Distributed Language

Mimesis and language: a distributed view

by Stephen J. Cowley

This is a draft of a paper that appeared recently in a Special Issue of Interaction Studies that takes as its theme: "Language as social coordination: an evolutuionary perspective". The final version appeared as:
Cowley, S.J. (2012). Mimesis and language: A distributed view. Interaction Studies, 13/1: 17-40.

A growing number of scholars regard language as social co-ordination. Not only does this overcome stale debate about... more A growing number of scholars regard language as social co-ordination. Not only does this overcome stale debate about whether langauge is cognitive or communicative but it opens up new thinking about its evolutionary history. Focusing on populations, the paper outlines and critiques Merlin Donald’s view of the human mind. It endorses the view that the evolutionary emergence of language can be traced to mimesis or what, twenty years ago, was called the “ability to produce conscious self-initiated representational acts that are intentional” (Donald, 1991: 168). However, ecological critique rejects the original theory’s appeal to symbolic models. I argue that, while Donald is regarded as likely to be correct about the evolutionary basis of language (and languaging), his account can be simplified. Instead of positing 3 evolutionary thresholds (mimesis, language and writing), it is argued that mimetic skills are sufficient to ground all the slow processes of human cognition. Indeed, like tool-making, they probably co-evolved with vocal coordination. As cultures developed tools together with ‘public language’, we gained skills in using distributed cognition –ways of living that were later extended by external resources such as, for example, writing, religions, laws and technologies.

Distributed language: implications for volition

by Stephen J. Cowley

The attached paper is a draft for a Russian volume that explored new perspectives on language. It was translated and appeared in Russian as:
С. Дж. Коули. Понятие распределенности языка и его значение для волеизъявления // А.В.Кравченко (ред.). Наука о языке в изменяющейся парадигме знания (Studia linguistica cognitiva 2). Иркутск: БГУЭП, 2009. С. 192-227.

It can be cited as:
Cowley, S. J. (2009). Distributed language: implications for volition. (In Russian). In A, Kravchenko (ed.) New Perspectives on Language and Cognition, pp. 192-227, Irkutsk: Baikal University Press.

Most post-Cartesian views trace human agency to the organism and are thus obliged to either leave aside questions of... more Most post-Cartesian views trace human agency to the organism and are thus obliged to either leave aside questions of volition or, worse, seek explanations in the individual brain. By contrast, when language is recognised as distributed, human cognition is seen to arise as we adapt to life in a collective world. Since language is embodied AND non-local, learning emerges under dual or multiple control –babies learn to talk by participating in “distributed cognitive systems.” In relation to human volition, this opens a gap between tracing actions and feelings to a single brain and privileging the person ‘level’. Although behaviour emerges as people deal with circumstances together, language gives some control over what is not said or done. By focusing on the possible (and what we imagine), we can use the real duration associated with verbal and other thoughts. In short, it is because language is embodied and conventional that we can modulate action/perception: this enables individual organisms to act as living subjects who exert a degree of control over what they – and others – say and do.

Distributed Language: cognition beyond the brain

by Stephen J. Cowley

This short paper was a presentation at the Annual International Forum in the Humanities Conference on Interdisciplinarity in Cognitive Science Research, State University for the Humanities, Moscow (March 2012).

As Cognitive Science develops a view of agency, we are learning much about human cognition. First, as living things,... more As Cognitive Science develops a view of agency, we are learning much about human cognition. First, as living things, we depend on active embodiment. Since, this is incompatible with reduction to information processing, we are bound to ask what cognition is –and what it is to be a person. On a ‘4E’ view, agency is embodied, embedded, enacted and extended. This applies, moreover, to living beings as diverse as earthworms, beavers, wolves and humans. To understand human agency, I therefore argue for a more radical view. Pursuing this, it is stressed that, while situated, language is also non-local: our voices always echo those of others. While grounded in first-order activity, language also enacts second-order practices. It is its symbiotic nature that makes homo sapiens ecologically special. Once acknowledged, this opens up a distributed perspective on language and cognition. By means of clarification, I offer thick description of a interactional moment where language links the brain with the world beyond the body. At this instant, the words actually spoken are background: the verbal aspect of speech acts as a Zeitgeber for bodily coupling that directly realizes human values. Finally, I place the distributed view of linguistic cognition against themes in Russian psycholinguistic tradition.

