Epistemic Value

Knowledge: Value on the Cheap

by Benjamin Jarvis

Fourthcoming in Australasian Journal of Philosophy
Co-authored with J. Adam Carter and Katherine Rubin

We argue that the so-called ‘Primary’ and ‘Secondary’ Value Problems for knowledge are more easily solved than is... more We argue that the so-called ‘Primary’ and ‘Secondary’ Value Problems for knowledge are more easily solved than is widely appreciated. Pritchard, for instance, has suggested that only virtue-theoretic accounts have any hopes of adequately addressing these problems. By contrast, we argue that accounts of knowledge that are sensitive to the Gettier problem are able to overcome these challenges. To first approximation, the Primary Value Problem is a problem of understanding how the property of being knowledge confers more epistemic value on a belief than the property of being true. The Secondary Value is a problem of understanding how, for instance, property of being knowledge confers more epistemic value on a belief than the property of being jointly true and justified. We argue that attending to the fact that beliefs are ongoing states reveals that there is no difficulty in appreciating how knowledge might ordinarily have more epistemic value than mere true belief or mere justified true belief. We also explore in what ways ordinary cases of knowledge might be of distinctive epistemic value. In the end, our proposal resembles the original Platonic suggestion in the Meno that knowledge is valuable because knowledge is somehow tied to the good of truth.

Knowledge: Value on the Cheap

by Dr. J. Adam Carter

(co-authored with Benjamin Jarvis and Katherine Rubin) Forthcoming in the Australasian Journal of Philosophy

ABSTRACT: We argue that the so-called ‘Primary’ and ‘Secondary’ Value Problems for knowledge are more easily solved... more ABSTRACT: We argue that the so-called ‘Primary’ and ‘Secondary’ Value Problems for knowledge are more easily solved than is widely appreciated. Pritchard, for instance, has suggested that only virtue-theoretic accounts have any hopes of adequately addressing these problems. By contrast, we argue that accounts of knowledge that are sensitive to the Gettier problem are able to overcome these challenges. To first approximation, the Primary Value Problem is a problem of understanding how the property of being knowledge confers more epistemic value on a belief than the property of being true. The Secondary Value is a problem of understanding how, for instance, property of being knowledge confers more epistemic value on a belief than the property of being jointly true and
justified. We argue that attending to the fact that beliefs are ongoing states reveals that there is no difficulty in appreciating how knowledge might ordinarily have more epistemic value than mere true belief or mere justified true belief. We also explore in what ways ordinary cases of knowledge might be of distinctive epistemic value. In the end, our proposal resembles the original Platonic suggestion in the Meno that knowledge is valuable because knowledge is somehow tied to the good
of truth.

Against Swamping

by Benjamin Jarvis

Forthcoming in Analysis
Co-authored with J. Adam Carter

The Swamping Argument – highlighted by Kvanvig (2003; 2010) – purports to show that the epistemic value of truth will... more The Swamping Argument – highlighted by Kvanvig (2003; 2010) – purports to show that the epistemic value of truth will always swamp the epistemic value of any non-factive epistemic properties (e.g. justification) so that these properties can never add any epistemic value to an already-true belief. Consequently (and counter-intuitively), knowledge is never more epistemically valuable than mere true belief. We show that the Swamping Argument fails. Parity of reasoning yields the disastrous conclusion that nonfactive epistemic properties – mostly saliently justification – are never epistemically valuable properties of a belief. We close by diagnosing why philosophers have been mistakenly attracted to the argument.

EPISTEMIC VALUE AND EPISTEMIC COMPROMISE, A REPLY TO MOSS

by Amir Konigsberg

Sarah Moss has recently suggested (Moss)1 that when they encounter conflict, epistemic
peers should not split the... more Sarah Moss has recently suggested (Moss)1 that when they encounter conflict, epistemic
peers should not split the difference between the credence that they each assign to some
disputed proposition p, as has been suggested by conciliatory approaches to belief
revision (Elga 2009; Matheson 2009) in the recent debate surrounding disagreement in
the literature (Elga 2007; Christensen 2007). Moss’ proposal is novel, intuitively appealing, lucid, and coherent. The paper introduces
important distinctions that are worthy of attention in their own right. These include
credence-eliciting and non-credence-eliciting scoring rules (Moss, 7–9). But setting the
merits of the paper aside, my present concern is with the viability of the model that Moss
proposes. More specifically, my concern is with the contention that scoring rules provide
an understanding of “how an agent may value certain credences over others, in a purely
epistemic sense” (Moss, 2; my emphasis).

