Delusions

Beyond the Barrier: A Hypothetical Model for Cause and Progression of Morgellons Disease

by Joseph Keleher

The author proposes the symptoms set often referred to as Morgellons Disease is the result of increasing inorganic more The author proposes the symptoms set often referred to as Morgellons Disease is the result of increasing inorganic
mercury levels beyond the blood/brain barrier (hereafter referred to as the Barrier Theory). While inorganic
mercury does not easily pass beyond the barrier, organic mercury does and may return to an inorganic
state beyond the barrier. If proven valid, our present understanding of mercury will need reevaluation.

Approaching Morgellons: A Former Sufferer's Perspective

by Joseph Keleher

Perception, emotions and delusions: Revisiting the Capgras Delusion

by Elisabeth Pacherie

Pacherie, E. (2008) Perception, emotions and delusions: Revisiting the Capgras Delusion. In. T. Bayne & J. Fernandez (eds.), Delusions and Self-Deception (pp. 107-126). Hove, UK: Psychology Press.

Delusions and metacognition in patients with schizophrenia

by Elisabeth Pacherie

Bruno, N. Sachs, N., Demily, C., Franck, N. & Pacherie, E. (2011). Delusions and metacognition in patients with schizophrenia. Cognitive Neuropsychiatry. First published on: 14 June 2011 (iFirst)DOI: 10.1080/13546805.2011.562071

Introduction. The aim of the present study was to explore the basis of the strong feeling of conviction and the high... more Introduction. The aim of the present study was to explore the basis of the strong feeling of conviction and the high resistance to change characteristic of delusions and to test whether patients with schizophrenia suffering from delusions have specific metacognitive impairments when compared to both patients without delusions and healthy controls.
Methods. 14 actively delusional patients with schizophrenia, 14 nondelusional patients, and 14 healthy subjects were administered two measures assessing different aspects of metacognition: an emotional metacognitive version of the WCST adapted from Koren et al. (2004) and the Beck Cognitive Insight Scale.
Results. Relative to both healthy controls and nondelusional patients, delusional participants were specifically impaired on metacognitive measures of free choice improvement and global monitoring. This was correlated with high self-certainty on the BCIS relative to nondelusional patients.
Conclusions. Our results suggest that metacognitive impairments play an important role in the maintenance of delusional beliefs. It may therefore be important to adapt remediation strategies to the metacognitive profiles of patients.

Phenomenology and delusions: Who put the ‘alien’ in alien control?

by Elisabeth Pacherie

Pacherie, E., Green, M. & Bayne, T. (2006). Phenomenology and delusions: Who put the 'alien' in alien control?. Consciousness and Cognition, 15: 566-577.

Although current models of delusion converge in proposing that delusions are based on unusual experiences, they differ... more Although current models of delusion converge in proposing that delusions are based on unusual experiences, they differ in the role that they accord experience in the formation of delusions. On some accounts, the experience comprises the very content of the delusion, whereas on other accounts the delusion is adopted in an attempt to explain an unusual experience. We call these the endorsement and explanationist models, respectively. We examine the debate between endorsement and explanationist models with respect to the ‘alien control’ delusion. People with delusions of alien control believe that their actions and/or thoughts are being controlled by an external agent. Some accounts of alien control (e.g., Frith, Blakemore, & Wolpert, 2000a) are best thought of in explanationist terms; other accounts (e.g., Jeannerod, 1999) seem more suited to an endorsement approach. We argue that recent cognitive and neurophysiological evidence favours an endorsement model of the delusion of alien control.

In Defence of the Doxastic Conception of Delusions

by Elisabeth Pacherie

Bayne, T. & Pacherie, E. (2005) In Defence of the Doxastic Conception of Delusions. Mind and Language, 20, 2: 163-188.

In this paper we defend the doxastic conception of delusions against the metacognitive account developed by Greg... more In this paper we defend the doxastic conception of delusions against the metacognitive account developed by Greg Currie and collaborators. According to the metacognitive model, delusions are imaginings that are misidentified by their subjects as beliefs: the Capgras patient, for instance, does not believe that his wife has been replaced by a robot, instead, he merely imagines that she has, and mistakes this imagining for a belief. We argue that the metacognitive account is untenable, and that the traditional conception of delusions as beliefs should be retained.

