Explanation

General theories of explanation: buyer beware

by Kareem Khalifa

Mechanistic Constraints on Evolutionary Outcomes

by Tudor Baetu

Philosophy of Science, 79(2): 276-294

Understanding the role mechanistic constraints play in shaping evolution can relieve the tension between the generally... more Understanding the role mechanistic constraints play in shaping evolution can relieve the tension between the generally accepted intuition that there are no strict laws in biology and empirical findings showing that evolutionary processes are biased towards preferred outcomes. Mechanistic constraints explain why some evolutionary outcomes are more probable than others, and allow for predictions in specific lineages. At the same time, mechanistic constraints are neither necessary, nor universal in the way laws are traditionally characterized: they remain contingent on the past evolution of the biological mechanisms underpinning them, and only constrain the future evolution of the organisms possessing them.

I can't get no (epistemic) satisfaction: Why the hard problem of consciousness entails a hard problem of explanation

by Brian Earp

Earp, B. D. (2012). I can’t get no (epistemic) satisfaction: Why the hard problem of consciousness entails a hard problem of explanation. Dialogues in Philosophy, Mental and Neuro Sciences, in press.

Daniel Dennett (1996) has disputed David Chalmers’ (1995) assertion that there is a “hard problem of consciousness”... more Daniel Dennett (1996) has disputed David Chalmers’ (1995) assertion that there is a “hard problem of consciousness” worth solving in the philosophy of mind. In this paper I defend Chalmers against Dennett on this point: I argue that there is a hard problem of consciousness, that it is distinct in kind from the so-called easy problems, and that it is vital for the sake of honest and productive research in the cognitive sciences to be clear about the difference. But I have my own rebuke for Chalmers on the point of explanation. Chalmers (1995, 1996) proposes to “solve” the hard problem of consciousness by positing qualia as fundamental features of the universe, alongside such ontological basics as mass and space-time. But this is an inadequate solution: to posit, I will urge, is not to explain. To bolster this view, I borrow from an account of explanation by which it must provide “epistemic satisfaction” to be considered successful (Rowlands, 2001; Campbell, 2009), and show that Chalmers’ proposal fails on this account. I conclude that research in the science of consciousness cannot move forward without greater conceptual clarity in the field.

Mainstream Economics: Searching Where the Light Is

by Rogier De Langhe

published in Journal of Post-Keynesian Economics

The starting point of this paper is the question how to explain mainstream economics’ great level of acceptance in the... more The starting point of this paper is the question how to explain mainstream economics’ great level of acceptance in the face of its poor empirical track record. An explanation is provided in terms of a combination of unification and, most importantly,
inference to the best explanation. This paper asks whether the appeal of mainstream economics to inference to the best explanation is justified and as a consequence questions one
of the main reasons for the dominance of mainstream economics today. The final section integrates the ideas from the previous sections into a general framework for explanatory
pluralism.

From Free Will to Hegel and Kant on Teleology and Life

by James Kreines

DRAFT

WilliamsLombrozo2009

by Joseph Jay Williams

WilliamsLombrozorehder

by Joseph Jay Williams

WilliamsLombrozo2010b

by Joseph Jay Williams

WilliamsLombrozoRehder2011

by Joseph Jay Williams

WilliamsLombrozo2010

by Joseph Jay Williams

The role of explanation in discovery and generalization: evidence from category learning

by Joseph Jay Williams

Published in Cognitive Science, 2010

Research in education and cognitive development suggests that explaining plays a key role in learning and... more Research in education and cognitive development suggests that explaining plays a key role in learning and generalization: When learners provide explanations—even to themselves—they learn
more effectively and generalize more readily to novel situations. This paper proposes and tests a subsumptive constraints account of this effect. Motivated by philosophical theories of explanation, this account predicts that explaining guides learners to interpret what they are learning in terms of unifying patterns or regularities, which promotes the discovery of broad generalizations. Three experiments provide evidence for the subsumptive constraints account: prompting participants to explain while learning artificial categories promotes the induction of a broad generalization underlying category membership, relative to describing items (Exp. 1), thinking aloud (Exp. 2), or free study (Exp. 3). Although explaining facilitates discovery, Experiment 1 finds that description is more beneficial for learning item details. Experiment 2 additionally suggests that explaining anomalous observations may play a special role in belief revision. The findings provide insight into explanation’s role in discovery and generalization.

Communicative functions of Why-questions in parent-child interaction at home

by Antonio Bova

Bova, A. (2012). Communicative functions of Why-questions in parent-child interaction at home. Proceedings of the 15th European Conference of Developmental Psychology (pp. 301-306). Bologna: Medimond.

Causal and Explanatory Autonomy: Comments on Menzies and List

by Juhani Yli-Vakkuri

Co-authored with Ausonio Marras. Published in Cynthia Macdonald and Graham Macdonald, eds., Emergence in Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.

