Epistemic Logic

Proyecto Final de Carrera: El paso de conocimiento en sistemas electrónicos. Lógica epistémica aplicada

by Aldo Filomeno

"L'irréductibilité de la connaissance et l'intentionnalité en contexte de découverte abductive" [The irreducible character of knowledge and intentionality in the context of abductive discovery]

by Philippe Gagnon

Laval Théologique et Philosophique, vol. 67, no. 2 (June 2011): pp. 227-258.

Knowledge is still an enigma, with its ability to inductively bring out a pattern without restricting itself to an... more Knowledge is still an enigma, with its ability to inductively bring out a pattern without restricting itself to an empirical count of situations experienced. Instead of seeing the concept as a weakened object representing an external reality, it is suggested to view knowledge as the bridging of a distance with an ability for the knower to stay connected with outward reality. Attempts at defining an external and quantitative criterion of truth are questioned, as many human performances are not likely to be solved or even properly grasped by the project of artificial intelligence. The positive side of the cognitive constructivist project is finally assessed and it is argued that one of its unexpected results could be to reinsert the human knowing power in the sub-human realm.

PSpace Tableau Algorithms for Acyclic Modalized ALC

by Vasant Honavar

Tao, J., Slutzki, G., and Honavar, V. (2011). PSpace Tableau Algorithms for Acyclic Modalized ALC. Journal of Automated Reasoning.

The Conway paradox: Its solution in an epistemic framework

by Martin Stokhof

In: J. Groenendijk, T. Janssen & M. Stokhof (eds), Formal Methods in the Study of Language. Vol. I, Amsterdam: Mathematical Centre, 1981, 87–111 Reprinted in: J. Groenendijk, T. Janssen & M. Stokhof (eds), Truth, Interpretation and Information, Dordrecht: Foris, 1984, 159–182
coauthored with J. Groenendijk, P. van Emde Boas

Impossible Worlds

by Francesco Berto

It is a venerable slogan due to David Hume, and inherited by the empiricist tradition, that the impossible cannot be... more It is a venerable slogan due to David Hume, and inherited by the empiricist tradition, that the impossible cannot be believed, or even conceived. In Positivismus und Realismus, Moritz Schlick claimed that, while the merely practically impossible is still conceivable, the logically impossible, such as an explicit inconsistency, is simply unthinkable.

An opposite philosophical tradition, however, maintains that inconsistencies and logical impossibilities are thinkable, and sometimes believable, too. In the Science of Logic, Hegel already complained against “one of the fundamental prejudices of logic as hitherto understood”, namely that “the contradictory cannot be imagined or thought” (Hegel 1931: 430). Our representational capabilities are not limited to the possible, for we appear to be able to imagine and describe also impossibilities — perhaps without being aware that they are impossible.

Such impossibilities and inconsistencies are what this entry is about...

Efficient Epistemic Reasoning in Partially Observable Dynamic Domains Using Hidden Causal Dependencies

by Theodore Patkos

Reasoning with knowledge, action and time in dynamic and uncertain domains

by Theodore Patkos

The Knowability Paradox: does logic come before metaphysics?

by Martina Orlandi

Co-authored with Giulia Casasole, forthcoming in Logic & Philosophy.

How serious is the paradox of serious of possibility?

by Simone Duca

Co-authored with Hannes Leitgeb, forthcoming in 'Mind'

A dynamic epistemic logic approach to modeling obligationes

by Sara L. Uckelman

in D. Grossi, S. Minica, B. Rodenhäuser, S. Smets, eds., LIRa Yearbook (Amsterdam: Institute for Logic, Language & Computation): 147-172.

The game-like nature of the medieval theory of obligationes is well-recognized. In an obligatio, two agents, the... more The game-like nature of the medieval theory of obligationes is well-recognized. In an obligatio, two agents, the Opponent and the Respondent, engage in a turn-based dialogue, where the Respondent’s actions are governed by certain rules, and the goal of the dialogue is establishing the consistency of a proposition. Given the central importance of the Opponent, the Respondent, and the rules governing the turn-taking and actions of both players, it seems natural to look to game-based structures in logic to provide a general framework for modeling different types of obligationes. However, few attempts have been made to provide an explicit specification of the game(s)
which are involved in different types of obligational disputations. Such formalizations which have been previously proposed are specific to the particular obligational framework being investigated, and have little in terms of explanatory value concerning the foundation of truth and knowledge within the disputation. In this paper we present an alternative framework,
which we call the reductive framework, which can be used to model many different types of obligationes within a single system.