European Security and Defence Policy

EU Defence Policy after Chicago: Going Smart?

by Alessandro Giovannini

CEPS Commentary, Co-authored with Giovanni Faleg

ublished on the eve of the NATO Summit in Chicago (May 20-21), this CEPS Commentary analyses the impact of the summit... more ublished on the eve of the NATO Summit in Chicago (May 20-21), this CEPS Commentary analyses the impact of the summit and the Smart Defence agenda on the European Union’s defence policy. Will the EU follow NATO and go ‘smart’? The authors point out that the NATO agenda provides indeed a unique chance for the EU to make unprecedented progress on pooling and sharing. They outline a three-part road map to rationalise the EU defence market and put the Union back on track as a credible and capable security provider. The Commentary also stresses that complementarity between the NATO and EU agenda is all important to achieve long-term change.

This Commentary draws on the authors’ more detailed analysis presented in a CEPS Special Report, “EU between pooling & sharing and smart defence: Making a virtue of necessity?”, May 2012 (http://www.ceps.eu/book/eu-between-pooling-sharing-and-smart-defence-making-virtue-necessity).

Between knowledge and power: epistemic communities and the emergence of security sector reform in the EU security architecture

by Giovanni Faleg

published in European Security (Routledge), 2012

This article provides a theoretically informed analysis to understand why and how security sector reform (SSR) norms... more This article provides a theoretically informed analysis to understand why and how security sector reform (SSR) norms have been integrated into the European Union (EU) security architecture. It investigates the role of epistemic communities in advancing the security-development/good governance agenda underpinning SSR and in fostering institutional learning. Shared knowledge and expertise have driven policy and institutional change, since they yielded a new policy consensus that transformed the EU's approach to security in the post-cold war international system. Empirical findings, based on content analysis and on 25+ semi-structured interviews, suggest that transnational expertise-based networks did play a leading role in shaping SSR conceptual development. However, they also show that cleavages between epistemic communities across the security/development dividing line are ultimately responsible for the EU's failure to achieve a coherent SSR policy implementation. Moreover, the article concludes that the institutionalisation of SSR in the EU did not originate in a single norm setter, nor in sheer ideational stimulus. Change occurred through the complex interplay between ideas and interests, that is between knowledge and power, leading specific norms to be visualised as consensual and dominant.

European Security: The End of Architecture and the New NATO (Paul Cornish) Özetleyen Rıza GÜLER

by Rıza Güler

Bu makale; soğuk savaş dönemi sonrasında Avrupa Güvenliği kapsamında tartışma ve müzakerelerin odağında bulunan NATO,... more Bu makale; soğuk savaş dönemi sonrasında Avrupa Güvenliği kapsamında tartışma ve müzakerelerin odağında bulunan NATO, AB ve BAB kuruluşlarının işlevlerini ve bunlar arasında değişen ilişkileri incelemektedir.

European Security in the 21st Century

by Ben Tonra

The European security environment which prevails in the early 21st century has evolved over more than twenty years.... more The European security environment which prevails in the early 21st century has evolved over more than twenty years. This paper identifies the major underlying characteristics of the current security order. It examines the origins of the system, identifies some of the major conceptual debates associated with the recent evolution, describes the multilateral institutional framework and, finally, comments on the contribution of Ireland.

Nato Smart Defence: Smart Defence Starts with Common Goals

by Tabish Shah

Peer-review op-ed article published in Atlantic Community (April 2012)

NATO’s Smart Defense initiative requires more than simply technological projects. The success of Smart Defense relies... more NATO’s Smart Defense initiative requires more than simply technological projects. The success of Smart Defense relies on NATO finding common strategic goals before Members are willing to come together and pool and share their military resources.

The EU between pooling & sharing and smart defence: making a virtue o necessity?

by Alessandro Giovannini

co-authored with Giovanni Faleg, CEPS Special Report

The financial crisis has deeply affected European defence budgets and, as a consequence, the EU’s capability to act as... more The financial crisis has deeply affected European defence budgets and, as a consequence, the EU’s capability to act as a provider of global security. This paper assesses the extent to which pooling & sharing (P&S) of military capabilities is a viable plan to boost collective capacity-building and offset the heavy budget cut-backs, drawing impetus from the NATO ‘smart defence’ agenda. Although multilateral cooperation is proven more efficient than the status quo through the lens of economics, and a set of external stimuli would facilitate deeper military integration, the paper acknowledges that a fully-fledged EU defence market remains difficult to attain due to short-term political and strategic considerations. However, piecemeal progress in specific areas is possible and viable, if political conditions are met. The last section of the paper offers some policy recommendations towards a pragmatic and feasible roadmap for P&S.

