Emotions (Philosophy)

Mind as Feeling' or Affective Relations?: A Contribution to the School of Andersonian Realism

by Simon Boag

Boag, S. (2008). 'Mind as feeling' or affective relations? A contribution to the school of Andersonian realism. Theory & Psychology, 18 (4), 505-525.

Andersonian realism is a determinist, empiricist position that acknowledges the important distinction between... more Andersonian realism is a determinist, empiricist position that acknowledges the important distinction between qualities and relations. However, Anderson’s ‘mind as feeling’ thesis, proposing that the mind’s qualities are emotional, is problematic since it fails to account for ‘feelings’ themselves. O’Neil’s (1934) alternative relational account of affects, in conjunction with Maze’s (1983) theory of instinctual drives, provides a coherent platform for developing a comprehensive realist account of affects. In discussing the relation between affects, cognition and motivation, affects are viewed as drive-evaluative phenomena, and ‘feelings’ are known bodily states arising in conjunction with motivationally driven environmental evaluations. The role that affects play in a revised desire/belief model of behaviour explanation is discussed.

Linquist & Bartol (forthcoming) 'Two Myths About Somatic Markers' British Journal for Philosophy of Science

by Jordan Bartol

Draft version.  Final version to appear in British Journal for Philosophy of Science.

Research on patients with damage to ventromedial frontal cortices suggests a key role for emotions in practical... more Research on patients with damage to ventromedial frontal cortices suggests a key role for emotions in practical decision making. This field of investigation is often associated with Antonio Damasio’s Somatic Marker Hypothesis–a putative account of the mechanism by which autonomic tags guide decision making in typical individuals. Here we discuss two ‘myths’ surrounding the direction and interpretation of this research. First, it is often assumed that there is a single somatic marker hypothesis. As others have noted, however, Damasio’s ‘hypothesis’ admits of multiple interpretations (Colombetti, [2008]; Dunn et al. [2006]). Our analysis builds upon this point by characterizing decision making as a multi-stage process and identifying the various potential roles for somatic markers. The second myth is that the available evidence suggests a role for somatic markers in the core stages of decision making, i.e. during the generation, deliberation or evaluation of candidate options. To the contrary, we suggest that somatic markers most likely have a peripheral role, in the recognition of decision points, or in the motivation of action. This conclusion is based on an examination of the past 25 years of research conducted by Damasio and colleagues, focusing in particular on some early experiments that have been largely neglected by the critical literature.

Emotion-Philosophy-Science

by Phil Hutchinson

Learning of pains; Wittgenstein's own Cartesian Mistake at Investigations 246

by David Robjant

forthcoming in the 2012 Wittgenstein Studien (Jahrbuch)

I refute the support offered for the remark at Philosophical Investigations 246: “It can’t be said of me at all... more I refute the support offered for the remark at Philosophical Investigations 246: “It can’t be said of me at all (except perhaps as a joke) that I know I am in pain.” I identify two kinds of support for this claim, the one arguing that I cannot learn of my own pains and the second arguing that I cannot be persuaded by evidence that I am in pain. Against the first sort of support I offer various cases in which I learn of a pain. I argue that one learns about the world and about ones body simultaneously, and that this includes learning of sensations. Against the second sort of support I develop the case in which I am persuaded by compelling evidence that I am, contrary to what I imagined, still in an emotional pain about N. I argue that in this case I make a mistake about my pain. P.M.S. Hacker claims that a mix of sensation and emotion such as might be found in my second case would make it irrelevant as a criticism of Wittgenstein. I argue that the reverse holds. That ‘sensation’ is quite separate from ‘emotion’ is a Cartesian Mistake which is, I argue, implicit in Wittgenstein’s discussion of ‘I know I am in pain’.

Rorty and Human Rights: Contingengy, Emotions and How to Defend Human Rights Telling Stories

by Jose-Manuel Barreto

Published in 'Utrecht Law Review', April 2011

This article draws some of the consequences of Rorty's thinking for the way human rights can be conceptualized and... more This article draws some of the consequences of Rorty's thinking for the way human rights can be conceptualized and cultivated today. On the basis of Rorty's critique of foundationalism, this reflection sketches a theory of human rights without metaphysics - a cultural theory of natural law. It turns from a rationalistic theory of rights towards emotions, and presents sympathy and solidarity as the sine qua non of moral progress. This article also calls for a moral global warming. Agreeing with Rorty that ours is a literary culture, this text finds in the poeticisation of scientific and cold modernity one of the more adequate paths for the sensibilisation of the contemporary global culture - the sentimental education of the epoch - and for advancing the quest for human rights in our times.

Key words: Rorty; human rights; Neopragmatism; contingency; emotions; sympathy; telling stories; sentimental education