Experimental philosophy

Misyurov D.A. Dialectical formulas based on the binary notation as the development formulas // Credo New. 2012. №2

by Dmitry Misyurov

The article suggests dialectical formulas based on the binary notation as the development formulas: formula with... more The article suggests dialectical formulas based on the binary notation as the development formulas: formula with dominant and the non-dominant elements; universal formula; formula with symbolic weight of elements; tautological formula. For example, it suggests an opportunity to use the dialectical formulas for modeling and artificial intelligence creation, etc.

Experimenting on Contextualism

by Nat Hansen

Co-authored with Emmanuel Chemla. Forthcoming in Mind & Language.

In this paper we refine the design of context shifting experiments, which play a central role in contextualist... more In this paper we refine the design of context shifting experiments, which play a central role in contextualist debates, and we subject a large number of scenarios involving different types of expressions of interest to contextualists, including ‘know’ and color adjectives like ‘green’, to experimental investigation. Our experiment (i) reveals an effect of changing contexts on the evaluation of uses of the sentences that we examine, thereby overturning the absence of results reported in previous experimental studies (so-called null results), (ii) uncovers evidence for a ‘truth bias’ in favor of positive over negative sentences, and (iii) reveals previously unnoticed distinctions between the strength of the contextual effects displayed by scenarios involving knowledge ascriptions and for scenarios concerning color and other miscellaneous scenarios.

Bad News for Conservatives? Moral Judgments and the 'Dark Triad'Personality Traits: A Correlational Study

by Marcus Arvan

forthcoming in Neuroethics

This study examined correlations between moral value judgments on a 17-item Moral Intuition Survey (MIS), and... more This study examined correlations between moral value judgments on a 17-item Moral Intuition Survey (MIS), and participant scores on the Short-D3 “Dark Triad” Personality Inventory – a measure of three related “dark and socially destructive” personality traits: Machiavellianism, Narcissism, and Psychopathy. 567 participants (302 male, 257 female, 2 transgendered; median age 28) were recruited online through Amazon Mechanical Turk and Yale Experiment Month web advertisements. Different responses to MIS items were initially hypothesized to be “conservative” or “liberal” in line with traditional public divides. Our demographic data confirmed all of these hypothesized categorizations. We then tested two broad, exploratory hypotheses: (H1) the hypothesis that there would be “many” significant correlations between conservative MIS judgments and the Dark Triad, and (H2) the hypothesis that there would be no significant correlations between liberal MIS judgments and Machiavellianism or Psychopathy, but “some” significant correlations between liberal MIS judgments and Narcissism. Because our hypotheses were exploratory and we ran a large number of statistical tests (62 total), we utilized a Bonferroni Correction to set a very high threshold for significance (p=.0008). Our results broadly supported our two hypotheses. We found eleven significant correlations between conservative MIS judgments and the Dark Triad – all at significance level of p<.00001 – and no significant correlations between liberal MIS judgments and the Dark Triad. We believe that these results raise provocative moral questions about the personality bases of moral judgments. In particular, we propose that because the Short-D3 measures three “dark and antisocial” personality traits, our results raise some prima facie worries about the moral justification of some conservative moral judgments.

What symbols

by Dmitry Misyurov

This article contains 12 questions about the symbols. What are your thoughts in response? This article contains 12 questions about the symbols. What are your thoughts in response?

Ethicists' Courtesy at Philosophy Conferences

by Linus (Ta-Lun) Huang

On An Alleged Truth/Falsity Asymmetry in Context Shifting Experiments

by Nat Hansen

Philosophical Quarterly, 2012

Keith DeRose has argued that context shifting experiments should be designed in a specific way in order to accommodate... more Keith DeRose has argued that context shifting experiments should be designed in a specific way in order to accommodate what he calls a ‘truth/falsity asymmetry’. I explain and critique De- Rose’s reasons for proposing this modification to contextualist methodology, drawing on recent experimental studies of DeRose’s bank cases as well as experimental findings about the verification of affirmative and negative statements. While DeRose’s arguments for his particular modification to contextualist methodology fail, the lesson of his proposal is that there is good reason to pay close attention to several subtle aspects of the design of context shifting experiments.