The Greek Defence Industry: From Pious Hope to Hard Realities: A Survey

by Apostolos Rafailidis

6th Annual Middlesex Conference on Economics and Security, London, UK 21st – 22nd June 2002
co-authored with Christos Kollias

Greece yearly allocates a substantial part of its national income to defence. Its defence burden is the highest among... more Greece yearly allocates a substantial part of its national income to defence. Its defence burden is the highest among EU and NATO members. Greek military spending has continuously exhibited a steady upward trend. During the post-bipolar era, while most countries have reduced their defence budgets, Greek military spending has grown in real terms by about 35% while, the corresponding change for total EU and NATO military expenditure was –12% and –23.4% respectively. For military hardware, Greece relies almost exclusively on imports. According to SIPRI data during 1996-2000 Greece ranked as the seventh importer of major conventional weapons in the world. Its total imports for this period amounted to about $3665 millions. In the past the development of an indigenous arms production capability was seen as an important step towards achieving a minimum degree military of self sufficiency and thus reduce its dependence on external suppliers of military hardware. The driving forces behind this policy of import substitution were a) the arms embargo during the military dictatorship and b) the fact that Greek defence planners felt that in case of an arms confrontation with Turkey (its mainly rival but at the same time NATO ally) Greece could not rely on its arms suppliers (mainly the USA and West European countries) and that it could be faced with a slow down in equipment and spare parts thus hindering its military effort. A number of industries were thus set up. They were mostly joint ventures between the Greek state and foreign arms producing companies. Most prominent cases were the Hellenic Aerospace Industry (EAB), the Hellenic Arms Industry (EBO), the Hellenic Vehicle Industry (ELBO). About three decades after the original ambitious plans, Greece has achieved a limited degree of import substitution in weapons requirements in such areas as ammunition, portable infantry weapons, jeeps and trucks, APCs and IFVs, and in airplane and helicopter maintenance. These however represent only a small proportion of the needs in military hardware. The majority of weapons systems are still imported including fighter planes, MBTs, helicopters, naval units, electronic equipment etc. All of which are of crucial determinants of the fighting capability of the Greek armed forces. Similarly, plans for extensive co-production agreements have not fully materialized while export performance has at best been limited. Currently the Greek defence industry is comprised of about 80 companies with a yearly turnover of more than 1,4 bn.€ and employing more than 16200 people. Most of the major indigenous military producers have for a number of years been facing important problems, of both financial and technological nature.
This paper attempts to address some important questions concerning the Greek arms industry. For example, why has Greece, despite its importance as a major importer and, until recently, the favourable conditions in the global defence market (the huge downturn that has however started to reverse during the last two years) not been able to succeed in its import substitution policy in defence procurement and thus effectively supporting the indigenous defence industry? Why do foreign firms have to look for capable local partners each time a Greek defence program is executed, and not vice versa? That is, why are Greek firms not capable of searching for, and assembling, industrial groups of local and foreign firms, in order to pursue the opportunities that appear in the local defence market? The paper surveys the Greek defence industry and its development over the last decades and discusses the options available to it in order to overcome its current problems. Emphasis is placed upon the technological capabilities of the local firms and upon the role that the defence procurement process can possibly play in augmenting these, so as to embed Greece in the current techno – economic paradigm.

Integrated Project for the Exergy and Sustainable Development: From the Knowledge Based Eco/Bio-Economy and Digital Business Eco/Bio-Systems Toward the Necessary Synergy According to the Gap(s) Between the Actual Knowledge Society and the 'Next' Consciousness Society By the Generosity - Creativity - Solidarity Triad Versus a Spirit of Integrity, Humility, Patience and Love

by Andrés Ginestet

a joint study integrated in complexity theory terms

The content of this study comprises pluri /inter/ trans /co /cross-disciplinarily challenge and approaches and a... more The content of this study comprises pluri /inter/ trans /co /cross-disciplinarily challenge and approaches and a consequent open invitation addressed to the worldwide scientific community to receive all these associable nuclei of knowledge (as entitled), to meditate/analyze, and to decide if the co-participation to the represented here enlarging/new subdomain(s) efforts would be a possible next step within the next horizon of the specific research topics from/between/beyond the contemporary Sciences. So, regarding the understanding and explanation for the Knowledge Society alongside to these efforts, the co-authors affirm and focalize upon a subdomain of an enlarged intersection between the Generosity – Creativity – Solidarity Triad and the dual merging construct: Knowledge Based Eco/Bio-Economy and Digital Business Eco/Bio-systems. This enlarging subdomain efforts belong to the Generosity – Creativity – Solidarity Consortium - as a 2008-2012 active interdisciplinary presence - and is connected to the homonymous project G_C_S KBEBE & DBEBS. There is a beneficed impact within the contemporary problems related to the contemporary Sciences. Now, the entire team of the project (at this stage - 14 - university, NGO and academic partners from UK, Ireland, The Netherlands, Italy, Germany, Poland, Hungary, Philippines and Romania) will focalize the research according to the openness of the international scientific community toward the multi-thematic domain of the Knowledge-Based Eco/Bio-Economy (KBEBE) versus the increasing potential of the Digital Business Eco/Bio-systems (DBEBS), from the and on the broader issues of the UN Millennium Goal and of the Lisbon Strategy for Growth and Jobs: Europe 2020.

