Evolution of cooperation (Evolutionary Biology)

Appearances can be deceiving: Lessons learned re-implementing Axelrod's' evolutionary approach to norms'

by Jose Manuel Galan

Axelrod's Metanorm Games on Networks

by Jose Manuel Galan

Explaining cooperative groups via social niche construction

by Simon Powers

Social Environment Construction Provides an Adaptive Explanation for New Levels of Individuality

by Simon Powers

The concurrent evolution of cooperation and the population structures that support it

by Simon Powers

"published in Evolution", "2011", "Co-authored with Alexandra S. Penn and Richard A. Watson"

The evolution of cooperation often depends upon population structure, yet nearly all models of cooperation implicitly... more The evolution of cooperation often depends upon population structure, yet nearly all models of cooperation implicitly assume that this structure remains static. This is a simplifying assumption, because most organisms possess genetic traits that affect their population structure to some degree. These traits, such as a group size preference, affect the relatedness of interacting individuals and hence the opportunity for kin or group selection. We argue that models that do not explicitly consider their evolution cannot provide a satisfactory account of the origin of cooperation, because they cannot explain how the prerequisite population structures arise. Here, we consider the concurrent evolution of genetic traits that affect population structure, with those that affect social behavior. We show that not only does population structure drive social evolution, as in previous models, but that the opportunity for cooperation can in turn drive the creation of population structures that support it. This occurs through the generation of linkage disequilibrium between socio-behavioral and population-structuring traits, such that direct kin selection on social behavior creates indirect selection pressure on population structure. We illustrate our argument with a model of the concurrent evolution of group size preference and social behavior.

Social cognition: From behavior-reading to mind-reading

by Alexandra Rosati

Rosati, A.G. & Hare, B. (2010). In: The Encyclopedia of Behavioral Neuroscience (G. Koob, R. F. Thompson, and M. Le Moal, eds.)

The social world has long been thought to be a major force shaping primate cognition: the social lives of primates are... more The social world has long been thought to be a major force shaping primate cognition: the social lives of primates are thought to be sufficiently complex to have acted
as a driving force in primate cognitive evolution. This basic thesis – that the sophisticated cognitive abilities of primates have evolved for a social function – has spurred experimental and theoretical investigations for over 40 years. In this article, we highlight a selection of complex behaviors that primates exhibit when interacting with others, with special attention to the cognitive mechanisms supporting those behaviors. Fundamental to the study of comparative cognition is the idea that many species may exhibit behaviors that appear similar, even though the psychology underlying those behaviors may differ across taxa. This distinction highlights the importance of thinking about primate social interactions not only in the context of behavioral evolution – the special things that primates (and humans) do – but also in terms of cognitive evolution – the special ways that primates think. We use this framework to analyze primate social behavior, and the differing psychologies underlying this behavior, in three areas: gaze-following, food competition, and mutualistic cooperation. The ultimate challenge of such analyses will be to understand why such different cognitive mechanisms have evolved across species.

An experimental study of social selection and frequency of interaction in linguistic diversity

by Gareth Roberts

Language and the freerider problem: An experimental paradigm

by Gareth Roberts

On equilibrium properties of evolutionary multiplayer games with random payoff matrices

by The Anh Han

co-authored with A. Traulsen and C. S. Gokhale.
Journal of Theoretical Population Biology (in press)

The analysis of equilibrium points in biological dynamical systems has been of great interest in a variety of... more The analysis of equilibrium points in biological dynamical systems has been of great interest in a variety of mathematical approaches to biology, such as population genetics, theoretical ecology or evolutionary game theory. The maximal number of equilibria and their classification based on stability have been the primary subjects of these studies, for example in the context of two-player games with multiple strategies. Herein, we address a different question using evolutionary game theory as a tool. If the payoff matrices are drawn randomly from an arbitrary distribution, what are the probabilities of observing a certain number of (stable) equilibria? We extend the domain of previous results for the two-player framework, which corresponds to a single diploid locus in population genetics, by addressing the full complexity of multi-player games with multiple strategies. In closing, we discuss an application and illustrate how previous results on the number of equilibria, such as the famous Feldman–Karlin conjecture on the maximal number of isolated fixed points in a viability selection model, can be obtained as special cases of our results based on multi-player evolutionary games. We also show how the probability of realizing a certain number of equilibria changes as we increase the number of players and number of strategies.

