Distributed Language: cognition beyond the brain
This short paper was a presentation at the Annual International Forum in the Humanities Conference on Interdisciplinarity in Cognitive Science Research, State University for the Humanities, Moscow (March 2012).
As Cognitive Science develops a view of agency, we are learning much about human cognition. First, as living things,... more As Cognitive Science develops a view of agency, we are learning much about human cognition. First, as living things, we depend on active embodiment. Since, this is incompatible with reduction to information processing, we are bound to ask what cognition is –and what it is to be a person. On a ‘4E’ view, agency is embodied, embedded, enacted and extended. This applies, moreover, to living beings as diverse as earthworms, beavers, wolves and humans. To understand human agency, I therefore argue for a more radical view. Pursuing this, it is stressed that, while situated, language is also non-local: our voices always echo those of others. While grounded in first-order activity, language also enacts second-order practices. It is its symbiotic nature that makes homo sapiens ecologically special. Once acknowledged, this opens up a distributed perspective on language and cognition. By means of clarification, I offer thick description of a interactional moment where language links the brain with the world beyond the body. At this instant, the words actually spoken are background: the verbal aspect of speech acts as a Zeitgeber for bodily coupling that directly realizes human values. Finally, I place the distributed view of linguistic cognition against themes in Russian psycholinguistic tradition.
Simulating others: the basis of human cognition?
This appeared as:
Cowley, S.J. (2004). Simulating others: the basis of human cognition? Language Sciences, 26/3: 273-299.
The paper critiques the argument of Michael Tomasello’s Cultural Origins of Human Cognition (1999). This culture-first... more The paper critiques the argument of Michael Tomasello’s Cultural Origins of Human Cognition (1999). This culture-first theory is judged to be a good sketch of how nature predisposes humans for talk. Above all, this is because if language mediated perspective-taking depends on cultural process, no innate linguistic representations are necessary in learning to talk. Unfortunately, the model is flawed by Tomasello’s claims for a putative species-specific competency. Rather than posit a simulation mechanism to link orthodox views of language with Gricean models of communication, I follow Dennett in treating ‘intentions’ as folk constructs. Talking, on this view, arises from encultured contextualizing. Situated, embodied activity turns infants into perspective-takers who, far from learning or acquiring ‘forms’, slowly become persons. Gradually, the infant’s developing social capacities produce activity that invites others to attribute linguistic knowledge to the child.
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Seen by:How human infants deal with symbol grounding
These proofs appeared as:
Cowley, S. J. (2007). How human infants deal with symbol grounding. Interaction Studies, 8/1: 81-104.
Taking a distributed view of language, this paper naturalizes symbol grounding. Learning to talk is traced to — not... more Taking a distributed view of language, this paper naturalizes symbol grounding. Learning to talk is traced to — not categorizing speech sounds — but events that shape the rise of human-style autonomy. On the extended symbol hypothesis, this happens as babies integrate micro-activity with slow and deliberate adult action. As they discover social norms, intrinsic motive formation enables them to reshape co-action. Because infants link affect to contingencies, dyads develop norm-referenced routines. Over time, infant doings become analysis amenable. The caregiver of a nine-month-old may, for example, prompt the baby to fetch objects. Once she concludes that the baby uses ‘words’ to understand what she says, the infant can use this belief in orienting to more abstract contingencies. New cognitive powers will develop as the baby learns to act in ways that are consistent with a caregiver’s false belief that her baby uses ‘words.’
Distributed cognition at three months: caregiver-infant dyads in kwaZulu-Natal
This appeared as:
Cowley, S.J. (2003). Distributed cognition at three months: mother-infant dyads in kwaZulu Natal. Alternation, 10.2: 229-257.
Until recently, cognitive science adopted what has been challenged as an ‘Input-Output’ (I-O) model (Hurley, 1998).... more Until recently, cognitive science adopted what has been challenged as an ‘Input-Output’ (I-O) model (Hurley, 1998). Conflating brain and person, cognitive processes were presented as problems or tasks that are dealt with independently of affect, perception and action. Using a narrow concept of causation together with the belief that, somehow, mind is realised at a ‘level’ of the brain, I-O models had thirty years of hegemony. In spite of their interdisciplinary claims, cognitive internalism relies on a mind-world dualism that is incompatible with much anthropology, linguistics and psychology. It overlooks the fact that many cognitive processes occur between body and world. In examining 3 month old babies, it is argued that the distributed nature of cognition is especially important in development. Rather than appeal to ‘competencies’ or developmental stages, it is possible to examine how their worlds impinge on their brains and behaviour. Body-world activity can thus be seen necessary, but not sufficient, to becoming minded: cognition is both derived and transformed by joint activity. The paper pursues the distributed approach by focusing on individual and cultural differences in the fourth month. In KwaZulu Natal, there are clearly cultural influences by this age. These help to establish a person level of function. For, when a baby is seen as, say, ‘wanting to play’ or ‘being uncomfortable’, human engagement depends on meshing with the baby’s neural and bodily activity. Biomechanical systems control baby behaviour to invite judgements that will dominate interindividual co-ordination and learning. During simultaneous speech, for example, babies in English speaking settings already vocalize quite differently from those growing up in an isiZulu speaking world.