Experience, Belief, and the Interpretive Fold

by Elisabeth Pacherie

Bayne, T. & Pacherie, E. (2004). Experience, Belief, and the Interpretive Fold. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology, 11, 1: 81-86.

Bottom-Up or Top-Down: Campbell's Rationalist Account of Monothematic Delusions

by Elisabeth Pacherie

Bayne, T. & Pacherie, E. (2004). Bottom-up or top-down: Campbell's Rationalist Account of Monothematic Delusions. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology, 11, 1: 1-11.

A popular approach to monothematic delu- sions in the recent literature has been to argue that monothematic delusions... more A popular approach to monothematic delu- sions in the recent literature has been to argue that monothematic delusions involve broadly rational re- sponses to highly unusual experiences. Campbell (2001) calls this the empiricist approach to monothe- matic delusions, and argues that it cannot account for the links between meaning and rationality. In place of empiricism, Campbell offers a rationalist account of monothematic delusions, according to which delu- sional beliefs are understood as Wittgensteinian frame- work propositions. We argue that neither Campbell’s attack on empiricism nor his rationalist alternative to empiricism is successful.

Reasoning under uncertainty in deluded schizophrenic patients: a longitudinal study

by Sasa Brankovic

Dopamine D4 receptor, electrodermal activity, and probabilistic reasoning in psychosis: A contribution to the psychobiological model of the genesis of delusions

by Sasa Brankovic

2002

Engaged epistemology: the limits of understanding in philosophy and psychiatry

by Andrzej Kapusta

Conference Proceedings,  [in:] Bartošová, E. (et al.), Psychologický ústav Filozofické fakulty Masarykovy univerzity, Brno 2011, s. 120-123

The concept of engaged epistemology reveals some limitations of contemporary cognitive theories of delusion. By... more The concept of engaged epistemology reveals some limitations of contemporary cognitive theories of delusion. By exposing the role of implicit dispositions and abilities in formation of mental disorders I explicate the thesis that emergence of delusions is accompanied by a very radical change in the structure of our experience. Such radical alteration of the Background -  nonrepresentational, non–rule-governed, dispositional structure of everyday understanding that strengthens our perception and reasoning - is crucial for the development of mental disorder. The concept of engaged epistemology was introduced to the philosophy of psychiatry by Richard GT Gipps and Bill Fulford (2004). The project appears to be consistent with the analysis of such notable philosophers as Martin Heidegger and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and contemporary researches: Hubert Dreyfus and Charles Taylor. Moreover, the elements of this theoretical approach are similar to the concept of embodied mind, developed in current cognitive sciences.
Keywords:
epistemology, philosophy of psychiatry, understanding, delusions, hermeneu

All common psychotic symptoms can be explained by the theory of ecological perception

by Jan Golembiewski

2012, Medical Hypotheses 78: 7-10. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.mehy.2011.09.029

The symptoms of psychiatric illness are diverse, as are the causes of the conditions that cause them. Yet, regardless... more The symptoms of psychiatric illness are diverse, as are the causes of the conditions that cause them. Yet, regardless of the heterogeneity of cause and presentation, a great deal of symptoms can be explained by the failure of a single perceptual function – the reprocessing of ecological perception.

It is a central tenet of the ecological theory of perception that we perceive opportunities to act. It has also been found that perception automatically causes actions and thoughts to occur unless this primary action pathway is inhibited. Inhibition allows perceptions to be reprocessed into more appropriate alternative actions and thoughts. Reprocessing of this kind takes place over the entire frontal lobe and it renders action optional. Choice about what action to take (if any) is the basis for the feeling of autonomy and ultimately for the sense-of-self. When thoughts and actions occur automatically (without choice) they appear to originate outside of the self, thereby providing prima facie evidence for some of the bizarre delusions that define schizophrenia such as delusional misidentification, delusions of control and Cotard’s delusion.

Automatic actions and thoughts are triggered by residual stimulation whenever reprocessing is insufficient to balance automatic excitatory cues (for whatever reason). These may not be noticed if they are neutral and therefore unimportant or where actions and thoughts have a positive bias and are desirable. Responses to negative stimulus, on the other hand, are always unwelcome, because the actions that are triggered will carry the negative bias.

Automatic thoughts may include spontaneous positive feelings of love and joy, but automatic negative thoughts and visualisations are experienced as hallucinations. Not only do these feel like they emerge from elsewhere but they carry a negative bias (they are most commonly critical, rude and are irrationally paranoid).