Managing multimodal simplicity.

by Christian Mosbæk Johannessen

In press. To appear in: Andersen, T. & M. Boeriis, Ed. (2012) "Socialsemiotik i Norden". Odense: University Press of Southern Denmark

The paper discusses the seemingly contradictory fact, that - from a Multimodal Social Semiotic (MSS) perspective - the... more The paper discusses the seemingly contradictory fact, that - from a Multimodal Social Semiotic (MSS) perspective - the structurally simplest graphic artifacts (texts) such as letterforms and trademarks are typically the hardest ones to grasp analytically. The paper suggests that the preference in MSS for a level of observation, at which elements from discrete modalities are structured into wholes using grammars, is a likely cause of this. This focus in MSS on the content strata of multimodal texts has caused the expression plane of semiotic resources other than language to have undergone insufficient scrutiny thus leaving us with an descriptively and explanatorily inadequate readiness for something like graphic form. The article seeks to remedy this shortcoming by presenting a simple inventory of structural dichotomies at a general level of delicacy which allows for exhaustive description of graphic shape. When this descriptive scheme is applied on graphic shape in concert with an scalar hierarchical (cf. Salthe 1985) analysis of the shape as a range of traces of micro-scale sub-events on different time- and spatial scales in the articulation event, a nuanced image of the expression plane emerges. In order to demonstrate the proposed method the article presents a comparative analysis of trademarks for two Scandinavian oil companies, Statoil and Preem.

This paper is available in Danish only. An English translation is on the drawing board.

Cognitive dynamics: language as values realizing activity

by Stephen J. Cowley

These are proofs that appeared as:
Cowley, S.J. (2012). Cognitive dynamics: language as values realizing activity. In A. Kravchenko (ed). Cognitive Dynamics and Linguistic Interactions, pp. 15-46. Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Press.

To challenge cognitivism it is important emphasise how human bodies function. Like other organisms, we evolved to act... more To challenge cognitivism it is important emphasise how human bodies function. Like other organisms, we evolved to act and perceive in changing environments. In spite of the fact that this can be described as representing aspects of the world, there is no reason to think that people use what are representations for the brain (Steiner 2010). The central nervous system deals in the body-world relations that sustain flexible, adaptive behaviour. Bodies use measurable physical events or cognitive dynamics to control how they coordinate with the world. Humans extend this general capacity by cooperating in cultural settings.

Biology thus becomes enmeshed with history and, in looking at language too, this must be traced to minded behaviour. It follows that language -and teaching languages -must be explicated with respect to how encounters with the world are experienced as meaningful (Gibson 1979). Far from being subjective or abstract, cognitive dynamics function as public opportunities and threats. Social activity realizes values that motivate inhibition, thinking and communication (Gibson 1950; Hodges & Geyer 2006; Hodges 2007). In language, successes and failures arise as we mesh wordings with experience of items that serve in a (partly) shared social world. Using this perspective, I turn to pedagogical design and signs of writing to consider how applied linguistics can be enriched by viewing language as values realizing activity. The main concern of applied linguists becomes, not learning, but SLA or 'skilled linguistic action'.

Prosody and pedagogy in a democratic South Africa

by Stephen J. Cowley

This appeared as:
Cowley, S.J. (2001). Prosody and pedagogy in a democratic South Africa. Southern African Linguistics and Applied Language Studies 2001 19: 179–196.

This article explores how prosodic patterning influences relationships. Written from an integrational point of view,... more This article explores how prosodic patterning influences relationships. Written from an integrational point of view, it highlights the local importance of the issue by examining talk that resounds with a post-apartheid ‘ugly tone’. Two central claims are made. Firstly, much understanding is the intertwining of vocalisations. Secondly, we are skilled in interpreting how this joint activity is integrated with word-based patterning. Since we take part in dialogue, we have capacities for responding in real time and, crucially, for making judgements about the unfolding sense of events. Especially where such ways of acting are intrinsic to identity, we need to develop dialogical capacities beyond the ‘in-group’. In the terms of the article, learners can be helped with first-order contextualizing and interactional ascription. By adopting these goals, local ways of speaking and listening become paramount. This leads to a new choice of oral/aural materials and a focus on tasks where learners explain judgements about talk within and across social groups. Emphasis thus goes on enhancing capacities for listening to, interpreting, and rectifying real-time dialogical events. Close examination of local speaking and listening, it is argued, will lead to development of contextually sensitive educational practices.