Against Swamping

by Dr. J. Adam Carter

(co-authored with Benjamin Jarvis) Forthcoming in Analysis

The Swamping Argument – highlighted by Kvanvig (2003; 2010) – purports to show that the epistemic value of truth will... more The Swamping Argument – highlighted by Kvanvig (2003; 2010) – purports to show that the epistemic value of truth will always
swamp the epistemic value of any non-factive epistemic properties (e.g. justification) so that these properties can never add any epistemic value to an already-true belief. Consequently (and counter-intuitively), knowledge is never more epistemically valuable than mere true belief. We show that the Swamping Argument fails. Parity of reasoning yields the disastrous conclusion that non-factive epistemic properties – mostly saliently justification – are never epistemically valuable properties of a belief. We close by diagnosing why philosophers have been mistakenly attracted to the argument.

Hildebrand_Pragmatic Objectivity in History Journalism and Philosophy_2011_Southwest_Philosophy_Review

by David Hildebrand

Slightly adapted from Hildebrand, Presidential Address, Southwestern Philosophical Society, November 2010.

In a discussion associating his views with those of William James, Richard Rorty once wrote that the word... more In a discussion associating his views with those of William James, Richard Rorty once wrote that the word "true" (like the words "good" and "rational") was merely a normative notion, "a compliment paid to sentences that seem to be paying their way and that fit in with other sentences which are doing so." (Rorty, 1982, p. xxv) Rorty argued that our culture's failures to achieve "Objectivity" tell us that we have been desiring the wrong ideal all along.
Perhaps "true" is just a compliment and "objectivity" is just an illusory desire; perhaps not. Regardless, calling objectivity "illusory" has done little to eradicate the constant and practical need of discussing and debating what objectivity should—and should not mean.
To better understand objectivity, this paper examines how objectivity is faring among theorists in history and journalism because both fields are crucially important in influencing what the average person considers to be debate, argument, knowledge, truth—indeed, what they think is "objectivity." First, I present two sketches of the recent history of the concept of "objectivity"—first among historians and then among journalism/media theorists. Second, I examine several critiques each field has made against what they consider the traditional conception of objectivity. Third, I shift to these critics' pragmatic proposals for reconstructing objectivity. Finally, I make a very brief case regarding why these critics' proposals would benefit from greater connection with a philosophically pragmatist conception of democracy. In brief, my tentative conclusion is that these (historians' and journalists') proposals to renovate "objectivity" only become defensible once they more firmly connected to democracy by dialogical and epistemic habits of inquiry.

The Role of Non-Epistemic Values in Engineering Models

by Sven Diekmann

joint work with Martin Peterson

We argue that non-epistemic values, including moral ones, play an important role in the construction and choice of... more We argue that non-epistemic values, including moral ones, play an important role in the construction and choice of models in science and engineering. Our main claim is that non-epistemic values are not only ‘‘secondary values’’ that become important just in case epistemic values leave some issues open. Our point is, on the contrary, that non-epistemic values are as important as epistemic ones when engineers seek to develop the best model of a process or problem. The upshot is that models are neither value-free, nor depend exclusively on epistemic values or use non-epistemic values as tie-breakers.

Rationality of Scientific Reasoning in the Context of Pursuit: Drawing appropriate distinctions

by Dunja Šešelja

Co-authored with Laszlo Kosolosky; submitted for review.

The aim of this paper is to present some of the key aspects of
rationality underlying the context of theory... more The aim of this paper is to present some of the key aspects of
rationality underlying the context of theory pursuit. To this end we propose a unifying pattern of pursuit worthiness: “It is rational for Y to pursue X if and only if X is conducive of the set of goals Z.” By showing in which ways variables X, Y, and Z can be changed, we present different notions of pursuit and pursuit worthiness. With respect to variable X, we distinguish the pursuit
of scientific theories from other types of scientifically relevant questions. Focusing on the former type of pursuit, we then distinguish between: i) epistemic and practical pursuit worthiness (with respect to variable Z), and ii) individual and communal pursuit worthiness (with respect to variable Y). In this way we are able to explicate some of the major ambiguities underlying the concepts of pursuit of pursuit worthiness, as well as to shed light on some confusions in philosophical literature that have been caused by their neglect.

