both pragmatic and dynamic. Consequently, the mind might best described as a fluctuating field, rather than an object or structur
