Dragonfly: An Ecological Approach to Digital Architectural Design
Published in ACADIA 2011: Integration Through Computation, ed. by J.M. Taron, V. Parlac, B. Kolarevic and J.S. Johnson, pp.178-186. Stroughton, WI: The Printing House, 2011.
(Co-authored with Daniel Hambleton)
In his keynote address delivered to The American Society for Esthetics in 1976, James J. Gibson wrote, “Architecture... more
In his keynote address delivered to The American Society for Esthetics in 1976, James J. Gibson wrote, “Architecture and design do not have a satisfactory theoretical basis.” He then asked, “Can an ecological approach to the psychology of perception and behavior provide it?” (1976, p. 413) We believe that it can, at least in part. In this paper, we expand upon Gibson’s insights into the nature of perceptual experience by applying the concept of “affordances” to the design of architectural objects in general, and to the domain of digital architectural design in particular. On our account, the affordance-concept supplies a useful theoretical basis for conceptualizing the relationship between environments and occupants with respect to the form and behavioral meaning of geometrically constructed layouts.
Donald Norman (1988) first introduced affordances to interaction design theorists, as a conceptual tool for predicting how agents will interact with a given product. The extensive body of literature that has since emerged, from human-computer-interaction studies (Ackerman, 1996; Conn, 1995; Moran, 1997; Norman, 1999) to architectural theory and practice (Koutamanis, 2006; Maier and Fadel, 2009), has followed Norman’s lead in defining affordances, somewhat amorphously, as whichever action-related properties of objects are sufficient to elicit the intended forms of behavioral interaction between the agent and object. However, while this is correct, it is only half the story. It leaves unexplained how human perceivers detect and “pair down” on the potentially vast range of possible affordances (at a given time), to select the ones that will be relevant to the coordination and guidance of the targeted actions. Call this the “selectivity problem,” a proper treatment of which is missing from the literature. This is no small matter. If the theory of affordances is to be useful to architects and designers, if it is to have explanatory and predictive power over how perceivers will interact with their surroundings, then some account of the cognitive procedure by which affordances are selected for the deployment of specific behaviors is necessary. Otherwise, it is unclear what the theory hopes to predict or explain.
To this end, we maintain that the couching of affordances in a framework of human intentionality is not only consistent with Gibson’s theoretical views (i.e., the action-oriented definition of the concept of affordances not only suggests an intentional perspective), indeed, such a perspective is necessary if we are to succeed in implementing the affordance-concept into an architectural design context in a way that addresses the selectivity problem. This is one of the goals of “Dragonfly,” a first attempt at implementing the affordance-based control of perceptually guided-action into a digital design simulation. Dragonfly enables human interaction with geometry by encoding the basic principles of ecological psychology (including a rudimentary form of intentionality) into an interactive CAD environment. New vistas for future research and interdisciplinary approaches to design are then discussed, with a special emphasis on their applicability to architecture.
Mimesis and language: a distributed view
This is a draft of a paper that appeared recently in a Special Issue of Interaction Studies that takes as its theme: "Language as social coordination: an evolutuionary perspective". The final version appeared as:
Cowley, S.J. (2012). Mimesis and language: A distributed view. Interaction Studies, 13/1: 17-40.
A growing number of scholars regard language as social co-ordination. Not only does this overcome stale debate about... more A growing number of scholars regard language as social co-ordination. Not only does this overcome stale debate about whether langauge is cognitive or communicative but it opens up new thinking about its evolutionary history. Focusing on populations, the paper outlines and critiques Merlin Donald’s view of the human mind. It endorses the view that the evolutionary emergence of language can be traced to mimesis or what, twenty years ago, was called the “ability to produce conscious self-initiated representational acts that are intentional” (Donald, 1991: 168). However, ecological critique rejects the original theory’s appeal to symbolic models. I therefore argue that, while Donald is regarded as likely to be correct about the evolutionary basis of language (and languaging), it is possible to simplify his account. Instead of positing 3 evolutionary thresholds (mimesis, language and writing), mimetic skills may themselves be sufficient to ground all the slow processes of human cognition. Indeed, like tool-making, they probably co-evolved with vocal coordination. As cultures developed tools together with ‘public language’, we gained skills in using distributed cognition –ways of living that were later extended by external resources such as, for example, writing, religions, laws and technologies.
