Extended Mind

Epistemological and Phenomenological Issues in the use of Brain-Computer Interfacess

by Richard Heersmink

In C. Ess, & R. Hagengruber (Eds.), Proceedings of the International Association for Computing and Philosophy 2011 (pp. 98-102). Münster: MV-Wissenschaft.

Brain-computer interfaces (BCIs) are an emerging and converging technology that translates the brain activity of its... more Brain-computer interfaces (BCIs) are an emerging and converging technology that translates the brain activity of its user into command signals for external devices, ranging from motorized wheelchairs, robotic hands, environmental control systems, and computer applications. In this paper I functionally decompose BCI systems and categorize BCI applications with similar functional properties into three categories, those with (1) motor, (2) virtual, and (3) linguistic applications. I then analyse the relationship between these distinct BCI applications and their users from an epistemological and phenomenological perspective. Specifically, I analyse functional properties of BCIs in relation to the abilities (particularly motor behaviour and communication) of their human users, asking how they may or may not extend these abilities. This includes a phenomenological analysis of whether BCIs are experienced as transparent extensions. Contrary to some recent philosophical claims, I conclude that, although BCIs have the potential to become bodily as well as cognitive extensions for skilled users, at this stage they are not. And while the electrodes and signal processor may to a variable degree be transparent and incorporated, the BCI system as a whole is not. Contemporary BCIs are difficult to use. Most systems only work in highly controlled laboratory settings, require a high amount of training and concentration, have very limited control options, have low and variable information transfer rates, and effector motions are often slow, clumsy and sometimes unsuccessful. These drawbacks considerably limit their possibilities for transparency and incorporation into either the body schema or cognitive system which is essential for bodily and cognitive extension. Current BCIs can therefore only be seen as a weak or metaphorical extension of the human central nervous system. To increase their potential for cognitive extension, I give suggestions for improving the interface design of what I refer to as linguistic applications.

Extended cognition & constitution: Re-evaluating the constitutive claim of extended cognition

by Michael Kirchhoff

Forthcoming in Philosophical Psychology. Pre-proof manuscript. Please do not cite.

Strategic domain pioneering and nonlocal action

by Brian Gordon

working paper, 2012

When rival firms adopt similar strategies, competition drives down returns and compresses variance.  One... more When rival firms adopt similar strategies, competition drives down returns and compresses variance.  One important source of advantage arises from Schumpeterian innovation and the ability to undertake nonlocal action.  The question arises, can nonlocal action be strategic?  One prominent answer, typically associated with the evolutionary school of strategy, suggests no, asserting that innovation ultimately is driven by luck and serendipity.  This paper suggests otherwise, arguing that nonlocal action can be strategic because firms can purposefully pioneer new domains of scientific, engineering, and technological knowledge in the pursuit of Schumpeterian innovation in products, technologies, and modes of production.  To this end, a new theory of strategic domain pioneering is introduced.  The idea of strategic domain pioneering as a ‘technology for exploration and nonlocal action’ and some implications for the theory of organizational and managerial control systems and the locus of knowledge are discussed in the final section.  In orientation, the theory of strategic domain pioneering introduced here is congruent with the new behavioral theory of strategy forwarded by Gavetti (2011).  By showing how knowledge creation processes can be actively managed for strategic ends, this paper expands upon and extends Gavetti’s nascent framework in new directions.

The Ethics of Cognitive Extension

by Joe Dewhurst

First published in Aporia (Issue 9, May 2012: 22-28). Draft version attached. The author can be contacted at 0819473.sms.ed.ac.uk

This paper explores some of the ethical implications of hypothesis of extended cognition. It discusses the possibility... more This paper explores some of the ethical implications of hypothesis of extended cognition. It discusses the possibility of the manipulation of external memory stores qualifying as literally tampering with somebody's memories, as well as the implications of social extension for moral responsibility and agency. It concludes that if the hypothesis of extended cognition gains widespread public acceptance, it will change the shape and texture of moral discourse.

