Las cuatro crisis de la Unión Europea
en Manuela Mesa (Coord.), Cambio de ciclo: crisis, resistencias y respuestas globales. Anuario CEIPAZ 2012-2013, Madrid, CEIPAZ, ISSN 2174-3665, pp. 51-83
La Unión Europea (UE) se encuentra en las horas más bajas de su historia, en una “crisis existencial” que pone en... more
La Unión Europea (UE) se encuentra en las horas más bajas de su historia, en una “crisis existencial” que pone en cuestión su racionalidad, legitimidad, relevancia y viabilidad. Esa crisis afecta al menos a cuatro dimensiones substantivas del proyecto europeo:
- La primera se refiere a la UE como proyecto económico capaz de promover la estabilidad, el crecimiento y la competitividad internacional, generado empleo y bienestar a través, primordialmente, de la experiencia más avanzada del mundo de integración económica.
- La segunda dimensión alude a la UE como experiencia federal y modelo político singular de gobernanza democrática cosmopolita y redefinición “federalizante” de la soberanía, la democracia y la ciudadanía más allá del tradicional Estado-nación.
- La tercera se refiere a la “Europa social” y al papel de la UE como mecanismo de solidaridad transnacional, a través de las políticas de cohesión económica, social y territorial.
- Finalmente, la cuarta dimensión se refiere a su papel como actor global en un sistema internacional caracterizado por rápidos e intensos procesos de cambio de poder.
Este trabajo examina los dilemas que la Unión enfrenta en cada una de estas cuatro dimensiones, que se relacionan con desafíos externos y en particular con los procesos de globalización y de cambio de poder a escala mundial, así como con sus limitaciones internas en el plano político e institucional. La resolución de esos dilemas pueden llevar a la Unión a tres posibles escenarios: uno, la paulatina renacionalización de la política y la economía, sobre la falsa premisa del control nacional; dos, la conversión de la moneda única y las instituciones de la UE en un mecanismo disciplinario al servicio de los mercados financieros, fracturando el binomio disciplina-solidaridad que ha caracterizado históricamente el proyecto europeo; o bien, como tercer escenario posible, la redefinición de la UE como proyecto de gobernanza efectiva de la globalización, garantizando la cohesión y la solidaridad intraeuropea.
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Seen by:Fixed Exchange Rates and Optimum Currency Areas: Lessons for the EMU
Undergraduate Honor's Thesis, January 2010
This project, inspired by two essays written for papers at Oxford University, discusses fixed and floating... more
This project, inspired by two essays written for papers at Oxford University, discusses fixed and floating exchange rates and single/optimal currency areas. Drawing on examples from history, the project focuses on European countries and periods of history when these countries participated in fixed exchange rate policy, floating exchange rate policy, and most recently, with the instigation of the Eurozone, a single currency area. The paper discusses Mundell’s four criteria for optimal currency areas, and whether or not the European Monetary Union (EMU) is an optimal currency area, or if fixed or floating exchange rates were a better option for the European Nations.
It then examines three different “classifications” of European nations not in the EMU. Fixed exchange rates and single currency areas work best among similarly economically developed countries (which is one reason why the EMU has been so successful over the past 15 years). First, I will discuss why Great Britain, a country as economically developed as the current EMU countries has not joined the EMU, and whether or not it would be beneficial for Britain to do so. In the next category, are the less economically developed countries of Eastern Europe. Within the past two to three years, a few Eastern European countries have either joined (e.g. Bulgaria) the EMU or have begun the process to join. These countries are drastically less developed than the major Western European countries. Thus, their individual success in the EMU will be uncertain, as will their affect on the EMU as a whole. I will discuss current EMU policy on allowing these countries to join (such as having these countries tie their currencies to the Euro—joining the ERM II, and ensuring that inflation remains extremely low within these countries for a number of years), and the effects of their entrance into the EMU. Lastly, I will discuss the allowance of Eurasian countries such as Turkey into the EMU. While Turkey is (partially) on the European continent, its economy effectively behaves more like an Asian country than a European one. Yet, it has begun the process to join the EMU in hopes of achieving not only economic growth, but also viability on the world stage.
100 views
Seen by:History repeating itself: from the Argentine default to the Greek tragedy?
Co-authored with Daniel Gros and Cinzia Alcidi
Since the onset of the debt crisis in late 2009, the comparisons between Greece and Argentina have multiplied, with an... more Since the onset of the debt crisis in late 2009, the comparisons between Greece and Argentina have multiplied, with an emphasis more on the similarities than the differences. This is not surprising given the stunning parallels. This Commentary draws a systematic comparison between the two countries over the decade before the crisis and the management of the crisis. Overall it suggests that there may be little left for Greece to do to avoid a repeat of the Argentine default, but on a larger scale.