11 views
Seen by: and 4 moreDistributed language: implications for volition
The attached paper is a draft for a Russian volume that explored new perspectives on language. It was translated and appeared in Russian as:
С. Дж. Коули. Понятие распределенности языка и его значение для волеизъявления // А.В.Кравченко (ред.). Наука о языке в изменяющейся парадигме знания (Studia linguistica cognitiva 2). Иркутск: БГУЭП, 2009. С. 192-227.
It can be cited as:
Cowley, S. J. (2009). Distributed language: implications for volition. (In Russian). In A, Kravchenko (ed.) New Perspectives on Language and Cognition, pp. 192-227, Irkutsk: Baikal University Press.
Most post-Cartesian views trace human agency to the organism and are thus obliged to either leave aside questions of... more Most post-Cartesian views trace human agency to the organism and are thus obliged to either leave aside questions of volition or, worse, seek explanations in the individual brain. By contrast, when language is recognised as distributed, human cognition is seen to arise as we adapt to life in a collective world. Since language is embodied AND non-local, learning emerges under dual or multiple control –babies learn to talk by participating in “distributed cognitive systems.” In relation to human volition, this opens a gap between tracing actions and feelings to a single brain and privileging the person ‘level’. Although behaviour emerges as people deal with circumstances together, language gives some control over what is not said or done. By focusing on the possible (and what we imagine), we can use the real duration associated with verbal and other thoughts. In short, it is because language is embodied and conventional that we can modulate action/perception: this enables individual organisms to act as living subjects who exert a degree of control over what they – and others – say and do.
7 views
Seen by: and 2 moreIntentionality and Developing Researcher Competence on a UK Masters Course: an Ecological Perspective on Research Education
by Juup Stelma
Co-authored with Dr Richard Fay (University of Manchester). This paper is accepted for publication in 'Studies in Higher Education'. A link to the online pre-publication version will be posted when this becomes available (probably in the late spring 2012).
Stelma, J. and Fay, R. (accepted, forthcoming) . Intentionality and developing researcher competence on a UK Masters course: an ecological perspective on research education. Studies in Higher Education.
This paper presents an ecological perspective on the developing researcher competence of participants in the research... more This paper presents an ecological perspective on the developing researcher competence of participants in the research education component of a professionally oriented Masters course. There is a particular focus on the intentionality (as in ‘purpose’) of the participants’ research education activity. The data used to develop the ecological perspective, and which at the same time is interpreted from this ecological perspective, consists of interactive, reflective and more product-like written outputs generated by two Masters course participants. The analysis reveals how the participants’ developing intentionality was shaped by a hybrid of professional and research-related influences, and how this developing intentionality affected the quality of the participants’ research education experience. The analysis, with its particular focus on intentionality, constitutes a further development of the ecological perspective on developing researcher competence proposed by Stelma (2011), and is intended also as a contribution to the emerging literature on ‘research education’ (Boud and Lee 2005).
Cognitive dynamics: language as values realizing activity
These are proofs that appeared as:
Cowley, S.J. (2012). Cognitive dynamics: language as values realizing activity. In A. Kravchenko (ed). Cognitive Dynamics and Linguistic Interactions, pp. 15-46. Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Press.
To challenge cognitivism it is important emphasise how human bodies function. Like other organisms, we evolved to act... more
To challenge cognitivism it is important emphasise how human bodies function. Like other organisms, we evolved to act and perceive in changing environments. In spite of the fact that this can be described as representing aspects of the world, there is no reason to think that people use what are representations for the brain (Steiner 2010). The central nervous system deals in the body-world relations that sustain flexible, adaptive behaviour. Bodies use measurable physical events or cognitive dynamics to control how they coordinate with the world. Humans extend this general capacity by cooperating in cultural settings.
