Experimental Economics

Does incentive provision increase the quality of peer review? An experimental study

by Flaminio Squazzoni

"Research Policy" 2012, In Press

Although peer review is crucial for innovation and experimental discoveries in science, it is poorly understood in... more Although peer review is crucial for innovation and experimental discoveries in science, it is poorly understood in scientific terms. Discovering its true dynamics and exploring adjustments which improve the commitment of everyone involved could benefit scientific development for all disciplines and consequently increase innovation in the economy and the society. We have reported the results of an innovative experiment developed to model peer review. We demonstrate that offering material rewards to referees tends to decrease the quality and efficiency of the reviewing process. Our findings help to discuss the viability of different options of incentive provision, supporting the idea that journal editors and responsible of research funding agencies should be extremely careful in offering material incentives on reviewing, since these might undermine moral motives which guide referees’ behavior.

The Effects of Fee Imposition on the Efficiency of Resource Utilization: An Experimental Study

by Jon Thor Sturluson

Personal identity: A theoretical and experimental analysis

by Fernando Aguiar

Co-authored with Pablo Brañas, María Paz Espinosa, and Luis Miller; published in `Journal of Economic Methodology´, 2010.

This paper aims to analyze the role of personal identity in altruism. To this end, it starts by reviewing critically... more This paper aims to analyze the role of personal identity in altruism. To this end, it starts by reviewing critically the growing literature on economics and identity. Considering the ambiguities that the concept of social identity poses, our proposal focuses on the concept of personal identity. A formal model to study how personal identity enters in individuals’ utility function when facing a dictator game decision is then presented.
Finally, this ‘identity-based’ utility function is studied experimentally. The experiment allows us to study the main parameters of the model, suggesting that we should move
with caution when attributing identities to individuals.

Does incentive provision increase the quality of peer review? An experimental study

by Giangiacomo Bravo

Authors: Flaminio Squazzoni, Giangiacomo Bravo, Károly Takács
Forthcoming in Research Policy

Although peer review is crucial for innovation and experimental discoveries in science, it is poorly understood in... more Although peer review is crucial for innovation and experimental discoveries in science, it is poorly understood in scientific terms. Discovering its true dynamics and exploring adjustments which improve the commitment of everyone involved could benefit scientific development for all disciplines and consequently increase innovation in the economy and the society. We have reported the results of an innovative experiment developed to model peer review. We demonstrate that offering material rewards to referees tends to decrease the quality and efficiency of the reviewing process. Our findings help to discuss the viability of different options of incentive provision, supporting the idea that journal editors and responsible of research funding agencies should be extremely careful in offering material incentives on reviewing, since these might undermine moral motives which guide referees' behavior.

"Economía psicológica"

by Vicente Caballero de la Torre

Downloads from E-Prints (UCM):
http://eprints.ucm.es/est/index.php?action=show_detail_eprint;id=8511

Robles Rodríguez, Francisco José y Caballero de la Torre, Vicente (2009) Economía Psicológica. In Diccionario crítico de ciencias Sociales. Plaza y Valdés, Madrid-México. IISBN: 978-84-96780-14-9

Sección de libro (book chapter)

Key words:

Gabriel Tarde, Daniel Kahneman, Prospect theory Sección de libro (book chapter)

Key words:

Gabriel Tarde, Daniel Kahneman, Prospect theory

Experimental Comparison of MultiStage and One-Stage Contests

by Roman Sheremeta

CONTEST DESIGN: AN EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATION

by Roman Sheremeta

Experimental comparison of multi-stage and one-stage contests

by Roman Sheremeta

Entry into winner-take-all and proportional-prize contests: An experimental study

by Roman Sheremeta

An Experimental Investigation of Colonel Blotto Games

by Roman Sheremeta

Perfect-Substitutes, Best-Shot, and Weakest-Link Contests between Groups

by Roman Sheremeta

Can groups solve the problem of over-bidding in contests?

by Roman Sheremeta

Simultaneous Decision-Making in Competitive and Cooperative Environments

by Roman Sheremeta

Expenditures and Information Disclosure in Two-Stage Political Contests

by Roman Sheremeta

Endowment effects in contests

by Roman Sheremeta

Endowment Effects in Contests

by Roman Sheremeta

MultiLevel Trust Game with "Insider" Communication

by Roman Sheremeta

A Laboratory Study of a MultiLevel Trust Game with Communication

by Roman Sheremeta

Why a Trade-Off? The Relationship between the External and Internal Validity of Experiments

by Luis Miller

Trust and partner selection in social networks: An experimentally grounded model

by Flaminio Squazzoni

Social Networks, 2012 in Press

This article investigates the importance of the endogenous selection of partners for trust and cooperation in market... more This article investigates the importance of the endogenous selection of partners for trust and cooperation in market exchange situations, where there is information asymmetry between investors and trustees. We created an experimental-data driven agent-based model where the endogenous link between interaction outcome and social structure formation was examined starting from heterogeneous agent behaviour. By testing various social structure configurations, we showed that dynamic networks lead to more cooperation when agents can create more links and reduce exploitation opportunities by free riders. Furthermore, we found that the endogenous network formation was more important for cooperation than the type of network. Our results cast serious doubt about the static view of network structures on cooperation and
can provide new insights into market efficiency.