Biological Fatalism: The Politics of (De)Naturalising Conflict and (De)Problematising Cooperation

by Adam Goodwin

Draft only. Currently re-working for publication.

This paper aims to critique the naturalizing function of realist thought, especially in its newest... more This paper aims to critique the naturalizing function of realist thought, especially in its newest incarnation—biological realism. In doing so, it will also offer an alternative perspective of how naturalizing behaviour counterintuitive to realist thought may affect world politics. Exploring and grounding our origins, whether it be through older theological origin myths or newer biological evolutionary theory, has played a key role to understanding our nature (Dupré, 2003). Many authors have worked to legitimate this exploratory enterprise with scientific approaches (See Gat ,2009; Thayer, 2000, 2004; Shaw and Wong, 1985a; Fukuyama ,1999), including anthropology, and the biosciences. However, their use of these scientific fields is limited and fails to acknowledge alternative perspectives and general critiques. There is also a dangerous political element in the attempt to naturalise certain human behaviour—in terms of realism, it indelibly affects policy through the perfusion of academically-derived assumptions among policy makers and the general public (Freyberg-Inan, 2004). I introduce Kropotkin‟s Mutual Aid Theory (Kropotkin, 1902) as constituting the heart of dissenting views to counter this realist trend to naturalise aggression. Mutual Aid Theory, if accepted as political „commonsense‟ as realism has come to be, offers a radically different perspective to engage with/against politics.

Intention Recognition, Commitment, and The Evolution of Cooperation.

by The Anh Han

Co-authored with L. M. Pereira and F. C. Santos.
In Proceedings of the 2012 IEEE Congress on Evolutionary Computation (CEC 2012), IEEE Press, Brisbane, Australia.

Individuals make commitments towards others in order to influence others to behave in certain ways. Most commitments... more Individuals make commitments towards others in order to influence others to behave in certain ways. Most commitments may depend on some incentive that is required to ensure that the action is in the agent's best interest and thus, should be carried out to avoid eventual penalties. Similarly, individuals may ground their decision on an accurate assessment of the intentions of others. Hence, both commitments and intention recognition go side by side in behavioral evolution. Here, we analyze the role played by the co-evolution of intention recognition plus the emergence of commitments, in the framework of the evolution of cooperative behavior. We resort to tools of evolutionary game theory in finite populations, showing how the combination of these two aspects of human behavior can enhance the emergent fraction of cooperative acts under a broad spectrum of configurations.

Punishment and cooperation in nature

by Nichola Raihani

Female cleaner fish cooperate more with unfamiliar males

by Nichola Raihani

Probabilistic participation in public goods games

by Tatsuya Sasaki

Replicator dynamics in public goods games with reward funds

by Tatsuya Sasaki

Co-authored with Tatsuo Unemi (Soka Univ., Japan); preprint; published in 'Journal of Theoretical Biology', 2011

Which punishment or rewards are most effective at maintaining cooperation in public goods interactions and deterring... more Which punishment or rewards are most effective at maintaining cooperation in public goods interactions and deterring defectors who are willing to freeload on others’ contribution? The sanction system is itself a public good and can cause problematic “second-order free riders” who do not contribute to the provisions of the sanctions and thus may subvert the cooperation supported by sanctioning. Recent studies have shown that public goods games with punishment can lead to a coercion-based regime if participation in the game is optional. Here, we reveal that even with compulsory participation, rewards can maintain cooperation within an infinitely large population. We consider three strategies for players in a standard public goods game: to be a cooperator or a defector in a standard public goods game, or to be a rewarder who contributes to the public good and to a fund that rewards players who contribute during the game. Cooperators do not contribute to the reward fund and are therefore classified as second-order free riders. The replicator dynamics for the three strategies exhibit a rock-scissors-paper cycle, and can be analyzed fully, despite the fact that the expected payoffs are nonlinear. The model does not require repeated interaction, spatial structure, group selection, or reputation. We also discuss a simple method for second-order sanctions, which can lead to a globally stable state where 100% of the population are rewarders.

