Ideal Language Philosophy and Experiments on Intuitions
Published in /Studia Philosophica Estonica/, 2.2, 2009
Proponents of linguistic philosophy hold that all non-empirical philosophical problems can be solved by either... more Proponents of linguistic philosophy hold that all non-empirical philosophical problems can be solved by either analyzing ordinary language or developing an ideal one. I review the debates on linguistic philosophy and between ordinary and ideal language philosophy. Using arguments from these debates, I argue that the results of experimental philosophy on intuitions support linguistic philosophy. Within linguistic philosophy, these experimental results support and complement ideal over ordinary language philosophy. I argue further that some of the critiques of experimental philosophy are in fact defenses of ideal language philosophy. Finally, I show how much of the current debate about experimental philosophy is anticipated in the debates about and within linguistic philosophy. Specifically, arguments by ideal language philosophers support experimental philosophy.
Artificial Language Philosophy of Science
Published in the /European Journal for Philosophy of Science/.
Artificial language philosophy (also called ‘ideal language philosophy’) is the position that philosophical problems... more Artificial language philosophy (also called ‘ideal language philosophy’) is the position that philosophical problems are best solved or dissolved through a reform of language. Its underlying methodology—the development of languages for specific purposes—leads to a conventionalist view of language in general and of concepts in particular. I argue that many philosophical practices can be reinterpreted as applications of artificial language philosophy. In addition, many factually occurring interrelations between the sciences and philosophy of science are justified and clarified by the assumption of an artificial language methodology.
Multiple Heideggers? An Early, Still Prevalent Misreading
published in Current Studies in Phenomenology and Hermeneutics 1. An electronic journal (now defunct?) whose URL is http://ereignis.org/csph/edboard.htm
Since the earliest commentaries on Heidegger's Being and Time, its theory of judgment and of propositions has been... more Since the earliest commentaries on Heidegger's Being and Time, its theory of judgment and of propositions has been widely misrepresented as relativistic, psychologistic, anthropologistic, pragmatic, etc. Even Edmund Husserl allowed himself to be persuaded to this point of view, to the great detriment of his phenomenological movement. And most of Heidegger's interpreters, whether friendly or hostile, have adopted this point of view, which normally includes the notion that there can be no fundamental difference between circumspective and apophantic forms of explication. This misreading ignores important aspects of the theory of propositional explication in Being and Time, ignores the fact that forms of interpretation would not be genera or species of interpretation, and is a clear instance of genetic fallacy. Yet it pervades the literature on Heidegger still.
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Download (.rtf) On a Straw Man in the Philosophy of Science - A Defense of the Received View
Published in /HOPOS: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science/ 2(1), pp. 77-120. Spring 2012.
I defend the Received View on scientific theories as developed by Carnap, Hempel, and Feigl against a number of... more I defend the Received View on scientific theories as developed by Carnap, Hempel, and Feigl against a number of criticisms based on misconceptions. First, I dispute the claim that the Received View demands axiomatizations in first order logic, and the further claim that these axiomatizations must include axioms for the mathematics used in the scientific theories. Next, I contend that models are important according to the Received View. Finally, I argue against the claim that the Received View is intended to make the concept of a theory more precise. Rather, it is meant as a generalizable framework for explicating specific theories.
Concept Formation in Ethical Theories: Dealing with Polar Predicates
Discussion note published in the /Journal of Ethics & Social Philosophy/, August 2010
In "A Danger of Definition: Polar Predicates in Metaethics," Mark Alfano (2009) concludes that the... more In "A Danger of Definition: Polar Predicates in Metaethics," Mark Alfano (2009) concludes that the response-dependence theory of Prinz and others and the fitting-attitudes theory first articulated by Brentano are false because they imply empirically false statements. He further concludes that these statements cannot be avoided by revising the definitions of the terms "good" and "bad" used in the two theories. In this note, I strengthen Alfano's first conclusion by arguing that the two theories are false even if they imply empirically true but conceptually contingent statements, and show how, contrary to his second conclusion, the theories can avoid both empirically false and conceptually contingent implications.