Book Review: "Enaction: Toward a New Paradigm for Cognitive Science," John Stewart, Olivier Gapenne, & Ezequiel A. Di Paolo (Eds.). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2010

by Michael Kirchhoff

Published in Philosophical Psychology

Distributed cognitive agency in virtue epistemology

by Michael Kirchhoff

Co-authored with Will Newsome. Published in Philosophical Explorations, vol. 15, no. 2, 2012

We examine some of the ramifications of extended cognition for virtue epistemology by exploring the idea within... more We examine some of the ramifications of extended cognition for virtue epistemology by exploring the idea within extended cognition that it is possible to decentralize cognitive agency such that cognitive agency includes socio-cultural practices. In doing so, we first explore the (seemingly unquestioned) assumption in both virtue epistemology and extended cognition that cognitive agency is an individualistic phenomenon. A distributed notion of cognitive agency alters the landscape of knowledge attribution in virtue epistemology. We conclude by offering a pragmatic notion of cognitive agency, where the situation sets the benchmarks for whether cognitive agency is individualistic or socio-culturally distributed.

The Turing Machine as a cognitive model of human computation

by Simone Pinna

Published in Franco Rubinacci, Angelo Rega, Nicola Lettieri
(editors), "Le scienze Cognitive in Italia 2011. AISC’11", Napoli: Università degli Studi Federico II, 2011, 147-150

Classical computationalism considers the Turing Machine to be a psychologically implausible model of humanmore Classical computationalism considers the Turing Machine to be a psychologically implausible model of human
computation. In this paper, I will first elaborate on Andrew Wells' thesis that the claim of psychological implausibility
derives from a wrong interpretation of the TM as originally conceived by Turing. Then, I will show how Turing's original
interpretation of the TM could be useful to construct cognitive models of simple phenomena of human computation, such as
counting using our fingers or performing arithmetical operations using paper and pencil.

McLuhan, Burawoy, McLuhan: Extending Anthropic Communications

by Gregory Sandstrom

Subtitle: On the Human Equation, the Extended Case Method and Human Extension

Published in: Revista da Associação Nacional dos Programas de Pós-Graduação em Comunicação | E-compós, Brasília, v.14, n.3, set./dez. 2011.

One of the main contributions that Marshall McLuhan made to the fields of culture, technology and communication was... more One of the main contributions that Marshall McLuhan made to the fields of culture, technology and communication was the idea of ‘the extensions of man,’ the subtitle of his masterpiece “Understanding Media” (1964). Here the idea of ‘human extension’ is explored for application in human-social sciences, along with the notion of ‘the extended case method’ promoted by current President of the International Sociological
Association, Michael Burawoy with its origins in the Manchester School of Social Anthropology.

‘Human extension’ is offered as an alternative approach to the ‘evolution’ of artefacts and is connected to the communications works of Marshall and his son Eric, reaching to the recent idea of a general ‘human equation.’

Mind and Artifact: A Multidimensional Matrix for Exploring Cognition-Artifact Relations

by Richard Heersmink

To appear in: Proceedings of AISB/IACAP World Congress 2012

What are the possible varieties of cognition-artifact relations, and which dimensions are relevant for exploring these... more What are the possible varieties of cognition-artifact relations, and which dimensions are relevant for exploring these varieties? This question is answered in two steps. First, three levels of functional and informational integration between human agent and cognitive artifact are distinguished. These levels are based on the degree of interactivity and direction of information flow, and range from monocausal and bicausal relations to continuous reciprocal causation. Second, a multidimensional framework for exploring cognition-artifact relations is sketched. The dimensions in the framework include reliability, durability, trust, procedural and representational transparency, individualization, bandwidth, speed of information flow, distribution of computation, and cognitive and artifactual transformation. Together, these dimensions constitute a multidimensional space in which particular cognition-artifact relations can be located. The higher a cognition-artifact relation scores on these dimensions, the more integration occurs, and the more tightly coupled the overall system is. It is then better, for explanatory reasons, to see agent and artifact as one cognitive system with a distributed informational architecture.