Why brains matter: an integrational perspective on The Symbolic Species
This appeared as:
Cowley, S. J. (2002). Why brains matter: an integrational perspective on “The Symbolic Species”. Language Sciences, 24: 73-95.
Deacon's co-evolutionary theory provides a new basis for how we think about language and brains. Instead of ascribing... more
Deacon's co-evolutionary theory provides a new basis for how we think about language and brains. Instead of ascribing language to either nature or nurture, it is intrinsic to both: biological principles ensure that the brain can only function by attuning to itsbody's worlds. For humans, this means both that our brains are biosocial organs permeated by history and that human bodies can tightly constrain the nature of our languages.
While endorsing the thought that language is insinuated into brains, I also identify what I take to be the theory's Achilles heel. Deacon pictures the brain as able to process words qua 'symbolic' tokens. Unlike morphosyntactic patterns, these belong to a private domain where referential interpretation detaches from experience. Opposing this split between symbolic (and nonverbal aspects of language,I claim that it is not only unnecessary but also implausible and damaging to co-evolutionary theory.
The turning of the tide: rethinking language, mind and world
These proofs appeared as;
Cowley, S.J. & Zheng, D. (2011) The turning of the tide: Rethinking language, mind and world. Journal of Multilingual Discourses, 6/2:197-210.
The paper explores radical ideas that are introduced in Per Linell’s (2009) “Rethinking language, mind, and world... more The paper explores radical ideas that are introduced in Per Linell’s (2009) “Rethinking language, mind, and world dialogically”. Using Chinese yin-yang thinking, we argue that cognitive linguistics lies at the high water mark of a tradition. Today, we can complement analyses of constructions, words, propositions, and/or meanings with views that see language as embodied, ecological and based on “double dialogicality.” Language is, at once, both situated and non-local. Once this is seen as possible, we link the individual and the collective within a perspective that acknowledges linguistic heterogeneity. Accordingly, we use Linell’s book to point towards a yin-yang linguistics that establishes a new peace by yoking psychology to language under a Chinese concept that links {unity} with {harmony}.
The cognitive dynamics of distributed language.
These proofs appeared as:
Cowley, S.J. (2007). The cognitive dynamics and distributed language. Language Sciences, 29/5: 575-583.
This is the introduction to the Special Issue of Language Sciences that launched the "distributed language... more This is the introduction to the Special Issue of Language Sciences that launched the "distributed language movement". It stresses that, until the 1990s, cognitive science relied on comparing human cognition to how everyday computers process information. However, with connectionism, neuroscience and robotics, symbol processing fell out of favour. Physical symbol systems are now rarely seen as appropriate models for brains or minds (MacDorman, 2007). Extending the critique of symbolic models to language, David Spurrett and I linked distributed cognition with integrational linguistics. We organized a conference in Durban where participants addressed questions like ‘‘Is intelligent behaviour (and language) based in the dynamical coupling of bodies?’’ and ‘‘Once we reject code models, how can we reconceptualise language and mind?’’ As respondent, Harris (1998: 728) was sceptical about this linking because, he believes, mental activities are best understood in lay terms. Talk of distributed cognition plainly falls foul of ‘‘commonsense lay ways of talking about the mind’’. As editor of the special issue of Language Sciences arising from the conference, Spurrett responds to Harris: "Either we think that science can tell us that we’re wrong with how we think things are with us . . . even to the extent of showing our common sense, or vulgar, self-conception to be deeply mistaken, or common sense is holding some kind of trump so it always beats science, or even that it never has to pay any attention to science" (Spurrett, 2004: 497). In siding with that naturalists on this issue, we gave birth to a new way of linking integrational critique with science: this produced the distributed perspective on language.
Long-term relationships as a benchmark for robot personhood
This appeared as:
MacDorman, K. F. & Cowley, S. J. (2008). Long-term relationships as a benchmark for robot personhood. To appear in AAAI 2008 Spring Symposium on Emotion, Personality, and Social Behavior. March 26-28, 2008. Stanford, California.