Epistemic Utility Arguments for Probabilism

by Richard Pettigrew

(2011) Zalta, E. (ed.) Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Epistemic utility theory explores a particular strategy that we might deploy in (formal) epistemology when we wish to... more Epistemic utility theory explores a particular strategy that we might deploy in (formal) epistemology when we wish to establish an epistemic norm. It is sometimes also called cognitive decision theory. Traditional, non-epistemic utility theory (or decision theory) explores a particular strategy for establishing norms of action. Epistemic utility theory (or cognitive decision theory), on the other hand, takes the framework and techniques of traditional utility theory and applies them to normative questions in epistemology. In this article, we consider the epistemic utility arguments that have been given for two putative epistemic norms that have been central to the study of credences (or degrees of beliefs). These are probabilism and conditionalization; they are the core tenets of Bayesian epistemology.

The framework in which traditional, non-epistemic utility theory takes place includes states of the world, actions, and, for each agent, a utility function, which takes a state of the world and an action and returns a measure of the extent to which the agent values the outcome of performing that action at that world: we call this measure the utility of the outcome at the world. For example, there might be just two relevant states of the world: one in which it rains and one in which it does not. And there might be just two relevant actions from which to choose: take an umbrella when one leaves the house or don't. Then my utility function will measure how much I value the outcomes of each action at each state of the world: that is, it will give the value of being in the rain without an umbrella, being in the rain with an umbrella, being with an umbrella when there is no rain, and being without an umbrella when there is no rain. Sometimes, we also have, for each agent, a credence function, which takes a state of the world and returns a measure of the agent's credence (or degree of belief) that the world is in that state. In our example, the credence function would give my credence that it will rain and my credence that it will not. With this framework in hand, we can state certain very general norms of action in terms of it. For instance, we might say that an agent ought to perform a particular action if, for every possible state of the world, that action has the highest utility at that state of the world amongst all possible actions. Or we might say that an agent ought to perform an action that has maximal expected utility, where the expected utility of an action is obtained by weighting its utility at each state of the world by the credence assigned to that state of the world, and summing.

In epistemic utility theory, the states of the world remain the same, but the actions are replaced by epistemic states, and the utility function is replaced, for each agent, by an epistemic utility function, which takes a state of the world and an epistemic state and returns a measure of the purely epistemic value that the agent would attach to being in that epistemic state at that state of the world. Again, certain very general norms may be stated: the obvious analogues of the two above, for instance. And from these, together with claims about the nature of the epistemic utility function, it is hoped that we can derive more substantial norms governing our epistemic states. In particular, as we will see in this article, it is hoped that we can derive the central Bayesian norms.

Thus, epistemic utility theory promises to replace pragmatic arguments for probabilism and conditionalization, such as the synchronic and diachronic Dutch Book arguments and the representation theorem arguments, with purely epistemic arguments that seem more appropriate for those norms.

Epistemic Value and Achievement

by Daniel Whiting

Ratio (2012) 25: 216-230.

Knowledge seems to be a good thing, or at least better than epistemic states that fall short of it, such as true... more Knowledge seems to be a good thing, or at least better than epistemic states that fall short of it, such as true belief. Understanding too seems to be a good thing, perhaps better even than knowledge. In a number of recent publications, Duncan Pritchard tries to account for the value of understanding by claiming that understanding is a cognitive achievement and that achievements in general are valuable. In this paper, I argue that coming to understand something need not be an achievement, and so Pritchard’s explanation of understanding’s value fails. Next, I point out that Pritchard’s is just one of many attempts to account for the value of an epistemic state—whether it be understanding, knowledge, or whatever—by appeal to the notion of achievement or, more generally, the notion of success because of ability. Tentatively, I offer reasons to be sceptical about the prospects of any such account.