Contextualizing bodies: human infants and distributed cognition

by Stephen J. Cowley

This paper that appeared as:
Cowley, S.J. (2004). Contextualizing bodies: how human responsiveness constrains distributed cognition. Language Sciences, 26/6, 565-591

By their second birthday caregivers treat infants as ‘using’ words that have grammatical properties. How do... more By their second birthday caregivers treat infants as ‘using’ words that have grammatical properties. How do brain-bodies develop the relevant capacity? In addressing this issue, the paper stresses how babies exploit other people’s understanding. It is argued that joint activity uses ‘shallow thinking’ to gradually develop both caregiver biases and infant predispositions. Using how activity is integrated, the baby's skills are gradually transformed. Taking part in competitive and co-operative activity is sufficient to nudge the infant towards strategic syllable-use. Gradually, a baby’s contextualizing body comes to exploit vocalizing in ways heard as arrangements of arbitrary signs. Far from relying on ‘language acquisition’, telegraphic speech arises from co-ordination, affect and adult interpretation. It emerges in infant agents whose anticipative strategies allow them to distinguish, say, ‘gone dada’ [gondada]’ (e.g. “please get it back, dad”) from ‘dada gone’ [dadagon] (e.g. “father is hiding again”).

Living in the social meshwork: the case of health interaction

by Stephen J. Cowley

This appeared as:
Steffensen, S., Cowley, S.J. and Thibault, P.J. (2010). Living in the social meshwork: the case of health interaction. In Cowley, S.J., Steffensen, S. & J.C. Major, Signifying Bodies: Biosemiosis, Interaction and Health, pp. 201-237. Braga: Portuguese Catholic University Press.

The paper presents a new way of investigating real-time decisions in health interaction. Using a simulation... more
The paper presents a new way of investigating real-time decisions in health interaction. Using a simulation setting, it brings home how much depends on team-work that arises as people concert their movements with speech. In a world of norms, coaction both brings off desired results and, drives problem finding. Using close analysis of a single case, we also identify strengths and weaknesses of using  a simulation setting for training purposes. Its advantage, naturally enough, is that it offers an opportunity to practice situated interpretation drawing on scenarios that, in the real-world, may be challenging. This is surprisingly dependent on external resources, closely timed movements and the sharing and prompting of perspectives. At the same time, close investigation at shows that parties play their roles without losing awareness of their ‘real’ relationships. While of no relevance to the health care investigated, their performance in an emergency simulation is inseparable from enacting a social situation.

How human infants deal with symbol grounding

by Stephen J. Cowley

These proofs appeared as:
Cowley, S. J. (2007). How human infants deal with symbol grounding. Interaction Studies, 8/1: 81-104.

Taking a distributed view of language, this paper naturalizes symbol grounding. Learning to talk is traced to — not... more Taking a distributed view of language, this paper naturalizes symbol grounding. Learning to talk is traced to — not categorizing speech sounds — but events that shape the rise of human-style autonomy. On the extended symbol hypothesis, this happens as babies integrate micro-activity with slow and deliberate adult action. As they discover social norms, intrinsic motive formation enables them to reshape co-action. Because infants link affect to contingencies, dyads develop norm-referenced routines. Over time, infant doings become analysis amenable. The caregiver of a nine-month-old may, for example, prompt the baby to fetch objects. Once she concludes that the baby uses ‘words’ to understand what she says, the infant can use this belief in orienting to more abstract contingencies. New cognitive powers will develop as the baby learns to act in ways that are consistent with a caregiver’s false belief that her baby uses ‘words.’

The cognitive dynamics of distributed language.

by Stephen J. Cowley

These proofs appeared as:
Cowley, S.J. (2007). The cognitive dynamics and distributed language. Language Sciences, 29/5: 575-583.

This is the introduction to the Special Issue of Language Sciences that launched the "distributed language... more This is the introduction to the Special Issue of Language Sciences that launched the "distributed language movement". It stresses that, until the 1990s, cognitive science relied on comparing human cognition to how everyday computers process information. However, with connectionism, neuroscience and robotics, symbol processing fell out of favour. Physical symbol systems are now rarely seen as appropriate models for brains or minds (MacDorman, 2007). Extending the critique of symbolic models to language, David Spurrett and I linked distributed cognition with integrational linguistics. We organized a conference in Durban where participants addressed questions like ‘‘Is intelligent behaviour (and language) based in the dynamical coupling of bodies?’’ and ‘‘Once we reject code models, how can we reconceptualise language and mind?’’ As respondent, Harris (1998: 728) was sceptical about this linking because, he believes, mental activities are best understood in lay terms. Talk of distributed cognition plainly falls foul of ‘‘commonsense lay ways of talking about the mind’’. As editor of the special issue of Language Sciences arising from the conference, Spurrett responds to Harris: "Either we think that science can tell us that we’re wrong with how we think things are with us . . . even to the extent of showing our common sense, or vulgar, self-conception to be deeply mistaken, or common sense is holding some kind of trump so it always beats science, or even that it never has to pay any attention to science" (Spurrett, 2004: 497). In siding with that naturalists on this issue, we gave birth to a new way of linking integrational critique with science: this produced the distributed perspective on language.