The EFSF as European Monetary Fund: Does it have enough resources
Co-authored with Daniel Gros
In the immediate aftermath of yesterday’s European Council’s decision to effectively transform the European Financial... more In the immediate aftermath of yesterday’s European Council’s decision to effectively transform the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) into a European Monetary Fund, this CEPS Commentary explores whether the EFSF has enough resources to become a credible deterrent against a recurrence of the recent turbulences in the euro area sovereign debt markets. The authors argue that an increase in lending capacity of the EFSF, which has been agreed politically but has not yet been fully ratified, is urgently needed. Moreover, they warn that even the ‘full’ EFSF of €440 billion would quickly reach its limits should Portugal and Ireland not be able to regain market access soon.
“Economist or Monetarist ? The difficult creation of an internal French consensus about European monetary integration (1974-1976)”
L’opposition entre la stratégie dite « économiste » et celle dite « monétariste » a dominé les débats sur l’Union... more
L’opposition entre la stratégie dite « économiste » et celle dite « monétariste » a dominé les débats sur l’Union économique et monétaire (UEM) dans les années 1970. Basé sur les archives gouvernementales et présidentielles françaises, ainsi que sur les archives de la Communauté économique européenne (CEE), cet article vise à illustrer cette dichotomie par l’exemple de la politique économique et monétaire française entre 1974 et 1976.
Cet article revient d’abord sur ce que signifient les stratégies diamétralement opposées appelées « économiste » et « monétariste. » Ensuite, la tentative de relancer la construction monétaire de l’Europe, faite par le biais du mémorandum Fourcade, d’inspiration plutôt monétariste, sera analysée en détail. Enfin il s’agira d’analyser les politiques économiques menées par le gouvernement français pendant cette période. Celles-ci, loin de soutenir les engagements européens de la France, ont plutôt souligné les contradictions internes du gouvernement français en matière de politique monétaire, et ont in fine conditionné l’échec des propositions de relance durant cette période, émanant pourtant de ce même gouvernement.
Les banquiers centraux de l'échec du plan Werner à la création du SME, 1974-1979 / Central bankers from the failure of the Werner Plan to the creation of the EMS, 1974-1979
This article focuses on the role of central bankers in European monetary cooperation, from the failure of the Werner... more
This article focuses on the role of central bankers in European monetary cooperation, from the failure of the Werner Plan to the creation of the European Monetary System (EMS). The role of central bankers in the run-up to the EMS is usually seen as limited: the main feature of the EMS negotiations was that the French president Valéry Giscard d'Estaing and the German chancellor Helmut Schmidt tried to bypass central bankers in order to reach an agreement to which they were otherwise opposed. Based on extensive research in British, French, German and EEC archives, this article stresses instead the continuum of cooperation, the progressive formation of a consensus around the Bundesbank interpretation of monetary policy, and the importance of seeing central bankers as members of a wider transnational monetary elite.
Cet article analyse le rôle des banquiers centraux dans la coopération monétaire européenne, de l'échec du plan Werner à la création du Système monétaire européen (SME). Le rôle des banquiers centraux dans les négociations du SME est généralement considéré comme mineur: la principale caractéristique des négociations de 1978 fut en effet l'effort du président français Valéry Giscard d'Estaing et du chancelier allemand Helmut Schmidt pour éviter les banquiers centraux, prévoyant leur opposition au projet franco-allemand. Utilisant des archives allemandes, britanniques, françaises et communautaires, cet article insiste plutôt sur la continuité de la coopération entre banquiers centraux durant la seconde moitié des années 1970, la formation progressive d'un consensus autour de la position de la Bundesbank, et souligne combien les banquiers centraux sont insérés dans une élite monétaire plus large incluant conseillers économiques et ministres des finances.
Forecasting Eu-Romania Trade By Gravity Analysis
Co-authored with Anna Maria Ferragina and Giorgia Giovannetti,
Romanian Journal of Economic Forecasting, 2005, 6(4): 83-93.
This paper attempts to forecast EU-Romania trade using the gravity approach developed in Ferragina, Giovannetti and... more This paper attempts to forecast EU-Romania trade using the gravity approach developed in Ferragina, Giovannetti and Pastore (2005). The trade potential of Romania with five EU members (France, Germany, Italy, Spain and UK) is computed using an “out-of-sample” methodology for the period 1995-‘01. The coefficients are taken from panel estimators of the gravity equation relative to intra-EU15 trade. The analysis suggests the existence of an important unexploited trade potential with Romania, which, nonetheless, is not much greater in size than that of the new EU members of Eastern Europe. The potential to actual trade ratio ranges from 2.2 to 2.7 and is sharply declining, suggesting that further dramatic economic integration is to be expected in the near future. Romania’s accession is likely to further push the process of economic integration.