Neuroanthropology or simply anthropology? Going experimental as method, as object of study, and as research aesthetic

by Andreas Roepstorff

Roepstorff, A., & Frith, C. (2012). Neuroanthropology or simply anthropology? Going experimental as method, as object of study, and as research aesthetic. Anthropological Theory, 12(1), 101–111. doi:10.1177/1463499612436467

Neuroanthropology is a new kid on the academic block. It seems to offer a methodological and conceptual synthesis,... more Neuroanthropology is a new kid on the academic block. It seems to offer a methodological and conceptual synthesis, which bridges current fault lines within anthropology, both as discipline and as departments. We are not convinced that it will deliver on these grounds. However, it has the potential to open up novel ways to do and think ‘experimental anthropology’, as a method, as an object of study and as a research aesthetic. This approach, we argue, is probably not neuroanthropological – it may simply be anthropological.

Results of my survey on natural theological arguments

by Helen De Cruz

draft only

What do philosophers think about arguments for the existence of God? To find out, I launched a survey among... more What do philosophers think about arguments for the existence of God? To find out, I launched a survey among professional philosophers. This is a short summary of the results.

Neurosciences et droit pénal : le déterminisme peut-il sauver la conception utilitariste de la peine ?

by Florian Cova

Published in Klesis, issue 21, 2011, pp.33-77.

Greene et Cohen (2004) ont défendu la thèse selon laquelle le développement des neurosciences, en favorisant une... more Greene et Cohen (2004) ont défendu la thèse selon laquelle le développement des neurosciences, en favorisant une vision déterministe de l'action humaine, finira par bouleverser notre conception de la peine et favorisera une conception utilitariste de celle-ci. De façon similaire, Xavier Bébin (2006) a défendu que les découvertes des neurosciences devraient nous conduire à adopter une conception utilitariste de la peine. Dans ce papier, je discute et rejette ces deux arguments, en utilisant des outils tirés de la philosophie, de la philosophie expérimentale, et de la psychologie.

Judgments about moral responsibility and determinism in patients with behavioural variant of frontotemporal dementia: Still compatibilists!

by Florian Cova

Co-authored with Maxime Bertoux, Sacha Bourgeois-Gironde and Bruno Dubois. To appear in Consciousness & Cognition. (This is a draft version. Ask for the final version.)

Do laypeople think that moral responsibility is compatible with determinism? Recently, philosophers and psychologists... more Do laypeople think that moral responsibility is compatible with determinism? Recently, philosophers and psychologists trying to answer this question have found contradictory results: while some experiments reveal people to have compatibilist intuitions, others suggest that people could in fact be incompatibilist. To account for this contradictory answers, Nichols and Knobe (2007) have advanced a ‘performance error model’ according to which people are genuine incompatibilist that are sometimes biased to give compatibilist answers by emotional reactions. To test for this hypothesis, we investigated intuitions about determinism and moral responsibility in patients suffering from behavioural frontotemporal dementia. Patients suffering from bvFTD have impoverished emotional reaction. Thus, the ‘performance error model’ should predict that bvFTD patients will give less compatibilist answers. However, we found that bvFTD patients give answers quite similar to subjects in control group and were mostly compatibilist. Thus, we conclude that the ‘performance error model’ should be abandoned in favour of other available model that best fit our data.

Naturalizing the normative and the bridges between 'is' and 'ought'.

by Katinka Quintelier

co-authored with Dan Fessler; Commentary in Behavioral and Brain Sciences

Elqayam & Evans (E&E) suggest descriptivism as a way to avoid fallacies and research biases. We argue, first,... more Elqayam & Evans (E&E) suggest descriptivism as a way to avoid fallacies and research biases. We argue, first, that descriptive and prescriptive theories might be better off with a closer interaction between “is” and “ought.” Moreover, while we acknowledge the problematic nature of the discussed fallacies and biases, important aspects of research would be lost through a broad application of descriptivism.

A New Hope for Philosophers’ Appeal to Intuition

by Damián Szmuc

Essays in Philosophy: Vol. 13: Iss. 1, Philosophical Methodology.