Les armées d'Europe face aux défis capacitaires et technologiques

by Alain De Neve

L'Agence européenne de défense et la coopération dans le domaine capacitaire

by Alain De Neve

A survey of the Greek defence industry

by Apostolos Rafailidis

Defence and Peace Economics, vol. 14(4), pp. 311 – 324, Aug. 2003
co-authored with Christos Kollias

Greece yearly allocates a substantial part of its national income to defence and its defence burden is the highest... more Greece yearly allocates a substantial part of its national income to defence and its defence burden is the highest among EU and NATO members. To meet the demand for military hardware it relies almost exclusively on imports, ranking among the largest conventional arms importers in the world. Despite efforts to develop a domestic defence industry, indigenous production only covers a limited proportion of Greece's demand for military equipment. The majority of weapons, including sophisticated and technologically advanced systems, are imported from the major arms producers. This paper critically surveys the Greek defence industrial base, its structure and recent performance, and assesses its future options.

Technology Strategy and Defense Industry: an evolutionary approach

by Apostolos Rafailidis

1st International Conference on Defense, Security and Economic Development in the Balkans and Eastern Mediterranean, Technological Education Institute of Larissa, Greece 22 – 24 June 2001
co-authored with Giannis Tselekidis

In the E.U. regulations there are no constraints concerning government policies for the support and ... more In the E.U. regulations there are no constraints concerning government policies for the support and  development  of  national  defence  industry,  very  much  unlike  what  is  true  for  the  civilian  sector.
Consequently, defence industry may constitute for E.U. member countries the main area in which gov-ernment technology policy can play a significantly discriminant role.
Defence industry can constitute a tool for the development of the critical mass of a country’s technological capabilities, both with defence and civilian applications.
In the Greek case, two more facts need to be taken into account: (a) the country’ s defence ex-penditures are significant, rendering the country a major international player and, (b) many of the exist-ing  domestic  high  technology  firms  are  also  active  in  the  defence  market  (or  were  indeed  established
targeting at this market at the first place).
However, considering the efforts of the: (a) E.U. to establish a Common Foreign and Security Policy  and,  (b)  Western  European  Union  for  the  consolidation  of  the  Western  European  Armaments Group, it seems that the possibility of local governments to pursue an active national technology poli-cy,  through  the  support  of  the  defence  industry,  may  diminish  in  the  future.  Thus,  the  time  to  act  is now.
In the authors’ view, given the limited technological capabilities of Greece, a technology poli-cy  should  be  formulated  around  international  defence  cooperation  programs.  The  ultimate  purpose  of participating  in  such  programs  should  be  the  transfer  and  assimilation  of  essential  and  fundamental
technological and organizational capabilities and skills. The ultimate goal is the leverage of the coun-try’ s technological capabilities, through diffusion.
If the country is to become truly integrated into the international industrial complex (deep in-tegration),  and  move  away  of  the  role  of  the,  often  uninformed,  customer  (shallow  integration),  it should pursue the fastest technological accumulation possible. The aim should be, on the one hand, the closure of the technological gap separating it from other countries and, on the other, the preparation for the next techno – economic paradigm so that it will have the capacity: (a) to recognize it early on and,
(b) become part of it on better terms, when international firms, in their pursuit of faster growth and de-velopment, will be seeking true partners.