The human body constructs itself into a person by becoming attuned to the affective consequences of its actions in... more The human body constructs itself into a person by becoming attuned to the affective consequences of its actions in social relationships. Norms develop that ground perception and action, providing standards for appraising conduct. The body finds itself motivated to enact itself as a character in the drama of life, carving from its beliefs, intentions, and experiences a unique identity and perspective. If a biological body can construct itself into a person by exploiting social mechanisms, could an electromechanical body, a robot, do the same? To qualify for personhood, a robot body must be able to construct its own identity, to assume different roles, and to discriminate in forming friendships. Though all these conditions could be considered benchmarks of personhood, the most compelling benchmark, for which the above mentioned are prerequisites, is the ability to sustain long-term relationships. Long-term relationships demand that a robot continually recreate itself as it scripts its own future. This benchmark may be contrasted with those of previous research, which tend to define personhood in terms that are trivial, subjective, or based on assumptions about moral universals. Although personhood should not in principle be limited to one species, the most humanlike of robots will be best equipped for reciprocal relationships with human beings.
Music and the Extended Self
My Chapter from the Book Situated Aesthetics:Art beyond the Skin. Edited by Riccardo Manzotti. available at imprint-academic.com
Leonard Bernstein argues that our musical experience must be constructed out of individual notes, the way Chomsky sees... more Leonard Bernstein argues that our musical experience must be constructed out of individual notes, the way Chomsky sees sentences constructed out of individual words. I argue that our experience of music, and experience in general is equally well accounted for by seeing it as starting with an experience of an undifferentiated whole, without even awareness of a distinction between self and environment. New experiences are not acquired by stuffing sense data into the brain, but rather by dividing a primordially unified experience into smaller interacting parts. This view dissolves many traditional problems in philosophy of mind, and also more accurately reflects what we have learned about connectionist neuroscience.
Dynamic empathy: A new formulation for the simulation theory of mind reading
Cognitive Systems Research 9 (2008) 52–63
The controversy between the theory-theory (TT) and simulation-theory (ST) has evolved so that it is often hard to tell... more The controversy between the theory-theory (TT) and simulation-theory (ST) has evolved so that it is often hard to tell exactly what the difference is between a simulation and a theory. I believe that this distinction was originally inspired, and can be freshly reconceived, as the distinction between verbal abstractions and concrete pictures. I argue that the multi-dimensional spaces described by connectionist neuroscience are best understood as pictures of a special sort. These multi-dimensional pictures do not have the limitations of ordinary three-dimensional pictures, and are capable of performing many of the cognitive functions that were traditionally thought to be the exclusive domain of abstract linguistic concepts. Consequently, there is a real possibility that a pure simulation theory could actually explain some sophisticated kinds of social cognition, without having to rely on a hybrid that combines simulations and theories. Paradoxically, such a pure simulation theory would not actually use simulations in the strictest sense of that word, because something can be a simulation only if it is verbally labeled as a copy of something else. Rather this kind of social cognition would establish vector transformations between perception and behavior without requiring any verbal labels at all. This would mean that the emotions caused by perceptions of other people would not be simulations of other people’s emotions, but rather the same emotion transferred by a kind of emotional contagion.
Extended cognition and intrinsic properties
Published in Philosophical Psychology, 23: 6, 741
— 757
The Hypothesis of Extended Cognition (HEC) have been criticized as committing what is called the coupling/constitution... more The Hypothesis of Extended Cognition (HEC) have been criticized as committing what is called the coupling/constitution fallacy, but it is the critic’s use of this concept which is fallacious. It is true that there is no reason to deny that the line between the self and the world should be drawn at the skull and/or the skin. But the data used to support HEC reveal that there was never a good enough reason to draw the line there in the first place. The burden of proof has fallen on the Mind/Brain identity theory, now that our intuitions/prejudices no longer support it. One of those “intuitions” is the Aristotelian assumption that the world can be neatly divided into objects that possess intrinsic causal powers, and the causal relations that connect those objects. In modern science, however, the concept of intrinsic causal powers is only a temporary stopgap that makes it possible to begin research in a particular area. It therefore seems best to assume that the line between mind and world is both pragmatic and dynamic. Consequently, the mind might best described as a fluctuating field, rather than an object or structur
"The Persistent Peril of the Artificial Slave"
Published in the journal Science Fiction Studies, vol. 38.2 (July, 2011): pp. 232-252. The link below leads to the abstract on the journal's website.
