Ethics of Belief

I'm in Love! I'm a Believer!: Structures of Belief in Jonathan Glazer's Birth

by Christine Evans

Evidentialism as Buck-Passing

by Kurt Sylvan

Draft only. Comments appreciated.

I argue that evidentialism can and should be framed as a second-order normative account in the same genre as the... more I argue that evidentialism can and should be framed as a second-order normative account in the same genre as the buck-passing account of value—i.e., as a theory of how normative facts of one type are grounded in normative facts of another. So understood, it can remain an interesting theory and help the cause of Reasons Basicness, the view that reasons are normatively fundamental. Not so understood, it is either false, trivial, or explanatorily idle. Having made these points in §2 and §3, I ask in §4 what it takes to support and to challenge evidentialism. Both take more than many assume, I argue. This has an important corollary. Setting aside hybrid theories, as in Comesaña (2010) and Goldman (2011), evidentialism sans phrase is often treated as a potential rival to reliabilism sans phrase. Even this treatment is, I argue, wrong. These views can conflict no more than a buck-passing account of value can conflict with a hedonist account of value.

Do I have more free will than you do?

by Brian Earp

Earp, B. D. (2011). Do I have more free will than you do? An unexpected asymmetry in intuitions about personal freedom. New School Psychology Bulletin, Vol. 9, No. 21, 34-40.

The present research explores the relationship between moral evaluations and intuitions about the causes of human... more The present research explores the relationship between moral evaluations and intuitions about the causes of human behavior, in particular freedom of the will. Two studies test for a self-serving bias in intuitions about free will. Study 1 explores whether individuals may seek to exculpate themselves from wrongdoing by denying free will, while justifying blame of others by endorsing free will. Study 2 explores whether individuals may justify personal failures by denying free will, while taking credit for personal successes by endorsing free will. In neither study do the data show the predicted differences between conditions. However, an unexpected finding is reported. By pooling the data from both experiments and collapsing across conditions, it is shown that participants give greater endorsement of free will whenever actions are described from a first-person, instead of third-person, perspective—a tentative “I have more free will than you do” effect. Possible explanations for these findings are discussed, as are avenues for further research on this topic.

Cultures of meta-cognition: developing an anthropological theory of belief

by Jonathan Mair

Paper given at the Goldsmith's anthropology seminar, 7 December 2011.

A Note on Practical Knowledge

by J. David Velleman

Unpublished: do not cite or quote.

Wendy, Michael, and John fly off to Neverland; skeptics stay at home with Nana. Wendy, Michael, and John fly off to Neverland; skeptics stay at home with Nana.

On the Aim of Belief

by J. David Velleman

Originally Published in The Possibility of Practical Reason (2000), online in the SPO Monograph Series.

How belief aims at the truth How belief aims at the truth

Nothing but the Truth: On the Norms and Aims of Belief

by Daniel Whiting

To appear in The Aim of Belief, edited by Timothy Chan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, Forthcoming).

That truth provides the standard for believing appears to be a platitude, one which dovetails with the idea that in... more That truth provides the standard for believing appears to be a platitude, one which dovetails with the idea that in some sense belief aims only at the truth. In recent years, however, an increasing number of prominent philosophers have suggested that knowledge provides the standard for believing, and so that belief aims only at knowledge. In this paper, I examine the considerations which have been put forward in support of this suggestion, considerations relating to lottery beliefs, Moorean beliefs, the criticism and defence of belief, and the value of knowledge. I argue that those considerations do not give us reason to give up the truth view in favour of the knowledge view and, moreover, that reflection on those considerations gives us some reason to reject the knowledge view. Thus, I conclude, we can continue to take the apparent platitude at face value.

Doxastic Deliberation

by J. David Velleman

Co-authored with Nishi Shah. Published in the Philosophical Review (2005)

Elaborates on Shah's expressivist theory of belief, by arguing for the possibility of deliberating about what to believe Elaborates on Shah's expressivist theory of belief, by arguing for the possibility of deliberating about what to believe

Communication and the construction of knowledge or transmission of belief: The role of conversation type and behavioral style

by Charis Psaltis

Psaltis, C. (2005). Communication and the construction of knowledge or transmission of belief:  The role of conversation type and behavioral style. Studies in Communication Sciences, 5, 209-228.

In this paper it is proposed that a central topic of inquiry in the study of social knowledge should be the... more In this paper it is proposed that a central topic of inquiry in the study of social knowledge should be the clarification of the conditions of communication that are likely to lead to the attainment of knowledge rather than to the transmission of belief. Insights and empirical evidence from social developmental psychology are presented that shed light on this issue. It is argued that social relations established between the partners in communication in the form of different conversation types are differentially linked to representations of an object based on the construction of new knowledge or transmission of beliefs. A central mechanism that constrains or enables the establishment of particular conversation types is social recognition, as this is manifested in different behavioural styles in communication.

International collaboration as construction of knowledge and its constraints.

by Charis Psaltis

Psaltis, C. (2007) International collaboration as construction of knowledge and its constraints. Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science, 41, 187-197.

In this paper I draw on Piaget and Habermas to underline the importance of the theoretical distinction between social... more In this paper I draw on Piaget and Habermas to underline the importance of the theoretical distinction between social relations of constraint and social relations of cooperation for reflecting upon inter-institutional projects. I argue that the socio-cultural approach to collaboration has some important limitations that restrict ideological critic and emancipatory research. The limitations of this approach can be located in its epistemological assumptions, a homogenized notion of culture and a weakness in articulating the intrapersonal, inter-personal, inter-group/positional and social representational/ideological levels of analysis. As an empirical example of this I discuss the SLOAN centres for family research.

Should I Believe the Truth?

by Daniel Whiting

dialectica (2010) 61: 213-224.

Many philosophers hold that a general norm of truth governs the attitude of believing. In a recent and influential... more Many philosophers hold that a general norm of truth governs the attitude of believing. In a recent and influential discussion, Krister Bykvist and Anandi Hattiangadi raise a number of serious objections to this view. In this paper, I concede that Bykvist and Hattiangadi's criticisms might be effective against the formulation of the norm of truth that they consider, but suggest that an alternative is available. After outlining that alternative, I argue that it is not vulnerable to objections parallel to those Bykvist and Hattiangadi advance, although it might initially appear to be. In closing, I consider what bearing the preceding discussion has on important questions concerning the natures of believing and of truth.

Does Belief Aim (Only) at the Truth?

by Daniel Whiting

Forthcoming in Pacific Philosophical Quarterly (2012).

It is common to hear talk of the aim of belief and to find philosophers appealing to that aim for numerous explanatory... more It is common to hear talk of the aim of belief and to find philosophers appealing to that aim for numerous explanatory purposes. What belief’s aim explains depends, of course, on what that aim is. Many hold that it is somehow related to truth, but there are various ways in which one might specify belief’s aim using the notion of truth. In this paper, by considering whether they can account for belief’s standard of correctness and the epistemic norms governing belief, I argue against certain prominent specifications of belief’s aim given in terms of truth and advance a neglected alternative.

Deciding to believe again

by Keith Frankish

Published in *Mind* 116 (463), 523-548, 2007

This paper defends direct activism—the view that it is possible to form beliefs in a causally direct way. In... more This paper defends direct activism—the view that it is possible to form beliefs in a causally direct way. In particular, it addresses the charge that direct activism entails voluntarism—the thesis that we can form beliefs at will. It distinguishes weak and strong varieties of voluntarism and argues that, although direct activism may entail the weak variety, it does not entail the strong one. The paper goes on to argue that strong voluntarism is non-contingently false, sketching a new argument for that conclusion. This argument does not tell against the weak form of voluntarism, however, and the final part of the paper argues that weak voluntarism, and consequently direct activism, remains a coherent and defensible position.

On pragmatic ethics of belief

by Andrés Pereyra Rabanal

Draft only

William James and W.K. Clifford on the ethics of belief William James and W.K. Clifford on the ethics of belief

Can science tell us what's objectively true?

by Brian Earp

Earp, B. D. (2011). Can science tell us what’s objectively true? The New Collection, Vol. 6., No. 1, 1-9. Featured article in the graduate journal of New College, Oxford.

Can science tell us what’s objectively true? Or is it merely a clever way to cure doubt – to give us something to... more Can science tell us what’s objectively true? Or is it merely a clever way to cure doubt – to give us something to believe in, whether it’s true or not? In this essay, I look at the pragmatist account of science expounded by Charles Sanders Peirce in his 1877 essay, ‘The Fixation of Belief’. Against Peirce, I argue that science does not come naturally to our species, nor does the doubting open-mindedness upon which its practice relies. To the extent that science is successful in ‘curing’ doubt, it’s because it tracks the real state of the world; and I argue that Peirce himself – his pragmatist narrative notwithstanding – is implicitly committed to this view as well.

How to Justify a Cliffordian Ethics of Belief (DRAFT)

by Benjamin Yelle

Draft only

This paper offers a novel deontological account of how one ought to justify a Cliffordian Ethics of Belief. Clifford’s... more This paper offers a novel deontological account of how one ought to justify a Cliffordian Ethics of Belief. Clifford’s seminal “The Ethics of Belief”, and its famous slogan “It is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything on insufficient evidence,” is often justified in two ways. First, believing something on insufficient evidence may be wrong because of the harmful consequences which nonevidential belief formation leads to. Second, nonevidential belief formation may be wrong because it violates some particular moral principle, value, or duty. Unfortunately, Clifford’s arguments in support of his principle are unclear in that they appeal to the disvalue of nonevidential belief formation while also holding that the consequences of one’s so believing are irrelevant to the wrongness of that belief. However, even if one is inclined to forgive or explain away Clifford’s lack of clarity, both consequentialist and deontic justifications of his principle face certain difficulties. This paper examines these difficulties and the viability of different solutions to them, culminating in a deontic justification of Clifford’s Principle that, I believe, is the most successful in addressing these difficulties, and as such offers a strong argument for the moral impermissibility of nonevidential belief-formation. I begin by considering several criticisms of Clifford’s Principle understood consequentially offered by Susan Haack that I believe are quite incisive and damaging to such approaches. Accordingly, I turn to a direct response to Haack, Melissa Bergeron’s nonconsequentialist reading of Clifford, which, while avoiding Haack’s more damaging criticisms, is not without its own problems. An appreciation of these problems leads to my own deontic justification of Clifford’s principle that is based on the value placed on one’s becoming and remaining autonomous. This is both a more stable justification than Bergeron’s account offers and avoids some of its counterintuitive implications.