Extending & Inventing Sex. Getting Rid of Females & Males (abstract. Draft coming)

by Saray Ayala

Co-authored with Nadya Vasilyeva (Psychology, Northeastern University)

Extended Knowledge and Causal Dependence

by Esteban Céspedes

Slaying the Chimera: a Complementarity Approach to the Extended Mind Thesis

by Mirko Farina

Supervisors : Andy Clark, Julian Kiverstein, Tillman Vierkant
Examiners: Michael Wheeler and Mark Sprevak

When Sensory Substitution Devices Strike Back: An Interactive Training Paradigm

by Brian Glenney

Co-authored with Zachary Reynolds, Research Intern, Harvard Medical School
Published in Philosophy Study, Forthcoming 2, 6 June-July 2012

A sensory substitution device (SSD) is a technology that translates information for one sensory modality, like vision,... more A sensory substitution device (SSD) is a technology that translates information for one sensory modality, like vision, into information for use by another, like touch. Though SSDs have been in existence for over four decades, effective training techniques for their use are rarely discussed. In this paper, we compare three training strategies on a particular SSD known as the vOICe. These comparisons were conducted using a minimal but active search and localization task of luminescent discs. These studies show that an interactive training paradigm, which combines the efforts of two trainees at the same time in a tag-like game, is more effective than passive training at a computer console or active training involving search and localization of luminescent discs. This finding supports philosophical views of perception that take interaction with the environment seriously. In particular, we argue that these findings are in support of certain features of the extended mind view as proposed by Andy Clark (2008). In particular, the study suggests that when environmental conditions are responsive to one’s behavioral activity, the activity itself is enhanced, as is predicted by the extended mind view.

Extending symbol grounding

by Stephen J. Cowley

this appeared as:
Belpaeme, T & Cowley, S.J. (2007) Extending symbol grounding. Interaction Studies, 8/1: 2-6.

The papers collected in this special issue emerged from an international workshop on symbol grounding organised at the... more The papers collected in this special issue emerged from an international workshop on symbol grounding organised at the University of Plymouth on 3 and 4 July 2006 by the Distributed Language Group. Our goal was to extend the classical view of symbol grounding by recognising that language and cognitive dynamics are mutually constitutive. Specifically, we aimed to do so by bringing researchers who study human signalling together with others who focus on simulating intelligence and language. In the original call for papers, we set out these objectives as follows: "Specifically, we wish to invite contributions viewing language and cognition as linking what goes on in the head with causal processes that are intersubjective, multimodal, affect-laden, and organised by historically rooted customs and artefacts.… The purpose of the workshop is not so much to
present completed work as to find new ways of tackling a complex issue and to launch collaboration among participants to that end.… Since the workshop focuses on how symbol grounding can be reconsidered when language is viewed as a dynamical process rooted in both culture and biology, research
related to robotic or computer modelling of symbol grounding, psychological and linguistic viewpoints on cognitive development and semiotic dynamics are of great interest."

How to do things without words: Infants, utterance-activity and distributed cognition

by Stephen J. Cowley

This is a draft of a paper that later appeared as:
Spurrett, D. & Cowley, S.J. (2004) How to do things without words. Language Sciences, 26/5: 443- 466.

In ‘The Extended Mind’ Clark and Chalmers (1998) argue for ‘active externalism’ – the view that the mind, or what... more In ‘The Extended Mind’ Clark and Chalmers (1998) argue for ‘active externalism’ – the view that the mind, or what realises it, need not be confined within either the brain, or the body, of the minded individual. We’re sympathetic to their position, and line of
argument. Among the many things outside the brain and body of any particular individual are, of course, other brains and bodies. This paper is a preliminary sketch of what happens when minds extend into one another. The paper is in two parts – the first
establishing some theoretical points of reference, the second being largely descriptive. We note at the outset that, while speculative, what we have written is suggestive of fruitful lines of further reflection and investigation. Above all, it highlights, ‘utterance-activity’, a term of art, used, here, to refer to the full range of kinetic and prosodic features of the on-line behaviour of interacting humans. Utterance-activity sometimes includes what are usually regarded as words and strings of words, but need not do so. It is not to be confused with verbal patterns. Our main argument is that, in learning to talk, infants depend on –not words –but other peoples’ utterance-activity.

Insightful thinking: cognitive dynamics and material artifacts

by Stephen J. Cowley

This appeared as:
Fioratou, E. & Cowley, S.J. (2009). Insightful thinking: cognitive dynamics and material artifacts. Pragmatics & Cognition, 17/3: 549-572.