Automatic positive actions may include laughter and smiling and these are welcome. Automatic behaviours that carry a negative bias, however, are unwelcome and like hallucinations, occur without a sense of choice. These include crying, stereotypies, perseveration, ataxia, utilization and imitation behaviours and catatonia.

Media delusion. How to change the viewpoint.

by Jan Petras

Short presentation held at Uppsala University about the lack of media coverage of the Occupy Wall Street event and the... more Short presentation held at Uppsala University about the lack of media coverage of the Occupy Wall Street event and the way this influences the flow of information.

Felt presence: Paranoid delusion or hallucinatory social imagery? (2007)

by Tore Nielsen

Delusions: A two-level framework.

by Keith Frankish

Forthcoming in M. Broome and L. Bortolotti (eds.), Psychiatry as Cognitive Neuroscience: Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press, 2009.

There is continuing debate about the nature of delusions and whether they are properly described as beliefs. This... more There is continuing debate about the nature of delusions and whether they are properly described as beliefs. This chapter argues that in order to make progress on this issue we need to adopt a more complex taxonomy of psychological states and processes, building on recent work in philosophy of psychology and cognitive science. I distinguish two levels of belief, and argue that delusions, if they are beliefs at all, belong to the second of them. I go on to offer an account of second-level belief according to which it is a species of a broader mental type, sometimes called ‘acceptance’, which is dependent on attitudes at the first level. I then propose that delusions are acceptances, some of which fall within, and some without, the narrower class of second-level beliefs. I argue that this view explains our competing intuitions about delusions and that it has important implications for understanding deluded patients.

Review: Delusions and the Madness of the Masses

by Mohammed Abouelleil Rashed

Excerpt:

Delusions and the Madness of the Masses is the latest book by Lawrie Reznek, a writer whose work... more Excerpt:

Delusions and the Madness of the Masses is the latest book by Lawrie Reznek, a writer whose work is associated with the field of the Philosophy of Psychiatry. Ambitious both in scope and intent, this book is the latest installment in a tradition of works that employ the language of pathology and disorder -- normally understood to apply to individuals -- to describe whole societies and belief-systems. One is reminded of Freud's (1969) assertion -- which Reznek cites -- that religion is mass delusion; of Edgerton's (1992) characterization of some pre-modern societies as "sick"; of Dawkin's (2006) polemic against God, belief in which he describes as delusional. While, thus, not original, Reznek's thesis -- that certain subcultures, groups, and sometimes whole communities can be deluded and should be described as such -- is arrived at primarily through philosophical argument rather than psychoanalytic insight or a perusal of detailed anthropological data. On the whole, and for reasons discussed below, I do not believe that Reznek has done enough to convincingly advance his thesis.

The Rationality of Psychosis and Understanding the Deluded

by Matthew Broome

Imaging and delusions

by Matthew Broome

Delusion formation and reasoning biases in those at clinical high risk for psychosis

by Matthew Broome

Delusional ideation, manic symptomatology and working memory in a cohort at clinical high-risk for psychosis: A longitudinal study

by Matthew Broome

M.R. Broome, F. Day, I. Valli, L. Valmaggia, L.C. Johns, O. Howes, P. Garety, P.K. McGuire in press European Psychiatry

We followed up a cohort (n = 35) of clients with an ‘‘At Risk Mental State’’ (ARMS) for almost 2 years (mean 21.3... more We followed up a cohort (n = 35) of clients with an ‘‘At Risk Mental State’’ (ARMS) for almost 2 years (mean 21.3 months). At baseline, these clients had taken part in research looking at the relationship between reasoning biases, memory, personality styles and delusional ideation. During the follow-up period, clients underwent a package of intervention from a specialist early detection team. Eighty percent (n = 28) of these clients were successfully re-interviewed. There was improvement across the cohort as a whole, however five participants (17.9%) had made the transition to psychosis at follow-up. Those who had become psychotic had lower levels of manic symptomatology at baseline than those who did not enter the first episode. Further, across the cohort, impaired working memory and delusional ideation at baseline combined to predict 45% of the delusional ideation at follow-up. These preliminary findings suggest that working memory impairments may be linked to the persistence of delusional ideation and that manic symptoms in someone with an ARMS may suggest that such an individual is less likely to develop a frank psychotic episode.