Suicide Bombings, weddings, and prison tattoos: An evolutionary perspective on subjective commitment and objective commitment

by Katinka Quintelier

Fessler D.M.T., Quintelier K. (in press). Suicide Bombings, weddings, and prison tattoos: An evolutionary perspective on subjective commitment and objective commitment. In Cooperation and its Evolution, Vol. 2: Agents and Mechanisms, K. Sterelny, R. Joyce, B. Calcott, and B. Fraser, Eds. MIT Press.

Reply to Henrich et al.: Behavioral variation needs to be quantified at multiple levels

by Shakti Lamba

Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (2012)

The take-it-or-leave-it option allows small penalties to overcome social dilemmas

by Tatsuya Sasaki

Co-authored with Åke Brännström, Ulf Dieckmann, and Karl Sigmund
Published in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA, 2012

Self-interest frequently causes individuals engaged in joint enterprises to choose actions that are counterproductive.... more Self-interest frequently causes individuals engaged in joint enterprises to choose actions that are counterproductive. Free-riders can invade a society of cooperators, causing a tragedy of the commons. Such social dilemmas can be overcome by positive or negative incentives. Even though an incentive-providing institution may protect a cooperative society from invasion by free-riders, it cannot always convert a society of free-riders to cooperation. In the latter case, both norms, cooperation and defection, are stable: To avoid a collapse to full defection, cooperators must be sufficiently numerous initially. A society of free-riders is then caught in a social trap, and the institution is unable to provide an escape, except at a high, possibly prohibitive cost. Here, we analyze the interplay of (a) incentives provided by institutions and (b) the effects of voluntary participation. We show that this combination fundamentally improves the efficiency of incentives. In particular, optional participation allows institutions punishing free-riders to overcome the social dilemma at a much lower cost, and to promote a globally stable regime of cooperation. This removes the social trap and implies that whenever a society of cooperators cannot be invaded by free-riders, it will necessarily become established in the long run, through social learning, irrespective of the initial number of cooperators. We also demonstrate that punishing provides a “lighter touch” than rewarding, guaranteeing full cooperation at considerably lower cost.

Predators promote defence of rhizosphere bacterial populations by selective feeding on non-toxic cheaters

by Alexandre Jousset

The Adaptive Problem of Absent Third-Party Punishment

by Gordon Ingram

Ingram, G. P. D., Piazza, J. R., & Bering, J. M. (2009). The adaptive problem of absent third-party punishment. . In H. Høgh-Olesen, P. Bertelsen, & J. Tønnesvang (Eds.), Human characteristics: Evolutionary perspectives on human mind and kind (pp. 205–229). Newcastle-upon-Tyne, UK: Cambridge Scholars.

Language is a uniquely human behaviour, which has presented unique adaptive problems. Prominent among these is the... more Language is a uniquely human behaviour, which has presented unique adaptive problems. Prominent among these is the transmission of information that may affect an individual’s reputation. The possibility of punishment of those with a low reputation by absent third parties has created a selective pressure on human beings that is not shared by any other species. This has led to the evolution of unique cognitive structures that are capable of handling such a novel adaptive challenge. One of these, we argue, is the propositional theory of mind, which enables individuals to model, and potentially manipulate, their own reputation in the minds of other group members, by representing the beliefs that others have about the first party’s intentions and actions. Support for our theoretical model is provided by an observational study on tattling in two preschools, and an experimental study of giving under threat of gossip in a dictator game.