The turning of the tide: Rethinking language, mind and world

by Dongping Zheng

Cowley, S. & Zheng, D. (2011). The turning of the tide: Rethinking language, mind and world [Review article of Linell, P. (2009), Rethinking language, mind, and world dialogically: Interactional and contextual theories of human sense-making]. Journal of Multicultural Discourses, 6(02), 197-210.

Cognitive and generative linguistics may lie at the high water mark of a tradition. They are the culmination of a... more Cognitive and generative linguistics may lie at the high water mark of a tradition. They are the culmination of a train of linguistic thought that arose in ancient Greece
when language was reduced to parts that could be analysed as constructions, words, propositions, and/or meanings. Human agents came to be seen as being caused to say
things about the world in which they live. The environment was separated from the mind or body which, in this tradition, became the ‘‘seat’’ of language (and languageuse).
Of course, such theories appear in many guises. For example, while generativists take a Cartesian view that separates a mind/brain from what is external, cognitive
linguists often follow Hume in placing a human body in an environment. In spite of their differences, however, the views are united in their individualism.Rethinking language, mind, and world dialogically (hereafter Rethinking) provides
an alternative to all such traditions. By taking an ecological approach, Per Linell provides a platform that offers much to both theorists and language teachers. His
general thesis is that dialogue can be used as the basis for reshaping the human sciences. By setting out this goal, Rethinking connects philosophy with empirical
studies in the social, cognitive, and behavioural sciences. Traditional focus on discourse, words, and grammar or what we dub yang linguistics can now be balanced
by their yin counterpart.1 This is needed, Linell argues, because sense-making prompts dialogue, mind, and selves to arise from social and collective living. As we act, feel, and think dialogically, sociodialogue constrains what we can (and
cannot) do. In terms of Sun Wu’s Strategies of Defence, our foe is neither Cartesian nor Humean traditions but, rather, how experience of literacy and silent thinking tempts us to ascribe minds to individual brains. Given what Linell (2005) calls written
language bias, these become stores of determinate items that constitute languagesystems. In the yang linguistics tradition, an individual (or mind/brain) is said to ‘‘possess’’ language. The dialogical perspective shows how turning to yin allows us to
avoid such metaphors. Rather, the focus turns to a ‘‘meta-theoretical framework’’ (22) in which we acknowledge the never-ending process of human becoming.

Beyond symbols: interaction and the enslavement principle

by Stephen J. Cowley

This appeared as:
Cowley, S.J. (2010). Beyond symbols: Interaction and the enslavement principle. In J. Streeck (Ed.) New Adventures in Language and Interaction, pp. 47-70. John Benjamins: Amsterdam.

Humans often contextualize without using cues. While Gumperz showed that analysis is not sufficient to explain... more Humans often contextualize without using cues. While Gumperz showed that analysis is not sufficient to explain interaction, his view of what lay beyond symbols was based in cognitive internalism. Opposing this, prosody can be shown to contribute directly to conversational sense-making. Humans use self organizing dynamics in ways that resemble what happens in gas-lasers. Voices attract each other and, at times, set off laser like synergies. Using these effects, we modulate our actions in situation-transcending events that give sense to the dynamics. Conversation is distributed cognition during which prosodic sensemaking links the world with brains and bodies. Far from being based in wordforms, interaction and language are dynamical first and symbolic afterwards.

Distributed Language: Biomechanics, Functions, and the Origins of Talk

by Stephen J. Cowley

Thisis a draft of a paper that appeared as:
Cowley, S.J. (2007). Distributed language: biomechanics, functions and the origins of talk. In Lyon, C., Nehaniv, C. & Cangelosi, A. (eds.) The Emergence and Evolution of Linguistic Communication, Springer: London, pp. 105-127.