Some recent researches in experimental philosophy have posed a problem for philosophers’ appeal to intuition... more Some recent researches in experimental philosophy have posed a problem for philosophers’ appeal to intuition (hereinafter referred to as PAI); the aim of this paper is to offer an answer to this challenge. The thesis against PAI implies that, given some experimental results, intuition does not seem to be a reliable
epistemic source, and —more importantly— given the actual state of knowledge about its operation, we do not have sufficient resources to mitigate its errors and thus establish its reliability. That is why PAI is hopeless. Throughout this paper I will defend my own conception of PAI, which I have called the Deliberative
Conception, and consequently, I will defend intersubjective agreement as a means to mitigate PAI errors, offering empirical evidence from recent studies on the Argumentative Theory of Reason that favor the conception I defend here. Finally, I will reply to some objections that might arise against the Deliberative Conception, which will lead me to discuss some metaphilosophical issues that are significantly relevant for the
future of the dispute about the appeal to intuition.

Self-Sacrifice and the Trolley Problem

by Ezio Di Nucci

forthcoming in Philosophical Psychology

Judith Jarvis Thomson has recently proposed a new argument
for the thesis that killing the one in the Trolley... more Judith Jarvis Thomson has recently proposed a new argument
for the thesis that killing the one in the Trolley Problem is not
permissible. Her argument relies on the introduction of a new scenario in which the bystander may also sacrifice herself to save the five. Thomson argues that those not willing to sacrifice themselves if they could may not kill the one to save the five. Bryce Huebner and Marc Hauser have recently put Thomson’s argument to the empirical test by asking people what they should do in the new trilemma case in which they may also sacrifice themselves. They found that the majority judge
that they should either kill the one or sacrifice themselves; Huebner and Hauser argue that those numbers speak against Thomson’s argument. But Thomson’s argument was about the dialectical effect of the new trilemma on the traditional dilemma, rather than about the trilemma itself. Here I present the results of a study in which I asked subjects first what they should do in the trilemma and then what they should do in the traditional Trolley Problem. I found that, if asked first about the trilemma, subjects then have the intuition that killing the one in the
traditional Bystander at the Switch is not permissible – exactly what Thomson’s argument had predicted.

Why shouldn't we be afraid of scepticism about intuitions?

by Péter Hartl

Second Draft,
Talk:
Salzburg Conference for Young Analytic Philosophy 2011
September 8-10, 2011
Department of Philosophy (Humanities) at the University of Salzburg

Do I have more free will than you do?

by Brian Earp

Earp, B. D. (2011). Do I have more free will than you do? An unexpected asymmetry in intuitions about personal freedom. New School Psychology Bulletin, Vol. 9, No. 21, 34-40.

The present research explores the relationship between moral evaluations and intuitions about the causes of human... more The present research explores the relationship between moral evaluations and intuitions about the causes of human behavior, in particular freedom of the will. Two studies test for a self-serving bias in intuitions about free will. Study 1 explores whether individuals may seek to exculpate themselves from wrongdoing by denying free will, while justifying blame of others by endorsing free will. Study 2 explores whether individuals may justify personal failures by denying free will, while taking credit for personal successes by endorsing free will. In neither study do the data show the predicted differences between conditions. However, an unexpected finding is reported. By pooling the data from both experiments and collapsing across conditions, it is shown that participants give greater endorsement of free will whenever actions are described from a first-person, instead of third-person, perspective—a tentative “I have more free will than you do” effect. Possible explanations for these findings are discussed, as are avenues for further research on this topic.

Is Gödel a plagiarist? Building Blocks for a New Experimental Semantics.

by Carlos M. Muñoz-Suárez

DRAFT.

Esperienze, linguaggio, giustificazione. Su "A Manual of Experimental Philosophy" di David Berman

by Daniele Bertini

Giornale di Metafisica, 33(3), 2011.

David Berman's work on experimental philosophy is a defence of a traditional approach to empiricism against both... more David Berman's work on experimental philosophy is a defence of a traditional approach to empiricism against both contemporary rationalism and logico-analytic philosophy. While his approach focuses on empirical evidence in support of theoretical claims, Berman distinguishes his position from the kind of experimentalism recently risen from the analytic world. After having highlighted the merit of Berman's approach to philosophy, I comment on his main views, addressing particularly the relationship between language, intuitions and experience from the standpoint of the epistemological topic of belief justification.

