Economics of Information

The bazaar economy or how bizarre is the bazaar really?

by Frank Fanselow

Man - Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 25, (2), 1990, pp. 250-265

Assessment of Ubiquitous Healthcare Information Systems Benefits

by Hamed Qahri Saremi

The economics of information and the information society: is social equity still on the agenda in the 1990s?

by Colin Darch

Innovation, no.10, June 1995, pages 3-12.

Librarians tend to overestimate the social value of information and to ignore its economic value. Although economists... more Librarians tend to overestimate the social value of information and to ignore its economic value. Although economists and information scientists use the term 'information' in narrower senses than librarians do, there is much that can be learned from them. In order to guarantee that redress actually takes place in South African society, especially for the information poor, librarians may need to take advantage of the commodity value of information in new ways, in order to gain access to the financial and technological resources necessary for the vast job of reconstruction in our sector. The question is, how can this be done?

Innovation or Imitation: Some Economic Performance and Social Welfare Policy Issues

by Soheil Ghili

Accepted for publication in "International Journal of Information Systems and Social Change"
Co-authors: Hengameh Shams and Madjid Tavana

In this paper, we develop a mathematical model of innovation in technology with two main characteristics. First, in... more In this paper, we develop a mathematical model of innovation in technology with two main characteristics. First, in our model, not only how much innovation to develop is endogenously determined, but also does how much to imitate. Second, we show that the decision to innovate or imitate are not mutually exclusive and a firm can innovate and imitate simultaneously. We present a mathematical model and explain the barriers to innovation development and diffusion. We further use the model to investigate the effectiveness of two technology innovation and imitation policies. We show that an intellectual property right (IPR) policy will better function if the price of innovation is set to a level lower than the cost of innovation. We also propose and develop the concept “superfluous innovation” (innovations whose costs are higher than their benefits) through investigating the policy of levying subsidies on innovation. We show that a high subsidy rate will result in superfluous innovation.

Executive Compensation and Incentives in a Mixed Oligopoly: A Two-Sided Matching Approach

by Sergio Montero Fortes

In this paper, I develop a matching model of firms and managers to analyze how government participation in product... more In this paper, I develop a matching model of firms and managers to analyze how government participation in product markets affects equilibrium outcomes in labor markets. When firms are monopolists in their respective product market, I find that the unique equilibrium matching that arises in the market for managers follows a monotonic pattern: more talented managers are hired by firms with a higher fraction of their shares owned by the government. Moreover, I show that managerial equilibrium compensations are increasing with respect to managerial talent. When firms compete imperfectly in an integrated product market, managerial effort (in cost reducing activities) imposes externalities on competing firms. This calls for a refinement of the notion of equilibrium in the market for managers. The study of the properties of equilibrium allocations under this refinement is a work in progress.