Emphasising that word-forms are culturally selected, the paper takes a distributed view of language. This is used to... more Emphasising that word-forms are culturally selected, the paper takes a distributed view of language. This is used to frame evidence that, in ontogenesis, language emerges under dual
control by adult and child. Since parties gear to each other’s biomechanics, norm based behaviour prompts affective processes that drive prepared learning. This, it is argued, can explain early stages in learning to talk. Next, this approach to external symbol grounding (ESG) is contrasted with ones where an equivalent problem is regarded as internal to the agent.

Then, turning to synthetic models, I indicate how the ESG can be used to model either populations of agents or dyads who, using complex signals, transform each other’s agency. Finally, I suggest that advances in understanding the emergence of language will follow if this kind of multiagent modelling can be complemented by simulations using interaction between humans and robots or androids.

From bodily co-regulation to language and thinking

by Stephen J. Cowley

This appeared as:
Cowley, S.J. (2007). From bodily co-regulation to language and thinking. Linguistics and the Human Sciences, 3(2): 137-164.

Though amenable to formal analysis, unlike a man-made program, language colours experience. Recognising this Michael... more Though amenable to formal analysis, unlike a man-made program, language colours experience. Recognising this Michael Tomasello and Derek Melser trace linguistic skills to bodily co-regulation. Applauding this, I contrast their mentalist and antimentalist approaches. While Melser traces language to co-action, Tomasello posits a competence in decoding intentions. While a parsimonious alternative to intention reading, Melser’s actional view fails to explain how children learn to hear words. In Tomasello’s terms, he offers no account of how concrete constructions come to sustain description in terms of (inner) intentions. While Tomasello posits that the problem is solved ‘in the head’, there is a simpler solution. Although conventions matter, children make things up: they learn as they act with expression. Were the problem of concrete constructions resolved, imagination would become crucial to the rise of thinking. Can we fill the gap? Melser separates action from biomechanics and Tomasello reduces language to convention. Both ignore real-time events. By contrast Love (2007) identifies first-order language with on-line sign-making. Using this idea, I link the strengths of Melser and Tomasello’s models. Once co-regulated, semiosis can shape action (including speech) around meanings (and adult goals). Babies orient to what caregivers hear as words. Without intention-reading, neural schema shape acting, speaking and understanding. Concrete constructions arise in the flow of co-action. In becoming a person, a baby makes things up, uses convention and gradually takes responsibility for what she says and thinks.

Taking a language stance

by Stephen J. Cowley

These proofs appeared as:
Cowley, S. J. (2011.) Taking a language stance. Ecological Psychology, 23/3: 185-209.

Linguists tend to view language in terms of forms and their use. For historical reasons, speaking and listening have... more Linguists tend to view language in terms of forms and their use. For historical reasons, speaking and listening have often often ascribed to knowledge of a language system. Language behavior is thus seen as the production and processing of forms. Others contrast language to man-made codes (see Kravchenko, 2007; Love, 2004). Instead of focusing on forms, language can be conceived of as action and, as such, both dynamic and symbolic (Raczaszek-Leonardi, 2009). History places us in a meshwork where public resources of language, among other things, contribute to games, mashing beans, and watching television. Speaking-while-hearing draws on cultural products (e.g., axes, social roles, pictures, and wordings). As we collaborate, we orient to wordings or repeated (and systematized) aspects of vocalizations that, within our community, carry historically derived information. Pursuing this view, it is argued that hearing “words” is like seeing “things” in pictures. This is described as taking a language stance. To defend the position, it is argued that, first, we learn to hear wordings and, later, to use “what we hear” as ways of constraining our actions. Far from depending on individual knowledge, orienting to wordings makes language irreducibly collective.

Distributed language and dynamics

by Stephen J. Cowley

This appeared as:
Cowley, S.J. (2009). Distributed language and dynamics. Pragmatics & Cognition, 17/3: 495-507.

Language is co-ordination. Pursuing this view, the Special Issue presents papers that challenge two orthodoxies.... more Language is co-ordination. Pursuing this view, the Special Issue presents papers that challenge two orthodoxies. First, they deny that language is essentially ‘symbolic’ and, second, that verbal patterns are represented inside minds (or brains). Rather, language is, at once, social, individual and constitutive of the feeling of thinking. It is distributed between us. By way of illustration, the papers report empirically-based work on the anticipatory dynamics of reading, its cognitive consequences, Shakespearean theatre, what images evoke, solving insight problems, and the basis of semiotic cognition. Having given reason to consider this challenge to linguistic autonomy, the collection concludes with theoretical papers. First, a central function of language lies in realizing values. Second, like all biologically based activity, we depend on how cultural and biological symbols co-function in regulating human dynamics.