Rationality within Reach? On Functional Differentiation as the Structural Foundation of Legitimacy in European Chemicals Regulation
European University Institute Department of Law Working Paper No. 2007/18
This paper analyses the potential legitimacy basis of REACH, the new regulatory system for the EU chemicals market. This paper analyses the potential legitimacy basis of REACH, the new regulatory system for the EU chemicals market.
Unleasing the Potential of the European Economy: Value proposition for Enterprise Interoperability
Liapis, A. (2008) "Unleasing the Potential of the European Economy: Value proposition for Enterprise Interoperability", European Commission, Brussels, Belgium
ICT is the innovation engine that will continue to drive growth and value for the next ten years. Already today more... more
ICT is the innovation engine that will continue to drive growth and value for the next ten years. Already today more than 90% innovations in the automotive sector, in logistics, and in medical technologies are based on ICT. We are living through a transition from single to integrated systems and linearity to complexity brought about by the convergence of players, technology strategies, and business models across a complex world.'
Today, over 1 billion people use the Internet - 250 million in the European Union alone. The immense growth of the Internet and the increasing use of information and communication technologies (ICT) in business and industry have made the Internet a critical infrastructure for all organisations. What we now call the Web 2.0 – a Web focused around user generated content and social networking using strangely named techniques such as wikis, mashups, APIs, widgets and tagging – has led to new uses of the Internet and new business opportunities.
What a difference from ten years ago! In 1997 landline telephony was still dominant, the state- monopolies were undergoing painful transitions, mobile phones were still novelties and the Internet was only just opening up to dot com services.
Business has changed as well. Economies of scale can now reach world wide, allowing firms to tap into the narrowest parts of the long tail of demand. Creating value now means continuous innovation and mass customisation: we are all unique and we want goods and services to match our individuality.
In the fast moving, global and internetworked context, we want total interoperability; this is not just a matter of interconnection of software applications, but a matter of freedom to choose the best technology, avoiding vendor lock-in situations. A new approach is needed to make interoperability for networked organisations across multiple industries something that is simple, affordable, accessible and reliable – interoperability must be universal (infrastructural offerings that are open and utility-based), conditional (business model specific offerings that are customised and protect the proprietary assets of business), and testable, measurable and verifiable. Enterprise Interoperability means combining technology and business approaches to catalyze and sustain radical innovations, added value for enterprises and customer value.
Enterprise Interoperability research is needed to support this vision of an open and borderless economy. Progress has been strong. Research activities, some funded by the European Commission, have created technologies, frameworks and specifications for interoperability. But, technical progress is not enough. 'The competitiveness of European enterprises calls for effective transfer of new ideas into applications in the real economy.
A clear vision of ICT interoperability for enterprises will not only catalyse innovation but help to demonstrate its value for enterprises. A solid business case for interoperability would be enormously helpful, especially for SMEs in the decision to take up ICT. It will help new forms of business collaboration to emerge and show how these could create innovative business models and value added services.
Quality matters. Italy's intra-industry trade with Eastern Europe over the years 19881995
Co-authored with Anna Maria Ferragina,
Studi Economici, 60(84/3): 97-119.
This paper studies the main changes observed over the period 1988-1995 in the Italian trade with several Central and... more This paper studies the main changes observed over the period 1988-1995 in the Italian trade with several Central and Eastern European (CEE) economies. The analysis is carried out using several methods. The first method consists of calculating the weight and the evolution of high and low quality intra-industry trade. The second method consists of looking at the features assumed by the trade reorientation using a Constant Market Share Analysis, able to break down the growth in CEE exports to Italy into a “demand” and a “competitiveness” share. Once verified the dominance of the latter, the paper tests by means of regression analysis to what extent the increased competitiveness has been determined by increased price competitiveness (term of trade effect) as opposed to quality upgrading. No evidence is found of the latter. A test of the employment effects associated with different sources of trade with the CEECs confirms the importance of monitoring the evolution of vertical and horizontal intra-industry trade and its impact on the adjustment process.
