Ferit Uslu, BİLİMSELLİĞİN KRİTERİ VE SINIRLARI PROBLEMİ: BİLİM, BİLİM OLMAYAN VE SAHTE BİLİM
by Ferit Uslu
Telif makaledir.
ÖZET:
Bu makale, bilim felsefesi edebiyatında “bilimin sınırları problemi” denen sorunu ele almaktadır. Bu... more
ÖZET:
Bu makale, bilim felsefesi edebiyatında “bilimin sınırları problemi” denen sorunu ele almaktadır. Bu çerçevede şu sorulara cevap aranmaktadır: bir metni, bir teoriyi, bir araştırmayı bilimsel yapan şey nedir? Bilimi ve bilimsel olanı metafizik öğretilerden, ideolojilerden, sahte-bilimden ve komploteorilerden nasıl ayırt edebiliriz? Makalede bu soruların cevabı incelenirken mantıkçı pozitivistlerin tümevarımcı bilim yöntemleri, Popper’ın tümdengelimci bilim yöntemi, T. Kuhn’un boz-yap çözebilme yeteneği olarak bilim anlayışı, I. Lakatos’un bir araştırma programı olarak bilim anlayışı öncelikle ele alınmıştır. Ardından bu konudaki yeni gelişmeler ele alınmış ve çoklu bilimsellik kriterleri incelenmiştir. Son olarak makale, bir şeyi sahte-bilim yapan nitelikler üzerinde durmaktadır.
ABSTRACT:
The article deals with the demarcation problem in the philosophy of science. In this context, it looks for answers to the following questions: What makes a text, a theory or a research scientific? How can we demarcate science and scientific from metaphysical thoughts, ideologies, pseudo-sciences and conspiracy theories? Those questions are discussed around the views of some modern philosophers. In this context, first of all the article deals with logical positivists and induction as their scientific method, Popper and deduction as his scientific method, T. Kuhn and his view of science as puzzle-solving skill, I. Lakatos and his view of science as research programmes. Then the article examines recent views on demarcation problem and evaluates multi criterion views about what makes something scientific. Finally the article seeks to give answer to the question what makes something pseudo-scientific.
Key words: Scientific, demarcation problem, pseudo-scienc
On an Allegedly Essential Feature of Criteria for the Demarcation of Science
Published in The Reasoner 5(8), August 2011.
Laudan’s argument against the possibility of a demarcation criterion for scientific theories rests on establishing that... more Laudan’s argument against the possibility of a demarcation criterion for scientific theories rests on establishing that any criterion must be a necessary and sufficient condition. But Laudan’s argument at most establishes that any criterion must provide a necessary condition and a possibly different sufficient condition. His own claims suggest that such a criterion is possible.
Autodemarcando la Tierra: Explorando ideas, árboles y caminos Hotï
E Zent, S Zent & Leticia Marius. 2004 Boletín Antropológico. 2(59):313-338.
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Download (.pdf) The Concept of Scientific Research
In Romeo Casabona (ed.) "Los nuevos horizontes de la investigación genética", Camares 2011
It is a commonly accepted view that research on humans should be ethically regulated. What is it about scientific... more
It is a commonly accepted view that research on humans should be ethically regulated. What is it about scientific research that requires special ethical consideration? In order to answer this question, in the paper I shall suggest that we should agree on a delimitation for the concept of scientific research, a sort of demarcation criterion that can be applied successfully in those cases in which we are in doubt as to whether a human activity satisfies the conditions for scientific research. Apart from the pressing ethical issues, I believe it is important to be able to offer an account of which activities count as scientific research, given the interest that society has in promoting legitimate research programmes as a means to benefit all citizens.
My suggestion, developed together with Bert Heinrichs as part of the European project EURECA, is that we need to consider both the procedural and functional dimensions of an activity before we can establish whether it is a genuine instance of scientific research. By placing research in a broader schema of activities, the similarities and differences between research activities and other activities become visible and it is easier to show why some activities that do not count as research can sometimes be confused with research (e.g. astrology and creationism) and some other activities can be regarded only partially as research (e.g. experimental therapy or work conducted as part of a Master dissertation). Although the concept of research is important to delimitate a class of activities which we might be morally obliged to promote, it is neither necessary nor sufficient for a human activity to be a genuine instance of scientific research in order to be subject to ethical regulation. I shall argue that all those activities that are likely to affect the rights and interests of sentient individuals and persons, whether they be research or not, raise ethical issues and might be in need of ethical regulation.
Delimiting the concept of research: an ethical perspective
co-authored with Bert Heinrichs and published in Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics in 2007
It is important to be able to offer an account of which activities count as scientific research, given our current... more It is important to be able to offer an account of which activities count as scientific research, given our current interest in promoting research as a means to benefit humankind and in ethically regulating it. We attempt to offer such an account, arguing that we need to consider both the procedural and functional dimensions of an activity before we can establish whether it is a genuine instance of scientific research. By placing research in a broader schema of activities, the similarities and differences between research activities and other activities become visible. It is also easier to show why some activities that do not count as research can sometimes be confused with research and why some other activities can be regarded only partially as research. Although the concept of research is important to delimit a class of activities which we might be morally obliged to promote, we observe that the class of activities which are regarded as subject to ethical regulation is not exhausted by research activities. We argue that, whether they be research or not, all the activities that are likely to affect the rights and interests of the individuals involved and impact on the rights and interests of other individuals raise ethical issues and might be in need of ethical regulation.