Milleks on sotsiaalse tunnetuse uurimisvaldkonnas tarvis filosoofiat? (Why does social cognition research need philosophy?)

by Vivian Bohl

The aim of the paper is to explain what is and what should be the contribution of philosophy to the social... more
The aim of the paper is to explain what is and what should be the contribution of philosophy to the social cognition research. I refute three popular claims against the necessity of philosophy in scientific research and bring out several ways of how philosophers contribute and should continue to contribute to social cognition research. I clarify the role of thought experiments in studying social cognition and argue that although classical philosophical thought experiments are unsuitable for solving scientific problems in this area, the methods of experimental philosophy should be more widely used for studying folk psychology. I claim that whereas philosophers tend to analyse the research of social cognition in order to make normative claims, there is likewise a need for more elaborate descriptive analysis. I also analyse the possible role of phenomenology in social cognitive research and explain how does the contribution of phenomenology differ from the contribution of nonphenomenological philosophy and what is the potential of phenomenology in social cognition research.

Käesoleva artikli eesmärgiks on selgitada, milline on ja peaks olema filosoofia panus sotsiaalse tunnetuse uurimisvaldkonnas. Vastustades kolme populaarset väidet, mille kohaselt filosoofiat ei ole teaduse tegemiseks tarvis, selgitan, kuidas filosoofid panustavad ning peaksid jätkuvalt panustama sotsiaalse tunnetuse uurimisse. Eraldi käsitlen mõtteliste eksperimentide rolli sotsiaalse tunnetuse uurimisel ning väidan, et kuigi klassikalised filosoofilised mõttelised eksperimendid ei sobi sotsiaalse tunnetuse valdkonna teaduslike probleemide lahendamiseks, tuleks rahvapsühholoogia uurimisel ulatuslikumalt rakendada eksperimentaalfilosoofilisi meetodeid. Väidan, et filosoofid analüüsivad sotsiaalse tunnetuse valdkonnas tehtud uurimistööd enamasti normatiivsetel eesmärkidel, kuid tarvis oleks ka sotsiaalse tunnetuse uurimistöö põhjalikumat deskriptiivset analüüsimist. Käsitlen ka fenomenoloogia võimalikku rolli sotsiaalse tunnetuse valdkonnas, selgitades, mille poolest fenomenoloogia panus erineb mittefenomenoloogilise filosoofia panusest ning milline on fenomenoloogia potentsiaal sotsiaalse tunnetuse uurimisel.

Experimental philosophy and free will

by Tamler Sommers

Studies in the Logic of Explanatory Power

by Jonah N. Schupbach

Human reasoning often involves explanation. In everyday affairs, people reason to hypotheses based on the explanatory... more Human reasoning often involves explanation. In everyday affairs, people reason to hypotheses based on the explanatory power these hypotheses afford; I might, for example, surmise that my toddler has been playing in my office because I judge that this hypothesis delivers a good explanation of the disarranged state of the books on my shelves. But such explanatory reasoning also has relevance far beyond the commonplace. Indeed, explanatory reasoning plays an important role in such varied fields as the sciences, philosophy, theology, medicine, forensics, and law.

This dissertation provides an extended study into the logic of explanatory reasoning via two general questions. First, I approach the question of what exactly we have in mind when we make judgments pertaining to the explanatory power that a hypothesis has over some evidence. This question is important to this study because these are the sorts of judgments that we constantly rely on when we use explanations to reason about the world. Ultimately, I introduce and defend an explication of the concept of explanatory power in the form of a probabilistic measure. This formal explication allows us to articulate precisely some of the various ways in which we might reason explanatorily.

The second question this dissertation examines is whether explanatory reasoning constitutes an epistemically respectable means of gaining knowledge. I defend the following ideas: The probability theory can be used to describe the logic of explanatory reasoning, the normative standard to which such reasoning attains. Explanatory judgments, on the other hand, constitute heuristics that allow us to approximate reasoning in accordance with this logical standard while staying within our human bounds. The most well known model of explanatory reasoning, Inference to the Best Explanation, describes a cogent, nondeductive inference form. And reasoning by Inference to the Best Explanation approximates reasoning directly via the probability theory in the real world. Finally, I respond to some possible objections to my work, and then to some more general, classic criticisms of Inference to the Best Explanation. In the end, this dissertation puts forward a clearer articulation and novel defense of explanatory reasoning. (Successfully defended on June 14, 2011).