Cognitive Dynamics and the Language Sciences

by Stephen J. Cowley

The paper, jointly written with Alexander Kravchenko, marks the birth of the Distributed Language Group at the opening meeting in September 2005 at Sidney Sussex College, Cambridge.

A Russian version was published in Voprosy Vazykoznanija as:
Коули С.Дж., Кравченко А.В. (2006). Динамика когнитивных процессов и науки о языке//Вопросы языкознания. 133-141.

Language flow: Opening the subject

by Stephen J. Cowley

This appeared as
Cowley, S.J. (2009) Language flow: opening the subject. Cognitive Semiotics, 4: 63-91.

Analysis of linguistic forms does not clarify experience of language. Pursuing this, the paper turns to dynamics and,... more Analysis of linguistic forms does not clarify experience of language. Pursuing this, the paper turns to dynamics and, using examples, introduces language flow. It is suggested that sensory perception uses movement that can be independently described (from different perspectives). Next, using Barbieri’s model of protein synthesis, attention is given to how experience is possible. It is suggested that, in principle, the operations of organic coding may have interactional counterparts. By analogy, prosodic ‘contextualization’ becomes felt reaction that influences real-time response. This parallels how anticipatory gaze is used to generate reading aloud. Finally, using neuroscientific work on intersubjectivity, it is suggested that norms and rewards may reconfigure neural processes that use experience of perception-actiion in sensing what is meant. On this view, language identifies how we use collective practices to integrate verbal patterns, action, and lived experience. Wordings thus constrain both the flow of langauge and, inseparably, the feeling of thinking that enriches how we act and perceive as we live the lives of human subjects.

Foundationalism and neuroscience; silence and language

by Stephen J. Cowley

Bennett and Hacker wrote a stinging response to this paper ("Isms are prisms: a reply to Keestra and Cowley", 2011. Language Sciences, 33/3: 459-463. In turn we responded to this with "Concepts-not just yardsticks, but also heuristics: rebutting Hacker and Bennett" 2011, Language Sciences, 33/3: 464-472.

Neuroscience offers more than new empirical evidence about the details of cognitive functions such as language,... more Neuroscience offers more than new empirical evidence about the details of cognitive functions such as language, perception and action. Since it also shows many functions to be highly distributed, interconnected and dependent on mechanisms at different levels of processing, it challenges concepts that are traditionally used to describe these functions. The question is how to accommodate these concepts to the recent evidence. A recent proposal, made in Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience (2003) by Bennett and Hacker, is that concepts play a foundational role in neuroscience, that empirical research needs to presuppose them and that changing concepts is a philosophical task. In defending this perspective, PFN shows much neuroscientific writing to be dualistic in nature due to our poor grasp of its foundations. In our review article we take a different approach. Instead of foundationalism we plead for a mild coherentism, which allows for a gradual and continuous alteration of concepts in light of new evidence. Following this approach it is also easier to deal with some neurological conditions (like blindsight, synaesthesia) that pose difficulties for our concepts. Finally, although words and concepts seem to seduce us to thinking that many skills and tasks function separately, it is language skill that – as neuroscientific evidence shows – co-emerges with action/perception cycles and thus seems to require revision of some of our central concepts.

Signifying Bodies: Biosemiosis, Interaction and Health

by Stephen J. Cowley

This appeared as:
Steffensen, S. & Cowley, S.J. (2010). Signifying bodies and health: the aftermath. In Cowley, S.J., Steffensen, S. & J.C. Major, Signifying Bodies: Biosemiosis, Interaction and Health, pp. 331-355. Braga: Portuguese Catholic University Press.

While health and suffering are intrinsic to living bodies, the relevant causes are not always based on the function... more While health and suffering are intrinsic to living bodies, the relevant causes are not always based on the function and dysfunction of living tissue. In human beings, tissue connects microbiology to organs, the skin, the “Self” and a world in which, together, we are moved to sense-making. Remarkably, when the authors of the volume proposed collaboration, this theme had not yet emerged. We had little sense of what would arise from using a biosemiotic lens to view health and health care as relational phenomena. The outcome, Signifying Bodies, is the result of coaction. Together, we have used the writing and thinking of others to restructure our thoughts around a striking idea: health is a non-local phenomenon.