Biology thus becomes enmeshed with history and, in looking at language too, this must be traced to minded behaviour. It follows that language -and teaching languages -must be explicated with respect to how encounters with the world are experienced as meaningful (Gibson 1979). Far from being subjective or abstract, cognitive dynamics function as public opportunities and threats. Social activity realizes values that motivate inhibition, thinking and communication (Gibson 1950; Hodges & Geyer 2006; Hodges 2007). In language, successes and failures arise as we mesh wordings with experience of items that serve in a (partly) shared social world. Using this perspective, I turn to pedagogical design and signs of writing to consider how applied linguistics can be enriched by viewing language as values realizing activity. The main concern of applied linguists becomes, not learning, but SLA or 'skilled linguistic action'.
What can be done with an egg? Creativity, material objects and the theory of affordances
Forthcoming in Journal of Creative Behavior
The present article offers a reflection on the role of material objects in the creative process and explores the... more
The present article offers a reflection on the role of material objects in the creative process and explores the potential links between creativity and the theory of affordances (Gibson, 1986), conceptualized from a socio-cultural perspective. From this standpoint creativity can be defined as a process of perceiving, exploiting and “generating” novel affordances during socially and materially situated activities. Illustrations are offered for each of the above from a research project investigating traditional Easter egg decoration activities in rural Romania. This brief case study exemplifies the discovery of existing action potentials, the generation of objects with novel affordances and the transgression of conventional procedures, all resulting in creative forms of expression. In the end some conclusions are drawn regarding the ways in which an affordance theory of creativity can enrich our understanding of the phenomenon and contribute to the development of a new program of research concerned with situated and distributed creative acts.
Keywords: material objects, affordance, intentionality, normativity, Easter egg decoration
The effects of familiarity and gender on spatial representation
Iachini, T., Ruotolo, F., & Ruggiero, G. (2009). The effects of familiarity and gender on spatial representation. Journal of Environmental Psychology,
Volume 29, Issue 2, pp. 227-234
This paper reports a study of how familiarity and gender may influence the frames of reference used in memory to... more This paper reports a study of how familiarity and gender may influence the frames of reference used in memory to represent a real-world regularly shaped environment. Familiar and unfamiliar participants learned the locations of three triads of buildings by walking on a path which encircled each triad. Then they were shown with maps reproducing these triads at five different orientations (from 0° to 180°) and had to judge whether each triad represented correctly the relative positions between the buildings. Results showed that unfamiliar participants performed better when the orientation of triads was closer to the learning perspective (0° and 45°) and corresponded to front rather than to back positions. Instead, familiar participants showed a facilitation for triads oriented along orthogonal axes (0°–180°, 90°) and no difference between front and back positions. These findings suggested that locations of unfamiliar buildings were mentally represented in terms of egocentric frames of reference; instead, allocentric frames of reference defined by the environment were used when the environment was familiar. Finally, males were more accurate and faster than females, and this difference was particularly evident in participants unfamiliar with the environment.
The cognitive dynamics of distributed language.
These proofs appeared as:
Cowley, S.J. (2007). The cognitive dynamics and distributed language. Language Sciences, 29/5: 575-583.
This is the introduction to the Special Issue of Language Sciences that launched the "distributed language... more This is the introduction to the Special Issue of Language Sciences that launched the "distributed language movement". It stresses that, until the 1990s, cognitive science relied on comparing human cognition to how everyday computers process information. However, with connectionism, neuroscience and robotics, symbol processing fell out of favour. Physical symbol systems are now rarely seen as appropriate models for brains or minds (MacDorman, 2007). Extending the critique of symbolic models to language, David Spurrett and I linked distributed cognition with integrational linguistics. We organized a conference in Durban where participants addressed questions like ‘‘Is intelligent behaviour (and language) based in the dynamical coupling of bodies?’’ and ‘‘Once we reject code models, how can we reconceptualise language and mind?’’ As respondent, Harris (1998: 728) was sceptical about this linking because, he believes, mental activities are best understood in lay terms. Talk of distributed cognition plainly falls foul of ‘‘commonsense lay ways of talking about the mind’’. As editor of the special issue of Language Sciences arising from the conference, Spurrett responds to Harris: "Either we think that science can tell us that we’re wrong with how we think things are with us . . . even to the extent of showing our common sense, or vulgar, self-conception to be deeply mistaken, or common sense is holding some kind of trump so it always beats science, or even that it never has to pay any attention to science" (Spurrett, 2004: 497). In siding with that naturalists on this issue, we gave birth to a new way of linking integrational critique with science: this produced the distributed perspective on language.