The chapter argues that Menzies and List's defence of the claim that higher‐level properties have causal powers... more The chapter argues that Menzies and List's defence of the claim that higher‐level properties have causal powers independent of those of their physical realizers conflates questions about the causal powers of properties with questions about their explanatory roles. Menzies and List's argument shows only that explanations in terms of higher‐level properties are sometimes more appropriate than explanations in terms of physical properties, but no conclusions about the causal powers of properties can be drawn from this without assuming a questionable version of the interventionist theory of causation.

Synthesis and fragmentation in social theory: a progressive solution

by John Holmwood

Postmodern claims for the lack of general coherence in social life and therefore in social research are merely a... more Postmodern claims for the lack of general coherence in social life and therefore in social research are merely a version of recurrent attempts to accept incoherence as adequate in explanations. Incoherence, however, is less sharply distinguishedfrom the synthetic and generalizing theories that it is held to have replaced than its proponents and critics suppose. Generalizing approaches, in fact, were built around contradictions
that contributed to their instability and facilitated postmodern fragmentation. In this paper we demonstrate the central contradictions in social theory, showing their common occurrence in apparently opposed positions. Both postmodernism and what it seeks to replace are features of a conservative and unproductive social science. We trace the
contradictory continuities through major modern schools of social theory in order to clear the ground for a progressive social science which accepts contradictions as problems that must be solved creatively in the practice of social research.

Explaining causal modelling. Or, what a causal model ought to explain

by Federica Russo

In M. D‟Agostino, G. Giorello, F. Laudisa, T. Pievani and C. Sinigaglia (eds), New Essays in Logic and Philosophy of Science, SILF Series, Volume I, College Publications, London, pp. 347-361. ISBN: 978-1-84890-003-5

One of the goals of the social sciences is to explain social phenomena. In this explanatory enterprise, causal... more One of the goals of the social sciences is to explain social phenomena. In this explanatory enterprise, causal relations, established by means of the so-called ‘causal models’, play a major role. This paper advances the view that causal models, by modelling causal mechanisms, (ought to) provide an explanation of social phe- nomena and should be seen as a model of explanation.

Interpretation as Action : The Risk of Inquiry

by Jon Awbrey

Awbrey, J.L., and Awbrey, S.M. (Autumn 1995), “Interpretation as Action : The Risk of Inquiry”, Inquiry : Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines 15(1), pp. 40–52.

“We hope you will find these thoughts of ours both interesting and useful.” These are words spoken to express an... more “We hope you will find these thoughts of ours both interesting and useful.” These are words spoken to express an intention, a bearing in the mind of a person toward an object which is yet to be achieved. The readiest moment of human life involves the interplay of signs, ideas, and objects — more explicitly, the interrelation of signifying expressions, states and dispositions of the mind or person, and objects or objectives either actual or potential. Our work designing instruments to enhance the play of inquiry has attuned us to the themes of interpretation and intentionality which every inquiry seems to involve. We hear what sounds like familiar strains reaching us from the hermeneutic quarter. The purpose of this essay is to trace to their sources a few of these potentially common themes, to draw out one line of their historical development, and to gather what consequences they inspire for educational practice and continued inquiry.

Mechanistic explanations at work: Accounting for pragmatic considerations in science and philosophy

by Mark Tschaepe

Narrative Explanation

by J. David Velleman

Published in The Philosophical Review (2003). A revised version published as Chapter 7 in How We Get Along.

What is narrative, and how does it explain? What is narrative, and how does it explain?

Emergence, Reduction, and Complexity in Biological Systems

by Kari Theurer

Philosophers of biology have become increasingly interested in complexity-based emergence (CBE). CBE asserts that... more Philosophers of biology have become increasingly interested in complexity-based emergence (CBE). CBE asserts that systemic properties are emergent if they cannot be predicted from behavior of simpler systems. Defenders of CBE claim that their position precludes strong forms of reductive explanation but is compatible with mechanistic explanation. I argue that CBE guarantees that we will see emergence, but at the cost of rendering it trivial. CBE’s success requires ranking systems
consistently with respect to complexity. I show that prominent approaches to complexity cannot be consistently applied to important test cases, and so CBE is incompatible with mechanistic explanation. Mechanists have an implicit commitment to reductionism that precludes them from
embracing CBE. Finally, I establish that even if CBE exists, the reductionist research program remains indispensable: discovery of emergent properties in biological systems first requires an attempt at reduction. Only when reduction fails can positive claims about emergence be made.

Explanation, Causality, and Unification, 11-12 November

by Alexander Gebharter

Report of the workshop "Explanation, Causality, and Unification". Schurz, G. & Gebharter, A. (2012). The Reasoner, 6(1), 9-10.