Auxiliary Assumptions, Unification, and Intelligent Design: A Defense of Contrastive Testability
Draft
Boudry and Leuridan argue that in a number of cases—and specifically in the case of intelligent design—a theory can be... more Boudry and Leuridan argue that in a number of cases—and specifically in the case of intelligent design—a theory can be intuitively testable, but not contrastively testable according to Sober’s definition. I argue that their purported counterexamples rely on misunderstandings of the concept of contrastive testability and the version of intelligent design criticized by Sober. I also argue that the liberalization of contrastive testability suggested by Boudry and Leuridan is trivial.
On Likelihoodism and Intelligent Design
Presented at the APA Eastern Division Meeting, Washington, DC, December 30, 2011
Two common and plausible claims in the philosophy of science are that (i) a theory that makes no predictions is not... more Two common and plausible claims in the philosophy of science are that (i) a theory that makes no predictions is not testable and (ii) one cannot confirm a theory by criticizing a competing one absent further assumptions about their relation. Elliott Sober has developed these claims within likelihoodism, which defines the testability and confirmation of a theory only in contrast to another, and has argued that the claims hold for intelligent design (ID) when contrasted with evolutionary theory (ET). I show that Sober’s arguments rely on a contentious hidden premise, and that within likelihoodism, both claims are false for ID and ET under his assumptions and one very weak further assumption about ID and ET. I then show that, given Sober’s assumptions, the claims are true for a non-contrastive criterion of testability close to the Bayesian one and the relevance criterion of confirmation.
Empiricism and Intelligent Design II: Analyzing Intelligent Design
Draft
If intelligent design (ID) is to compete with evolutionary theory (ET), it must meet the modified falsifiability... more If intelligent design (ID) is to compete with evolutionary theory (ET), it must meet the modified falsifiability challenge, that is, make some deductive or probabilistic observational assertions. It must also meet the modified translatability challenge, which it fails if ET makes all the observational assertions of ID, while ID does not make all the observational assertions of ET. I discuss four prominent and surprisingly diverse formulations of ID and show that each either fails one of the two challenges or is analytically false.
Empiricism and Intelligent Design I: Three Empiricist Challenges
Draft
Due to the logical relations between theism and intelligent design (ID), there are two challenges to theism that also... more Due to the logical relations between theism and intelligent design (ID), there are two challenges to theism that also apply to ID. In the falsifiability challenge, it is charged that theism is compatible with every observation statement and thus asserts nothing. I argue that the contentious assumptions of this challenge can be avoided without loss of precision by charging theism (and thus ID) directly with the lack of observational assertions. In the translatability challenge, it is charged that theism can be translated into a (non-theistic) set of observation statements without loss of cognitive content. I argue that the contentious assumptions of this challenge are avoided by the related charge that the (non-theistic) evolutionary theory makes all the observational assertions of ID, while the converse does not hold. Elliott Sober has argued that ID meets the falsifiability challenge, but, since it makes almost no observational assertions, is not testable. I point out two problems with Sober’s argument and show that ID is both deductively and probabilistically testable. Sober’s argument, I suggest, inconsistently combines the modified falsifiability challenge with the modified translatability challenge. If his claims about ID’s observational assertions are true, however, ID succumbs to the modified translatability challenge.
On a Contrastive Criterion of Testability II: The Material Inadequacy of Contrastive Testability
Draft
Elliott Sober has suggested his contrastive criterion of testability as an improvement over previous criteria of... more Elliott Sober has suggested his contrastive criterion of testability as an improvement over previous criteria of empirical significance like falsifiability and the standard Bayesian criterion of empirical significance. I argue that the criterion fails to meet four of the conditions of adequacy for a criterion of empirical significance that follow from Sober’s position or are presumed in his arguments. I suggest to define empirical significance as empirical non-equivalence to a tautology, because this definition does meet the conditions of adequacy. Specifically, it is equivalent to the standard Bayesian criterion of empirical significance whenever all probabilities are defined and contains falsifiability as a special case. This latter feature is important because those conditions of adequacy that apply to criteria of deductive empirical significance single out falsifiability.
On a Contrastive Criterion of Testability I: Defining Contrastive Testability
Draft
Elliott Sober has suggested his contrastive criterion of testability as an improvement over previous criteria of... more Elliott Sober has suggested his contrastive criterion of testability as an improvement over previous criteria of empirical significance like falsifiability or a suggestion within Bayesianism. I argue that Sober’s criterion entails that if one group of people is justified in believing a claim, every group is, and that it tacitly relies on an inconsistent interpretation of probabilistic inequalities. Furthermore, the criterion’s restrictions on the use of auxiliary assumptions are in part redundant and in part unjustified. Most importantly, they are so weak that almost all theories can be contrastively tested. On the basis of these results, I suggest a modification of Sober’s criterion that avoids these problems without abandoning Sober’s core idea.
Criteria of Empirical Significance: a Success Story
An earlier version of this article received the Sir Karl Popper Essay Prize 2009 of the British Society for the Philosophy of Science.
The sheer multitude of criteria of empirical significance has been taken as evidence that the pre-analytic notion... more The sheer multitude of criteria of empirical significance has been taken as evidence that the pre-analytic notion being explicated is too vague to be useful. I show instead that a significant number of these criteria—by Ayer, Popper, Przełęcki, Suppes, and David Lewis, among others—not only form a coherent whole, but also connect directly to the theory of definition, the notion of empirical content as explicated by Ramsey sentences, and the theory of measurement; two criteria by Carnap and Sober are trivial, but can be saved and connected to the other criteria by slight modifications. A corollary is that the ordinary language defense of Lewis, the conceptual arguments by Ayer and Popper, the theoretical considerations by Przełęcki, and the practical considerations by Suppes all apply to the same criterion or closely related criteria. Furthermore, the equivalence of some criteria allows for their individual justifications to be taken cumulatively and, together with the entailment relations between nonequivalent criteria, suggest criteria for general auxiliary assumptions, comparative criteria, and more liberal conceptions of observation.