We trace how cognition arises beyond the skin. Experimental work on insight problem solving is used to examine how... more We trace how cognition arises beyond the skin. Experimental work on insight problem solving is used to examine how external artifacts can be used to reach the goal of assembling a ‘cheap necklace’. Instead of asking how insight occurs ‘in the head’, our participants in Experiment 1 can either draw solution attempts or manipulate real objects (specifically, chain links that make up a necklace). Even though performance with real chain links is significantly more successful than on paper, access to objects does not make this insight problem’s simple: objects themselves do not shape cognition. This challenges extended mind views. While failure often results from the inappropriate (to the current insight problem) application of hill-climbing, material artifacts can trigger solutions. In Experiment 2, we used ‘open link’ conditions of the concretised problem to prompt participants to act (or think). Solutions arrived via insight, serendipity, or trial-and-error. By investigating how objects are used, we show that they do more than supplement neural events. Rather, participants monitor and anticipate the effects of action (and thinking) within an organism-environment system. By analogy, language too draws on experience of monitoring real-time effects as bodily dynamics play out in a normative and cultural world. In engaging with public language, it is likely that verbal patterns function by constraining anticipatory (action-based) cognitive processes.

Extended life

by Ezequiel Di Paolo

Di Paolo, E. A. (2009) Extended life Topoi 28:9-21.

This paper reformulates some of the questions raised by extended mind theorists from an enactive, life/mind continuity... more This paper reformulates some of the questions raised by extended mind theorists from an enactive, life/mind continuity perspective. Because of its reliance on concepts such as autopoiesis, the enactive approach has been deemed internalist and thus incompatible with the extended mind hypothesis. This paper answers this criticism by showing 1) that the relation between organism and cogniser is not one of co-extension, 2) that cognition is a relational phenomenon and thereby has no location, and 3) that the individuality of a cogniser is inevitably linked with the question of its autonomy, a question ignored by the extended mind hypothesis but for which the enactive approach proposes a precise, operational, albeit non-functionalist answer. The paper raises a pespective of embedded and intersecting forms of autonomous identity generation, some of which correspond to the canonical cases discussed in the extended mind literature, but on the whole of wider generality. In addressing these issues, this paper proposes unbiased, non-species specific definitions of cognition, agency and mediation, thus filling in gaps in the extended mind debates that have led to paradoxical situations and a problematic over-reliance on intutions about what counts as cognitive.

Keywords: extended mind, enactive approach, autonomy, precariousness, agency, mediation, individuation.

Does the Mind Extend Out into the World

by Andrew Kishino

Music and the Extended Self

by Teed Rockwell

My Chapter from the Book Situated Aesthetics:Art beyond the Skin. Edited by Riccardo Manzotti. available at imprint-academic.com

Leonard Bernstein argues that our musical experience must be constructed out of individual notes, the way Chomsky sees... more Leonard Bernstein argues that our musical experience must be constructed out of individual notes, the way Chomsky sees sentences constructed out of individual words. I argue that our experience of music, and experience in general is equally well accounted for by seeing it as starting with an experience of an undifferentiated whole, without even awareness of a distinction between self and environment. New experiences are not acquired by stuffing sense data into the brain, but rather by dividing a primordially unified experience into smaller interacting parts. This view dissolves many traditional problems in philosophy of mind, and also more accurately reflects what we have learned about connectionist neuroscience.

Embodiment and the Perceptual Hypothesis

by William E. S. McNeill

forthcoming in The Philosophical Quarterly

The Perceptual Hypothesis is that we may sometimes see, and thereby have non-inferential knowledge of, others' mental... more The Perceptual Hypothesis is that we may sometimes see, and thereby have non-inferential knowledge of, others' mental features. The Perceptual Hypothesis opposes Inferentialism, which is the view that our knowledge of others' mental features is always inferential. The claim that some mental features are embodied is the claim that some mental features are realized by states or processes that extend beyond the head, and may have parts that are on people's surfaces. The view I discuss here is that the Perceptual Hypothesis is plausible if, but only if, the mental features it claims we see are embodied, and are realized by states or processes which have parts that are on people's surfaces. Call this Embodiment Theory.

I argue that Embodiment Theory is false. It doesn‘t follow that the Perceptual Hypothesis is false. The considerations which serve to undermine Embodiment Theory serve equally to undermine the motivations for assuming that others‘ mental lives are always imperceptible.