Offsets as a Technology Strategy Tool: technology transfer through cooperation in Greece

by Apostolos Rafailidis

2nd International Conference on Defence, Security and Economic Development, Technological Education Institute of Larissa, Greece 18 – 20 June 2004

Industrial Participation (IP) appears to be gradually replacing offsets as a term in the literature referring to... more Industrial Participation (IP) appears to be gradually replacing offsets as a term in the literature referring to defence procurement. IP implies some sort of industrial cooperation between buyer and supplier of defence equipment, while at the same time technology transfer  is often thought as the most suitable and acceptable tool of IP. The first part of this paper is an effort to define technology transfer, through the study of concepts like technology, know – how, know – why, knowledge, technological accumulation and learning. The main point made is that the study of the results of technology transfer offsets should also include “soft” parameters, and mainly the learning achieved on the part of the buyer. Following this logic, the second part of the paper presents some empirical evidence from firms of the Greek defence industry. The focus is on some of the factors that may affect the success of technological learning through cooperation agreements. More specifically, 31 cases of technological cooperation involving technology transfer to and from these firms are examined in respect to: (a) their longevity, (b) their complexity, (c) the technological distance between the partners and, (d) the technological and other motives and goals driving Greek firms. It is thought that these are four of the parameters that have an immediate effect on the success of the technology transfer process.

Четыре измерения украинской интеграции в Европу

by Andreas Umland

Geopolitika [Центр геополитических исследований, Вильнюс, Литва]. 2011. 19 мая.

Die europäischen Sanktionen gegen den Iran 2010. Wie effektiv können sie sein?

by Sebastian Levi

** published in German language** Hausarbeit 2010

Die Europäische Union erließ 2010 neue Sanktionen gegen den Iran, um ihn zu einem Einlenken im Atomkonflikt zu... more Die Europäische Union erließ 2010 neue Sanktionen gegen den Iran, um ihn zu einem Einlenken im Atomkonflikt zu bewegen. Diese Hausarbeit untersucht diese Sanktionen auf ihre voraussichtliche Wirksamkeit unter einer neo-realistischen Perspektive. Unter Berufung auf empirische Erfolgsindikatoren und inhaltliche Abwägung messe ich die voraussichtliche Effektivität mittels vier Indikatoren: 1. Geschlossenheit der EULänder,2. der wirtschaftlichen Kosten der Sanktionen für die EU selbst, 3. der wirtschaftliche Schaden für den Iran und 4. den Auswirkungen des erlassen Waffenembargos. Dabei stellt sich heraus, dass die Kosten der Iran Sanktionen für die EU im Vergleich zu anderen Sanktionen zwar beträchtlich sind, aber dennoch keinen größeren wirtschaftlichen Schaden verursachen. Auch die suboptimale Geschlossenheit wird, begünstigt durch die Struktur der EU, die Sanktionen nicht gefährden, auch wenn es beunruhigende Uneinigkeiten zwischen den Mitgliedsländern gibt. Die Auswirkungen auf den Iran sind – gemessen an den Möglichkeiten der EU – groß, jedoch existieren ungenutzte Möglichkeiten und Ausweichmöglichkeiten für Teheran. Die Effektivität lässt sich als tendenziell positiv bewerten, jedoch kommt es nun darauf an, dass die EU in weiteren Sanktionen die noch ungenutzten Potentiale nutzt, um Verhandlungsdruck
aufzubauen und dafür wichtige Partner, wie die USA, China und Russland gewinnt.

The Future of Energy Security in Southeastern Europe and the Establishment of the Greek EEZ

by Zenonas Tziarras

Published on Strategy International, 17/12/2011

The EU between "pooling & sharing" and “smart defence”: making a virtue of necessity?

by Giovanni Faleg

CEPS Special Report, May 2012, co-authored with Alessandro Giovannini. Available from: http://www.ceps.eu/book/eu-between-pooling-sharing-and-smart-defence-making-virtue-necessity

The financial crisis has deeply affected European defence budgets and, as a consequence, the EU’s capability to act as... more The financial crisis has deeply affected European defence budgets and, as a consequence, the EU’s capability to act as a provider of global security. This paper assesses the extent to which pooling & sharing (P&S) of military capabilities is a viable plan to boost collective capacity-building and offset the heavy budget cut-backs, drawing impetus from the NATO ‘smart defence’ agenda. Although multilateral cooperation is proven more efficient than the status quo through the lens of economics, and a set of external stimuli would facilitate deeper military integration, the paper acknowledges that a fully-fledged EU defence market remains difficult to attain due to short-term political and strategic considerations. However, piecemeal progress in specific areas is possible and viable, if political conditions are met. The last section of the paper offers some policy recommendations towards a pragmatic and feasible roadmap for P&S.

'Les Anglo Saxons', FIG and the rival Conceptions of'advanced'Armaments Research and Development Co-operation in Western Europe, 1956-1958

by Mervyn O'Driscoll

European Defence Autonomy: An Inevitable Illusion

by Kenneth Payne

New order. Changing the guard in Kosovo

by Sven Gunnar Simonsen

[On Kosovo’s security sector]
Published in Jane's Intelligence Review, No. 4, 2009 (April), pp. 24-27.