An ecological model of developing researcher competence: the case of software technology in doctoral research
by Juup Stelma
Stelma, J. (2011). An ecological model of developing researcher competence: the case of software technology in doctoral research. Instructional Science, 39(3): 367-385.
This paper presents an ecological model of developing researcher competence, with a particular focus on doctoral... more This paper presents an ecological model of developing researcher competence, with a particular focus on doctoral students’ use of research software. The model extends on theoretical work done by Young et al. (Instructional Science 30(1): 47–63, 2002), modelling the intentional dynamics of technological learning contexts. The development of the ecological model is linked to existing ways of understanding the doctoral experience. This includes the recent emphasis on pedagogy and learning, as well as different conceptualisations of context. The experiences of three doctoral student informants are used to exemplify aspects of the ecological model. A description of an e-learning resource, designed to support Education doctoral students’ use of research software, illustrates a concrete pedagogical contribution of the model. The paper concludes with a more general discussion of contributions of the model to the field of ecological psychology and the literature on doctoral education.
Music and affordances
by Luke Windsor
Co-Authored with Christophe de Bézenac, to appear in Musicae Scientiae. Published online before print February 17, 2012, doi: 10.1177/1029864911435734
This paper explores the extent to which ideas developed in The Senses Considered as Perceptual Systems and further... more This paper explores the extent to which ideas developed in The Senses Considered as Perceptual Systems and further refined in The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception (Gibson, 1966; 1979) can be applied to the analysis of perception and action in musical settings. The ecological approach to perception has rarely been applied to music, although some recent work in ecological acoustics, music theory and music psychology has begun to show an interest in direct perception of events and objects. We would argue that despite this pioneering work, Gibson’s most radical and controversial idea, that of the direct perception of affordances (Gibson, 1979), has not been adequately addressed in a musical context. Following an introduction to the theoretical background to affordances and a review of the ways in which previous authors have investigated ecological approaches to auditory perception, we show how both the production and perception of music can fruitfully be analysed using the concept of affordances, and how such an approach neatly integrates seemingly active and passive engagement with music. In addition, we place this ecological approach to music within a broader empirical context, giving examples of music-psychological, ethnomusicological and neuroscientific evidence which complement our more theoretical approach. In conclusion, we argue that the links between the performance, composition and reception are underpinned by the mutuality of perception and action.
Taking a language stance
These proofs appeared as:
Cowley, S. J. (2011.) Taking a language stance. Ecological Psychology, 23/3: 185-209.
Linguists tend to view language in terms of forms and their use. For historical reasons, speaking and listening have... more Linguists tend to view language in terms of forms and their use. For historical reasons, speaking and listening have often often ascribed to knowledge of a language system. Language behavior is thus seen as the production and processing of forms. Others contrast language to man-made codes (see Kravchenko, 2007; Love, 2004). Instead of focusing on forms, language can be conceived of as action and, as such, both dynamic and symbolic (Raczaszek-Leonardi, 2009). History places us in a meshwork where public resources of language, among other things, contribute to games, mashing beans, and watching television. Speaking-while-hearing draws on cultural products (e.g., axes, social roles, pictures, and wordings). As we collaborate, we orient to wordings or repeated (and systematized) aspects of vocalizations that, within our community, carry historically derived information. Pursuing this view, it is argued that hearing “words” is like seeing “things” in pictures. This is described as taking a language stance. To defend the position, it is argued that, first, we learn to hear wordings and, later, to use “what we hear” as ways of constraining our actions. Far from depending on individual knowledge, orienting to wordings makes language irreducibly collective.