32 views
Seen by:Integrating an international political economy dimension into European integration history: the challenges of the 1970s
Journal of European Integration History, volume 17, n°2, pp.335-341
For anyone interested in international political economy (IPE), the fact that European integration is embedded in... more For anyone interested in international political economy (IPE), the fact that European integration is embedded in global influences is, arguably, a given. Economic and monetary phenomena do not really know borders – or at least not in the same way as other fields of foreign policy and cooperation do. As a consequence, taking into account the global context in the study of European developments largely goes without saying. Talking of European monetary cooperation without mentioning the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system, explaining various European monetary policies without mentioning the influence of Milton Friedman and the Chicago school, or the US administration’s “neglect” of the dollar in the late 1970s, would be fairly pointless. To put it the other way around: had the US been more amenable to aligning its eco- nomic and monetary policy with the German one, the European Monetary System (EMS) would probably not have been created. Keeping this in mind, this article will briefly set out the state of the field, outline some of the problems/methodological challenges to historical research on the 1970s and finally sketch some potential re- search directions.
Entrepreneurship, small and medium size business markets and European economic integration
A. Samitas, D. Kenourgios (2005) “Entrepreneurship, Small and Medium Size Business Markets and European Integration”, Journal of Policy Modeling, Vol. 27(3), pp. 363-374.
Industry and Economy in Europe - Risks and Uncertainties in a Global Environment
The question of industry in Europe necessarily proceeds from the problem of aggregation. This is the problem of... more
The question of industry in Europe necessarily proceeds from the problem of aggregation. This is the problem of defining the subject area. One could refer to European Community (E.C.) industrial and competition policy, stressing commonalities and convergence. Or one could analyse business and industrial structures, emphasising difference and divergence. The analytical focus must, however, proceed further than this and examine the globalisation of economic relations, of trade and of investment. The principal agents in this globalisation are the transnational corporations (TNC’s). These TNC’s seek to exploit their international monopoly power to subvert the national controls of individual governments, fashioning an international division of labour in their own image. The question of industry in Europe must be located and defined within this globalised economic and political environment. Most importantly, the globalisation of economic relations puts a question mark against the notion of a ‘European’ identity as such and hence against the rationale of an E.C. industrial policy. If, as shall be argued, a strong industrial base is the condition of a strong domestic economy, and if this industrial base requires an active, interventionist policy apparatus, then great problems can be identified in E.C. policy with respect to the globalisation of economic relations. For the Single European Market (S.E.M.) is directly contrary to industrial policy (Sawyer 1992). Far from being a coherent response to the process of globalisation, the S.E.M. is an integral part of that very process (Grahl and Teague 1990:58/9).
The argument presented in this thesis is that Europe requires a common regulatory framework in order to preserve and develop its technological and competitive edge and secure a strong manufacturing base. However, in pursuing market integration before social and political integration, the S.E.M. programme has effectively conceded power and responsibility to private enterprise and private control. In the context of globalisation, these market forces reinforce the power of the TNC’s. The problem is that these TNC’s possess global rather than European priorities. As a result, any industrial policy that may be formulated lacks a policy apparatus. An industrial policy for Europe could not be implemented even if the political will for the creation of such a policy existed (Tsoukalis 1993:113 117 335).
25 views
Seen by:An Inference About Relation Between Evolution Of The EU Political Structure and The EU Budget
by Mirac Yazici
draft only
In this article, some inferences are made about evolution of European Union’s political structure by analysing Member... more In this article, some inferences are made about evolution of European Union’s political structure by analysing Member States’ General Government Expenditures, Annual Gross Domestic Productions, EU budget amounts and EU Annual Gross Domestic Productions. EU’s political structure tendance is tested in a fiscal aspect. It is determined that EU’s political structure will remain a confederal ‘United Europe of States’ rather than transforming to a federal ‘United States of Europe’ in the medium-term.
9 views
Seen by:Agency Work – from Marginalisation towards Acceptance? Agency work in EU Social and Employment Policy
published in German Law Journal, Volume 5, issue 10 (2004)
The article traces the development of agency work under EU labour law, considering the tension between internal market... more The article traces the development of agency work under EU labour law, considering the tension between internal market regulation (calling for freedom to provide the service of hiring workers out across borders) and employee rights (requiring regulation of these services). It identifies a three different regulatory approaches for the phenomenon: restricting agency work to exceptional situations, requiring agencies to provide workers with an unlimited employment contract and collectively agreed wages and requiring user firms to treat agency workers equally with main workers. Following that, it demonstrates that the Works Agency Directive oscillates between these approaches, and establishes the hypothesis that this will lead to difficulties implementing the directive. The implementation in Germany is used as a case study for demonstrating that these difficulties are most likely overcome through sacrificing workers' protection.