This article surveys and analyzes the pre-industrial history of artificial humanoid servants and their historical... more This article surveys and analyzes the pre-industrial history of artificial humanoid servants and their historical persistence. The idea of artificial slaves—and questions about their tractability—is present not only in the literature of modern times but also extends all the way back to ancient Greek sources; and it is present in the literature and oral history of the Middle Ages and Renaissance as well. Furthermore, at each of these intervals, this idea is connected with an emotional paradox: the joy of self-enhancement is counterpoised with the anxiety of self-displacement that comes with distribution of agency. The idea of rebellious and dangerous artificial slaves is an archetype that spans Western history and persists not only in the pre-modern and modern imaginations, via stories about rebellious AI servants, but also in ancient scientific accounts and in modern systems theory, which is the basis for real AI.
Emergence of mirror neurons in a model of gaze following
by Gedeon Deák
Triesch, J., Jasso, H., & Deák, G.O. (2007). Emergence of mirror neurons in a model of gaze following. Adaptive Behavior, 15, 149-165
Gaze following is the ability to redirect one's gaze to the location where another agent is looking. We present a... more Gaze following is the ability to redirect one's gaze to the location where another agent is looking. We present a computational model of how human infants or other agents may acquire gaze following by learning to predict the locations of interesting sights from the looking behavior of other agents through reinforcement learning. The model accounts for many findings about the development of gaze following in human infants. During learning, the model develops pre-motor representations that exhibit many properties characteristic of mirror neurons, but they are specific to looking behaviors. The existence of such a new class of mirror neurons is the main prediction of our model. The model also offers a parsimonious account of how these and possibly other mirror neurons may acquire their special response properties. In this account, visual representations of other agents' actions become associated with pre-motor neurons that represent the intention to perform corresponding actions. The model also demonstrates how this development may be obstructed in autism spectrum disorder, giving rise to specific physiological and anatomical differences in the mirror system.
Ontological Complexity and Human Culture
Co-authored with Frederico Fonseca and presented at Philosophy’s Relevance in Information Science, Paderborn, Germany, October 3-4, 2008.
Ontologies are being used by information scientists in order to facilitate the sharing of meaningful information.... more Ontologies are being used by information scientists in order to facilitate the sharing of meaningful information. However, computational ontologies are problematic in that they often decontextualize information. The semantic content of information is dependent upon the context in which it exists and the experience through which it emerges. For true semantic interoperability to occur among diverse information systems, within or across domains, information must remain contextualized. In order to bring more context to computational ontologies, we introduce culture as an essential concept for information science. Culture helps to focus our attention on and make meaning of relevant extrapersonal structures and their qualities and dimensions that comprise the context and background of the world. In our approach, culture is integral to the study of semantics and, consequently, the study of ontologies and information technologies. The meaning we make of entities and phenomena in the world is always shaped by our cultural experience. If we understand culture as the emergent interplay of intrapersonal cognitive structures and extrapersonal structures of the world, then the notion of cognitive and cultural schemas becomes essential to understanding ontology and the ways in which we might achieve authentic semantic interoperability among diverse information systems. We explore the nature of ontologies and reconceptualize them as cultural schemas. Our proposal is an alternative to the historical path from philosophical ontology to computational ontologies as one that adheres primarily to the notion of ontology as a categorization and classification system. The obvious implication for ontology as categorization is that there is a single objective world that exists and that it can be described as entirely separate from the person observing it. We draw upon Heidegger’s examination of ontology to ground ontology in a phenomenological perspective, enabling it to remain flexible and adaptable and to accommodate context.
Do Medieval and Renaissance Androids Presage the Posthuman?
Published in the refereed, online journal: CLCWeb: Comparative Literature and Culture 12.3 (2010) (Purdue University). Available at: http://docs.lib.purdue.edu/clcweb/vol12/iss3/3/
In his article "Do Medieval and Renaissance Androids Presage the Posthuman?" Kevin LaGrandeur analyzes the... more In his article "Do Medieval and Renaissance Androids Presage the Posthuman?" Kevin LaGrandeur analyzes the relationships between literary images of artificial humans associated with medieval alchemists and alchemy, their modified reemergence in the Renaissance, and how such androids may forecast the idea of a posthuman subjectivity that is connected with their present-day descendents. For example, the talking brass heads in Robert Greene's two Renaissance plays, The Honorable History of Friar Bacon and Friar Bungay and Alphonsus, Prince of Aragon have their roots in Arabic sources, and the former derives specifically from legends concerning the thirteenth-century alchemist and philosopher Roger Bacon. These early instances of the artificial anthropoid also anticipate, in a broad sense, the kinds of philosophical issues regarding subjectivity that cyborgs bring up for our "posthuman" society. For instance, the literature of the earlier era represents a fear that humans will be diminished-all of the creators in the fictional literature examined are in danger of losing control of their creations, and thus of having their agency called into dispute.