75 views
Seen by: and 10 moreLighting affects students’ concentration positively: Findings from three Dutch studies
Sleegers, P.J.C., Moolenaar, N.M., Galetzka, M., and Zanden, B. van der. (accepted). Lighting affects students’ concentration positively: Findings from three Dutch studies. Lighting Research & Technology.
The importance of lighting for performance in human adults is well established. However, evidence on the extent to... more The importance of lighting for performance in human adults is well established. However, evidence on the extent to which lighting affects school performance of young children is sparse. This paper evaluates the effect of lighting conditions (with vertical illuminances between 350-1000 lux and correlated colour temperatures between 3000-12000K) on the concentration of elementary school children in three experiments. In the first two experiments, a flexible and dynamic lighting system is used in quasi-experimental field studies using data from 89 pupils from two schools (Study 1) and 37 pupils from two classrooms (Study 2). The third experiment evaluated two lighting settings within a school-simulating, windowless laboratory setting (n = 55). The results indicate a positive influence of the lighting system on pupils’ concentration. The findings underline the importance of lighting for learning. Several suggestions are made for further research.
The Butterfly Dream: Creativity around the Bionomical Visual Media (胡蝶の夢: 生態映像メディアを巡る創造性)
Special Award, Vision of Future Visual Information Media, ITE Journal Vol. 64, No. 1(2010), pp36-38
Beyond today’s user-generated audio-visual culture’s advancement on the Web, moving images will not only be
sampled by imaging devices but also our bionomical images – vision and sense as seen and perceived by our physical organs,
in addition to our mental image of memory or imagination, and dreams – will be digitized, and be manipulated and modified
for lifelogging or creative purposes. In that situation, how would our very notion of creativity evolve?
Timing a one-handed catch: II. Adaptation to telestereoscopic viewing.
van der Kamp, J., Bennett, S.J., Savelsbergh, G.J.P., & Davids, K. (1999). In: Experimental Brain Research, 129, 369-377.
An Ecological Approach to Nonconceptual Self-Awareness
"Draft Only"
In this paper I will advance and defend a minimal conception of self- consciousness, which I shall call nonconceptual... more In this paper I will advance and defend a minimal conception of self- consciousness, which I shall call nonconceptual self-awareness (henceforth, NCSA). As a contrastive term, the central idea behind NCSA is that the possession of a “self- concept” is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for representing oneself as an embodied agent in the ecological and social environments. To be sure, concept- possession is needed for activities such as mastering the grammar of the first-person pronoun, constructing autobiographical narratives, and formulating long term plans. It has its place in theoretical specifications of the contents of representational states, and as John McDowell points out, it allows us to “coherently credit experiences with rational relations to judgment and belief.” However, I will argue that these “higher-order” cognitive achievements are parasitic on a more primitive and already-existing form of self-awareness that operates independently of concepts. This primitive capacity is built into the very structure of perceptual experience and manifests as co-perception of the embodied self and the environment. In what follows, I will elaborate the thesis that this co-perception constitutes the foundations for full-fledged self-conscious activities (such as the capacity to maintain some form of detached perspective on oneself as the enduring subject of oneʼs own actions and mental states) precisely because these activities are experientially grounded in a unified, albeit nonconceptual, form of perspectivity. While my approach draws broadly on recent developments in ecological psychology, the debate on conceptual/nonconceptual mental content provides a convenient starting point for discussion.
Multiple information sources in interceptive timing
van der Kamp, J., Savelsbergh, G.J.P., & Smeets, J.B. (1997). In: Human Movement Sciences, 16, 787-821.
Body-scaled ratio as a control parameter for prehension in 5-to 9-year-old children
van der Kamp, J., Savelsbergh, G.J.P., & Davis, W. (1998). In: Developmental Psychobiology, 33, 351-361.
10 views
Seen by:Action and perception in infancy
van der Kamp, J., & Savelsbergh, G.J.P. (2000). In: Infant Behavior & Development, 23, 237-251.
The development and learning of the visual control of movement: An ecological perspective
van der Kamp, J., Oudejans, R.D.D., & Savelsbergh, G.J.P. (2003). In: Infant Behavior & Development, 26, 495-515.
14 views
Seen by:
