Desacuerdo sin reconciliacion: democracia, igualdad y la esfera pública (2012)
Debate Feminista, Año 23, No. 1, México, 2012, pp. 41-59
Nancy Fraser alega que la esfera pública nunca estuvo a la altura del supuesto de igualdad irrestricta previsto por... more Nancy Fraser alega que la esfera pública nunca estuvo a la altura del supuesto de igualdad irrestricta previsto por Arendt y Habermas. También sostiene que la igualdad socioeconómica es una condición necesaria para que haya una esfera pública genuinamente democrática. Esto es problemático, pero no porque la igualdad sea un objetivo cuestionable sino porque se la asocia con narrativas clásicas de la emancipación y por ende con un ethos de la reconciliación, al menos de manera implícita. La alternativa que propongo consiste en pensar el espacio público a partir de un ethos de la polémica y en usar dos criterios para enmarcar su relación con la igualdad. Uno de ellos es que el espacio público surge a través de polémicas en torno al estatus de lo dado. Estas ponen a prueba la frontera entre lo público y lo privado y muy a menudo la reconfigura. El otro criterio es que la igualdad es siempre una igualdad disputada y por venir. Esto no se debe a que la igualdad sea una mera presencia diferida —una igualdad ideal que aún no ha arribado— sino a que no puede tener un punto final: el problema de la igualdad vuelve a aparecer cada vez que hay un intento por verificarla.
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Seen by:Addendum - More Seminal Ethics Implications
by Mark Singer
Tandem works include: "Seminal Ethics," "Kant Concept Art," "More Seminal Ethics Implications" - also on this site.
This paper includes the "Possibility Implications" of the Kantian, Machiavellian, and Nietzschean Ethical Standards.
Equality and the Rule of Law in Classical Athens
by Paul Gowder
In this paper, I defend three claims.
First, contra some classicists and legal historians, classical... more
In this paper, I defend three claims.
First, contra some classicists and legal historians, classical Athens during the democratic period substantially satisfied the demands of the rule of law (excepting its treatment of women, noncitizens, and slaves). I show that arguments to the contrary mostly represent an unduly narrow conception of what might count as law in Athens, one that inappropriately excludes common-knowledge social customs.
Second, Athenians saw the rule of law as serving the equality of mass and elite, oligarchs and democrats: there was no contradiction (again contra some classicists) between the democratic power of the masses and the rule of law. This equality consisted in two topoi frequently deployed in the Athenian legal and social discourse. First is the respect topos, according to which the laws represent respect for the democratic polis. To disregard them is to reveal one's lack of respect for the polis and one’s oligarchic character. Second is the strength topos, according to which the laws are the way that the democratic polis exercises its power: weak members of the masses cannot stand up to strong members of the elite alone, they need the backing of the whole community, and that backing is coordinated through the law; to undermine the law is thereby to undermine the political power of the masses.
Third, this connection between equality and the rule of law explains the most striking fact about Athenian legality, to wit, the otherwise puzzling effectiveness of the amnesty enacted for crimes committed under the Thirty Tyrants. The strength topos explains why the democrats in Athens refrained from avenging themselves against the Thirty despite their opportunity to do so: by doing so, they would have undermined the law, and thereby their own equality. The strength topos led the Athenians to take the internal point of view on the law.
The account of the rule of law deployed in this paper is that developed in my Equality Under the (Rule of) Law, also available here. This paper serves the function, in part, of demonstrating the cross-cultural applicability of the conception of the rule of law developed in that paper.
¿Derechos sin Liberalismo? El Individualismo y la Igualdad formal en el actual sistema de derechos
Published in “Artificium” Revista Iberoamericana de Estudios Culturales y Análisis Conceptual. Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana, México, Año 1, Vol 2.
El siguiente documento presenta una interrogante sobre la plausibilidad de las relaciones de interdependencia... more El siguiente documento presenta una interrogante sobre la plausibilidad de las relaciones de interdependencia usualmente establecidas entre el liberalismo y los derechos a la luz de los desarrollos producidos por el sistema de derechos (humanos, fundamentales) en las últimas décadas. Se centra el análisis en dos puntos: (i) una concepción individualista de los derechos y (ii) la defensa de la igualdad formal. Pareciera ser que el sistema de derechos (humanos, fundamentales) actualmente se ha desligado de la doctrina liberal para enfrentar variadas de las problemáticas que encontramos en las sociedades contemporáneas como la situación de grupos desaventajados y la protección del medio ambiente. Se concluye que la pregunta no es vana como tampoco lo es el imaginar a los derechos (humanos, fundamentales) de otra manera, emancipados de la doctrina liberal.
Pauline Universalism: Anachronism or Reality?
Published in Journal of Asia Adventist Seminary 14.1 (2011): 65-‐‑77
Are we able to attribute a modern concept such as universalism (in the sense of the opposite to particularism) to Paul... more Are we able to attribute a modern concept such as universalism (in the sense of the opposite to particularism) to Paul in the formation of his communities, or is such an idea hopelessly anachronistic? This paper suggests that although Paul’s universalism does not fully conform to modern definitions, there is a universalistic dimension to his formation of the ἐκκλησία that was radical within his own culture in both Jewish and Hellenistic terms. Nevertheless, there were some first-century social and philosophical currents that would have provided some implicit support for his application of universalistic principles. However, the roots of Paul’s approach are to be found not so much in Hellenistic philosophical currents, but rather in his understanding of divine convenantal condescension. These considerations allow us some insights to understanding the status of different genders, ethnicities, and socio-economic classes in the Pauline communities.
More Seminal Ethics Implications
by Mark Singer
Tandem works include: "Seminal Ethics," "Kant Concept Art," "Addendum - More Seminal Ethics Implications" - also on this site.
These implications are: moral, epistemology, love, happiness, time and space, psychological, art, education, medical, economic, war, capital punishment, and abortion.
"Addendum - More Seminal Ethics Implications" includes additional categories.
A Defence of Democratic Egalitarianism
by Sagar Sanyal
Journal of Philosophy; forthcoming
This is a constructive response to a 2008 article by Kok-Chor Tan. It outlines a version of democratic egalitarianism... more This is a constructive response to a 2008 article by Kok-Chor Tan. It outlines a version of democratic egalitarianism to complement, rather than compete against, luck egalitarianism. The concepts of autonomy and domination are used to elaborate democratic equality, and I suggest a broadening in the understandings of distributive justice; of why distributive justice matters; and of the concepts of grounding and substantive principles (in relation to distributive justice).
A distinction within egalitarianism
by Alan Carter
There are two different ways in which an egalitarian might evaluate momentary distributions. This suggests two... more There are two different ways in which an egalitarian might evaluate momentary distributions. This suggests two different egalitarian theories, with each theory focusing upon a different value. However, there may well be reason for refusing to make a choice between these theories, and recognizing both values, instead. But this would suggest that egalitarianism may be more pluralist than has generally been presupposed.
Visibility and Voice in Organisations: Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgendered Employee Networks
by Fiona Colgan
co-authored with Aidan McKearney
Purpose - This paper considers organisation and union lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgendered (LGBT) networks and... more
Purpose - This paper considers organisation and union lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgendered (LGBT) networks and groups in the U.K. The paper explores the rationale for establishing LGBT trade union and company networks and examines the ways in which they can facilitate employee visibility and voice for LGBT organisational members.
Design/methodology/approach - Primary Research took place during a two-year period 2004-2006. The fieldwork involved in-depth interviews with 149 lesbian, gay and bisexual (LGB) employees and 55 management, trade union and LGB group representatives within 14 case study organisations across public, private and voluntary sectors.
Findings - The research highlights the pivotal role played by LGBT employees in driving, establishing and sustaining organisation and union networks. Findings indicate that LGBT company employee networks and LGBT union groups were highly valued by most LGB respondents as important support mechanisms and as a potential vehicle for encouraging and facilitating LGB voice and involvement. Employers and trade unions supported the development of networks and there was broad recognition of the organisational benefits that such diversity networks offered.
Practical implications - This paper provides important insights into the rationale for and potential benefits of LGBT company networks and union groups. These insights are of practical assistance to practitioners, employees and others involved in the equality and diversity management arena.
Originality/value - Despite the growing number of British based organisations which have established LGBT company networks, there has been little research or inquiry aimed at evaluating how such groups work. The research addresses this gap by focusing on organisations which are perceived as ‘good practice employers’.
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Seen by:Rescuing the Middle Ground: neoliberalism and associational socialism
by Luke Martell
This paper replies to Peter Saunders' critique of my 'New ideas of socialism' andtakes the debate further by... more This paper replies to Peter Saunders' critique of my 'New ideas of socialism' andtakes the debate further by clarifying my advocacy of 'associational socialism' andmaking a more general critique of neo-liberalism. The combination of decentraliz-ation and co-operative co-ordination envisaged in the idea of ‘associationalism' isdefended and clarified. It is argued that repression is not necessarily inherent insocialist ends. Libertarians are seen to be poor liberals with a limited andunambitious concept of freedom which focuses on the dangers of state power butglosses over economic and social threats to liberty. It is argued that socialismshould be about balancing liberal and socialist principles rather than opting for oneside over the other
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The Strange History of Charter-Like Claims Against Legislated Government Services Under the Human Rights Codes in Canada
by Claire Mumme
*Note: A fuller version of this paper will appear in the next volume of the Journal of Law and Equality’s special issue on the Tranchemontagne decision.
In Tranchemontagne v. Ontario (Director, Disability Support Program), the Ontario Court of Appeal entered onto the... more
In Tranchemontagne v. Ontario (Director, Disability Support Program), the Ontario Court of Appeal entered onto the most recent battleground in the world of statutory human rights law: a challenge to the content of a statutorily-created government program under the auspices of the Human Rights Code instead of under section 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. In recent years government services claims under the Codes, of the sort exemplified by Tranchemontagne, have gained increasing visibility. In government services claims a challenge is brought under the Human Rights Codes to the substantive content of a statute that creates a government program, or discretionary decision-making under the statute’s terms.
These claims are almost identical to ones that would otherwise be brought under the section 15(1) constitutional equality provision, and the Codes provide an almost identical remedy. They do so in a much more accessible manner, because the Tribunals are faster and less expensive. And it can be argued, the analytical framework for determining a violation of the Human Rights Codes is significantly friendlier to claimants than is the constitutional test. A government service claim under the Codes thus allows claimants to effectively bypass a constitutional claim altogether. The availability of the lower burden of proof and the more accessible human rights framework is under increasing pressure, however. Government lawyers have recently begun arguing, as they did in Tranchemontagne 2, that the same jurisprudential test ought to apply under the Codes and under the Charter. But, as this article will seek to demonstrate, the relatively straightforward question of which jurisprudential standard should apply masks the complicated history of the role of statutory government services claims within Canadian equality law
In this paper I explore the history of government services claims under the Human Rights Codes and their relationship to Bill of Rights and Charter equality claims. I argue that, much like section 15(1) claims, there is a tension in statutory government services claims between the courts’ ability to sit in judgment over the political decisions of elected officials, and the need for counter-majoritarian protection against state decisions that violate fundamental rights. Yet, as the history presented here demonstrates, this tension has not been explicitly examined in regards to the Codes the way it has been in regards to Charter claims. It is for this reason, I argue, that the issue is now starting to creep towards the surface in the current debate over the appropriate jurisprudential standard in government services cases under the Codes. Indeed, at the core of the recent trend towards merging the constitutional and statutory standards appears to be a growing judicial unease over the differences between private and public sector discrimination
Citizenship without Respect: The EU's Troubled Equality Ideal
Jean Monnet Working Paper (NYU Law School) No. 08/10 http://centers.law.nyu.edu/jeanmonnet/papers/10/100801.html
The European Union suffers from an empty formalistic reading of the principle of equality when dealing with situations... more The European Union suffers from an empty formalistic reading of the principle of equality when dealing with situations where different legal orders legitimately compete, aspiring to regulate the condition of the same persons in the same circumstances. Consequently, equality before the law is not safeguarded in the Union, and a radical reform of the procedural reading of the principle of equality is required. Most importantly, to live up to being a true principle of EU law, equality in the EU needs to acquire a substantive component which is entirely missing at the moment. This paper looks at the procedural vistas informing the ECJ’s attempts to address the EU’s fundamental problems through the redefinition of the scope ratione materiae of EU law following the introduction of Union citizenship, only to find the outcomes of such efforts inadequate and potentially dangerous for the rule of law in Europe. It is suggested that a substantive approach to equality could be employed instead, and that the idea of respect, lying just as equality itself, at the core of the notion of citizenship – and the law as such – could supply the missing core of the equality principle, providing the much-needed cure for some crucial deficiencies of EU law as it currently stands.
Book Review: Helen Meenan (ed.), 'Equality Law in an Enlarged European Unoin: Understanding the Article 13 Directives'
20 European Journal of International Law 2, 2009
A positive review of an solid publication A positive review of an solid publication
Ius Tractum of Many Faces: European Citizenship and the Difficult Relationship Between Status and Rights
15 Columbia Journal of European Law 2, 2009, pp. 169–237.
The citizenship of the European Union is a rare example of a "fundamental status" which is entirely... more The citizenship of the European Union is a rare example of a "fundamental status" which is entirely dependent on the specific features of the bearer, instead of vice versa, making any appeal to equality between European citizens impossible. Based on an overview of the legal essence and functioning of European citizenship both as a legal status and a bundle of rights, this paper provides a critical analysis of the current development of the European citizenship concept vis-a-vis both citizens and third-country nationals in the EU and addresses key issues which will have to be resolved to create a truly meaningful citizenship in Europe. The deficiencies of European citizenship are too important to resolve them rhetorically by appeals to the interplay between different legal orders in Europe. Sooner or later the outstanding problems will have to be addressed in a constructive way. The EU does not need a citizenship of unequals by law.
New governance for higher education institutions, prospects for female university careers and equality law
This is a co-authored paper (with A. Kirschbaum, who is the second author), published in A. Numhauser-Henning (ed) Women in academia and equality law: aiming high - falling short? Klwer 2006
The Fundamental Blaberon: The Incommensurability of Freedom, Equality, and Democracy
by Matthew Cole
Unpublished, 2009
In each revolution, “the walls are destroyed, but architectural model is not deconstructed.”[2] The question therefore... more In each revolution, “the walls are destroyed, but architectural model is not deconstructed.”[2] The question therefore arises: how to deconstruct the model? To address the question of politics is to explore the potential for deconstruction within the concepts of freedom, equality, democracy and revolution itself. In doing so, we will explicate the aporiatic problems inherent in the structure of sovereignty qua democracy and equality qua freedom. The sovereignty of the people is contingent upon the double coupling of “freedom and equality” with “equality according to number and equality according to worth.”[3] This double couple forms the basis for the dominant class to deny politics, to deny the difference in class, to deny the common, and to deny the incommensurable. The structure of this politics is based on a wrong that finds itself buried in the very foundations of democratic society.
